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‘If there is a political will for peace, water will not be a hindrance. If you 
want reasons to fight, water will give you ample opportunities.’1 
Uri Shamir 
 
‘This makes the role of third-parties all the more crucial. We are 
confident that the international water community can take on this 
responsibility. We must keep our eyes open to recognise and confront 
the reality of power asymmetry, basin bullies and coercion in order to 
achieve effective cooperation.’2 
Mark Zeitoun and Anders Jägerskog 
 
                                                     
1 Shamir 2001, cited in Julien, F 2012, ‘Hydropolitics is what societies make of it (or why we need a 
constructivist approach to the geopolitics of water)’, International Journal of Sustainable Society, 
vol. 4, no. 1/2, p. 62 
2 Zeitoun, M, & Jägerskog, A 2009, ‘Confronting Power: Strategies to Support Less Powerful States’ 
in A Jägerskog, & M Zeitoun (eds), Getting Transboundary Water Right: Theory and Practice for 
Effective Cooperation, Report no. 25, Stockholm International Water Institute, Stockholm, pp. 12-13 
 
 
Abstract 
Because of the complex nature of transboundary water governance, and the inherent 
unpredictability of complex adaptive systems, this thesis argues that international actors 
alone are unable to directly bring about positive water interaction between riparian states. 
This thesis analyses a major World Bank-led program of transboundary water governance, 
and provides a critique of the recent trend in international development to address 
transboundary water conflicts in developing countries through foreign-led interventions. 
This thesis examines the perspectives and needs of stakeholders affected by the South Asia 
Water Initiative (SAWI) to evaluate the effect that this, and other donor-led processes, 
may have on the quality of transboundary water interaction between riparian states. These 
in-basin views have remained absent from, or secondary to, international assessments and 
approaches to addressing water conflict and cooperation.  
The portion of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna mega-basin that is shared between 
Nepal, Bhutan, northern India, and Bangladesh is one of the poorest, most densely 
populated, ecologically vulnerable, and socially and politically unstable in the world. It is 
possible that water will be a stress multiplier in socio-political conflict in this 
problemshed. Reducing the potential for transboundary water conflict by increasing 
cooperation between riparian states has been of particular interest to policymakers, aid 
donors, and scholars of conflict for more than a decade. The World Bank began to 
intervene in the transboundary water governance in South Asia in the mid-2000s, and 
SAWI is its most ambitious of its initiatives in this regard.  
Yet, in more than a decade of existence, neither SAWI nor other international initiatives, 
such as those of the Australian and UK governments, have been able to improve 
transboundary water interactions between India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. An 
analysis of more than 30 semi-structured interviews with subject matter experts from 
within the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed reveals several weaknesses in the approach 
of these interventions in improving transboundary water interactions. The methods of 
Track II dialogue and benefit sharing favoured by the World Bank are found to have very 
limited effect on increasing transboundary water cooperation. In addition, stakeholders 
identified a number of contextual factors that make the goal of increased transboundary 
water cooperation particularly challenging in this region: addressing transboundary water 
issues is not a top priority for the riparian states; there is significant resentment about 
 
 
India’s hydro-hegemony; and international actors in general do not have substantial 
support of the elites in the region. But the analysis suggests some ways forward for 
increasing water cooperation and decreasing water conflict in this, as well as other, 
problemsheds.  
This thesis argues that there is no one single approach or actor that can definitively 
improve transboundary water interaction. As such, international organisation and foreign 
aid donors should not expect to have significant or immediate effects on transboundary 
water cooperation, but there may nonetheless be a role, albeit highly circumscribed, for 
them in slowly ‘chipping away’ (in the words of one regional analyst) at the complex and 
cumbersome problem of water conflicts through the approaches identified as desirable by 
the stakeholders within the problemshed. 
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Introduction 
The fear of water wars, and the understanding that water can be a stress multiplier in 
socio-political conflict at all levels, has generated in recent years some impetus for 
increasing water cooperation between riparians (the countries that are connected by a 
common river system). How to improve transboundary water cooperation (that is to say, 
the mutually agreeable governance of shared freshwater resources between states) has 
been of particular interest to policymakers, aid donors, and scholars of conflict. The 
prevailing idea is that cooperation arises from good governance. As Araral and Wang have 
shown, ‘Water scholars, policy makers and donors over the last decade generally agree that 
improving water governance holds the key to solving water insecurity in developing 
countries.’3 But who is to be in charge of improving water governance? Is it the riparian 
states themselves? Or neutral third parties with international experience of facilitating 
hydro-diplomacy? 
The case of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed provides some answers to these 
questions. ‘Fine minds in South Asia are seeking solutions for the looming water and river 
crisis in this region’ argues Colopy, and ‘[s]ome outsiders would like to help…Perhaps 
South Asia could use help from outsiders, perhaps not; but governments in the rest of the 
world are starting to pay attention.’4 But the effect of foreign-led interventions on the 
water interaction between India-Nepal, India-Bhutan, and India-Bangladesh illustrates 
that transboundary water cooperation cannot simply be imposed from the outside – even 
though that is currently the dominant approach to resolving water conflicts in developing 
countries. Instead, the experience of the World Bank and other aid donors in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed suggests that transboundary cooperation is a complex 
phenomenon, which can only emerge when multiple conditions are met – and even then it 
cannot be guaranteed.  
At first glance this may not be an especially encouraging finding for the growing number 
of scholars and practitioners who believe that increasing cooperation between water 
stakeholders at all scales is the key to reducing a slew of water-related risks, including 
transboundary water conflicts. After all, if transboundary water cooperation cannot be 
                                                     
3 Araral, E & Wang, Y 2013, ‘Water Governance 2.0: A Review and Second Generation Research 
Agenda’, Water Resources Management, vol. 27, p. 3945 
4 Colopy, C 2012, Dirty, Sacred Rivers; Confronting South Asia's Water Crisis, Oxford University 
Press, New York, p. 319 
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guaranteed, even with the best intentions, best practice, and best theoretical 
underpinnings, is there any role for foreign-led interventions at all? Are transboundary 
water basins with simmering conflicts and weak or ineffectual governance fated to muddle 
along indefinitely?  
This thesis does not question whether or not international organisations and foreign aid 
donors should be intervening in transboundary water governance, either in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed or elsewhere – there are many reasons why they do and will 
likely continue to do so. Nor does it question whether transboundary water cooperation is 
a worthwhile goal for international actors to pursue generally (or, indeed, whether it is a 
desirable outcome for all riparians). Rather, this thesis examines the normative claims that 
international organisations make in regards to water governance, and critiques the 
approaches used to pursue them. It compares the effect international organisations and 
foreign aid donors have had in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed with their stated 
objectives of increasing transboundary water cooperation and decreasing conflict. This 
analysis if based on an in-depth investigation of perspectives, experiences and needs from 
key stakeholders within the problemshed.  
Taking a transdisciplinary approach such as this unique and significant because most 
evaluations of transboundary water governance focus on international expertise rather 
than that of those within the basin or problemshed in question. Julien argues that 
‘hydropolitics is what societies make of it.’5 By examining what affected societies make of 
transboundary water interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, this thesis 
sheds new light on a complex problem that has hitherto been largely examined through 
the lens of international expertise. Yet, as Julien points out, ‘it is the political dynamics 
inside which transboundary water management occurs that must be the focus of analysis’6 
With this approach in mind, this thesis examines from the local perspective the levels of 
transboundary water conflict and cooperation – together known as water interaction – 
between India-Nepal, India-Bhutan, and India-Bangladesh. Together, these countries form 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. This problemshed lies in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra-Meghna basin, in which China is also a riparian. Yet the centre of gravity for 
foreign-led interventions is contained within the political, not hydrological, boundaries 
                                                     
5 Julien, F 2012, ‘Hydropolitics is what societies make of it (or why we need a constructivist approach 
to the geopolitics of water)’, International Journal of Sustainable Society, vol. 4, no. 1/2, p. 62 
6 Julien, F 2012, ‘Hydropolitics is what societies make of it (or why we need a constructivist 
approach to the geopolitics of water)’, International Journal of Sustainable Society, vol. 4, no. 1/2, p. 
62 
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and thus the concept of problemshed is more appropriate for limiting the scope of this 
thesis than is the concept of the watershed. The concept of the problemshed is used herein 
because:  
‘Freshwater resources management by definition is a context‐specific 
phenomenon, given that it concretely happens through managing river 
basins, aquifers, landscapes and ecosystems. However, the 
“problemsheds” and “issue networks” of water resources management 
may stretch well beyond the physical boundaries of these units, and 
span the globe and history.’7 
This thesis argues that because of the complex nature of transboundary water governance, 
and the inherent unpredictability of complex adaptive systems, external actors alone are 
unable to directly bring about positive water interaction between riparians. They may, 
however, to some extent influence the conditions from which cooperation may emerge. 
What those conditions are, and how they could be influenced, are the subject of this 
research. 
The rest of this Introduction tells the story of the foreign-led interventions in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed, and provides an overview of how these interventions have 
been experienced within the region. These insights deepen the understanding of 
transboundary conflict and cooperation, and also provide some approaches for improving 
transboundary water interactions. 
Turbulent waters: why are transboundary water interactions in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed a problem? 
The Hindu Kush Himalayan region, of which the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is a 
part, has one of the largest bodies of ice outside the polar caps, and the mountains are 
often referred to as the ‘water towers’ of Asia. These mountains are the major source of 
both surface and groundwater in the region during the dry season, and have the potential 
to play a vital role in energy security; if properly harnessed, hydropower could transform 
the lives of the people living in these river basins. But, as Vaidya and Sharma explain:  
‘in the wet monsoon season, the contributions of meltwater and rainfall 
coincide, creating a situation of too much water in the wet season and 
                                                     
7 Mollinga, P 2008, ‘Water, politics and development: framing a political sociology of water 
resources management’, Water Alternatives, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 7-8 
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too little water in the dry season, which is exacerbated by the lack of 
water storage facilities. The increasing gap between water availability 
and demand in months other than the monsoon season is already posing 
a serious threat to livelihoods and economic development in the 
region.’8  
The Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is an area of both plenty and of scarcity. Both 
extremes are likely to be exacerbated by the effects of climate change. As Hill notes, ‘[t]he 
phrase “too much and too little water” has been used as a shorthand for the challenges 
that climate presents for the Hindukush Himalayas, with droughts and floods becoming 
more commonplace.’9  
The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin is one of the richest basins in the world in terms 
of natural resources (hydropower, fisheries, forestry, irrigated agriculture, navigation, 
environmental amenities, tourism, minerals, et cetera) Yet India, Nepal, and Bangladesh 
are some of the poorest in the world and sometimes called ‘the poverty triangle.’10 It is also 
a densely populated region. The greater Hindu-Kush-Himalaya is home to nearly half of 
the world’s population; approximately 630 million people in an area of 1.7 million 
kilometres squared.11  
Water storage is a particularly important issue for transboundary governance because it 
can be used to even out water supply between where it is comparatively plentiful – Nepal 
and Bhutan – and where it is scarce – India. In addition to flow augmentation for 
downstream irrigation, Nepal’s storage potential of 88bcm could bring other mutual 
benefits, such as hydropower generation, flood control during the monsoon, and flow 
augmentation for navigation.12 
                                                     
8 Vaidya, RA, & Sharma, E (eds) 2014, Research Insights on Climate and Water in the Hindu Kush 
Himalayas, ICIMOD, Kathmandu, p. 3 
9 Hill, D 2015, ‘Where Hawks Dwell on Water and Bankers Build Power Poles: Transboundary 
Water, Environmental Security and the Frontiers of Neo-liberalism’, Strategic Analysis, vol. 39 no. 
6, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2015.1090679, p. 739 
10 Dinar, A, Dinar, S, McCaffrey, S, & McKinney, D 2007, Bridges Over Water: Understanding 
Transboundary Water Conflict, Negotiation and Cooperation, World Scientific Series on Energy and 
Resource Economics - vol. 3, World Scientific Publishing Co, Singapore, p. 251 
11 Vaidya, RA, & Sharma, E (eds) 2014, Research Insights on Climate and Water in the Hindu Kush 
Himalayas, ICIMOD, Kathmandu, p. 17 
12 Onta, IR 2001, ‘Harnessing the Himalayan waters of Nepal: A case for partnership on the Ganges 
basin’ in AK Biswas, & JI Uitto (eds), Sustainable development of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna 
basins, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, p. 106 
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Although the issue of hydropower generation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is 
the one most often – and most vigorously – debated within the region and internationally, 
it is water for irrigation that has broader effects in terms of human security; livelihoods 
and food production. As Dinar et al. point out, ‘Agriculture accounts for nearly one half of 
all freshwater usage in the [Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna] basin, making water supply one 
of the most significant barriers to economic development.’13 Agriculture, in turn, is 
vulnerable to drought and flooding. 
These issues of hydropower generation, irrigation, flooding and sedimentation are brought 
together in the prevailing narrative of freshwater resource development in the region. The 
prevailing thinking is that there is almost infinite hydropower potential in the Himalayas 
(especially Nepal) and that it should be exploited for the benefit of all riparians. Planned 
upstream dams are framed as ‘multi-purpose’ and promise to bring multiple benefits; 
economic benefit for Nepal, energy security for northern India, water storage for dry 
season flow augmentation and irrigation, and flood control throughout the basin. This 
narrative is based on the dominant paradigm of water management; command and control 
of nature, and the pursuit of technological and engineering solutions to water related 
problems. 
In addition to these issues, water interactions between India, Nepal, Bhutan and 
Bangladesh are not positive. As A. Dinar et al. note in regards to the Ganges basin, it ‘has 
tremendous joint development potential that has not yet been realised by its riparian 
states. Rather, the Ganges Basin is more popularly known for its rich history of disputes.’14 
Factors in this ‘rich history of disputes’ include the lack of strong regional identity, the 
securitisation of water issues, the presence of a hydro-hegemon that struggles to be a 
regional leader, the reliance on bilateral rather than multilateral approaches to 
transboundary water governance, and a number of unresolved disputes between India-
Nepal and India-Bangladesh. Wirsing et al. also add faltering river diplomacy, and 
simmering separatist tensions and political turmoil to these conflict-inducing factors.15 
                                                     
13 Dinar, A, Dinar, S, McCaffrey, S, & McKinney, D 2007, Bridges Over Water: Understanding 
Transboundary Water Conflict, Negotiation and Cooperation, World Scientific Series on Energy and 
Resource Economics - vol. 3, World Scientific Publishing Co, Singapore, p. 254 
14 Dinar, A, Dinar, S, McCaffrey, S, & McKinney, D 2007, Bridges Over Water: Understanding 
Transboundary Water Conflict, Negotiation and Cooperation, World Scientific Series on Energy and 
Resource Economics - vol. 3, World Scientific Publishing Co, Singapore, p. 248 
15 Wirsing, R, Jasparro, C, & Stoll, DC 2013, International Conflict Over Water Resources in 
Himalayan Asia, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p. 14 
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Uprety summarise the transboundary water interactions in South Asia by saying that while 
some riparian states claim to be in favour of cooperative, multi-national approaches to 
water governance, ‘collective multilateral attention to the problems of transboundary 
waters has been rare. Historically, the region has lacked a collective strategy and 
bilateralism remains the focus.’16 He continues: 
‘[d]ue to their prevailing mutual distrust, their inability to delink 
hydropower from water resources, and their reservation against 
generalizing policy to avoid establishing precedent, the strategic 
approach of most of the countries is merely to theoretically engage in 
water-related initiatives, but practically advance only those serving their 
own specific interests.’17 
As Asthana and Shukla show, there is also no sense of collective action for dealing with 
non-traditional security threats, such as water conflicts. Indeed, they argue that ‘[n]on-
traditional threats are also securitised across borders due to a bitter past, mistrust and 
hatred that dominates the socio-political structure in these countries.’18 The securitisation 
of water continues to be a driver of negative water interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed. 
India is by far the most powerful state in this area and as such is able to set the 
transboundary water governance agenda. This creates tensions and mistrust between 
riparian states. As Hill shows, ‘[t]he geopolitics of the region is arguably defined by the 
dominance of India and issues surrounding whether trans-boundary disputes should be 
handled bilaterally or internationalised continue to provoke tensions’ and furthermore 
these tensions ‘are likely to intensify as demand for water becomes more acute in the 
future.’19 
                                                     
16 Uprety, K 2014, A South Asian Perspective on the UN Watercourses Convention, International 
Water Law Project Blog, published online 14 July 2014, viewed 23 July 2014, 
<http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/blog/2014/07/14/dr-kishor-uprety-a-south-asian-
perspective-on-the-un-watercourses-convention/>. 
17 Uprety, K 2014, A South Asian Perspective on the UN Watercourses Convention, International 
Water Law Project Blog, published online 14 July 2014, viewed 23 July 2014, 
<http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/blog/2014/07/14/dr-kishor-uprety-a-south-asian-
perspective-on-the-un-watercourses-convention/>. 
18 Asthana, V & Shukla, AC 2014, Water Security in India; Hope, Despair, and the Challenges of 
Human Development, Bloomsbury Academic, New York, pp. 275-277 
19 Hill, D 2008, ‘The Regional Politics of Water Sharing: Contemporary Issues in South Asia’ in K 
Lahiri-Dutt, & RJ Wasson (eds), Water First: Issues and Challenges for Nations and Communities in 
South Asia, Sage, New Delhi, p. 75 
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It is the possibility of these tension intensifying that is one of the primary drivers of 
foreign-led interventions in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. The Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed is particularly vulnerable to water conflicts, which are generally 
understood to be the result of state fragility (recent violence, obstacles to economic 
development, weak management institutions), and high water stress.20 As water 
governance issues gain higher political attention locally, nationally, regionally and 
globally, cooperation and hydro-diplomacy are increasingly seen as means of attenuating 
water-related disputes, particularly in transboundary settings.21 
As Earle et al. note, ‘[c]onsidering the enormity of the climate change challenges in South 
Asia, there is at present no paucity of collaborative efforts to explore effective response 
strategies.’22 Some of these collaborative efforts are an extension of existing initiatives or 
engagements by international organisations and foreign aid donors in the region. For 
example, the diplomatic and foreign aid relationships that Australia and the United 
Kingdom in South Asia have in recent years turned toward climate change, water security, 
sustainable development, and other concerns of the age. Other collaborative efforts are 
entirely new and specific to transboundary water governance. The most significant of 
these are outlined in the following section. 
Fresh beginnings: the Abu Dhabi Dialogue and the South Asia Water Initiative 
The confluence and culmination of global challenges such as climate change, water 
scarcity and other non-traditional security threats, and regional challenges for water 
governance (described in Chapter 3), led in the mid-2000s to an international round of 
talks called the Abu Dhabi Dialogue.  
The ADD was funded and convened by the World Bank,23 and periodically brought 
together senior members of government, academia and civil society from Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Nepal, and Pakistan in a non-formal, consultative 
                                                     
20 National Research Council of the National Academies 2012, Himalayan Glaciers: Climate Change, 
Water Resources, and Water Security, The National Academies Press, Washington DC, p. 92 
21 Keskinen, M, Inkinen, A, Hakanen, U, Rautavaara, A, & Niinioja, M 2014, ‘Water diplomacy: 
bringing diplomacy into water cooperation and water into diplomacy’ in G Pangare (ed.), Hydro 
Diplomacy; Sharing Water Across Borders, Academic Foundation, New Delhi, p. 39 
22 Earle, A, Cascão, AE, Hansson, S, Jägerskog, A, Swain, A, & Öjendal, J 2015, Transboundary Water 
Management and the Climate Change Debate, Earthscan Studies in Water Resource Management, 
Routledge, Abingdon, p. 41 
23 Earle, A, Cascão, AE, Hansson, S, Jägerskog, A, Swain, A, & Öjendal, J 2015, Transboundary Water 
Management and the Climate Change Debate, Earthscan Studies in Water Resource Management, 
Routledge, Abingdon, p. 41 
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process intended to foster regional cooperation on various challenges facing Himalayan 
Rivers.24 Earle et al. describe the ADD as ‘the only multilateral framework involving all the 
riparian countries of the Ganges-Brahmaputra basin that is engaged in an informal and 
consultative process’ and they point out that the ADD aimed to build trust between 
riparians primarily through information exchange and the co-management of 
development projects.25 
The ADD was instituted with a decade-long agenda beginning in 2006.26 In 2007, the seven 
countries met to ‘share global experience on international waters and benefit-sharing, with 
the goal of achieving constructive convergence on common challenges.’27 For the World 
Bank, however, the ADD was a chance to create a ‘common water-sharing framework in 
line with the Nile Basin Initiative.’28 Yet, the Nile Basin Initiative has not been an 
unmitigated success in terms of increasing transboundary water cooperation.29 The ADD 
can therefore be seen as an opportunity to transpose the successes, such as they were, of 
the Nile Basin Initiative into a different region and to improve on the failures. The Ganges-
Brahmaputra was an appropriate choice as there was – and still is – no other basin-wide 
collaborative process but the potential for water conflicts remains high. 
The 2007 meeting of the ADD was also when the South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI) was 
established. The mandate of SAWI is to ‘support future ADDG [Abu Dhabi Dialogue 
Group] activities’ and to ‘promote the goals of poverty reduction, economic growth, 
mitigation and adaptation to climate change, water security and regional peace through 
significant and measurable improvements in water resources management and 
development.’30 These goals underpin the three funding and operational phases of SAWI 
(the current is Phase II, and is financed for the years 2013-2017). 
                                                     
24 South Asia Water Initiative 2015, ‘The Abu Dhabi Dialogue (ADD)’, viewed 16 March 2015, 
<https://www.southasiawaterinitiative.org/node/11>. 
25 Earle, A, Cascão, AE, Hansson, S, Jägerskog, A, Swain, A, & Öjendal, J 2015, Transboundary Water 
Management and the Climate Change Debate, Earthscan Studies in Water Resource Management, 
Routledge, Abingdon, p. 41 
26 Vaidya, RA, & Sharma, E (eds) 2014, Research Insights on Climate and Water in the Hindu Kush 
Himalayas, ICIMOD, Kathmandu, p. 4 
27 South Asia Water Initiative 2015, ‘The Abu Dhabi Dialogue: 2007’, viewed 28 April 2015, 
<https://www.southasiawaterinitiative.org/node/97>. 
28 Earle, A, Cascão, AE, Hansson, S, Jägerskog, A, Swain, A, & Öjendal, J 2015, Transboundary Water 
Management and the Climate Change Debate, Earthscan Studies in Water Resource Management, 
Routledge, Abingdon, p. 41 
29 Swain, A 2011, ‘Challenges for water sharing in the Nile basin: changing geo-politics and changing 
climate’, Hydrological Sciences Journal, DOI:10.1080/02626667.2011.577037, vol. 56, no. 4, p. 696 
30 South Asia Water Initiative 2015, ‘The Abu Dhabi Dialogue: 2007’, viewed 28 April 2015, 
<https://www.southasiawaterinitiative.org/node/97>. 
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The main objective of SAWI is to promote regional cooperation and the sustainable 
management of water resources of the Himalayan Rivers31 based on the principles of 
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM), inclusive and multi-disciplinary 
dialogue, and participatory and deliberative processes.32  
Another key principle of SAWI is to deliver mutual benefits.33 The applicable theory of 
change is that mutual benefits accrue ‘from coordinated planning and joint investment for 
new infrastructure that ensure equitable upstream-downstream sharing of both benefits 
and impacts, and from coordinated planning and joint investment into upstream 
watershed rehabilitation that deliver both local benefits and downstream water quality 
benefits.’34 In other words, benefit sharing is linked in SAWI methodology to 
transboundary water cooperation. 
It is worth noting that these principles and objectives – IWRM, deliberative governance, 
benefit sharing – are all driven by global narratives around international development and 
environmental management (these narratives are discussed in Chapter 4). They have not 
come from within the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, or been put on the 
transboundary water governance agenda by riparian stakeholders.  
A further noteworthy aspect of SAWI is that it is funded exclusively by external donors; 
Australia, United Kingdom, and Norway.35 The countries in which SAWI operates (that is, 
the Abu Dhabi Dialogue Group member states) do not make even symbolic contributions. 
This illustrates a significant distinction between the ADD and SAWI. While the ADD is 
about the riparian states of the Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra basins driving dialogue 
(facilitated by the World Bank) about shared water issues, under SAWI it is the donors – 
particularly the World Bank, Australia, and the United Kingdom – setting the agenda. The 
riparian states remain more or less passive recipients of the initiative.  
                                                     
31 Rollason, R 2012, ‘Design Summary and Implementation Document: South Asia Water Initiative - 
Proposed program and approach’, draft from 9 March 2012, AusAID, Canberra 
32 South Asia Water Initiative 2015, ‘Approaches and Objectives’, viewed 11 January 2015, 
<https://www.southasiawaterinitiative.org/SAWIApproach>. 
33 South Asia Water Initiative 2015, ‘Approaches and Objectives’, viewed 11 January 2015, 
<https://www.southasiawaterinitiative.org/SAWIApproach>. 
34 South Asia Water Initiative 2015, ‘Strategic Alignment’, viewed 11 January 2015, 
<https://www.southasiawaterinitiative.org/SAWIAlignment>. 
35 The World Bank 2014, South Asia Water Initiative: Annual Report from the World Bank to Trust 
Fund Donors July 1, 2013 – June 30, 2014, The World Bank, Washington DC, pp. 30-34 
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Lessons learned: insights from within the problemshed 
The year 2016 marks the end of the decade-long ADD process. What can we learn from it? 
How do the experiences of stakeholders within South Asia reflect on World Bank 
initiatives into transboundary water governance? What are the lessons for foreign-led 
interventions generally, and what options remain for improving transboundary water 
interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed specifically? 
As Earle et al. remark, ‘[u]nfortunately, the World Bank has failed in its hope to bring 
South Asian countries within a common water-sharing framework in line with the Nile 
Basin Initiative.’36 But just as the ADD was an opportunity to improve on the Nile Basin 
Initiative, so too there are lessons to be learned from the ADD. These lessons can be 
applied to whatever comes next in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, but also to 
other basins or regions of the globe where the World Bank – or other international 
organisations or foreign aid donors – may be planning. There are four main lessons about 
how international organisations and aid donors conduct interventions into transboundary 
water governance, and how this affects their effectiveness in terms of increasing 
cooperation between riparian states. 
First, the ADD and SAWI have met with only middling support from riparians, especially 
India, and this, in Asthana and Shukla’s words, makes ‘multilateralism or third-party 
interventions in a regional waterscape… not only difficult but also impossible.’37 Second, 
there are limitations inherent in the way that international actors approach transboundary 
water governance. As one analyst put it, there are ‘a lot of solutions looking for problems’ 
in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, and that ‘when all you have is a hammer, then 
every problem becomes a nail.’38 Third, the system in which international organisations 
and foreign aid donors operate – the system of foreign aid – is crowded, inefficient, short-
sighted, and driven by complex agendas. Furthermore, the effectiveness and impact of 
these actors in the transboundary water governance of the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed will likely never be known because of the twin problems of effect and 
                                                     
36 Earle, A, Cascão, AE, Hansson, S, Jägerskog, A, Swain, A, & Öjendal, J 2015, Transboundary Water 
Management and the Climate Change Debate, Earthscan Studies in Water Resource Management, 
Routledge, Abingdon, p. 41 
37 Asthana, V & Shukla, AC 2014, Water Security in India; Hope, Despair, and the Challenges of 
Human Development, Bloomsbury Academic, New York, p. 344 
38 Anonymous 10, 2014, 2 November 2014, New Delhi 
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attribution.39 The crowded and complex system of foreign aid means that it is almost 
impossible to separate out the effects of individual donors and external factors on 
common objectives.40 And the desired effects can be brought about by factors entirely 
unrelated to the project or program working towards them.41  
If they continue with their current approaches to improving transboundary water 
interaction (that is, focusing on deliberative governance through Track II dialogue – 
facilitated discussions between government and non-government stakeholders – and 
benefit sharing), it is unlikely that the international organisations and foreign aid donors 
engaged in improving transboundary water interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed will achieve in the foreseeable future their stated goals. Riparian 
stakeholders, however, have unique insights into how transboundary water conflict may 
be reduced, and cooperation increased, in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. These 
include: addressing the political context and historical grievances; building trust and 
addressing power asymmetry between riparian states; creating political will for 
cooperation; de-securitising water; taking a problemshed view; strengthening water 
sharing institutions; and moving beyond narratives of water scarcity and supply-side 
solutions. Incorporating these approaches into the foreign-led intervention in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed, as well as future interventions into other problemsheds, may 
help create the conditions in which positive transboundary water interactions may 
emerge. 
This thesis argues that the complexity of transboundary water interaction prevents any 
one actor from definitively increasing cooperation between riparian states. There may, 
nonetheless be a circumscribed role for international organisations and foreign aid donors 
in supporting riparian states to foster the conditions in which cooperation may emerge. 
International actors, if they choose to engage in transboundary water governance in 
developing countries, should adopt some or all of the approaches identified by 
stakeholders from within the problemshed as desirable.  
                                                     
39 Mayne, J 1999, Addressing Attribution Through Contribution Analysis: Using Performance 
Measures Sensibly, Discussion Paper, June 1999, Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Ottawa, 
pp. 2-3 
40 Riddell, RC 2014, Does foreign aid really work? An updated assessment, Devpolicy Discussion 
Paper no. 33, 1 March 2014, Canberra, viewed 21 March 2015, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2409847>, p. 26 
41 Riddell, RC 2014, Does foreign aid really work? An updated assessment, Devpolicy Discussion Paper 
no. 33, 1 March 2014, Canberra, viewed 21 March 2015, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2409847>, p. 45 
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Thesis structure  
This thesis is divided into six chapters and a conclusion. Each chapter is structured into a 
hierarchy of sections, sub-sections, and segments. Chapter 1 provides the methodology for 
the thesis and a definition of key terms. It also outlines some of the gaps in knowledge that 
this thesis fills, and identifies opportunities for future research. Chapter 2 is a review of 
literature on third party interventions and transboundary water conflict, cooperation and 
interaction.  
Chapter 3 describes the challenges for transboundary water governance in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed, and the quality of interactions between India, Nepal, Bhutan 
and Bangladesh. This background provides some of the reasons why international 
organisations and foreign aid donors are interested in addressing water issues in this 
region. These, and other motivations of international actors, are examined in Chapter 4. 
Some of these drivers are global; the objectives of foreign aid donors are changing the 
world over, India is rapidly developing, and there are more competitors for the World 
Bank, which is forcing it to find new niches for investment and influence. At the same 
time, the discourse around international development is increasingly focusing on the 
sustainable uses of natural resources (such as water), and the ‘good governance’ of 
collective action problems.  
In light of these contextual factors, the main objectives of international actors in regards to 
transboundary water interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed are: instituting 
good governance of shared water resources; ensuring overall regional stability; supporting 
climate change resilience; sustainable development and poverty eradication. These are 
discussed in Chapter 5, as is the genesis of the main foreign-led interventions – the Abu 
Dhabi Dialogue, and the South Asia Water Initiative. Chapter 5 also examines the views 
from within the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed toward transboundary water 
interaction. Have international actors been able to reach their normative goals of 
increasing cooperation and reducing conflict? Why or why not?  
Based on the findings from local stakeholders, Chapter 6 provides recommendations for 
how transboundary water interaction may be improved in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed. Several approaches have been identified by local policymakers, subject-
matter experts, journalists, activists, hydrologists and economists as being critical in 
increasing cooperation between India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh over shared 
freshwater resources. These include: addressing the political context and historical 
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grievances; building trust and addressing power asymmetry between riparian states; 
creating political will for cooperation; de-securitising water; taking a problemshed view; 
strengthening water sharing institutions; and moving beyond narratives of water scarcity 
and supply-side solutions. Significantly, these approaches are not central to the work of 
the South Asia Water Initiative or other donor-led processes in this region. 
Chapter 6 builds on the insights of riparian stakeholders within the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed to critique the approaches of international organisations and foreign aid 
donors to improving transboundary water interaction. Specifically, this chapter argues that 
knowledge sharing is not the solution to all transboundary water governance problems, 
and that sometimes seeing a problemshed rather than a basin is a more constructive 
approach. It also argues that the root causes of water conflicts must be addressed – noting 
that they may not necessarily related to water per se – and that increasing transboundary 
water cooperation will not automatically result in greater regional stability.  
Chapter 6 concludes with some observations about the global system of foreign aid that 
also poses challenges for international organisations and foreign aid donors in regards to 
transboundary water governance. This is a system that favours short-term effectiveness 
but results often in long-term failure. It is also crowded, inefficient, and risk-averse. 
Effectiveness of specific programs is difficult to determine, and in any case, donor agendas 
are driven by foreign interests rather than the perspectives and objectives of the societies 
affected. 
The concluding chapter analyses the findings of the previous chapters and draws 
conclusions about the effect of the World Bank and other international donor agencies on 
transboundary water interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. It discusses 
what the experiences of the ADD and SAWI reveal about the nature of transboundary 
water conflict and cooperation. The Conclusions chapter also provides some 
recommendations for how future foreign-led interventions in other basins and 
problemsheds may more effectively approach the task of increasing transboundary water 
cooperation and reducing conflict. The effect of international actors on transboundary 
water cooperation may be highly limited – but there is no single approach or actor that 
can definitely improve transboundary water interaction between riparian states. 
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Chapter 1: Methodology 
This chapter states the approach, ontology, methodology, theoretical underpinnings and 
method used in developing this thesis. This inquiry into the effect of foreign-led 
interventions on transboundary water interaction is transdisciplinary.  
In assuming transboundary cooperation to be an emergent property of multiple 
conditions, and in assuming that these conditions may not have the same effect in 
different contexts or configurations, I am revealing myself as a critical realist. This 
ontology led to taking a transdisciplinary approach to the analysis of water interaction in 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. This methodology allows me to understand the 
social, political, economic, and ecological dynamics within the region of study that affect 
transboundary water interaction there. 
I am using the Transboundary Water Interaction Nexus (TWINS) as the theoretical 
underpinnings of this research, and build upon it by questioning whether international 
organisations and foreign aid donors can drive high-cooperation, low-conflict water 
interaction. These claims are explained and expanded on below.  
Following the explanation of the methods used in conducting this research, there is a 
section that defines the key terms used throughout this thesis, namely: international 
actors, problemshed, transboundary water governance, conflict and interaction, and Track 
II dialogue. The last two sections of this chapter are devoted to the gaps that this research 
fill, as well as the opportunities that exist for further research. 
Transdisciplinary approach 
Transdisciplinary research, according to Patterson et al., ‘is grounded in “real” problem 
situations, involves stakeholder collaboration in research, and involves more fluid and 
evolving methodologies than traditional academic research’ and it aims not only to create 
peer-reviewed knowledge, but to also influence the problem or practice.42 Another 
defining characteristic of transdisciplinary research is that it is based on collaborations 
with ‘non-academic stakeholders from business, government, and the civil society in order 
to address sustainability challenges and develop solution options’ as well as 
                                                     
42 Patterson, JJ, Lukasiewicz, A, Wallis, PJ, Rubenstein, N, Coffey, B, Gachenga, E & Lynch, AJJ 2013 
‘Tapping fresh currents: Fostering early-career researchers in transdisciplinary water governance 
research’, Water Alternatives, vol. 6, no. 2, p. 295 
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interdisciplinary collaborations (that is, collaboration with scholars from different 
disciplines).43 
Transdisciplinary research lends itself especially well to ‘real-world problems’ such as 
sustainability challenges and environmental resource management issues because, as Lang 
et el point out, these challenges ‘require new ways of knowledge production and decision-
making’ and this in turn necessitates ‘the involvement of actors from outside academia 
into the research process in order to integrate the best available knowledge, reconcile 
values and preferences, as well as create ownership for problems and solution options.’44 
Water governance is a field particularly well suited to transdisciplinary research because it 
cuts across a range of disciplines and because, as Patterson et al. point out, there are 
diverse ways of understanding the meanings and management of water. They argue that 
‘water governance research would benefit from approaches that engage with a diversity of 
traditions and disciplinary perspectives.’45 
Taking a transdisciplinary approach supports Araral and Wang’s ‘second generation 
research agenda’ of water governance, an agenda that ‘pays more attention to the study of 
incentive structures, is multi and inter-disciplinary in orientation and with clear policy 
implications.’46 For the purposes of this thesis, taking a transdisciplinary approach has 
meant interviewing policymakers, subject-matter experts, hydrologists, journalists, 
activists, et cetera, from within India, Nepal, and Bangladesh, as well as several key 
representatives from the World Bank, the South Asia Water Initiative, and the Australian 
and UK governments. 
Critical realist ontology  
My ontology is critical realism. The fundamental premise of critical realism is that there is 
a real world independent of human knowledge of it, but ‘although a real world exists, our 
                                                     
43 Lang, DJ, Wiek, A, Bergmann, M, Stauffacher, M, Martens, P, Moll, P, Swilling, M, & Thomas, CJ 
2012, ‘Transdisciplinary research in sustainability science: practice, principles, and challenges’, 
Sustainability science: bridging the gap between science and society, DOI 10.1007/s11625-011-0149-x, 
vol. 7, no. 1, p. 2 
44 Lang, DJ, Wiek, A, Bergmann, M, Stauffacher, M, Martens, P, Moll, P, Swilling, M, & Thomas, CJ 
2012, ‘Transdisciplinary research in sustainability science: practice, principles, and challenges’, 
Sustainability science: bridging the gap between science and society, DOI 10.1007/s11625-011-0149-x, 
vol. 7, no. 1, p. 1 
45 Patterson, JJ, Lukasiewicz, A, Wallis, PJ, Rubenstein, N, Coffey, B, Gachenga, E & Lynch, AJJ 2013 
‘Tapping fresh currents: Fostering early-career researchers in transdisciplinary water governance 
research’, Water Alternatives, vol. 6, no. 2, p. 294 
46 Araral, E & Wang, Y 2013, ‘Water Governance 2.0: A Review and Second Generation Research 
Agenda’, Water Resources Management, vol. 27, p. 3946 
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knowledge of it is socially constructed and fallible.’47 In this sense, critical realism, 
according to Bygstad, combines a realist ontology with an interpretive epistemology. In 
regards to society, the critical realist view is that social structure exists independently of 
current human activity and ‘[t]his implies that although structure exists only through 
human activity, it is not reducible to such activity.’48 Political boundaries, for instance, as a 
social structure that exists only through human activity, but does not define or determine 
human activity. 
In regards to water, critical realism understands there to be a physical, objective, reality. 
Water exists in the world and interacts with other elements and physical forces around it 
irrespective of human understanding of this. But water is also a social construct, and 
known only through human interpretation: how it is conceptualised, how and why it is 
exploited, and how it is understood to fit into broader ecological, economic, and cultural 
processes is determined by people. Water governance, then, is entirely socially 
constructed: ‘hydropolitics is what societies make of it.’49 Julien explains that:  
‘[h]ydropolitics is first and foremost about politics, not water. Therefore, 
it is the political dynamics inside which transboundary water 
management occurs that must be the focus of analysis. And these 
dynamics cannot be reduced to simple interstate power ratios or 
economic calculation. They also have to do with culture, history and 
ideology.’50 
Julien’s argument about hydropolitics being what societies make of it is foundational to 
my methodology. By examining what affected societies make of transboundary water 
interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, I am shedding new light on a 
complex problem that has hitherto been largely examined through the lens of 
international expertise. Yet, as Julien points out above, ‘it is the political dynamics inside 
                                                     
47 Bygstad, B, & Munkvold, BE 2011, ‘In search of mechanisms: Conducting a critical realist data 
analysis’ Completed Research paper, Thirty-Second International Conference on Information 
Systems, Shanghai 2011, pp. 1-2 
48 Bygstad, B, & Munkvold, BE 2011, ‘In search of mechanisms: Conducting a critical realist data 
analysis’ Completed Research paper, Thirty-Second International Conference on Information 
Systems, Shanghai 2011, p. 3 
49 Julien, F 2012, ‘Hydropolitics is what societies make of it (or why we need a constructivist 
approach to the geopolitics of water)’, International Journal of Sustainable Society, vol. 4, no. 1/2, p. 
62 
50 Julien, F 2012, ‘Hydropolitics is what societies make of it (or why we need a constructivist 
approach to the geopolitics of water)’, International Journal of Sustainable Society, vol. 4, no. 1/2, p. 
62 
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which transboundary water management occurs that must be the focus of analysis’51 
especially so in a constructivist epistemology such as mine. Here, the political dynamics in 
question (that is, transboundary water interactions) occur primarily – though not 
exclusively – between states. The state is therefore assumed to be the central actor – albeit 
not the only, nor the only legitimate actor – for the purpose of this thesis. 
TWINS as theoretical basis 
The theoretical framework for this analysis is Mirumachi’s Transboundary Water 
Interaction Nexus (TWINS).52 Like Perlman-Petersen and Wolf, I find that ‘[c]lassifying 
each case study using the TWINS framework helps to deﬁne the state of the cooperative 
process.’53 The TWINS matrix makes explicit the dual nature of transboundary water 
interaction – conflict and cooperation coexist – and thus ‘allows the political faces of the 
interaction to emerge, with the explicit recognition that particular faces of cooperation 
have neutral or less desirable features along with the positive ones.’54 This approach also 
allows for incorporating differences in how riparians perceive the quality of relations 
between themselves.55 One weakness of the TWINS matrix, however, is that it does not 
draw out specific facets of conflict, such as those along gender, ethnicity or class lines.  
Most importantly, the TWINS matrix facilitates the analysis of the complexity of water 
interaction. Transboundary water interaction may be understood, examined, analysed and 
explained by considering positions on a two-dimensional matrix rather than at a discrete 
location on a spectrum.56 A benchmarking of the transboundary water interactions in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed through TWINS allows for an evaluation of the extent 
to which international actors may have affected any changes in the quality of these 
                                                     
51 Julien, F 2012, ‘Hydropolitics is what societies make of it (or why we need a constructivist 
approach to the geopolitics of water)’, International Journal of Sustainable Society, vol. 4, no. 1/2, p. 
62 
52 Mirumachi, N 2015, Transboundary Water Politics in the Developing World, Routledge, Abingdon 
53 Petersen-Perlman, JD & Wolf, AT 2015, ‘Getting to the First Handshake: Enhancing Security by 
Initiating Cooperation in Transboundary River Basins’, Journal of the American Water Resources 
Association, DOI: 10.1111/1752-1688.12348, vol. 51, no. 6, p. 9 
54 Zeitoun, M, & Mirumachi, N 2008, ‘Transboundary water interaction I: reconsidering conflict and 
cooperation’, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, vol. 8, no. 4, p. 
309 
55 Mirumachi, N, & Allan, JA 2007, ‘Revisiting Transboundary Water Governance: Power, Conflict, 
Cooperation and the Political Economy’, Proceedings from CAIWA International Conference on 
Adaptive and Integrated Water Management: Coping with Scarcity, Basel, Switzerland, 12-15 
November 2007, p. 9 
56 Zeitoun, M, & Mirumachi, N 2008, ‘Transboundary water interaction I: reconsidering conflict and 
cooperation’, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, vol. 8, no. 4, p. 
307 
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interactions. This is the basis of the analysis of stakeholder perspectives conducted in 
Chapter 5. 
As discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2, Mirumachi rejects the prevailing notion 
that conflict and cooperation are binary opposites that can be represented linearly, and 
has developed a matrix approach: ‘Instead of simply quantifying “conflict” or “cooperation” 
of a basin, the TWINS approach allows much more complex and textured interpretations 
to exist.’57 As Zeitoun and Mirumachi point out, the use of continua in the analysis of 
water governance over-simplifies complex situations and makes it difficult to represent 
how the relevant socio-political context has changed over time. Most importantly:  
‘the unidimensional analysis may tend to obscure the multiple political 
dimensions of interaction. States or trans-national actors may be 
cooperating in data gathering, for instance, even while their leaders 
dispute openly and their armed forces clash.’58  
The TWINS matrix, on the other hand, allows water interaction to be conceived of as the 
coexistence of varying intensities of conflict and cooperation, and to see how these have 
shifted over time:  
‘On viewing the trajectory, one can understand how a “cooperation” 
event does not change the status quo of a water regime, or how 
contained conflict may be sustained. Consequently, the political context 
determining different combinations of conflictive and cooperation 
interactions become a very important analytical focal point.’59 
The TWINS matrix depicts intensities of cooperation on the x-axis and intensities of 
conflict on the y-axis. On the cooperation scale, the lowest intensity is ‘confrontation of 
the issue’ and the highest is ‘risk-taking’, while mid-scale intensities of ‘ad-hoc’, ‘technical’ 
and ‘risk-averting’ and distinguish interactions based on the intent and act. On this scale 
‘One may plot the difference, for example, between interaction that “just happens” (i.e. ad-
                                                     
57 Mirumachi, N, & Allan, JA 2007, ‘Revisiting Transboundary Water Governance: Power, Conflict, 
Cooperation and the Political Economy’, Proceedings from CAIWA International Conference on 
Adaptive and Integrated Water Management: Coping with Scarcity, Basel, Switzerland, 12-15 
November 2007, p. 9 
58 Zeitoun, M, & Mirumachi, N 2008, ‘Transboundary water interaction I: reconsidering conflict and 
cooperation’, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, vol. 8, no. 4, p. 
302 
59 Zeitoun, M, & Mirumachi, N 2008, ‘Transboundary water interaction I: reconsidering conflict and 
cooperation’, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, vol. 8, no. 4, p. 
309 
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hoc agreement between ferrymen and traders on either side of a boundary-forming river, 
without external government or outsider interference) and cooperation that has occurred 
following mutual agreement.’60 The five intensities of cooperation are defined as follows: 
• Confrontation of the issue: The issue is acknowledged but there is no specific 
joint action or identification and sharing of goals.  
• Ad hoc: When there is joint action but no shared goals; two (or more) riparians 
just so happen to be acting together but with different goals. 
• Technical: When there are shared goals but no joint action; there may be shared 
goals in how to solve a specific water-related problem, but actions and policies may 
not necessarily be aligned.  
• Risk-averting: When there is joint action and shared goals, in addition to the 
belief that the other will do as expected to execute the action. This level can be 
characterised as risk-averting because the states do not undertake the unforeseen 
costs in the future when committing to such action.  
• Risk-taking: When such costs and risks are taken into account. Risk-taking 
cooperation is an ideal form of cooperation as it is unlikely that states will assume 
costs without evident reciprocation.61 
The scale of conflict intensities draws on the security theory of the Copenhagen School 
(discussed in the literature review chapter). Zeitoun and Mirumachi identify four levels on 
this scale:  
‘an issue or a state of affairs may be perceived within a range from non-
politicised (“off the radar”, i.e. not an issue, such as minimal river off-
takes by small farms) to politicised (the event or state of affairs is an 
issue, or is being made an issue such that it requires reallocation of 
national resources and considerations). This may extend to being 
securitised (the issue is now reframed in existential terms…) and 
“violised” (where the issue has passed beyond the realm of normal 
                                                     
60 Zeitoun, M, & Mirumachi, N 2008, ‘Transboundary water interaction I: reconsidering conflict and 
cooperation’, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, vol. 8, no. 4, p. 
308 
61 Mirumachi, N, & Allan, JA 2007, ‘Revisiting Transboundary Water Governance: Power, Conflict, 
Cooperation and the Political Economy’, Proceedings from CAIWA International Conference on 
Adaptive and Integrated Water Management: Coping with Scarcity, Basel, Switzerland, 12-15 
November 2007, pp. 5-7 
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politics and into the realm where extreme measures such as warfare, are 
taken).’62  
The four intensities of conflict are defined as follows: 
• Non-politicised: Issues that do not concern the state, or issues that are not in the 
public domain.  
• Politicised: Issues on the political agenda and ones that are part of public policy, 
requiring government decision and resource allocation. 
• Securitised/opportunitised: Issues that are seen as an existential threat requiring 
emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political 
procedure, or issues that offer such a chance to improve a situation that it justifies 
actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure. A securitized issue is a 
threat that justifies emergency actions, an opportunitised issue is an opportunity 
for improving a situation that requires emergency actions.  
• Violised: Issues that are already securitised and become a casus belli for violent 
altercation.63 
 
                                                     
62 Zeitoun, M, & Mirumachi, N 2008, ‘Transboundary water interaction I: reconsidering conflict and 
cooperation’, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, vol. 8, no. 4, p. 
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Figure 1: Transboundary Water Interaction Nexus 
The intensities of conflict and cooperation are illustrated in Figure 1. Note that specific 
quadrants of the matrix denote negative, neutral and positive water interaction, but these 
are blurred and overlapping categorisations. Negative interaction is defined as that which 
is ‘inducing a significant degree of resentment with one or more of the actors, thereby 
negatively affecting the broader political context.’64 Negative interaction could be a 
contained conflict, but it could also be marked by resource capture, unilateral 
environmentalism, or the negotiation of treaties not based on international water law. 
Mutual distrust has been identified by Zeitoun and Mirumachi as a potential driver of 
negative interaction.65 
In contrast, neutral interaction may have no inherent effect on the broader political 
context, whereas positive interaction ‘generally tends to meet the interests of the actors, 
and contributes to improvement or sustained relations at the broader political level.’66 
Minor information exchange, or the establishment of technical commissions or meetings, 
are examples of neutral interaction, as are joint infrastructure projects or pollution 
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management. Significantly, Zeitoun and Mirumachi list benefit-sharing based on 
agreements as an example of neutral rather than of positive interaction.67 
Positive interaction can consist of ‘“broad” cooperation (meaning cooperation across many 
issues, perhaps not all directly water-related) and “cooperation on equal terms”, whereby 
the cooperative structures are the result of an inclusionary deliberative process.’68 
Examples of positive interaction include, but are not limited to, establishing and exercising 
principles for water governance (e.g., do no harm principle, or the principle of equitable 
use), the creation of transboundary regimes, the negotiation of a treaty based on 
international water law, et cetera.69  
The quality of transboundary water interaction shifts over time in accordance with 
changes in the socio-political context and specific events. This thesis examines the effect 
that international organisations and foreign aid donors have on the socio-political context 
of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, and questions whether this effect is sufficient to 
shift transboundary water interaction between India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh into 
the ‘positive interaction’ quadrant of the TWINS matrix. 
Method 
This research was begun with a thorough review of literature on a broad spectrum of 
topics, including environmental resource conflicts, water security, negotiations, hydro-
hegemony, water governance, sustainable development, aid effectiveness, and the history 
of water governance in South Asia. In keeping with a transdisciplinary approach, I 
reviewed not only scholarly works but also grey literature (e.g., official policy papers, 
strategic plans of international organisations working on water governance issues in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, other reports) and some media reporting of water and 
security issues in South Asia. 
Between April and November 2014 I conducted fieldwork in India, Nepal and Bangladesh. 
In light of the transdisciplinary approach, I interviewed practitioners in the field, as well as 
                                                     
67 Zeitoun, M, & Mirumachi, N 2008, ‘Transboundary water interaction I: reconsidering conflict and 
cooperation’, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, vol. 8, no. 4, p. 
310 
68 Zeitoun, M, & Mirumachi, N 2008, ‘Transboundary water interaction I: reconsidering conflict and 
cooperation’, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, vol. 8, no. 4, 
pp. 309-310 
69 Zeitoun, M, & Mirumachi, N 2008, ‘Transboundary water interaction I: reconsidering conflict and 
cooperation’, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, vol. 8, no. 4, p. 
310 
23 
 
scholars in other disciplines, e.g., hydro-engineering, ecology, economics. I met with 
subject matter experts, policymakers, academics, analysts, former diplomats, journalists, 
and activists from the region as well as international consultants from Australia and the 
United Kingdom. I used the snowball method of finding and contacting people to speak 
with, and conducted over 30 semi-structured interviews. A full list of stakeholders 
interviewed is in Appendix 1: Fieldwork interviewees. 
The benefit of this approach is that it provides rich insights into the topic, and the 
responses of interviewees are not constrained by predetermined questions and possible 
answers. As such, I learned many things that I would not have known to ask about. A 
further strength of this qualitative approach is that it reveals a nuanced and relatively 
unbiased picture of the situation. Stakeholders were able to discuss that which was 
important to them, not that which I thought would be significant. One drawback, 
however, is that data from semi-structured interviews is difficult to quantify. It is not easy 
to draw out statistically significant results, or to replicate findings.  
A further weakness of the snowball method of interviewing is that it may result in a biased 
representation of stakeholders. Because interviewees are asked to provide names and 
contact details of other relevant stakeholders, it is possible that this reinforces the views of 
one group while excluding other stakeholder groups. Because of this inherent bias, I spoke 
with more people who worked for or with the World Bank than any other international 
organisation (e.g., the Asia Development Bank). That, in turn, established the focus of the 
thesis to be squarely on the World Bank-led South Asia Water Initiative. For that reason I 
was unable to do, say, a comparative study between the World Bank and the Asia 
Development Bank. 
My position as outsider was both a benefit and a hindrance to this research. I was 
generally perceived by stakeholders as neutral and without a hidden agenda. Thus 
interviewees were able to be candid with me. On the other hand, not having had personal 
experience of the water governance structure and cultures of South Asia prior to beginning 
fieldwork, I had a lot more to learn and did not always ask the most insightful questions. 
In regards to how I was perceived by stakeholders, my foreign status afforded me some 
privileges. I believe that as an Australian I was accepted by South Asians as a neutral 
outsider, and treated with less suspicion than I would have been had I been native to the 
region. I was also able to access foreign aid donors and officials – not just other 
Australians, but also British, American and Norwegian government representatives. I did 
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not, however, have access to other nationalities prominent in the development aid space 
in South Asia, such as the Japanese. 
Based on the knowledge and data gathered through both the literature review and the 
fieldwork phases, I conducted an analysis of data gathered during fieldwork in South Asia 
in 2014, as described in the methodology sub-section above. I evaluated key interactions 
between India and Nepal, India and Bhutan, and India and Bangladesh according to the 
TWINS matrix, and analysed the main organisations interested in water governance in 
these countries (see: Appendix 2: Organisations engaged in water governance in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed). The final phase of the process was the writing of this 
thesis.  
Small parts of this thesis, especially parts of Chapters 2 and 3, are based on articles I wrote 
and published during the course of this PhD. These are: 
• ‘Sharing waters vs. sharing rivers: The 1996 Ganges Treaty’, Global Water Forum, 28 
July 2014, Canberra, Australia. 
• ‘Power Flows: Hydro-hegemony and Water Conflicts in South Asia’ Security 
Challenges, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2014), pp. 95-112. 
• ‘Blue Gold for whom? Multi-level games in the development of Himalayan 
hydropower’ International Journal of Water Governance-Special Issue (2015) pp. 1–
18, DOI: 10.7564/13-IJWG32. 
• ‘The Politics of Water Governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin’ 
Observer Research Foundation, November 2015, Issue Brief no. 112. 
Definition of key terms 
International actors, foreign aid donors, and third parties 
‘International actors’ is a term used herein as a catch-all for international and 
transnational organisations, foreign aid agencies, states acting on the international stage 
or pursuing their interests abroad, and international non-government organisations 
(INGOs). For the purposes of this thesis, these actors are almost exclusively western and in 
the main aligned with a liberal-democratic ideology. The terms ‘external actors’ and ‘third 
party’ are used interchangeably throughout to emphasise the outsider role that these 
actors play vis-à-vis riparian stakeholders. 
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A third party is ‘[a] person or group besides the two primarily involved in a situation, 
especially a dispute’ according to the Oxford Dictionary. In the context of transboundary 
water interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, it is any individual, 
government, organisation, or other group that does not come from India, Nepal, Bhutan or 
Bangladesh but that nonetheless is engaged in water governance here.  
The most significant international actors of relevance here are the World Bank, the South 
Asia Water Initiative (led by the World Bank), the United Kingdom (which contributes to 
the South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI) but also funds the South Asia Water Governance 
Programme through the Department for International Development), and Australia 
(another major contributor to SAWI).  
The Australian intervention is coordinated through the Sustainable Development 
Investment Portfolio, which targets the three major Himalayan river basins – the Indus, 
Ganges and Brahmaputra. This portfolio has a 12-year time horizon and is comprised of six 
partner organisations: Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR), 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), International 
Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), Consumer Unity Trust Society 
International (CUTS), International Centre of Excellence for Water Resource Management 
(ICE WaRM), and SAWI.70 Other Australian funded initiatives in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed include eWater and the recently formed Australian Water Partnership 
(AWP). 
Norway and Japan are also aid donors in this space, but their contribution is significantly 
smaller and therefore less relevant here. Likewise, there are a number of international and 
multinational initiatives that are each only tangentially related to transboundary water 
cooperation but all together contribute to the bigger picture of foreign-led interventions. 
The International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), for example, is 
an important multinational organisation working primarily on transboundary 
collaborations on scientific knowledge production. Hill describes ICIMOD as ‘a regional 
intergovernmental learning and knowledge-sharing centre based in Kathmandu that 
serves the member countries of the Hindukush Himalayas and has an incredibly 
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significant role in capacity building in the region’ and argues that it is ‘[p]erhaps the best-
known pan-South Asian agency in terms of water and climate change issues.’71  
Other international organisations that also affect transboundary water interaction in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed include, but are not limited to, the Global Water 
Partnership (GWP), the International Water Management Institute (IWMI), the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), World Wildlife Fund (WWF), 
the Asia Development Bank (ADB), and the Asia Foundation. The German foreign aid 
agency, Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, is also active in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed. These, and other internationally funded or run organisation, 
are referred to herein as foreign-led interventions unless stated otherwise. For a list of 
some of these international and domestic stakeholders, see Appendix 2: Organisations 
engaged in water governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed.  
An international actor can become engaged in a situation in different ways and for 
different reasons. In terms of transboundary water governance, international organisations 
and foreign aid donors intervene with the permission of riparian states. A riparian state 
may or may not initiate a request for assistance from a third party, but these external 
actors are generally accepted and largely seen as legitimate – even if at the same time their 
presence is resented (attitudes toward foreign-led interventions in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed are discussed in Chapter 5). The main normative reason for 
international actors intervening in transboundary water interaction is to improve 
governance and increase cooperation, although there are other implicit or unstated drivers 
as well (these are examined in Chapter 4). 
Problemshed 
A problemshed is ‘a geographic area that is large enough to encompass management 
issues, but small enough to make implementation feasible.’72 The problemshed, then, has 
both a physical – geographic – dimension, as well as a socially constructed one. As 
Mollinga et al. argue, problemsheds are a socio-political construct and are thus more 
appropriate as a unit of management, and hence regulatory organisation, than a watershed 
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or river basin.73 Watersheds, in any case, frequently influence – and are influenced by – 
factors outside their hydrological boundaries.74 As Islam and Susskind point out: 
‘[t]he origin of many of our water management difficulties stems from 
our fragmented or bounded view of water as a “natural object”, or at 
other times, as a “societal issue” or at still other moments as a “political 
construct”. The components of a water resource management puzzle can 
fit together in so many different ways that it is practically impossible to 
use “reductionist” or traditional “systems engineering” methodologies to 
resolve complex water management problems.’75  
The concept of a problemshed takes account of these complexities. 
Similarly, the concept of ‘water’ has both a physical and a social/political meaning. Water 
can be understood differently in different fields of study. The water that is the subject of 
hydrology or ecology is conceptually different to that which is the subject of water 
governance. In the context of this thesis, water refers to international rivers and the social, 
economic or environmental uses of freshwater derived from these rivers (e.g., irrigation). 
Although it is rivers that are of interest here, the terms water and transboundary waters 
are used throughout as that is the convention in the field. 
The dual nature of water and of the problemshed construct – their physicality rooted in 
geography and their socially constructed dimensions – arise out of the critical realist 
ontology. The concept assumes an objective, knowable reality – that of water and the 
hydrological cycle – and takes the nation-state as the central actor. Socially constructed 
forces – those of governance regimes, agendas of international organisations, reigning 
paradigms about environmental resource management – interpret and act upon this 
reality in complex and unpredictable ways. The significance of the problemshed concept, 
then, lies in understanding how those social constructs that occur even outside the 
hydrological boundaries of a watershed nonetheless affect the measurable quantity and 
quality of water within it. For instance, as this thesis illustrates, the global discourse of 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), and the investment funds of 
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international organisations that favour ‘multi-purpose dams’ influences whether or not 
some dams are built in Nepal. In turn, these dynamics that large originate and occur 
outside of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin nonetheless ultimately affect the 
quantity and quality of water that flows from Nepal, through India, and into Bangladesh.  
The problemshed concept is not problem-free. The definition of ‘feasible’ implementation 
is also socially constructed and therefore problematic. What may be feasible for one set of 
stakeholders may be, for example, unacceptable to another. Feasibility of any project or 
policy also has a political dimension – and that makes it open to contestation and debate. 
Therefore, the problemshed concept is neither fixed nor objective. It remains, however, a 
useful, albeit flawed, construct for the purposes of this thesis.   
The Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is defined here as those parts of the Ganges-
Brahmaputra-Meghna hydrological basin that fall within the political boundaries of Nepal, 
Bhutan, Bangladesh and northern India. This basin is shown in Figure 2. This river basin 
extends to the Tibetan plateau, however the problemshed of interest here does not include 
China because the centre of gravity for foreign-led interventions in transboundary water 
governance lies in the interaction between India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. 
Although the main foreign-led interventions – the Abu Dhabi Dialogue and the South Asia 
Water Initiative – do include China (and Pakistan), these are in effect treated as separate 
projects from those of improving interactions between Nepal-India-Bangladesh in the 
Ganges basin, and Bhutan-India-Bangladesh in the Brahmaputra basin. 
That is not to belittle the significance of China, Chinese interests in the water resources of 
Nepal, Bhutan, India and Bangladesh, and the relationships of those countries with China. 
On the contrary; as Earle et al. point out, ‘[t]he advent of China in the [Ganges-
Brahmaputra-Meghna] basin’s hydro-politics’, like in the Mekong and the Nile, has 
brought further complications and uncertainties.’76 Of those further complications and 
uncertainties brought on by the advent of China, only those of interest to the riparian 
states are of interest to this thesis.  
China is relevant to this thesis only insofar as India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh 
perceive, engage, or otherwise relate to China as part of the hydropolitics among each 
                                                     
76 Earle, A, Cascão, AE, Hansson, S, Jägerskog, A, Swain, A, & Öjendal, J 2015, Transboundary Water 
Management and the Climate Change Debate, Earthscan Studies in Water Resource Management, 
Routledge, Abingdon, pp. 41-42 
29 
 
other. For instance, it is relevant here that India evokes the spectre of China to securitise 
water in the problemshed. Hill explains:  
‘[i]n recent years, the activities of Chinese hydropower companies in 
Tibet have led to a great deal of commentary in the Indian media and 
beyond… In terms that frequently echo those expressed by Homer-
Dixon and similar writers, but perhaps stripped of the nuances that were 
originally found in their texts, we now find many people questioning 
whether a dispute between the India and the PRC [People’s Republic of 
China] over the utilisation of the waters of the Brahmaputra may spur 
confrontation and eventually escalate into outright conflict.’77  
Of specific concern is how the damming of the Brahmaputra and its tributaries will affect 
the flows of water into northeast India, especially during the dry season. For the purpose 
of this thesis, however, the exact details of China’s plans on the so-called Great Bend of the 
Brahmaputra River are less relevant than the perceptions within India and Bangladesh, 
and how those perceptions affect hydropolitics with China. It is also worth noting that 
India’s position as hydro-hegemon is strengthened by limiting China’s influence and 
interests in the region.  
That is not to say that China is not significant in the region, or that it does not face water 
governance challenges. It does, and these are of interest to international organisations and 
foreign aid donors too. But these Chinese water challenges do not form part of the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed because, as per the definition, a problemshed is a unit of 
feasible water management. The part of the Brahmaputra River which lies within China 
(and is there called the Yarlung Tsangpo) cannot readily be managed under the same 
water governance regime as the part of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin on the 
south side of the Himalayan range. 
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Figure 2: Map of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin 
 
Transboundary water governance, cooperation, conflict and interaction 
Water cooperation refers to a generally agreeable state of water governance, which, 
according to Dore, is:  
‘the multi-layered interplay of water-related negotiations, agenda-
setting, preference shaping, decision-making, management and 
administration between many actors (including organisations) in the 
state-society complex, at and between different levels and scales, vying 
for authority or influence, and constrained or enabled by evolving norms 
and institutions.’78  
In other words, water governance is the whole complex system of stakeholders, events, 
and agendas at all levels. A more workable understanding is that ‘[w]ater governance 
refers to the range of political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in 
place to develop and manage water resources, and the delivery of water services, at 
different levels of society.’79 This Global Water Partnership (GWP) definition from 2002 is 
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one of the most commonly used, and although it is not perfect (Araral and Wang, for 
example, argue that it ‘lacks a coherent analytic framework and diagnostic value as it is 
mainly descriptive’80) it is relevant here because it implies that water governance is a 
complex system. Water cooperation, then, is an emergent property of that system.  
Emergence is one of the principles of complexity.81 It means that a quality or characteristic 
is only present through the combination of particular factors or conditions, but is not 
inherent to those factors in isolation. In other words, ‘characteristics of larger units are not 
simple combinations of attributes of smaller units, but can show new, collective 
behaviours.’82 Consciousness, for example, is an emergent property of neural processes in 
the brain. Therefore, if water governance is a ‘range of political, social, economic and 
administrative systems’83 then cooperation may emerge when those systems develop 
particular attributes.  
The emergent property of a water network is derived from the interactions and feedback 
of nodes and links (representing natural, societal, and political variables and processes), 
and is not observable or inherent in any node or link of the network considered 
separately.84 According to Islam and Susskind, ‘[e]mergence raises serious questions about 
how we ought to manage complex water networks.’85 This is because:  
‘Emergence helps us understand why a given intervention (e.g., building 
a dam) to achieve a particular water management objective (e.g., 
hydropower generation) may lead to unexpected outcomes even though 
that strategy as worked in other locations to achieve the desired 
purpose…Emergent phenomena challenge our cognitive bias: we expect 
the same actions to have the same results.’86  
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The supplementary question of this thesis is what those attributes or conditions for 
cooperation are, and whether or not international actors can bring them about. It is 
important to note that these conditions will not always combine to produce the same 
outcome, but do increase the likelihood of it occurring. The concept of emergent 
properties is also central to the workings of ‘mechanisms’ (explained above) because, as 
Bygstad and Munkvold explain, ‘it is often a combination of objects that will trigger a 
mechanism, and produce an outcome that is dependent on, but not reducible to the 
objects…Whether the mechanism will be triggered, and which result it will produce, is not 
predetermined, but will depend on other active mechanisms. However, it will have a 
tendency to produce certain outcomes.’87 It is hypothesised in this thesis that the 
configuration of mechanisms that makes it more likely that transboundary cooperation 
will emerge are political will, trust, and Track II dialogue. Third parties are best placed to 
facilitate Track II dialogue, but less so to increase political will and trust between riparians. 
Transboundary water cooperation by definition emerges across boundaries. Those 
boundaries here refer to political boundaries, that is, borders between states. For Sadoff, 
Grey and Connors the state is the central element to transboundary cooperation: ‘Effective 
cooperation on an international watercourse is any action or set of actions by riparian 
states that leads to enhanced management or development of the watercourse to their 
mutual satisfaction.’88 This definition is problematic for two reasons. First, it may lead to 
the misconception that a treaty or international agreement is automatically a measure of 
cooperation. Second, it presumes governments are the only actors in water governance 
systems.  
A treaty between two or more riparians is not necessarily a measure of cooperation 
between them. As Warner and Zawahri argue, ‘even when international water agreements 
are signed, it does not mean contracting states are actually cooperating, and the lack of 
agreement does not mean riparian states are fighting. In other words, the presence of a 
treaty does not automatically translate into behavioural altering cooperation.’89 Zeitoun 
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and Jägerskog add that a treaty does not reflect the cooperation (or lack thereof) between 
states:  
‘Some treaties stand for so long that their words and the evolving (or 
devolving) reality on the waterfront are hopelessly distant. The existence 
of the Mahakali Treaty between India and Nepal, for example, cannot 
hide the lack of coordination between the two states. Its presence was 
nowhere felt when the 2008 Kosi flood caused widespread destruction 
on both sides of the border.’90  
They also argue that an inequitable treaty may in fact be part of the problem between 
riparians, and ‘the existence of an unfair and ineffective treaty can prevent a more 
equitable arrangement from being established.’91 
Moreover, while states are the primary and most powerful actors in transboundary water 
governance systems, they are not the only ones. As Mollinga argues, ‘[t]he political 
contestation of water policies takes place within state apparatuses, but also in the 
interaction of state institutions with the groups directly and indirectly affected by the 
policies, and in the context of development assistance strongly or weakly by international 
development agencies.’92 Together, this messy process is known as water interaction. 
When it occurs between states in regard to shared freshwater resources, it is called 
transboundary water interaction.  
Mirumachi defines transboundary water interaction as ‘relations of co-existing 
cooperation and conflicts among communities, groups or states over international or sub-
national water, with a focus here on inter-state interaction.’93 Central to the idea of water 
interaction is the understanding that conflict and cooperation can coexist. Strictly 
speaking, then, cooperation is transboundary water governance marked by low conflict, 
high cooperation – or, in Mirumachi’s terminology, positive interaction (as distinct from 
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negative or neutral interaction). This concept has already been discussed, but to reiterate, 
the brief definition of positive interaction is ‘inter-state interaction that generally tends to 
meet the interests of the actors, and contributes to improvement or sustained relations at 
the broader political level.’94 The term transboundary water cooperation, or just 
cooperation, is used within this thesis as shorthand to denote positive interaction, or low-
conflict, high-cooperation interaction. 
Track II dialogue 
One mode of water governance is that of deliberative governance. Deliberative water 
governance is the ‘constructive engagement in water governance arenas through 
promotion of inclusive, deliberative processes that emphasise different perspectives, 
critical analysis, learning and institution-building whilst respecting rights, accounting for 
risks, acknowledging responsibilities and fairly distributing rewards.’95 Within deliberative 
water governance there are, as Dore has shown, multiple tracks.96 Each track can be 
thought of as a form of dialogue or diplomacy.  
Track I Diplomacy, according to Petersen-Perlman and Wolf,  
‘involves supporting the conclusion of a formal agreement between 
riparian states, typically through mediation and facilitation. Track II 
Diplomacy tries to arrive at feasible development strategies on the 
ground through promoting informal dialogues, research and studies, 
and capacity building. Track III Diplomacy addresses policies at the 
national and local levels, which are typically at the root of 
transboundary water problems.’97   
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They note that ‘None of these strategies are mutually exclusive; for example, Track II 
Diplomacy efforts may eventually lead to the initiation of more formal, Track I 
discussions.’98  
As Dore points out, ‘Track 2 refers to state-civil society interactive forums that have 
emerged as complementary or parallel forums [to Track 1], which generally aim to enhance 
the effectiveness of state processes.’99 Of all the tracks, Track II diplomacy or dialogue is of 
most relevance to this thesis as it is the primary method through which international 
organisations and foreign aid donors, especially the World Bank-led South Asia Water 
Initiative, are attempting to increase transboundary water cooperation in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed.  
Track II dialogue is also a form of dispute resolution, and can be a complement to formal 
negotiations over a contentious issue or set of issues. Because Track II dialogue is most 
often applied in situations of conflict or dispute, a third party is likely to be involved. Jones 
notes that Track II dialogue is more often than not facilitated by a third party. He defines 
the process as:  
‘unofficial dialogues, generally between two antagonistic parties, and 
often facilitated by an impartial Third Party and involving individuals 
with some close connections to their respective official communities, 
focused on cooperative efforts to explore new ways to resolve differences 
over, or discuss new approaches to, policy-relevant issues.’100 
Salame shows that ‘Track II initiatives are useful when all parties in a relationship 
recognise that there is a divergence of views while neither side wants the situation 
spiralling out of control on a vital matter such as water resources’ and she argues that 
‘They build the cooperation route one block at a time. And they allow decision-makers to 
engage in political dialogue based on trust and mutual understanding.’101  
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Track II dialogue can certainly bring state and non-state actors together in an informal 
setting to discuss issues of mutual concern, however, as this thesis argues, this method 
alone cannot build transboundary water cooperation. Furthermore, failure of Track II 
dialogue may undermine state efficacy in improving water governance. As Dore shows in 
the case of the Mekong basin, ‘[l]oss of faith in Tracks 1 and 2 has led to the emergence of 
increasingly influential Tracks 3 and 4 [civil society to civil society interaction] in the 
Mekong Region that do not privilege state involvement and may proceed without it.’102 
What research gaps does this thesis fill? 
The year 2016 marks the end of the decade-long Abu Dhabi Dialogue, and as such is a 
fitting time to reflect on the effect that this World Bank-led Track II dialogue has had on 
transboundary water cooperation in South Asia – the prime objective of the initiative. 
Evaluating the Abu Dhabi Dialogue in this systematic way contributes to lessons learned 
from the Nile Basin Initiative (on which the Abu Dhabi Dialogue was based) and allows for 
better informed planning for future interventions of a similar nature. It also contributes to 
the knowledge around how the World Bank and other international organisations and 
foreign aid donors construct and conduct interventions into transboundary water 
governance. This is novel and significant because international organisation and bilateral 
aid donors have in recent decades been increasing their involvement in transboundary 
water governance in developing countries. The narrative around this trend implies that it 
is international organisations and foreign aid donors that are best placed to facilitate 
positive transboundary water interaction between riparian states. Yet, my research 
suggests that this may not always be the case. Insights from within the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed provide new approaches to addressing transboundary water 
conflicts and building cooperation. 
Numerous critiques exist about the World Bank, its financing, and its influence on 
international development. However, few, if any, critiques exist about the World Bank’s 
effect on transboundary water governance. This thesis can thus be taken as an overview of 
the World Bank in this regard, using the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed as a case 
study. 
As per the literature review chapter, this research also fits into the body of knowledge on 
transboundary water conflicts and cooperation (together known as water interaction). 
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This thesis deepens our understanding of transboundary water interaction by building on 
what is already known about the coexistence of conflict and cooperation and examining 
the conditions that are necessary for low conflict, high cooperation interaction to emerge 
in. Colopy notes that ‘[t]ransboundary river issues have become a field of study, an 
academic discipline. Emerging theories in this field draw on laws governing other natural 
resources, and on the success or failure of past river-sharing treaties. A body of precedents 
is emerging.’103 This thesis is a further contribution to this body of knowledge about how 
conflicts and cooperation emerge over specific transboundary rivers. 
Secondly, this thesis contributes to the still small but slowly growing body of knowledge 
about how foreign-led interventions can more effectively influence conditions in which 
transboundary interaction may become more cooperative. The focus on what conditions 
can enable transboundary water cooperation is novel and important because, as the 
literature review illustrates, while there are many studies on what transboundary 
cooperation looks like as an end state, there is very little on how to get there, especially 
through foreign-led interventions. 
Track II dialogue, or the informal discussions between government and non-government 
stakeholders facilitated by third parties, is increasingly the preferred method of 
international organisations and bilateral aid donors in interventions into water 
governance. Yet, as Jones has recently observed, ‘relatively little has been written on what 
the third party can do to assist in transfer [of ideas from Track II fora into praxis].’104 This 
thesis explores how international organisations and foreign aid donors may be able to 
influence the governance of transboundary waters, especially through the transfer of 
western ideas around good governance, cooperation, sustainable development, et cetera.  
In regards to knowledge of water governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, 
and South Asia more broadly, this research also fills an important gap. The region remains 
relatively under-analysed by scholars of water interaction, perhaps because the risk of 
violent conflict here seems less than that in more politically volatile basins (e.g., Nile, 
Jordan, Tigris-Euphrates). As such, there has not yet been a comprehensive study of the 
hydropolitics in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, nor of the effects of international 
actors on water conflicts and cooperation in this region. Yet, as Asthana and Shukla 
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believe, the hydropolitics in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed may be ‘one of the 
most urgent, complex, and contentious issues facing the regional community in the 
twenty-first century.’105 
At the same time, the literature does exist on water conflicts and cooperation in South 
Asia tends to be hawkish and focused on the national security aspects of transboundary 
water governance (a point that is elaborated in the literature review in Chapter 2). Much 
has been written about domestic water governance issues in India, Nepal, Bhutan and 
Bangladesh, but few studies have been conducted into transboundary water interaction in 
the Ganges or Brahmaputra basins. Malhorta shows that:  
‘[t]here is no systematic and well researched work on water issues in 
South Asia, which is a glaring discrepancy considering that this is an 
issue that seriously impacts most of the countries in South Asia. It is 
even starker to notice a complete absence of a comparative study of the 
bilateral water relations of a set of countries with the bilateral relations 
of another set of countries.’106  
This thesis fills this knowledge gap by examining the hydropolitics of the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed by comparing bilateral water relations between India-Nepal, 
India-Bhutan, and India-Bangladesh. 
Dash points out that very few systematic studies are available on regional cooperation in 
South Asia, and those that do exist focus mostly on historical or economic aspects rather 
than on the interplay of domestic considerations in regional interests and relationships.107 
Lahiri-Dutt adds that:  
‘Discussions regarding the water resources of South Asia conventionally 
begin with one of the three approaches: a description of the size of the 
population compared with the amount of land and water available, a 
description of population distribution and rainfall/water availability 
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figures, or an inventory of available water resources of any one 
country.’108  
This thesis moves beyond these conventional approaches and focuses instead on the 
quality of interaction between stakeholders that determines whether water resources, 
scarce or otherwise, are managed in a mutually agreeable way. 
The dearth of knowledge about transboundary hydropolitics in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed, however, is likely to change as donors and international organisations 
continue to increase investments in the governance of the region’s natural resources, 
including transboundary waters, in the near future. Matthew sees South Asia as likely to 
become ‘the linchpin of humanity’s collective effort’109 in the coming decades as the planet 
faces increasingly complex collective action problems. Mollinga too has noted the 
increasing international interest in the region’s hydropolitics. ‘South Asian water resources 
scholarship is experiencing an upsurge,’ he writes,  
‘[l]ike water itself, the expansion of writing on water during, say, the 
past 10 to 15 years has both quantitative and qualitative aspects. A recent 
publication on water conflicts in India states that there are a “million 
revolts in the making”. The growing volume of published work is no 
doubt a response to the proliferation of water management problems 
and the active contestations these involve.’110 
As such, this thesis responds to a need of international actors to better understand the 
nature of transboundary water interaction between India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. 
This is in accordance with the transdisciplinary approach, which stresses the importance 
of collaboration with non-academic stakeholders for the resolution of ‘real-world’ 
problems, and communicating research findings to these stakeholders.111  
The insights of this thesis may prove useful to program managers at the South Asia Water 
Initiative or the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade interested in 
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evaluating their water governance projects or amending plans for future interventions in 
this problemshed. These insights may also be of use to policymakers, negotiators, and 
scholars interested in transboundary water interaction in other international basins and 
problemsheds, now and into the future. 
What opportunities exist for further research? 
At the same time as filling the research gaps mentioned above, this thesis also creates 
opportunities for further studies. For a start, this thesis could be the start of a wider study 
into third party interventions, especially those led by the World Bank, into transboundary 
water conflict and cooperation the world over. ‘Unfortunately,’ argue Earle et al., ‘the 
World Bank has failed in its hope to bring South Asian countries within a common water-
sharing framework in line with the Nile Basin Initiative.’112 The World Bank involvement in 
water governance processes in other basins could provide fertile ground for further 
research. The comparison of the Nile Basin Initiative with the Abu Dhabi Dialogue and 
South Asia Water Initiative could be particularly insightful in this regard. Similarly, a 
comparison with the role of the Asia Development Bank (ADB) in other basins, the 
Mekong in particular, may revel important insights into the role of international 
organisations in transboundary water governance in developing countries.  
The World Bank is increasingly competing with other international organisations for 
investment opportunities and influence. A comparative study could be made of these 
organisations, such as the newly established Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
versus the World Bank in affecting water governance in developing countries. China is also 
emerging as a competitor to the World Bank in terms of financing hydro-engineering 
projects in developing countries, including Nepal and Bhutan. As Earle et al. explain, ‘The 
advent of China in the [Ganges-Brahmaputra] basin’s hydro-politics’, like in the Mekong 
and the Nile, has brought further complications and uncertainties.’113 The effect of these 
complications and uncertainties, especially in Nepal and Bhutan, could also be the subject 
of further research. 
In terms of furthering theory on water conflict and cooperation, further research is 
required to test the approaches for creating positive transboundary water interaction 
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identified in Chapter 5 by stakeholders from within the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed. Similarly, the hypothesis about political will, trust and dialogue as being 
necessary conditions for transboundary water cooperation could be tested in other basins 
or historical cases. This theory of transboundary water cooperation could also be tested 
through an expanded stepwise qualitative comparative analysis wherein the entire Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed becomes one of many case studies. Again, the Nile basin could 
provide an interesting comparison to the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin. 
This thesis is strong on illustrating how third parties can facilitate Track II dialogue, but 
weak on how (or if at all) external actors may be able to affect political will and trust 
between riparians. This is another avenue for further research.  
The chosen problemshed could also be examined through different theoretical lenses. For 
example, transboundary water governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed could 
be analysed as a complex adaptive system or through the lens of neo-colonialism to yield 
new insights into water interaction. Assemblage theory or actor-network theory could also 
be applied as an analytical frame to the same problemshed. It would also be interesting to 
examine the hydropolitics of the region in terms of the gender, social class and ethnic 
dimensions of water conflicts. 
The increasing scholarly interest in water justice, and the nexus between perceptions of 
(in-)justice and water disputes reveals another research gap: there has thus far been no 
comprehensive study of water justice issues in the transboundary water interaction in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, or the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin as a whole.  
One approach for conducting such research is in applying a critical institutionalism 
framework to tease out the social justice issues associated with transboundary water 
governance and the role of foreign-led interventions. Critical institutionalism, as Cleaver 
and de Koning point out, ‘explores how institutions dynamically mediate relationships 
between people, natural resources and society. It focuses on the complexity of institutions 
entwined in everyday social life, their historical formation, the interplay between formal 
and informal, traditional and modern arrangements, and the power relations that animate 
them. In such perspectives a social justice lens is often used to scrutinise the outcomes of 
institutional processes.’114 As such, it provides an interesting and relevant approach to 
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conduct further research on the chosen problemshed and deepen our understanding of 
transboundary water interaction. 
A further avenue for inquiry is that into the overall effectiveness of foreign-led 
interventions. Should international organisations and foreign aid donors ever intervene in 
transboundary water governance? Or are riparians without third party assistance more 
likely to reach mutually satisfactory outcomes than those with outside help?  
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
The research field in which this thesis sits is critical water studies (defined by Mollinga in 
2008 as political sociology of water resources management,115 and renamed critical water 
studies by Mollinga and Gondhalekar in 2014116). The topic area of focus is transboundary 
water conflicts and cooperation, and the specific topic is the role of foreign-led 
interventions in shaping conditions necessary for transboundary water cooperation to 
flourish. This review therefore covers three bodies of literature: the role of third parties in 
international dispute resolution; the nature of transboundary water conflicts and 
cooperation; and the recent emergence of the concept of ‘hydro-diplomacy’. 
The first section of this chapter provides an overview of knowledge about the role of third 
parties in conflict resolution and negotiations. Traditionally those roles have been 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication of disputes. The emphasis was on 
reaching agreement over specific issues within the limited scope of the negotiation 
process. The effects of external factors, such as culture or power dynamics between parties 
to the conflict, were rarely taken into account. In the late 1960s, however, a new method of 
international negotiations emerged: Track II diplomacy or dialogue. This is the idea that 
the relationships built and ideas discussed through informal channels or ‘pre-negotiation’ 
may have an overall positive effect on levels of cooperation between conflicted parties. The 
role of third parties in Track II dialogue is that of facilitation. The focus shifted away from 
reaching consensus and towards improving relations between stakeholders so that it 
would be easier to negotiate agreements in the future. 
The second section of this chapter explains the evolution of the concept of positive water 
interaction, starting from debates around the nature of water conflict and cooperation. 
Much is now known about what conflict and cooperation over shared water resources 
looks like. Yet, very little has been written about how international organisations and 
foreign aid donors could contribute to transboundary water cooperation. This is despite 
the fact that the involvement of aid donors and international organisations in 
transboundary water governance is increasing the world over. 
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What little literature does exist on the role of third parties in increasing transboundary 
water cooperation is covered in the third section of this chapter. Some of this literature 
suggests that the most important role for external actors is in facilitating benefit sharing 
arrangements between riparians. This, however, confuses cause and effect. Benefit sharing 
is largely an outcome of positive water interaction rather than a driver of it. Thus, while 
neutral third parties may be well positioned to mediate benefit sharing agreements (in the 
same way that a neutral third party can be used to mediate any negotiation), it is unlikely 
that riparians will come to the formal negotiation table without some degree of trust 
between them and political will to resolve the issues at hand. In other words, 
transboundary water cooperation is a precondition of benefit sharing rather than vice 
versa.  
The main focus in the literature on third party interventions in transboundary water 
governance is on dispute resolution rather than on creating positive water interaction. The 
difference here is subtle but important. Dispute resolution is about coming to terms on a 
specific issue, whereas positive interaction is a quality of governance or a situation within 
which disputes may exist, but which is overall cooperative. Only in recent years has the 
negotiation literature begun to take into account the broader, contextual factors that may 
sustain water disputes – much as the scholarly thinking on negotiation and diplomacy first 
centred on dispute resolution, and only slowly began to consider the effects of contextual 
factors such as culture and power dynamics.  
The emerging thinking is that third parties may have a role in facilitating general processes 
(similar to, or even explicitly called, Track II dialogue) that could sustain cooperation. This 
is sometimes known as water- or hydro-diplomacy. The role of international actors in 
facilitating such dialogues between conflicted riparians is of significance to this thesis 
because that is the primary role taken on by the World Bank through the South Asia 
Water Initiative (SAWI) in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed.  
Third parties and international conflict  
The role of third parties in conflict and cooperation is well documented in the literature 
on negotiations. This body of literature is extensive and negotiation theories are plentiful. 
For the purposes of this thesis, however, only negotiations relating to disputes over 
environmental resource management are of interest. Likewise, in transboundary water 
interaction – that is to stay, interaction primarily between states – it is state-to-state 
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negotiations that are of most relevance. As Elver points out, ‘[t]here is no question that 
international water disputes generally depend on state-to-state negotiation.’117  
State-to-state negotiations can be separated into two general categories; negotiation as 
formal, bounded conflict usually over a single issue, and negotiation as Track II dialogue, 
or a loose, complex, informal set of overlapping processes usually over numerous issues 
and usually between government and non-government actors. Importantly, a negotiation 
of either kind is neither the beginning nor the end of transboundary water interaction. As 
Tiwary states, ‘The politics (national or domestic) over water do not abruptly end with an 
international treaty; it just enters a new phase of inter- and intra-nation level scrutiny and 
criticisms.’118 
This section first outlines the traditional roles of third parties in negotiations, then 
discusses the role of power dynamics between parties to a dispute, and the cultural aspects 
of negotiation. The third sub-section focuses on Track II dialogue and the role of the third 
party as facilitator.  
Negotiation and dispute resolution: the third party as mediator, conciliator, arbitrator, 
or adjudicator 
Formal negotiations can be seen as a way of containing conflict within mutually acceptable 
and non-violent processes. The idea of negotiation as bounded conflict is, for Dore, 
‘critical for complex water governance where there is, more often than not, a divergence of 
interests between actors who also recognise there is a degree of mutual interdependence 
in resolving problems.’119 The divergence of interests is the root of conflicts, and formal 
negotiation is also primarily about conflict resolution.  
According to Cosgrove, ‘Negotiation is the means of dispute resolution most often 
employed by states when trying to resolve any international conflict, including those over 
transboundary water resources.’120 But different states will approach a formal negotiation 
differently at different times and for different purposes. It is possible to discern a national 
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negotiating style, but this is fluid and comprises of several difficult to quantify elements: 
culture, history, political systems, and position in the world.121 Negotiations are complex 
and most negotiation experts suggest that ‘strong and effective agreements are more 
difficult to reach as the number of actors increases.’122 
Formal negotiations can take various forms depending on the issues at stake and the 
number of states involved (e.g., bilateral talks, diplomatic correspondence, international 
conference) and these can be used at all stages of the conflict, although ‘[n]egotiations are 
considered merely as the first step that states usually take in resolving their dispute. If they 
fail or if parties are unable to enter into negotiations altogether, other means of dispute 
settlement are available to them, and all are based on the involvement of a neutral third 
party.’123 The involvement of a third party is more often than not a consideration in formal 
negotiations, where parties to the conflict may seek assistance in reaching agreement. 
That is because, as Faure explains, the purpose of a formal negotiation is ‘to find a formula 
for the distribution of a contested value or set of values between the negotiating parties. 
Thus negotiation is a joint decision-making process through which negotiating parties 
accommodate their conflicting interests into a mutually acceptable settlement.’124  
Third parties, then, can be neutral shepherds of a negotiated settlement. The roles that 
third parties can play in a formal negotiation are relatively clear: mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, adjudication. A neutral third party (be it a state, joint body, international 
organisation, or an individual) can offer ‘good offices’ to the conflicting states, and act as a 
‘go-between’ in order to persuade them to enter into negotiations.125 Mediation is a step 
towards more active third-party participation in the formal negotiations, because a 
mediator provides assistance to the disputing parties in finding a solution.126 Conciliation 
is an effort to reconcile opposing contentions; the parties to the dispute are left free to 
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accept or reject the proposals formulated by third parties.127 However, as Cosgrove points 
out, ‘[t]he boundaries between good offices, mediation, and conciliation are sometimes 
blurred, and one procedure can often lead to another.’128  
Two further roles for third parties include arbitration and adjudication. Arbitration allows 
parties to the conflict to nominate the arbitrator(s) who will hear the dispute, and to 
determine the law governing the substance and procedure of the case, where the dispute 
will be heard, and the language of the arbitration.129 States embroiled in transboundary 
water conflict may also agree to have their cases heard by an ad hoc or permanent court, 
such as the International Court of Justice.130 However, as Islam and Susskind point out, 
assigning a higher authority has become an increasingly unpopular approach to water 
conflict resolution in recent years and instead a negotiated settlement is considered 
preferable.131 Lastly, a third party could conduct an inquiry or fact-finding process designed 
to produce an impartial finding of disputed facts because, as Cosgrove shows, many 
international disputes arise from disagreements over questions of fact. Inquiry and fact-
finding are procedures specifically.132 
Nonetheless, reaching a settlement or formal agreement through mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration or adjudication is not necessarily the same as developing cooperation between 
conflicted parties. As Qaddumi points out, ‘[u]ltimately, cooperation rests not on objective 
measure of gains to be had, but rather on the subjective perceptions held by these various 
groups and how these are played out in the policies, institutional arrangements and, 
finally, treaties.’133 It is easy but misleading, according to Habeeb, to think of negotiations 
as simply a series of offers, demands, and concessions, in which the two sides inch toward 
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an agreement.134 Yet this is the basis of the benefit sharing approach to creating 
transboundary water cooperation. Benefit sharing is described in the final section of this 
chapter. 
How, then should negotiations be understood if not as a series of offers and counter-
offers? Habeeb describes three main approaches to understanding formal negotiations in 
international relations: game theory, concession/convergence theory, and behavioural 
theory. Game theory reduces negotiation to rational-choice behaviour, and sees actors 
pursuing a strategy of minimising own losses and maximising own gains. But game theory 
has little relevance for international negotiation, in which power has many sources and 
dimensions, and in which there are numerous tactics and actors.135  
Concession/convergence theories of formal negotiation posit that the parties start with 
stalemate and in an action-reaction process respond to each other’s concession rate 
behaviour, thus converging toward an outcome. Concession/convergence theories do not 
provide a clear conception of power, Habeeb argues, and instead assume that the overall 
weaker party will concede more and at a faster rate. Thus,  
‘[l]ike game theory, concession/convergence theories are deterministic. 
They assume that, once the process begins, the actors will behave in a 
predictable way…This deterministic quality makes it virtually impossible 
to inject a dynamic conception of power into concession/convergence 
theories, and makes them of only limited use in understanding 
international negotiation.’136  
The third school of thought on formal negotiation is the psychological-behavioural 
approach, and it is one of the oldest. It attempts to explain negotiation outcomes by 
analysing personality traits and characterises them as hard-line, soft-line, interpersonal, 
motivational orientation and need orientation. Thus this approach looks at the agent 
rather than the process of negotiation, and moreover, the characteristics of the agent 
rather than the actions of the agent. It is through action that power and power tactics are 
revealed, argues Habeeb, and therefore the psychological-behavioural approach does not 
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reveal the process by which outcomes are caused. This psychological-behavioural 
knowledge, however, may explain the behaviour of the actors, such as the responsiveness 
of the opponents’ behaviour, the choice of tactics, et cetera, and thus illuminates the 
process.137  
These three approaches do not account for the full breadth of complexity of negotiations 
because, according to Habeeb, ‘[t]hey offer too narrow an understanding of a multifaceted 
phenomenon. Negotiation is not only strategic choice, or only concession and 
convergence, or only a reflection of the psychological makeup of the actors.’138 Instead, he 
argues, the context of culture and power dynamics between actors has as much of an 
influence on building cooperation as does the process of formal negotiations. Culture and 
power dynamics in negotiations are the subject of the following sub-section. 
Context: the role of culture and power in influencing cooperation 
In addition to the well-defined roles of mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and 
adjudication, third parties may be able to assist riparians in pre-negotiation efforts. This 
role could include ensuring that the appropriate stakeholders are at the table, that they are 
well prepared, and specify a timetable, ground rules, agenda, and fact-finding procedures 
before formal negotiations begin. Islam and Susskind argue that it is these pre-negotiation 
efforts, rather than what happens within the formal negotiation process, that largely 
determine the success or failure of attempts at transboundary water dispute resolution.139 
Faure and Sjostedt add that ‘[o]utcome is the function of all of the other dimensions of 
negotiation: actors, structure, strategy, and process. Accordingly, the impact of culture on 
these other elements of negotiation eventually also indirectly influences the outcome.’140  
Similarly, Tiwary shows that considerations outside of the negotiation table affect the 
outcome of formal negotiations. He argues that above all else, ‘international water conflict 
resolution requires considerable political will on all the sides’ and sustained motivation to 
reach agreement.141 Tiwary also argues that states negotiate not only in reaction to other 
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riparians, but also in reaction to domestic politics. For example, ‘[i]n nations where threats 
of water security are more apparent, or in a relatively weaker state (which strikes a deal 
with stronger states), there are dangers of negotiators – political 
parties/institutions/individuals – being labelled as villains who compromised over national 
well-being’142 and the fear of this colours the negotiation dynamic. Thus, understanding 
the cultural context and power dynamics between riparians is important in understanding 
informal negotiations over transboundary waters, and political will on the part of the 
stakeholders is an important factor in conflict resolution.  
Culture influences international negotiations to the extent that the human factor plays a 
role, argues Lang, and negotiators ‘represent their professional culture at least as much as 
they represent their national culture.’143 Both professional and national culture affect how 
riparians perceive issues, other actors, and their intentions. Faure and Sjostedt go as far as 
to say that:  
‘culture may determine the whole outlook on negotiation. 
Representatives of some cultures tend to regard negotiation as a power 
confrontation, whereas others view it as a cooperative venture. 
Negotiators from some cultures are strongly result oriented: they tend to 
focus on the outcome and the ways to get there. In other cultures the 
negotiation process represents significant values that must be 
defended.’144  
Culture, then, affects how riparians approach negotiation processes, but it also affects the 
role and approach of third parties. As Faure and Sjostedt point out, any actor in a 
negotiation, be it a party to the dispute or a mediator, et cetera, is likely to assess foreign 
cultures through their own cultural lenses. Those characterised by ethnocentrism have ‘a 
marked tendency to interpret and judge other cultures by their own standards. The effect 
may be an inclination to belittle or misinterpret the intentions or design of other parties 
involved in the negotiations. To the extent that negotiators behave along these lines, they 
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are likely to impede an agreement.’145 This limits the neutrality of any third party involved 
in transboundary water negotiations.  
The importance of the cultural factors is largely overlooked in the literature on negotiation 
theory except that, as Zartman claims, ‘the only negotiations outcome that culture is 
purported to explain is failure.’146 Similarly, the role of power relations is also largely 
missing from the literature on formal negotiations. Habeeb argues that the three 
traditional approaches to understanding conflict resolution (described above) do not 
address the concept of power in negotiation, yet ‘[a] conception of power in negotiation 
must be sufficiently comprehensive if it is in any way to illuminate what happens in the 
causal process that leads to outcomes.’147 This argument is similar to that of Zeitoun et al. 
in the context of transboundary water conflicts and cooperation (discussed in the 
following section of this chapter). And much like Zeitoun et al., Habeeb does not see 
power or hegemony as being deterministic in the sense of always leading to outcomes in 
favour of the dominant party. 
Habeeb identifies three types of power: aggregate structural power, issue power, and 
tactical or behavioural power. The first is an actor’s total resources and capabilities (for 
example, India has the greatest political, economic, military, and soft power strength in 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed). Issue power is an actor’s resources and 
capabilities within the context of a specific issue (for example, a relatively small and weak 
country may have great issue power if, like Bhutan, it is upstream of a hydro-hegemon 
that, like India, has a strong interest in its freshwater resources). The third type of power is 
tactical, or behavioural power, and refers to an actor’s ability to use its power resources to 
attain objectives148 Chapter 3 illustrates that Nepal has low tactical power as it is unable to 
harness its political resources to obtain water-related objectives due to numerous and 
conflicting other priorities on the political agenda. 
It is issue power, argues Habeeb, that largely determines the process and outcome of state-
to-state negotiation. Furthermore, the aim of tactical power – an actor’s ability to use its 
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power resources – is ‘to alter the issue power balance in a more favourable direction.’149 
Habeeb shows that:  
‘[t]he negotiation process consists of the tactical efforts by each side to 
change the pre-negotiation issue power balance in a more favourable 
direction so as to achieve more of its preferred outcomes in an 
agreement. The final agreement thus reflects the final issue power 
balance. It redefines the two sides’ interdependent relationship in a 
particular issue area. But the outcome says nothing about the aggregate 
power balance between the two sides.’150  
The case of transboundary water governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is 
illustrative of this dynamic. Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh are trying to use tactical power 
to negotiate more favourable water outcomes with India. Only Bhutan has succeeded in 
increasing issue power (this is discussed further in Chapter 3). But none of it affects the 
overall power asymmetry between the hydro-hegemon and the weaker riparians. 
Understanding the effect of power dynamics and the cultural context on negotiations 
illuminates the nature of conflict and conflict resolution, but reveals little about the role of 
third parties in facilitating transboundary cooperation. It was not until the development of 
Track II dialogue that the importance of factors outside of the formal negotiation process 
began to be recognised and addressed by third parties.  
Track II dialogue: the third party as facilitator 
Track II dialogue has its genesis in the mid-1960s when an Australian former diplomat, 
John Burton, and his colleagues at University College London challenged the prevailing 
realist notions of international negotiations. They developed the view that human factors 
such as dialogue, communication, values, and relationships between individuals could be 
equally important in avoiding and resolving international conflicts as the factors identified 
by game theory, concession/convergence theory, and behavioural theory. From the very 
beginning, points out Jones, Track II dialogue, like conflict resolution generally, ‘has 
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struggled to establish credibility in the eyes of hard-nosed, realist-oriented officials and 
academics.’151  
Burton tested his theory by developing a new process to help resolve a boundary dispute 
between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Burton and his colleagues called the new 
process ‘controlled communication’, and it consisted of informal, unofficial workshops, 
chaired by a neutral third party who facilitated the protagonists’ mutual analysis of 
problems with the aim of helping them develop solutions that were not apparent through 
traditional diplomatic techniques. This new method attracted the attention of the 
academic community and soon a small but active ‘scholar-practitioner’ community arose, 
intent on furthering Burton’s ideas.152  
These ideas fit in well with other new ideas about democracy, such as deliberative 
governance. The principles of Track II dialogue accord with those of good governance (a 
concept that reappears in Chapter 4 in relation to the ideological drivers of third parties in 
transboundary water conflict and cooperation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed). 
Deliberative governance, like Track II dialogue, is about creating and nurturing the 
‘preconditions for positive changes and their institutionalisation by strategic nudging 
within these admittedly complex arenas.’153 
The role of the third party in this nascent ‘interactive problem solving’ approach was 
further developed by Herbert Kelman, a Harvard-based social psychologist. Kelman 
defined his model as ‘an academically based, unofficial third party approach, bringing 
together representatives of parties in conflict for direct communication.’ He saw the role of 
the third party in this arrangement as being different to that of a traditional mediator. 
Mediators propose solutions (and arbitrators impose them), while third parties in Track II 
dialogue facilitate a process whereby solutions will emerge out of the interaction between 
the parties themselves: ‘[t]he tasks of the third party is to provide the setting, create the 
atmosphere, establish the norms, and offer the occasional interventions that make it 
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possible for such a process to evolve.’154 This is the model on which third party 
interventions in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed are also based. 
Jones sees the involvement of a third party as the defining feature of Track II dialogue:  
‘[t]he term relates to the idea that most Track Two features two parties 
who are in conflict plus a third party who is present to arrange and 
facilitate the interaction. Not all Track Two requires an outside third 
party. But the majority of Track Two processes, and the great majority of 
conflict resolution-oriented Track Two processes, feature a third 
party.’155  
But is a third party really necessary in Track II dialogue? Could people from societies in 
conflict quietly come together themselves to brainstorm about possible ways forward?  
Most of the literature on Track II dialogue takes the view that a third party is necessary, 
and Jones argues that the heart of Track II dialogue is the inability or unwillingness of the 
protagonists to the conflict to come together of their own accord. Furthermore, he argues, 
brainstorming by the parties themselves may not be enough, and under the wrong 
circumstances it may do more harm than good. Jones shows that:  
‘the role of a third party is to gently steer the conversation down more 
productive paths; in effect, the idea behind Track Two is not just that 
the parties engage in brainstorming but that they engage in a particular 
kind of facilitated discussion [emphasis in original]. Absent this role, the 
conversation can degenerate into a frustrating bargaining session which 
holds little promise, especially in a highly charged, emotional situation 
where the conflict is deemed to be intractable; in such circumstances, 
what is there to bargain over?’156 
Jones’ point is at the crux of this thesis: if there is trust between riparians and political will 
to take action, then there is no need for facilitated Track II dialogue (though third parties 
may provide technical assistance). Track II dialogue becomes an option for dispute 
resolution only when those two factors are missing. Yet the absence of trust between 
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riparians and lack of political will for building transboundary water cooperation is also 
what undermines Track II dialogue. That is to say, Track II is more likely to succeed if 
there is trust between the parties, or when there is political will for action. Certainly, Track 
II dialogue may contribute to the development of one or both of those conditions, but that 
is a long term enterprise and highly unpredictable.  
Furthermore, third parties, though central to Track II dialogue, may also contribute to the 
worsening of a situation. As John Burton, the Australian former diplomat credited with 
pioneering Track II dialogue, has said, ‘the intervention of a third party into relationships 
between others is a delicate task and can easily do more harm than good.’157 The third 
party should have some knowledge of the specifics of the conflict, but a firm grasp of 
group dynamics is essential.158 Neutrality, however, may not always be necessary. Jones 
argues that the  
‘[s]o-called insider-partial third parties, those who have well-developed 
and well-known views on the conflict, may be just as effective. What 
seems to be necessary is that the third party be able to convey that it will 
run the process in a fair and impartial way and will not, due to its own 
views, disadvantage anyone at the table.’159  
Moreover, third parties will always act out of a mixture of motivations and objectives 
(Chapter 4 examines these drivers of external actors in the Ganges-Brahmaputra basin). 
This does not necessarily impair their neutrality or effectiveness, but ‘[w]hatever the third 
party’s motivations are, it is vital to reflect on them and be honest about them up front.’160 
What other qualities must the third party possess in order to fulfil the role of facilitator? 
Saunders writes of the ‘wise citizens, well prepared.’ For Jones, this definition illuminates 
two important characteristics of the third party: ‘first, political sophistication, both of a 
general nature and relative to the conflict at hand…and second, the ability to create an 
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environment in which the people in conflict will gradually feel safe enough to open 
themselves up to the third party, and to each other.’161 
One of the tasks of the third party in Track II dialogue is to build a relationship of trust 
between the parties in the conflict to a level that is sufficient for them to be drawn into a 
conversation in which they will gradually reconsider the meaning of the conflict and 
simultaneously reveal their innermost perceptions of the conflict to each other. Moreover,  
‘[i]f two parties who profoundly mistrust each other are to begin a face-
to-face interaction and sustain it over time, they must be able to trust at 
least someone in the room; they must be able to designate someone 
present as the repository of their trust until they can come to feel at 
least some trust for the other side. This is the role of the third party.’162  
To gain and retain the trust of the parties in the dispute is thus, according to Jones, the 
single most important factor in the eventual success of conflict resolution. The 
environment within which the third party begins working is, by definition, particularly 
lacking in trust, and once broken, trust is not easily regained.163 
In conclusion, trust between parties is a necessary condition for Track II dialogue to 
succeed in contributing to the resolution of international disputes and building 
cooperative relationships between states. At the same time, Jones points out that ‘real 
peace is made as a result of a complex and interlocking web of factors, and that Track Two, 
however important in getting a dialogue going, is but one of these.’164 The following 
section of this chapter turns to the idea of what Jones’ ‘real pace’ looks like in the literature 
on transboundary water interaction. 
Water conflict, cooperation and interaction 
States will continue to engage in armed conflict and political disputes ‘whether or not 
scholars acknowledge the link between the environment and security’ argues S. Dinar, and 
similarly there is a rich history of cooperation over water ‘regardless of scholarly debate on 
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cooperation and the environment. The debate regarding the link between water, conflict, 
and cooperation is thus futile and has become a scholarly debate marred by polemics and 
semantics.’165 The nuances of this debate are the subject of this section of the literature 
review. 
In the body of knowledge on transboundary water security, conflict and cooperation – 
together sometimes referred to as water interaction – there are, according to Jägerskog and 
Zeitoun, three broad camps. In the first camp, scholars ‘emphasise the causal relationships 
between water scarcity (or floods) and violent conflict or poverty.’ In the second, scholars 
‘contend that the evidence of cooperation that exists globally suggests a 
comforting trend towards stability and wealth. The third camp sits 
between the two. Not indecisive fence-sitters, this latter group stresses 
the existence of numerous water conflicts that fall short of violence. 
They focus on the need to resolve conflicts equitably and balance 
concerns for livelihoods and the environment.’166  
I too fit into this third camp and contribute to it by exploring ways in which third parties 
can help resolve conflicts and increase levels of cooperation. Below is a commentary on 
how these three camps have developed and relate to each other, and the directions that 
scholarship on water interaction has taken in recent years. In particular, it focuses on the 
output of scholars associated with the London Water Research Group, which has been 
especially influential to this thesis. The London Water Research Group is based at King’s 
College, London, and ‘gathers international water professionals, activists and scholars 
form the social and natural sciences to facilitate the analysis of transboundary water 
management, politics and policy.’167 The scholars affiliated with this group who are also of 
particular interest here include Mirumachi, Zeitoun, and Warner. 
Water war versus water peace 
‘The next war will be fought over water, not politics,’ claimed Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the 
former Secretary-General of the United Nations, in 1991. Four years later, the vice 
president of the World Bank, Ismail Serageldin, said ‘[i]f the wars of this century were 
fought over oil, the wars of the next century will be fought over water – unless we change 
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our approach to managing this precious and vital resource.’ And in 2001, Kofi Annan, also 
a Secretary-General of the United Nations, speculated at the 97th Annual Meeting of the 
Association of American Geographers that ‘[f]ierce competition for freshwater may well 
become a source of conflict and wars in the future.’ These quotes more or less mark the 
period in which the possibility of wars – or at least violent conflict – over water resources 
preoccupied scholars of transboundary hydropolitics, and defined their main concern. 
A secondary concern for scholars in this period has been the question of how to quantify 
conflict and cooperation once they have been defined. The purpose of the classification 
method is to assess hydropolitics in specific transboundary river basins, and to predict the 
likelihood of war. Several such scales of conflict and cooperation exist. The most 
commonly used of these is Yoffe et al.’s Water Event Intensity Scale, which ranks water-
related events from -7 (formal declaration of war) to +7 (voluntary unification into one 
nation).168 Zeitoun and Mirumachi also refer to the NATO stages of conflict development, 
ranging from war to durable peace, and Delli-Priscoli’s continuum of alternative dispute 
resolution techniques.169 The assumption underlying these scales is that conflict and 
cooperation are direct opposites of each other. The binary distinction between water peace 
and water conflict has also until very recently dominated scholarship of hydropolitics. 
The debate between proponents of the water wars thesis, and those who foresee an era of 
water peace is well documented. As Cosgrove points out in a report prepared for UNESCO 
in 2003, there is one school of thought that says water wars are inevitable; the counter-
movements claims that learning to cooperate in sharing water will build peace.170 
Commenting on this debate, Chellaney, who himself belongs firmly in the water wars 
camp, says that:  
‘[i]n one sense, this is a clash between idealistic and realistic views, 
which is not uncommon in a wide range of disciplines in the social 
sciences, humanities, and natural sciences. In another sense, such an 
intellectual divide can act as a brake on attempts to turn water into a 
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pressing strategic concern demanding concerted, integrated action at 
the subbasin, basin, and international levels. The water-peace school 
tends to look back at the past, rather than at how the new security 
challenges in an era of growing water scarcity could shape the future.’171 
It is true that those who argue against imminent water wars do so more often than not on 
the basis that historical international relations over shared freshwater resources are 
overwhelmingly cooperative172 and that ‘a water war, as such, has never actually 
occurred.’173 The water peace school, however, does not diminish the importance of water 
security issues. On the contrary. Some scholars contend that it is precisely the urgency 
with which water scarcity and mismanagement issues need to be resolved that will bring 
riparians together. As Uitto and Duda show, ‘there is evidence that water may also become 
the unifying resource around which countries cooperate’ and that ‘[s]hared water 
resources can actually provide the basis for cooperation and sharing of benefits, rather 
than conflict, provided that the threats to the international waters are objectively 
recognised and institutional structures for collaboration are created.’174  
The scholar most famously associated with the ‘water rationality’ view is Aaron Wolf, who 
has argued since the mid-1990s that shared interests along a waterway seem to overwhelm 
water’s conflict-inducing characteristics and, once water management institutions are in 
place, they tend to be consistently resilient.175 Wolf et al. add that while water can certainly 
be both an irritant (in the sense of making bad relations worse) as well as a unifier, 
ultimately in the context of transboundary hydropolitics, ‘international waters can act as a 
unifier in basins with relatively strong institutions.’176 
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The counter-argument to this position is that good governance and institutional resilience 
can only go so far; increasing water scarcity, due to growing demand, rapid population 
growth, environmental degradation, and climate change, will stretch already stressed 
resources to breaking point and competition will turn into conflict. Homer-Dixon is the 
most prominent champion of this idea, and of environmental resource scarcity in general 
being the increasingly common cause of conflicts. He identifies three types of conflict that 
can arise out of environmental scarcity: scarcity, group-identity, and deprivation conflict. 
Scarcity conflicts will likely arise over river water, prime fisheries, and good cropland 
because these are the resources most critical to human survival. Group identity conflicts 
are likely to arise from large-scale displacements of populations due to environmental 
scarcity and degradation. Deprivation conflicts arise out of anger at widening disparity in 
standards of living.177 
Wolf is not convinced by this theory. He argues that scarcity itself is not a cause of water 
conflict; indeed, cooperation actually increases during droughts, and naturally arid 
countries have a high level of cooperation over water.178 Yoffe et al. concur. For them, 
scarcity is not the only factor in water conflict, and looking solely at factors such as volume 
of water available per capita does not take into account spatial variability in water 
resources within countries and the technological or economic adaptation of nations at 
different level of development.179 In this school of thought, the planet does not suffer from 
a shortage of water but from the mismanagement of it.180 
The mismanagement of water resources is not a problem exclusively at the global or 
national scale. Some of the most inequitable allocations of water occur at local and 
regional scales. Even Wolf concedes that while transboundary water conflicts are rare, 
there are countless instances of water-related violence – but these incidents occur at sub-
national level, often between tribes, water use sectors, or states.181 For this reason, he 
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argues, it is also incorrect to speak of a state’s priorities and approaches to water resource 
management as homogenous because subsets of national actors have different values and 
priorities, and this is where most conflicts occur, e.g., between rural and urban 
populations.182 At the same time, as Conca reminds us, sub-state water conflicts  
‘may be driven by powerful external forces. The growth of industrial fish 
farming is fuelled by changing consumer tastes in rich countries. Big 
hydroelectric projects in remote locations often power industrial 
processing facilities that plug into the global economy, while bypassing 
local economies and imposing a heavy burden on local communities’183 
Resource scarcity and conflict 
Contemporary global challenges – unprecedented population growth, rising demand for 
food and energy, rapid urbanisation, climate change, and food security – have given rise to 
fears of conflicts over natural resources such as water. Such fears are significant here 
because they drive, in part, international actors to improve transboundary water 
cooperation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. 
Although, as discussed above, the threat of imminent global water wars has been largely 
discredited, the relationships between freshwater scarcity and conflict has, according to 
Warner and Zawahri, regained momentum in light of climate change.184 Recent 
intelligence reports and war games conclude that over the next two or three decades 
vulnerable regions of the world (particularly sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East, and South 
and Southeast Asia) will face the prospect of food shortages, water crises and catastrophic 
flooding driven by climate change.185 As Campbell et al. explain, ‘[t]ensions could increase 
within and between states that experience shrinking water supply; countries with an 
abundant water supply could seek to exploit it for diplomatic advantage.’186  
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Evans suggests that there are three types of threats. The first is the knock-on social, 
economic or security impacts caused by acute shocks driven by climate change (such as 
extreme weather events) or resource scarcity (such as price spikes). The second is the risk 
of large-scale unplanned migration as the result of increasing environmental degradation 
(though, Evans warns, the idea of ‘climate refugees’ is unhelpful in that it implies an 
unrealistic mono-causality). The third threat is that existing international legal structures 
may be rendered outdated or irrelevant by changing environmental circumstances, thus 
paving the way for novel disputes that existing law may struggle to manage.187  
This last point may be especially relevant for transboundary water governance. As Evans 
argues,  
‘[t]rans-boundary water sharing agreements may become sources of 
conflict rather than co-operation as flows and water levels change, 
particularly where agreements are based on a set volume of water rather 
than a percentage of what is available (and above all when the rate of 
change in access outpaces institutions’ capacity to adapt); hydropower-
sharing agreements also risk being undermined by changing water 
flows, particularly in regions affected by glacial melting with the risk of 
above-average flows as glaciers melt being followed by droughts once 
they have disappeared’188  
Climate change, moreover, is likely to worse existing tensions, especially over natural 
resources,189 and the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defence Review recognises climate change as 
an ‘accelerant of instability or conflict.’190 That is the salient point here: climate change in 
itself is not a cause of conflict, but may exacerbate disputes in volatile regions that lack the 
resilience to deal with the effects of climate change. As Evans points out, ‘it is important to 
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remember that the actual risk of violent conflict posed by climate change or resource 
scarcity depends as much on the vulnerability of populations, ecosystems, economies and 
institutions as on the strength of climate or scarcity impacts.’191 Nonetheless, the nexus of 
climate change, migration and conflict, in the words of Werz and Conley, ‘will test the 
capabilities of…the world to manage global security in ways never thought.’192 At the same 
time, as Earle et al. point out, ‘[t]he advent of China in the [Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna] 
basin’s hydro-politics’, like in the Mekong and the Nile, has brought further complications 
and uncertainties.’193 All these factors culminate as the starting point for the World Bank 
and other international actors engaged in reducing conflict and increasing transboundary 
cooperation water management in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. This is 
discussed further in Chapter 4. 
Water security and the securitisation of water 
The concept of water security is a related one to that of water conflicts and cooperation. As 
S. Dinar points out,  
‘security does not end with nor does it only imply armed conflict. 
Because the pursuit of peace, and thus conflict and cooperation, 
constitutes the flip side of security, water is indeed relevant to the 
concept of security. It is this phenomenon that traditionalists have cast 
off as irrelevant and other rejectionists of the environment-security link 
have ignored.’194  
What, then, is water security? UN Water defines water security as:  
‘[t]he capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to 
adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining 
livelihoods, human well-being, and socio-economic development, for 
ensuring protection against water-borne pollution and water-related 
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disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and 
political stability.’195  
This definition is well established in international development and human security 
literature. 
The concept of water security also finds a place in the literature of national security and 
defence, and in the field of international relations. The so-called Copenhagen School of 
critical security studies has been instrumental in broadening the understanding of security 
and developing a theory of securitisation. Securitisation theory claims that threats from 
which protection is needed may not necessarily be physical and currently existing, but 
instead they are socially constructed. Moreover, a ‘securitising actor may discursively 
establish that the survival of the referent object is in danger through speech acts... 
Consequently, securitising an issue shifts the focus from normal politics and its procedures 
to one of emergency politics or “panic politics”.’196  
The idea that water may be securitised by state actors to further a political agenda has 
been of interest to the London Water Research Group. Warner, for example, has been 
instrumental in applying the work of Buzan et al. to transboundary hydropolitics.197 
Mirumachi’s study of India’s securitisation of the Tanakpur barrage on the Nepalese 
border198 is especially illuminating and relevant to this thesis on the hydropolitics of the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, which includes this barrage. 
Buzan et al. from the Copenhagen School have also identified five security sectors: 
military; environmental; economic; society; and politics.199 The military sector of security 
concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states 
and states’ perceptions of each other’s intentions. The political involves the organisation 
stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. 
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The economic considers the access to resources, finance and markets that is necessary to 
sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. The societal is about traditional 
patterns of language, culture, religion, national identity and custom. The environmental 
incorporates the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential 
support system on which all other human enterprises depend.200 Hill notes that for the 
Copenhagen School, ‘there is nothing objective about any environmental resource, such as 
transboundary waters, being cast as a security threat and this process should instead be 
seen as an inherently socially constructed process.’201 As discussed in the methodology in 
Chapter 1, this thesis too understands water security as being socially constructed. 
Water security has been conceptualised as a sub-set within each of these sectors because 
there are economic, social, political, environmental and even military aspects to water 
management. But of the five security sectors, environmental security is most closely 
associated with water security in policy and, indeed, frequently used interchangeably with 
water security. Both water security and environmental security are neologisms arising out 
of the realisation among international relations scholars that the environment is not 
endlessly abundant and perpetually resilient, and that environmental issues do not respect 
state or institutional borders. Since the late 1960s there has been a growing awareness that 
ecological health must be an essential ingredient in any recipe for (inter)national order.202  
The difficulty of ensuring international water security is that the reasonable, equitable and 
sustainable utilisation of international water courses has long been constrained by 
national sovereignty and security priorities. Transboundary water management is a wicked 
problem, with competing interests of agricultural uses, industrial development, 
environmental sustainability, water sanitation, hydroelectric energy production, et cetera. 
These uses compete for prominence at the national level, and are sometimes irreconcilable 
with the same competing priorities of neighbouring littoral states. As Mirumachi points 
out, the pursuit of one nation’s water use priorities may be considered a security threat to 
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another.203 For example, if an upstream nation retains water during summer months for 
hydro-electricity production during winter, its downstream neighbour may be left with 
inadequate water supply for its agricultural production during the peak growing season. 
Hill argues that the concept of water security should move beyond state-centric 
understandings of security, and focus instead on individual or human security. That, in 
turn, may lead to more just and equitable distribution of water resources. Hill shows that 
‘[t]he securitisation of the environment has a now well-drawn academic lineage’ but that 
the most prominent thinkers on environmental security ‘frequently advocate new 
measures to ensure that states [emphasis mine] can safeguard their resources,’ especially 
transboundary water resources.204 As such, Hill points out that ‘the discussion of water as a 
security issue is framed in a way that is almost exclusively about the role of the state and 
its capacity to exercise its sovereignty in ways that reduce the existential threat posed by 
an outside force.’205 But, he adds, the notion of security itself is increasingly contested, and 
the definition of security is now being expanded. More importantly,  
‘the focus on the overwhelming primacy of the state has given way to different 
interpretations of how power operates, the potential of other actors to contest the 
hegemony of the state, and a change in the locus of attention from security defined by 
national interests to individual security. Scholars now argue that the way that security is 
defined is an inherently political action.’206In light of the traditional state-centrism of 
security concerns, cooperation between states over shared waters is still largely seen and 
interpreted as infringing the sovereignty of riparian states, according to Pachova et al.207 
Claims to sovereignty have only strengthened since the rise of democratisation in the post-
Cold War era. An increasing number of people in different states across the globe now 
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understand sovereignty as the exclusive right to exercise supreme political authority over a 
geographical region, a group of people or oneself, and that this sovereignty is held directly 
by the people.208 Zeitoun and Jägerskog argue that the push for ‘hydro sovereignty’ at the 
2009 World Water Forum is a reversion of sorts to the Harmon Doctrine (a territorial 
sovereignty theory wherein riparian states have exclusive rights over water flowing in their 
territory)209 that had been abandoned over a century ago.210 With the resurgence hydro 
sovereignty claims it is perhaps not surprising that the mere suggestion of another 
national or trans-national coalition making decisions affecting one nation’s territory or 
social welfare, even positively, can create emotional backlash and a securitisation of water 
issues.  
The post-Cold War era of democratisation and globalisation has also seen a proliferation 
of influence of non-state domestic actors in national decision-making on traditionally 
foreign policy debates. The definitions of sovereignty and security have also begun to 
evolve, and while these changes entail new threats to collective action problems such as 
international water security, Jansky et al. argue that they also present new opportunities.211 
Even proponents of the water wars thesis such as Chellaney understand that water 
insecurity and water conflict cannot adequately be dealt with through the traditional tools 
of national defence alone.212 Pachova et al. make a strong argument for the re-examination 
of water governance cases through the lens of human security rather than state 
sovereignty, as commonly done in the past.213 Another approach, supported by Wolf et al., 
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is to reconceptualise water security through a conflict management lens.214 This is largely 
the task undertaken by scholars of water negotiations, such as Islam and Susskind, whose 
work is discussed in the sub-section below on the rise of hydro-diplomacy.  
Water security in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed 
The notion of water security in the national security sense dominates the literature on 
transboundary water governance issues in South Asia. This is in opposition to water 
security in the human security sense, which is more commonly used in the literature on 
international development. The human security lens on water is also prevalent in the 
literature on domestic water issues within India, Nepal and Bangladesh. Certainly, the 
works of prominent scholars such as R.R. Iyer215 and B.G. Verghese216 advocate a human-
centric approach to water cooperation, even in relation to transboundary water 
governance. But while Iyer and Verghese are authoritative on water issues within India, 
they do not dominate the literature of transboundary water conflict and cooperation in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. That body of knowledge, small as it is, is dominated 
by Chellaney, who claims that ‘[w]ater has emerged as a source of increasing competition 
and discord within and between nations, spurring new tensions over shared basin 
resources’217 and that therefore ‘[w]ater wars are no longer just the stuff of Hollywood 
melodrama.’218  
In regards to the Indian subcontinent, Chellaney argues that water is a potential point of 
friction and that ‘[i]nterstate water wrangles are common in this region, where all the 
countries other than the island states share land borders with India but not with each 
other. India thus is the focal point for subcontinental hydropolitics.’219 But ‘[j]ust as India 
has no articulated national security strategy, it also has no national water-security 
strategy.’220 This, claims Chellaney, is a point of vulnerability for not just India, but also the 
broader region, because ‘[t]he growing interstate Asian competition over water is 
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prompting some countries to build upstream hydroengineering projects on the 
transnational rivers, with little concern for the interests of co-riparian states.’221 Dam 
building can, according to Chellaney, be an act of war because ‘water wars can be fought 
and won without firing a single shot – by quietly building an upstream hydroengineering 
infrastructure to commandeer shared resources.’222 
Other prominent scholars of transboundary water security in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed are Wirsing, Jasparro and Stoll. They too take a state-centric understanding 
of water security in the region, but their views on transboundary water conflicts and 
cooperation are more nuanced and less hawkish than those of Chellaney. They argue that 
water conflicts in the region ‘have multiple and diverse roots – not all of them by any 
means reducible to a territorial imperative or, for that matter, to a power asymmetric 
imperative.’223 Many different dynamics – ‘whether demographic, ethnographic, 
hydrological, climatic, or simply riparian status (upper or lower)’ – exert a profound effect 
on the water interaction between the riparians.224 They also acknowledge the significant 
influence on water interaction of power asymmetry between riparians.225 
At the same time, Wirsing et al. argue that ‘[a] zero-sum water resource atmosphere is 
clearly building up in Himalayan Asia; that in turn is fuelling already intense geopolitical 
rivalry among all the concerned powers’ and that ‘the situation seems reflective of an all 
too familiar state-centric and asymmetrical power-political order.’226 Furthermore, in the 
absence of third party interventions, or other support ‘coming along from the “globalized 
world” to relieve the situation’, the riparians of the Himalayan river basins, including 
India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh, ‘seem to have little to fall back on but their own, in a 
few cases severely limited, national resources.’227 Nonetheless, Wirsing et al. are ‘more 
convinced than ever’ that what the  
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‘region needs most to ensure environmental sustainability along with 
the water security of the billions of people who do now or will in future 
live there is an uncompromising political commitment to cooperative 
management of the region’s river basins. Needless to say, commitment 
of this kind is far from abundant in any of the world’s river basins; and 
in the river basins of Himalayan Asia it is hardly to be found. So…it may 
be necessary that the region’s well-wishers set their sights, at least 
initially, on more modest objectives.’228 
Conflict and cooperation, together at last 
Wirsing et al., as well as Chellaney, belong to Jägerskog and Zeitoun’s first camp of water 
conflict and cooperation scholars, the one that draws a causal relationship between water 
availability and violent conflict or poverty.229 A section of this school of thought sees water 
not necessarily as a direct cause of violent conflict, but one of the (many) factors that may 
exacerbate social unrest. Even Wolf, a proponent of the thesis that water more often than 
not leads to peace and cooperation, admits that ‘[w]hile “water wars” may be a myth, the 
connection between water and political stability certainly is not. The lack of a clean 
freshwater supply clearly does lead to instability, which, in turn, can create an 
environment more conducive to political or even military conflict.’230 
At the same time, there is also a growing understanding of the converse relationship: 
conflict can exacerbate water scarcity, or the availability of, or access to, water resources, 
especially for vulnerable populations. There is a large and vibrant body of literature that 
deals with the effects of conflict on human-centric water security, and the role of water in 
environmental peacebuilding.231 
There is no clear distinction between conflict and cooperation. It is these blurred lines that 
define Jägerskog and Zeitoun’s third camp, the one that ‘stresses the existence of 
numerous water conflicts that fall short of violence’ and focuses research ‘on the need to 
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resolve conflicts equitably and balance concerns for livelihoods and the environment.’232 
The main proponents of this nuanced view of water conflict and cooperation have been 
scholars affiliated with the London Water Research Group. Warner and Zawahri point out 
that Mirumachi and Allan’s Transboundary Water Interaction Nexus (TWINS) model, and 
Zeitoun and Warner’s work on hydro-hegemony, have served as cautionary tales against 
the prevalent optimism, without reverting to the water wars scenario.233 
Mirumachi and Allan argue that ‘[r]elations of basin states evolve over time, experiencing 
periods of both interaction and non-interaction. More specifically, relations evolve 
through co-existing conflictive and cooperative interactions’234 Thus, the absence of war is 
not the same as absence of conflict and tensions over transboundary waters are 
sophisticated and complex:  
‘[w]ater conflict varies significantly in intensity across basins and across 
time, and ranges in form from stymied fuming to very public displays of 
hostility, affecting all levels of society, often even in distant non-riparian 
circles. Perhaps most significantly, various forms of conflict over water 
occur almost without exception alongside various forms of 
cooperation.’235  
This is the essence of the term ‘water interaction’,236 which is explained in greater detail in 
the methodology chapter as it is central to this thesis.  
By establishing that conflict and cooperation coexists, Mirumachi rejected the idea that 
they are binary opposites that water interaction can be plotted on a linear spectrum, as 
had previously been the case. As she and Allan point out, ‘[c]onsidering conflict and 
cooperation as opposing concepts misleadingly simplifies the complexity of 
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interactions.’237 Thus Mirumachi developed a conceptual framework for understanding 
water interaction on a matrix, with levels of cooperation on one axis and levels of conflict 
on the other.238 This is called the Transboundary Water Interaction Nexus (TWINS) and is 
another concept discussed further below. 
That conflict and cooperation coexist is generally well known, yet, as Zeitoun and 
Mirumachi point out, in the analysis of transboundary water interaction ‘conflict and 
cooperation are inevitably treated separately. That separation usually means that the less 
ugly faces of conflict and less pretty faces of cooperation are overlooked, and the political 
aspects of the interaction are routinely ignored.’239 By this they mean that ‘[t]ensions may 
lead to resolution of conflict and thus be considered in a positive light’240 and that the 
‘uncritical acceptance of traditional forms of “cooperative” arrangements may in fact 
sustain the conflict it was intended to transform.’241 
Building on the concept of water interaction, scholars affiliated with the London Water 
Research Group have gone on, amongst other things, to theorise about hydro-hegemony 
and water justice. This shift in focus is in line with a broader trend in the directions that 
scholarship on water conflicts and cooperation is taking. As Jägerskog et al. observe, 
‘[i]ncreasingly, the debate on water security has broadened from the classic IR 
[international relations] field…to wider areas including development; rights perspectives 
on water; legal aspects; and the water, food and energy nexus.’242  
The recent development of literature about hydro-hegemony addresses what Habeeb 
identified as ‘the failure of mainstream international theorists to develop a framework for 
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understanding asymmetrical relations between states.’243 Habeeb was writing this in 
regards to the literature on negotiations and dispute resolution, but it applies equally to 
the literature on transboundary water conflict and cooperation: the element of power, and 
power asymmetry between riparians, has also been largely missing. 
Hydro-hegemony refers to a situation in which one riparian is able to assert its power 
(though not necessarily through coercion; a hegemon is also able to influence or persuade) 
over how shared waters are to be utilised.244 It is a concept developed primarily by Zeitoun 
and Warner, who posit that ‘the hydro-hegemon can establish the form of interaction over 
transboundary waters that it prefers.’245 Much like with conflict and cooperation, there is 
no clear good and bad in hydro-hegemony. Zeitoun and Warner point out that ‘[t]he 
hydro-hegemon engaged in a guiding role in the basin can establish a positive/leadership 
form of hydrohegemony… The hydro-hegemon engaged in a unilateral, exploitative role is 
likely to establish a negative/dominative form of hydro-hegemony’ but ‘[w]hether the 
hegemon chooses leadership or domination in the water sector is ultimately governed by 
the broader political context.’246 The concept of hydro-hegemony reappears in Chapter 5, 
where it applies to India’s role in the water interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed.  
The concept of water justice is more difficult to pin down than that of hydro-hegemony. 
Yet issues of water justice are everywhere. They surface in both the process and the 
outcome of water interaction because, as Patrick points out, ‘[w]hen water-sharing 
arrangements are negotiated, there is always a process of identifying for what and why 
water is needed by different parties, followed by decisions on how water should be 
distributed among water uses and users.’247 In 2014, Zeitoun et al. conducted a review of 
water justice literature based around the question ‘who decides who gets water, when, 
how, and why’ as a contribution to water interaction analysis and diplomacy.248 Although 
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water justice is a relatively new and evolving concept, it is relevant to this thesis in that 
perceived injustice is at the root of conflicts and can thus be a hindrance to cooperation.  
Towards positive water interaction through third party interventions 
The year 2013 was the United Nation’s International Year of Water Cooperation,249 and saw 
the publication of books such as UNESCO’s scholarly compilation, Free Flow - Reaching 
Water Security Through Cooperation.250 This reflected and cemented a growing 
enthusiasm within and outside of academia for cooperation, collective action, good 
governance, et cetera, as a means of tackling serious challenges facing the globe – ‘climate 
change; water scarcity; communicable disease; volatility in international food, fuel, and 
financial markets; and the depletion of common-pool resources, such as fisheries’ because 
these affect entire regions, and sometimes the whole world.251 Stemming from this idea of 
cooperation, better water governance was identified as ‘absolutely the top priority’252 for 
human security, and by 2010 ‘[m]any studies at international level have indeed identified 
the water crisis not as one of scarcity but as one of governance.’253 But while good 
governance and transboundary cooperation have been generally agreed upon as a goal (a 
topic of further discussion in Chapter 4), few scholars are asking how it can be achieved, 
let alone how it can be achieved through third party intervention. 
In 2009, Jägerskog and Zeitoun began asking these questions in a report for the Stockholm 
International Water Institute called Getting Transboundary Water Right: Theory and 
Practice for Effective Cooperation. The report asks ‘What is the quality of cooperation? 
What does “cooperation” mean in the first place? Why and under what conditions do 
states cooperate?’254 But the answers it provides are ambivalent at best. In the report’s 
second of five essays, Zeitoun reiterates his theory of hydro-hegemony. He and Jägerskog 
answer the three central questions of the report by arguing that states cooperate once 
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power asymmetry between them is addressed (either by being influenced or challenged) 
and they also list general ways in which third parties can assist riparians in influencing or 
challenging power asymmetry.255  
This is a useful way of thinking about water interaction, but it does not say much about 
the conditions necessary or sufficient for transboundary cooperation to emerge. After all, 
as Zeitoun acknowledges, transboundary cooperation – and conflict – can flourish 
irrespective of the presence of a hydro-hegemon.256 This idea is echoed more than five 
years later in the report The Rise of Hydro-Diplomacy, which states that ‘[h]egemons are 
not necessarily impediments to cooperation; they can also facilitate it.’257 In other words, 
the presence or absence of a basin hegemon is not a necessary condition for transboundary 
cooperation, although hegemonic or counter-hegemonic interactions do affect political 
will, trust between riparians, and facilitated dialogue between stakeholders. 
The remainder of the Getting Transboundary Water Right focuses on frameworks for 
reaching agreement between riparians on sharing the benefits of a transboundary basin. 
Granit and Claassen ‘present the Transboundary Water Opportunity (TWO) Analysis, 
which provides stakeholders with a framework to identify a variety of opportunities for a 
basin’258 while Grey, Sadoff and Connors argue that states ‘cooperate when the net benefits 
of cooperation are perceived to be greater than the net benefits of non-cooperation, and 
when the distribution of these net benefits is perceived to be fair.’259 In both of these essays 
the equitable sharing of benefits is understood to be the cause of transboundary 
cooperation, rather than the effect of it. The role of third parties is to mediate as riparians 
negotiate the optimal spread of benefits for all stakeholders. This is a classic role of the 
third party in formal negotiations that do not take into account contextual factors or the 
relationship between parties to the conflict. 
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Benefit sharing: cause or consequence of cooperation 
Sadoff and Grey have been two prominent contributors to the embryonic literature on – 
and the practice of – transboundary water cooperation through third party interventions 
(although their contribution is more applicable in the field of formal negotiations than 
water cooperation theory). Since 2002 they have claimed that transboundary water is 
largely a matter of optimising benefits, and therefore the role of third parties is that of a 
neutral broker mediating the development of a constellation of possible win-win 
outcomes.260 Grey, Sadoff, and Connors argue that states do not cooperate because of any 
ethical imperative, but rather because it can be pragmatic to do so: ‘states work together 
when doing so offers special economic and political advantages over unilateral 
development, and when these larger benefits are shared.’261  
In the benefit sharing approach, the role of the third party is to nudge riparians away from 
unilateral national agendas and toward a shared cooperative agenda, one which provides 
‘benefits that exceed the sum of the two non-cooperative national agendas, and will thus 
have become the rational choice of each sovereign nation’262 Cooperation, then, is a 
rational choice, and the natural product of maximised outcomes. For Sadoff and Grey, all 
that stands in the way of creating transboundary cooperation is the puzzle of how best to 
maximise for all riparians four types of benefits:  
‘environmental benefits to the “river” (e.g. improved water quality, 
conserved biodiversity); economic benefits from the “river” (e.g. 
increased food and energy production); reduction of costs because of the 
“river” (e.g. reduced geo-political tensions, enhanced flood 
management); and benefits beyond the “river” (catalysing wider 
cooperation and economic integration).’263  
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Moreover, they claim that ‘[t]he broader the basket of benefits, the greater is the scope for 
structuring mutually beneficial cooperation.’264 
Of particular significantly to this thesis, is the fact that Sadoff and Grey (and Connors) 
have all been involved in various capacities with the South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI) 
and the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment (GSBA). Indeed, the guiding principle of the 
Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment was benefit sharing. The purpose of this World Bank 
study was to gather comprehensive hydrological, economic and socio-political data from 
which draw informed conclusions about maximising benefits to the river, from the river, of 
the river, and beyond the river. Yet, as Chapter 5 illustrates, the laying out of possibilities 
for positive-sum outcomes based on the hydrological, economic and social modelling of 
the Ganges basin did not bring riparians rushing to the negotiation table to capitalise on 
these potential benefits. The Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment was rejected by the 
riparians and failed to establish a new era of transboundary cooperation based on mutual 
benefit sharing. Why? This thesis argues that the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment, 
much like the idea of cooperation through benefit sharing, fails to account for the broader 
socio-political context in which the basin is situated. As Habeeb has argued, it is easy but 
misleading to think of conflict resolution as simply a series of offers, demands, and 
concessions, in which the two sides inch toward an agreement.265 
The major weakness of seeing benefit sharing as the sufficient condition of cooperation is 
that it does not take into consideration all the other influences on states engaging with 
each other (or not) over shared water issues. For example, power asymmetry between 
riparians, underlying historical grievances, and non-water related interests and agendas 
are not explicitly taken into consideration. Sadoff and Grey do acknowledge that 
‘[a]chieving international cooperation is always a long and complex journey, for which 
there is no single path and few short cuts’ and that ‘For each international basin, the 
optimal mode of cooperation will depend on a mix of factors including hydrologic 
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characteristics, the economics of cooperative investments, numbers and the relationships 
of riparians, and the costs of parties coming together.’266  
Sadoff and Grey’s definition of benefits as going ‘beyond the river’ also hints at the 
importance of non-water related interests affecting water interaction. But they do not 
address how power asymmetry between riparians could stand in the way of benefits being 
shared. Moreover, nothing in their work suggests that these or other issues must first be 
resolved before talk of maximising benefits can even begin. Their theory of benefit sharing 
is one that belongs in the literature of formal negotiations rather than of water conflict 
and cooperation. As Qaddumi points out, cooperation is not an objective measure of gains 
to be had, but rather an emerging property of the subjective perceptions held by the 
stakeholders, and it plays out in the policies, institutional arrangements and, finally, 
treaties that these stakeholders develop.267  
Maximising benefits across a river basin is a tactic that has many merits and may be 
appropriate for cementing cooperative outcomes if, and only if, the necessary conditions 
for cooperation are met first, that is, political will, trust between riparians, and dialogue 
among stakeholders. The sharing of benefits may be an outcome of cooperative water 
interaction, but it cannot be the cause of them. 
Hydro-diplomacy 
The lines between negotiated agreement and cooperation are blurred in the literature on 
water interaction. Sadoff and Grey are not the only ones who use the language of water 
conflict and cooperation theory when discussing negotiation strategies for resolving water-
related disputes. Islam and Susskind, for example, also advocate in their Water Diplomacy 
Framework (WDF)268 for the development of non-zero-sum approaches to negotiations, 
but they see water governance (or water management networks, in their terminology) as a 
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complex adaptive system.269 As such, Islam and Susskind understand that by definition 
there are no straightforward, predictable and replicable solutions to complex problems. 
They identify three types of water management problems – simple, complicated, and 
complex – and argue that only ‘[s]imple problems are amenable to optimisation because 
they involve easily identifiable and neatly-bounded elements of water management that 
respond in predictable ways and pose challenges about which there is almost complete 
agreement with regards to means and ends.’270  
In other words, if high-conflict, low-cooperation transboundary water interaction was a 
simple problem, then the optimisation of benefits could be a satisfactory solution. But 
water interactions are complex, and thus cannot be ‘solved’ directly. Instead, Islam and 
Susskind argue that practical solutions to water conflicts ‘are most likely to be found 
through a negotiated and joint problem-solving approach that blends science, policy, and 
politics to understand…and manage…complex water problems.’271 For Islam and Susskind, 
water conflicts are most constructively understood as differences in values and how to 
translate those values into policies and actions within the political domain.272 As such, the 
role of the third party is to assist in the translation of those values into equitable actions.  
Specifically, the Water Diplomacy framework calls for third parties to act as professional 
mediators or neutral facilitators in water conflict negotiations, and Islam and Susskind 
describe in great detail the tasks that this entails.273 These tasks are very similar to those 
outlined by Jones throughout his book Track Two Diplomacy in Theory and Practice.274 
Indeed, there are many similarities and complementarities between the emerging concept 
of hydro-diplomacy and that of Track II dialogue. As Jones points out, ‘Track Two often 
plays its greatest role…in assisting the process of developing new ideas and incorporating 
them into negotiations, rather than in necessarily providing specific outcomes to officials 
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[emphasis in original].’275 It is also about building trust between conflicted parties and 
helping  
‘the two sides learn more about each other and develop more accurate 
understandings of the complexities each side must deal with. In this 
sense, Track Two is useful in breaking down previously monolithic 
interpretations each side may have held of the other, and allowing for 
learning and differentiation about the deeper realities and constraints 
that the other faces.’276  
This is also largely true of hydro-diplomacy.  
Track II dialogue is a particularly appropriate method for addressing regional security 
issues, such as transboundary water interaction, in which there might not necessarily be a 
specific conflict to be resolved but where an atmosphere of distrust and lack of 
cooperation nonetheless persists.277 Transboundary water interactions are also an 
appropriate context for facilitated dialogue because, as Wolf points out, ‘[w]ater is, by its 
nature, an interdisciplinary resource – the attendant disputes can only be resolved through 
active dialog among disciplines.’278 The importance of dialogue between different groups of 
stakeholders as a means of building cooperation is beginning to catch on in both the 
scholarly literature on water conflicts, and the so-called grey literature of government and 
private sector output.  
In 2014, the Berlin-based consulting firm Adelphi released a report written by Benjamin 
Pohl et al. called The Rise of Hydro Diplomacy. Pohl et al. claim that the most important 
role for third party interventions is in strengthening water governance institutions.279 They 
argue that to decrease conflict and increase cooperation, foreign policy makers must:  
‘exert political leadership in fostering intra-basin cooperation and 
integration; connect and reinforce appropriate institutional structures 
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for coordinated and cross-sectoral, comprehensive engagement; and 
strengthen the diplomatic track of transboundary cooperation on water 
by investing more in training and capacity-building, expanding efforts to 
build confidence in shared basins, and improving water-related crisis 
response and conflict resolution mechanisms.’280  
Not only is Pohl et al.’s report unique in focussing on the role of third parties in 
transboundary water cooperation, in doing so it also brings the concept of hydro-
hegemony out of the realm of theory and into that of practice. Pohl et al. acknowledge that 
‘[b]asin politics are often compounded by power asymmetries, begging the question of 
how to deal with riparian hegemons’281 and argue that international actors must engage 
with basin hegemons.282 This is in line with Zeitoun and Jägerskog’s argument from 2009 
that one way to address power asymmetry is to ‘create conditions to encourage basin 
bullies to transform into basin leaders.’283 
In addition to these contributions to the literature on water conflict and cooperation, Pohl 
et al.’s report is interesting in that it emphasises the need for political will and trust 
between riparians for cooperation to flourish. The authors argue that ‘[u]ltimately, 
strengthening foreign policy for transboundary waters hinges on creating and reinforcing 
international institutions that can channel political will into coherent action.’284 Pohl et al. 
also claim that trust is critical but that ‘[t]rust can only be built through longterm 
transparency in terms of data-sharing and intentions regarding future infrastructure, 
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which in turn requires long-term engagement.’285 Thus the element of time is brought into 
the understanding of how transboundary cooperation can develop.  
The circumscribed role of the third party 
Similar conclusions about the conditions necessary for transboundary cooperation, and 
the role of third party interventions, are reached by Perlman-Petersen and Wolf. In 2015, 
they conducted a study based on a selection of cases from the Oregon State University 
Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database. The study examined factors that have been 
effectively used by third parties in nudging towards transboundary cooperation, defined by 
them as formal, state-to-state agreements. Significantly, Perlman-Petersen and Wolf find 
that  
‘objective or “paper” beneﬁts (as projected in the many studies on 
regional cooperation or integration, e.g., Feitelson and Haddad, 1998; 
Sadoff and Grey, 2002, 2005) are only the starting point. In other words, 
beneﬁts are necessary, but they are not sufﬁcient to induce cooperative 
action.’286  
Perlman-Petersen and Wolf’s study also finds that ‘[t]here is no one way to initiate 
cooperation — each transboundary basin is unique’ and ‘[i]ndividual policy makers in a 
nation making decisions about cooperation operate within the historical context of their 
nations, fed by a set of external and internal drivers of decision making…They do not 
consider beneﬁts alone.’287 Global trends, for example, can ‘also exert inﬂuence on 
cooperation, given the history of ideas and experience regarding international waters that 
nations and their partners contemplating cooperation can draw from.’288  
More importantly, the cultural context, and the sense of rights or entitlements to water 
also shapes the claims that states make on transboundary basins: 
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‘[f]actors such as commonly held beliefs about the river ﬂowing through 
one’s nation and legacies of use and management under legal and 
constitutional instruments shape how people perceive these rights. 
Culture and tradition related to water also often instil values that 
inﬂuence how rights are perceived.’289  
Because of this, Perlman-Petersen and Wolf argue that ‘[i]t is necessary both to address 
past and present grievances as a prerequisite for market-driven solutions’ 290 for enhancing 
transboundary water cooperation. 
In regards to the role of external interventions in nudging transboundary cooperation, 
Perlman-Petersen and Wolf point out that:  
‘[t]hough it is not possible for third parties to create a conducive, 
political environment alone, they can provide incentives both directly 
and indirectly to cooperate through playing a brokerage role: 1. 
Providing technical competence and examples of best practices 2. 
Assisting in negotiation and mediation skills, including the provision of 
legal and other water experts 3. Facilitating investments in 
transboundary settings’291  
They also identify Track II Diplomacy as one of the four strategies available to third parties 
in pursuing the development of cooperative water interaction.292 
Perlman-Petersen and Wolf’s research into the role of third parties in facilitating 
transboundary cooperation is one of the first studies into this question, and this thesis 
builds upon their insights. Here, however, the definition of cooperation is broader than 
                                                     
289 Petersen-Perlman, JD & Wolf, AT 2015, ‘Getting to the First Handshake: Enhancing Security by 
Initiating Cooperation in Transboundary River Basins’, Journal of the American Water Resources 
Association, DOI: 10.1111/1752-1688.12348, vol. 51, no. 6, p. 4 
290 Petersen-Perlman, JD & Wolf, AT 2015, ‘Getting to the First Handshake: Enhancing Security by 
Initiating Cooperation in Transboundary River Basins’, Journal of the American Water Resources 
Association, DOI: 10.1111/1752-1688.12348, vol. 51, no. 6, p. 4 
291 Petersen-Perlman, JD & Wolf, AT 2015, ‘Getting to the First Handshake: Enhancing Security by 
Initiating Cooperation in Transboundary River Basins’, Journal of the American Water Resources 
Association, DOI: 10.1111/1752-1688.12348, vol. 51, no. 6, p. 5 
292 Petersen-Perlman, JD & Wolf, AT 2015, ‘Getting to the First Handshake: Enhancing Security by 
Initiating Cooperation in Transboundary River Basins’, Journal of the American Water Resources 
Association, DOI: 10.1111/1752-1688.12348, vol. 51, no. 6, p. 5 
84 
 
that of Perlman-Petersen and Wolf and closer to their understanding of collaboration as a 
slew of formal and informal interactions, dialogue, joint research, and capacity building.293  
The final point to make on where this thesis fits into the relevant literature regards the 
research agenda of transboundary water conflict and cooperation. Araral and Wang argue 
for the development of a ‘second generation research agenda—water governance 2.0—
which pays more attention to the study of incentive structures, is multi and inter-
disciplinary in orientation and with clear policy implications.’294 This is in reference to the 
field of water governance generally, of which water conflict and cooperation is a sub-
sector. The call for a transdisciplinary approach that focuses on incentives and 
disincentives is equally appropriate and needed in the literature on water conflict and 
cooperation. Indeed, this is the agenda that this research aims to further.  
Conclusion 
The role of third parties is well established in the literature on conflict resolution (where it 
can be mediation, conciliation, arbitration, et cetera) and Track II dialogue (where it is 
limited to facilitation). But it is not well established in the literature on transboundary 
water conflicts and cooperation. The prevailing paradigm is that third parties can assist in 
establishing benefit sharing outcomes for riparians, but that is not the same as building 
cooperation. Only in recent years have scholars and practitioners begun to turn to the 
problem of third parties, especially aid donors and international organisations, as 
facilitators of positive water interaction. This is the concept of hydro-diplomacy, which 
takes the principles of Track II dialogue and applies them to questions of transboundary 
water security.  
The recurring theme throughout this survey of literature on negotiations and 
transboundary water interaction is that there is no one path to cooperation, and no 
certainty for the third party that they will resolve conflicts. Numerous factors play into the 
dynamics within dispute resolution processes and the contexts in which they occur; 
culture, domestic politics, trust (or lack thereof) between parties, power asymmetries, 
issue power, the presence or absence of third parties, et cetera. While all these, and other, 
factors define the outcome of interactions, dialogues, negotiations, they do not pre-
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determine them. This is an important insight considering the increasing involvement of 
international aid donors in transboundary water governance and the growing importance 
of cooperation in reducing water conflict. 
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Chapter 3: What is the quality of transboundary water 
interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed? 
This chapter illustrates that there are numerous issues of concern in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed, but that on the whole they are not a high priority for the 
riparian states. Improving interaction with co-riparians is not prominent on the political 
agendas either. As Earle et al. argue, ‘there is certainly a lack of political will in the basin, 
particularly in India, to provide the space for multilateral river institutions to effectively 
emerge.’295 This limited political will undermines the efforts of third parties to increase 
transboundary water cooperation.  
The multitude of issues affecting water resource management in the region is both 
attracting international attention, as well as diffusing it. According to one regional analyst, 
the biggest transboundary water problem in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is that 
there is no problem; or rather, there are so many problems that not one is able to 
command sufficient attention to resolve it.296  
A crisis can be used to coalesce action and foment change. That is not to say that an 
environmental crisis must be manufactured, but rather that if a crisis does occur, the 
opportunity for policy change should not be wasted.297 A crisis, such as a natural disaster, 
can bring previously feuding parties together for a common purpose. For example, the 
Millennium Drought in Australia precipitated bipartisan political action that led to policy 
reform in the Murray-Darling basin. Without a crisis to compel and propel action, or 
political will created by other imperatives, there may be little but an unfocused, slow, 
uneven, chipping away at many problems. But a crisis cannot be addressed if it is not first 
defined.298 The problem, then, for transboundary water governance in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed is not a crisis, but a lack thereof. There are, however, many 
crises – and therefore none takes priority.  
Some of these crises arise out of the historical context of the problemshed, particularly the 
colonial hangovers and the legacy of the Green Revolution. But other crises are global, or 
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challenges faced by policymakers the world over: rapid population growth; rising demand 
for food, energy, and water; unprecedented urbanisation; climate change; and socio-
political conflict arising out of resource scarcity. There are also numerous non-water 
related issues that occupy the Indian, Nepalese, and Bangladeshi (but less so the 
Bhutanese) polities and thus detract from the political will available for dealing with 
transboundary water issues. The first two sections of this chapter examine these 
challenges for transboundary water interaction. 
The third section of this chapter focus on issues that have attracted the attention of 
international actors. Considering the relatively low political will among riparians to resolve 
the numerous issues of transboundary concern, there has been some impetus among the 
international organisations in this space to define and prioritise the problems of 
transboundary water governance. Foremost among these attempts is the Ganges Strategic 
Basin Assessment, which identifies storage, irrigation, hydropower development, flooding 
mitigation, and sedimentation as the most pressing of issues in the Ganges basin. These 
issues are discussed in turn. 
The fourth section examiners the transboundary water interaction between India-Nepal, 
India-Bhutan, and India-Bangladesh. It concludes that while the interactions between 
India-Bhutan are largely positive, those between India-Nepal and India-Bangladesh are 
generally neutral and at times negative. 
The fifth section discusses the contextual factors within the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed that make positive transboundary water interaction problematic. These 
include an underdeveloped civil society, weak regionalism, zero-sum attitudes to water 
sharing, the securitisation of transboundary waters, and a general culture of secrecy 
around water knowledge.   
The sixth and final section addresses the issue of India’s hydro-hegemony. India is neither 
a leader nor a bully, but resentment lingers within Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh about 
India’s power and influence. This impedes cooperative transboundary water interactions.  
The context of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed 
The transboundary water issues in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed today are in 
part the product of a historical legacy and in part shaped by global factors and concerns. 
The history of British colonialism established a lasting foundation for water governance 
practices, while the Green Revolution created unintended challenges.  
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Part of this legacy is the way in which rivers are understood and managed, namely through 
the ‘command and control’ approach. At the same time, river management and 
transboundary water cooperation are not a top priority for the ruling elites of the riparian 
states because there are more pressing non-water related considerations. These are 
examined below. 
Colonial hangovers and the legacy of the Green Revolution 
The British colonial rule in South Asia has left a legacy for transboundary water 
governance. For example, water in India has been regulated under different state laws, 
principles and rules adopted over many decades,299 but predominantly Irrigation Acts 
devised in the colonial era.300 Irrigation was, according to Hardiman, the defining 
achievement and lasting contribution British water management in the region. Although 
pre-colonial South Asia depended on various forms of irrigation, canal systems were not 
centrally governed and ‘water was distributed according to the political power of different 
groups within local communities of users.’301 In the pre-colonial era, floods on the Gangetic 
plain had been understood as a duality of calamity and benefits. Flooding brought 
nutrient-rich sediment, and rice harvests were traditionally segmented throughout the 
year to hedge against flood pattern fluctuations.302  
The British, however, disliked the so-called ‘uncontrolled’ systems of irrigation, such as 
flood inundation, and frowned upon their use.303 Instead, water was to be managed 
according to the principle that nature could and should be mastered through science and 
technology, allowing natural resources to be, in Hardiman’s words, ‘transformed and made 
more productive, allowing Indian agrarian products to be sold competitively in a rapidly 
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expanding world market.’ 304 Consequently, ‘Water resources lost their mystery, being seen 
merely as a commodity. Rivers were to be engineered, controlled, tamed and made into a 
source of water for artificial “rivers” (canals).’305  
In the colonial period, then, the principal law of water governance was that of canal 
irrigation, and water disputes meant disputes over allocation of water for agricultural 
purposes only.306 This way of thinking has, according to Iyer, continued beyond British 
rule and is even enshrined in India’s Constitution:  
‘The identification of water with rivers, the preoccupation with 
irrigation, and the influence of the engineering way of thinking are 
evident in the basic entries relating to water in the 
Constitution...Curiously enough, there is no explicit mention of 
groundwater. There is no evidence of recognition of water as an integral 
part of the ecological system.’307  
The supply-based paradigm of water management carried on into the post-colonial period. 
The independence of India in 1947 coincided with improvements in engineering and a 
worldwide enthusiasm for dam-building. Big dams and mega engineering projects were 
not only regarded as a symbol of modernity and development in South Asia, but were also 
the favoured means of meeting water needs of the region.308 The apparent ease of water 
supply that dams offered appealed especially to Indian farmers, who created political 
pressure for constructing dams for irrigation purposes.309  
This was also the era of massive irrigation schemes and other agricultural reforms in the 
Soviet Union, which greatly influenced the newly independent India. As Dhaka illustrates,  
‘The massive challenge of poverty and famine were taken up through 
prodigious five-year planning and infrastructure development model 
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envisioned along socialist path of reconstruction. Central Asia provided 
a noble example to world planners of social and economic 
transformation at a single go, a perfect inspiration for post-colonial 
India.’310 
Surface and groundwater irrigation increased enormously in India in the mid-twentieth 
century, although, as Hill points out, two-thirds of the population continues to depend 
upon rain-fed agriculture as a direct or indirect source of livelihood. Rain-fed agriculture is 
especially important in the mountainous north where it is difficult to build irrigation 
infrastructure, and also the parts of the country which continue to have the largest 
concentrations of chronic poverty.311 Nonetheless, the expansion of the canal systems for 
irrigation facilitated the Green Revolution312 in the 1960s and 1970s.313  
The Green Revolution was an unprecedented boost to food production made possible 
through the availability of new, high-yielding crop varieties that required intensive 
irrigation. This, as Asthana and Shukla argue, had a positive effect not only on food 
security but also on the regional economy; agriculture was no longer largely for 
subsistence purposes, but was able to provide income through the sale of excess 
produce.314 The Green Revolution, combined with the dam-building that expanded 
irrigation networks, increased agricultural output and allowed India to decrease 
dependence on food imports from abroad.315  
In addition to these on the whole positive developments, the Green Revolution also had 
the unintended consequence of creating an over-reliance on pumped groundwater to 
irrigate fields.316 A quarter of India's crops are now grown using non-renewable 
underground water,317 and the area irrigated with pumped groundwater exceeds the area 
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irrigated by surface water.318 This predicament is facilitated by universal access to cheap 
water pumps, Pearce argues.319 The availability of water pumps, claims Hill, combined with 
lack of regulation on groundwater extractions and largely unsatisfactory provision of 
municipal water services have facilitated a market in water-selling by local pump owners, 
who themselves are often former farmers.320  
The unsustainable exploitation of groundwater resources is a grave issue for India, but as it 
is only tangential to transboundary water governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed, it is not addressed in greater detail in this thesis. Rather, the salient point 
here is that India, and perhaps the broader region, is in need of what Pearce calls a ‘Blue 
Revolution’ of water use efficiency and sustainability.321 This could be an opportunity for 
Foreign-led capacity building initiatives, and indeed some of the explicit objectives of 
international organisations and aid donors in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed are 
to improve sustainable development of the region’s freshwater resources. This is discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 4.  
Narratives of scarcity, sharing, science, and supply-side solutions 
Mahatma Gandhi famously said that nature provides enough for everyone’s need, but not 
for everyone’s greed. This aphorism is often raised in relation to water governance in 
South Asia, usually to support arguments such as those made by Iyer that water resources 
are plentiful but being mismanaged or apportioned unjustly.322 It has also been invoked to 
support the discourse of water scarcity in the region – the discourse that claims there is 
simply not enough freshwater to satisfy the needs of all. This is the prevailing narrative in 
South Asia: water resources are seen as increasingly scarce, rather than increasingly 
strained and possibly mismanaged due to growing demand and competing water use 
priorities.323  
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The narrative of scarcity has some implications for water governance. Seeing the water 
crises in the region as primarily crises of availability implies that the solution, at least 
according to engineers and bureaucrats such as those at the World Bank, lies in increasing 
water ‘production’ through additional water infrastructure. In this paradigm, the quantity 
of water is the central problem rather than the clever or equitable distribution of it. 
According to Iyer, another solution favoured by the World Bank is in ‘water markets’ 
which allow for free trading that creates a supply-side response to the growing demand.324 
As Hill argues, this neo-liberal approach ignores the significant social, economic and 
political issues associated with this supply-side, scarcity-focused approach to development 
of water resources in the region.’325 
A supply-side approach to water resource management implies that solutions to water 
problems will focus on creating more water availability. This, however, can lead to a 
destructive, self-perpetuating cycle. As Iyer explains:  
‘There is always a demand for more water and still more water...But 
where will this “more water” come from? It has to be brought from 
somewhere. So big dams, canals and long-distant water transfers are 
planned. These will in turn generate new conflicts. It is clear, then, that 
what lies at the heart of water conflicts is “greed” in Mahatma Gandhi’s 
sense. Agreements, accords, treaties, and adjudications may temporarily 
bring peace, but the conflict will erupt again unless we learn to re-define 
“development.”’326  
One way in which this dominant water governance paradigm could be flipped is by 
reframing a problem of ‘insufficient water supply’ as one of ‘excessive water consumption’, 
thereby leading to solutions that favour the way in which water is allocated, used and 
consumed, rather than technological solutions that ‘create’ more water.327 Shifting the 
water governance paradigm in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed from a supply-side 
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approach to a demand side is one of the approaches identified by riparian stakeholders 
(and discussed in Chapter 6) as desirable for improving transboundary water governance.  
As it currently stands, water governance in South Asia is dominated by supply-side 
concerns, and by the various disciplines of engineering, claims Routray.328 The National 
River Linking Project is one prominent example of this within India.329 In terms of 
transboundary water governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, it too has, 
according to Prasai and Surie, ‘long been dominated by technical perspectives from civil 
engineering, economics, and international law.’330 Hill, too, sees the dominance of these 
perspectives in the region, especially in regards to hydropower development. Hydropower 
development, he argues, is overwhelmingly guided and constrained by the supply-side 
paradigm.331 
The narratives of scarcity and supply-side solutions also frame water as a finite and single-
use resource. This framing creates a zero-sum attitude to water sharing. That is, in the 
narrative of scarcity, the idea that water can be used for multiple purposes, and create 
multiple values from the same quantity, is lost. As Paranjpye shows, even at the domestic 
level in India there is a ‘lack of integrative thinking among all parties concerned.’332 This is 
also a feature of transboundary water interactions in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed. As Wirsing et al. point out, ‘[a] zero-sum water resource atmosphere is 
clearly building up in Himalayan Asia.’333  
Multi-scale, non-water related priorities 
Another important contextual factor is that water interactions exist in a complex political 
dynamic that operates on various but interconnected scales (local, national, regional, 
global). These multi-scale socio-political dynamics may be a distraction from, or 
prioritised higher than, issues of transboundary water governance. As Hill makes clear, 
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‘[c]hanges in the political party or parties running the governments in each of these 
countries [in South Asia] also impacts policy priorities, most evidently in India. These 
international and sub-national disputes are likely to intensify as demand for water 
becomes more acute in the future.’334  
In India, for example, inter-state water conflicts are more pressing than transboundary 
ones.335 Bangladesh is focussing on rapid economic growth rather than sustainable 
development of natural resources. Meanwhile, Nepal has been grappling with an 
insurgency, political instability, and a lack of domestic consensus on how to develop that 
country’s vast hydropower resources.336 Only Bhutan seems to have sufficient political will 
to satisfactorily address its transboundary water issues with India, but that may be because 
it is a small, politically stable, ethnically and religiously homogenous country with few 
options for economic development other than by selling hydropower to India.  
Hill argues that India’s bureaucracy is also a limitation on transboundary cooperation. He 
claims that:  
‘the principal obstacle to the region effectively using its water resources 
is not disagreements between states, or indeed diversions in Tibet. 
Rather, according to the World Bank, the major obstacle is the 
bureaucratic culture prevailing in India, which it suggests is 
characterised by “the paternalism of central-level bureaucrats, coercive 
top-down planning, and little support or feedback from locals.”’337  
Hill’s reference to a recent World Bank report illustrates that the World Bank itself is not 
blind to all contextual factors affecting transboundary water governance in South Asia. As 
this thesis argues, however, this understanding of the region does not translate into 
tailored solutions to water governance problems; foreign expertise and one-size-fits-all 
approaches are favoured by international actors above context-specific ones. 
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The disagreements between states in India are also a further limitation on the 
development of the region’s water resources. There are disputes about all the major rivers 
in India but, according to Paranjpye, the contending states ‘do not appear to be seriously 
interested in finding solutions that are acceptable and beneficial to all concerned.’338 
Instead, water disputes within India are, in Iyer’s words, ‘characterised by bitterness, tend 
to get enmeshed in party politics, and become intractable.’339 Overall, the domestic 
politicking over inter-state water disputes within India distract political attention from 
transboundary matters. As Dash notes, ‘Regional cooperation is a two-level process in 
which domestic support and regional bargains and negotiations must overlap if 
cooperation is to proceed.’340  
Domestic issues, however, simply take precedence over regional cooperation in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. In the words of S. Dinar:  
‘In the GBM [Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna] Basin, for example, 
domestic politics play a large role in the hydropolitics between the basin 
riparians. Political factions that accuse the ruling party of compromising 
their respective nation’s sovereignty and national interest often curtail 
cooperation between Bangladesh, Nepal, and India. Although 
hegemonic stability theory tells us that a lack of regional cooperation is 
due to the desires of India to prevent multilateral regional cooperation, 
domestic factors including political instability and nationalist fervor 
intensify the conflict and also prevent collaboration.’341 
A further effect of the intense politicking between Indian states over water is that it 
creates an unhelpful impression. Prasai and Surie point out that there is a perception that 
if India cannot manage its own domestic water conflicts, it will not be able to manage the 
international ones.342 Also, there is an assumption that ‘conflicting needs and interests of 
the different states must be reconciled domestically before any international agreement 
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can be reached.’343 Yet, India’s transboundary water relationships are better than the water 
interactions between Indian states.344 While a degree of basin-wide coordination and 
integration exists between India and its neighbours, Iyer notes that no such arrangements 
exist within India and that there is strong resistance to the idea of the River Basin 
Organisation (RBO) on the part of the state governments.345  
Downstream of India on both the Ganges and Brahmaputra Rivers is Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh is especially vulnerable to any quantitative and qualitative impacts caused by 
the actions of upstream riparians because approximately 94 per cent of its surface waters 
originate outside of Bangladesh.346 As such, it seems reasonable that Bangladesh should 
devote a significant amount of political energy to maintain cooperative relations with 
India, and ensure that any upstream actions do not pose adverse consequences within 
Bangladesh. This, however, is not the case. Certainly, a high priority for Bangladesh is 
developing a constructive water policy and attaining development goals associated with 
this.347 But a national water policy establishes how water is to be managed domestically, 
not how important transboundary waters are.  
Yet, transboundary waters are not unimportant to Bangladesh. Begum Khaleda Zia, the 
former Prime Minister of Bangladesh, has said that ‘the sharing of the waters of our 
common rivers’ is one of the most pressing issues vis-à-vis India.348 But while water 
disputes are high up on the bilateral agenda for Bangladesh, they are not a relatively high 
priority overall in the context of other social, political and economic issues on various 
levels. The political situation in Bangladesh remains unstable,349 while rapid economic 
growth currently trumps environmental considerations and sustainable development. 
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These factors stand in the way of Bangladesh resolving disputes with India, for example 
over the Teesta river (an issues discussed further in the final section of this chapter).  
Nepal is aggrieved by India in regards to transboundary water governance in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed, and like Bangladesh is not able to focus political will on 
resolving these grievances – but for different reasons. Nepal continues to feel cheated over 
existing hydropower project deals with India, even ones dating as far back as the 1950s, 
and the bitterness generated by these experiences has coloured all subsequent water 
interactions between the two countries350 (this too is discussed in the final section of this 
chapter). The persistent resentment towards India hinders the cooperative development of 
shared water resources. 
Decades of political and social instability in Nepal have also detracted from the political 
attention available to address transboundary water management issues.351 Nepal has been 
wracked by severe political flux since the early 1990s352 and it is now caught up in a cycle of 
insecurity and instability. The state’s failure to initiate socio-economic development is one 
of the drivers of conflict in Nepal, while the chaos and violence in turn hinders the state’s 
ability to initiate socio-economic development.353 Most development activities have halted 
in rural Nepal, and the government has slashed development funds, diverting them to 
security expenditures. Moreover, rebel attacks on hydropower plants, access facilities, 
communication networks and development projects have caused substantial economic 
losses and general devastation.354  
At the same time, as Gyawali and Dixit argue, Nepali party functionaries fear political 
allegations that a project, any project, is not moving forward due to their inaction 
regardless of technical, economic or developmental demerits of such projects, and so they 
prefer to be seen ‘for’ projects rather than questioning them.355 There is enormous political 
pressure within Nepal to harness water resources vis-a-vis India, particularly through mega 
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projects, which are believed to bring more economic benefit and political kudos than more 
moderately sized undertakings.356 But the problem lies, according to Shakya, in the lack of 
political consensus on any projects, big or small.357 
In contrast to the numerous issues that distract and divide political will in Nepal away 
from transboundary water governance is the case of Bhutan, which has made a concerted 
effort to come to terms with India on issues of mutual interest. The fact that Bhutan is 
small, ethnically, religiously and politically homogenous, with a stable government, and 
few other socio-economic issues to distract it, means that it has been able to channel 
political will into resolving contentious water resource development issues with India. 
This arrangement is positive-sum and the export revenue that Bhutan receives from the 
sale of hydropower to India is not only a major source of GDP but has also fuelled 
remarkable socio-economic growth.358  
While the quality of water interaction between India and Bhutan provides an interesting 
juxtaposition to the hydropolitics between India and Nepal, there is no meaningful 
comparison between the two countries; Bhutan is one fiftieth the size of Nepal, has no 
Terai lowlands to irrigate,359 and is governed by a stable central government. The 
‘Bhutanese model’, if there is one, is therefore not appropriate for the Nepal case. The core 
water issue between Bhutan and India is hydropower as Bhutan is upstream of the water-
rich state of Assam (fed by the Brahmaputra river), while Nepal is upstream of the water-
scarce and populous states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh thus making irrigation and flood 
control significant issues to resolve with India.360 The purpose of juxtaposing Nepal and 
Bhutan, then, is to illustrate that water interactions are complex and determined by 
different factors on different scales, and not just riparian position vis-a-vis the hydro-
hegemon. 
In addition to these domestic issues within Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal and India, there are 
also international dynamics that affect hydropolitics between them. As Earle et al. point 
out, ‘[t]he advent of China in the [Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna] basin’s hydro-
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politics’…has brought further complications and uncertainties.’361 Although it is not within 
the scope of this thesis to consider China in greater detail, the point remains that how 
India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh relate to and are influenced by China affects the 
hydropolitics between them.  
These examples of domestic barriers to developing transboundary water cooperation 
illustrate that dispute resolution mechanisms and institutions alone are not immune to 
politics at various scales and that the political context must be considered when 
addressing water conflicts. This point recurs in Chapter 4, which examines foreign-led 
interventions in building transboundary water cooperation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed: the lack of consideration of the political context is a significant weakness of 
these interventions. The lack of priority given to transboundary water issues by the 
riparian states in the problemshed is a further limitation on the likelihood of 
transboundary water interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed improving 
significantly in the foreseeable future. 
Challenges for transboundary water governance 
The riparians of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed may be preoccupied with issues 
other than transboundary water cooperation, but that does not mean that there are no 
crises or challenges for shared water resources that require policy attention in this region. 
Some of these challenges are similar the world over: population growth, rise in demand for 
food, energy, and water, as well as rapid urbanisation. This is in addition to the effects of 
climate change, which may be particularly acute in this poor and densely populated region 
that is also not especially resilient in terms of its institutions and polity.  
These factors, which are not unique to the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, have given 
rise to the fear of socio-political conflicts, including international disputes, over 
increasingly scarce natural resource and human displacement due to environmental 
degradation. These fears, in turn, drive third parties such as international organisations 
and bilateral aid donors, among others, to address the many water crises the world over to 
mitigate the risk of such conflicts developing.  
These are not insignificant challenges. As Verady et al. argue, these global pressures drive 
increasing demand for freshwater and  
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‘diplomacy will be called on increasingly to anticipate, mitigate and 
resolve conflicting claims on shared water resources. Nowhere will this 
contest be more stark than in transboundary regions, where bordering 
states will need to balance national interests with regional welfare and 
economic security. Therein lies the great challenge of hydro-diplomacy 
and the concomitant potential of hydro-solidarity.’362  
Climate change, population growth and urbanisation will be, according to Keskinen et al., 
the ‘hard’ drivers of transboundary water cooperation, ‘as opposed to the sometimes 
perceived notion of cooperating on “soft” environmental values.’363 Indeed, part of the 
rationale of Australia’s commitment to the South Asia Water Initiative is that:  
‘[t]he combination of high poverty and high population density, in a 
largely agrarian society undergoing rapid urbanization, makes it 
extremely difficult for communities to cope with hydrological and 
climate variability. To ensure sustained food security, economic growth 
and political stability in the future, water must be managed better.’364 
This section outlines how these ‘hard’ drivers play out in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed and the challenges they pose to transboundary water governance. First are 
the connected challenges of economic development, rapid population growth, and 
urbanisation. Next are the effects of climate change, followed by the issue of food security. 
The section finishes with a discussion of the risks of socio-political conflicts linked to 
natural resource scarcity. 
Economic development, rapid population growth and urbanisation 
The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin is densely populated; it is home to 630 million 
people in an area of 1.7 million kilometres squared.365 India today has to support over 17  
per cent of the world’s population on just over two  per cent of the world’s land area, while 
Bangladesh supports about 2.27  per cent of the world population on 0.11  per cent of the 
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world’s land area, and these ratios are bound to widen by mid-century.366 India expected to 
overtake China as the world’s most populous country by the year 2035.367 The implication 
of this population growth for water management is grave: more people means more 
demand for food, energy, and water. 
Asia is already the world’s most water-stressed continent. The per capita availability is less 
than 1,700 cubic meters per year, the internationally accepted definition of water stress.368 
In India, the richest country in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, per capita 
availability of water is expected to drop below 1,000 cubic meters (that is, below officially 
accepted water scarcity levels) by the end of this century if the pace of development 
continues at current levels.369 In Chellaney’s words, ‘not only is Asia’s per capita water 
availability the lowest of any continent, but its water stress has also been exacerbated by 
its dramatic economic rise… coupled with breakneck urbanization.’ 370  
Increasing populations, urbanisation, and development have also been identified in India’s 
National Water Policy (in 2012, but also in previous years) as a major problem for water 
governance. Rapid urbanisation alone ‘is driving increased water demand both for 
municipal supply and for the industrial and agricultural products in demand in cities.’371 
Even in sparsely populated Bhutan, which is home to only 733,000 people, rates of 
urbanisation are higher than in India, Nepal or Bangladesh,372 and the Royal Government 
of Bhutan admits that ‘[u]rbanisation has become a key issue that has serious impact on 
both water demand and quality.’373  
The unintended consequence of the growing awareness that rapid urbanisation, economic 
development, and increasing populations will exacerbate pressures on finite resource is 
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that too often ‘the answer [to these problems] lies in large supply-side projects and long-
distance water transfers.’374 As discussed above, supply-side, engineering, and 
economically-driven solutions already dominate the transboundary water governance 
regime in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, and so growing pressures may further 
cement these approaches rather than encourage demand-side or innovative policy 
solutions. 
Climate change 
Water management issues stemming from population growth, rapid urbanisation, and 
socio-economic development are further exacerbated by the effects of climate change. The 
countries of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed are less resilient to water-related 
disasters than other Asia-Pacific states, which creates a further challenge for 
transboundary water governance and climate change adaptation.375 As Hill notes, ‘[t]he 
phrase “too much and too little water” has been used as a shorthand for the challenges 
that climate presents for the Hindukush Himalayas, with droughts and floods becoming 
more commonplace.’376 The region is also ill-prepared institutionally for climate change. 
For example, none of the treaties and agreements that Nepal has with India address 
climate change or the uncertainty posed by potential effects of changing melt dynamics 
from Himalaya-Hindu-Kush glaciers.377  
The effects of climate change include complications with spatial and temporal rainfall 
variability, evaporation rates, and temperatures in different agro-climatic zones and river 
basins.378 This, in turn, will affect ‘agricultural production and food security, ecology, 
biodiversity, river flows, floods and droughts, water security, and human and animal 
health’379 Changes in climatic conditions also affect diseases transmitted through water, 
                                                     
374 Iyer, RR 2008, ‘National and Regional Water Concerns: Setting the Scene’ in K Lahiri-Dutt, & RJ 
Wasson (eds), Water First: Issues and Challenges for Nations and Communities in South Asia, Sage, 
New Delhi, p. 7 
375 Vaidya, RA, & Sharma, E (eds) 2014, Research Insights on Climate and Water in the Hindu Kush 
Himalayas, ICIMOD, Kathmandu, p. 12 
376 Hill, D 2015, ‘Where Hawks Dwell on Water and Bankers Build Power Poles: Transboundary 
Water, Environmental Security and the Frontiers of Neo-liberalism’, Strategic Analysis, vol. 39 no. 
6, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2015.1090679, p. 739 
377 National Research Council of the National Academies 2012, Himalayan Glaciers: Climate Change, 
Water Resources, and Water Security, The National Academies Press, Washington DC, p. 86 
378 Asthana, V & Shukla, AC 2014, Water Security in India; Hope, Despair, and the Challenges of 
Human Development, Bloomsbury Academic, New York, p. 139 
379 Vaidya, RA, & Sharma, E (eds) 2014, Research Insights on Climate and Water in the Hindu Kush 
Himalayas, ICIMOD, Kathmandu, p. 17 
103 
 
via vectors such as mosquitos.380 The compounded effects of rising temperature, flooding, 
sea level rise, loss of wetlands and cyclones381 will leave densely populated ‘mega-deltas’, 
such as the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin particularly at risk.382 In this region, 
climate change will likely result in increasingly frequent and hazardous weather patterns, 
such as extreme temperatures, changes in average annual precipitation, irregular rainfall 
patterns, and intense rainfall events. These, according to research from the International 
Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), ‘may in turn lead to increases in 
floods, landslides, and erosion, as well as an increase in the frequency and intensity of 
droughts, with a resultant lowering of the water table, drying of natural springs, and 
reduced stream discharge.’383  
The large number of dams in the region also poses a unique problem in light of climate 
change: ‘With the accelerated glacial melting, the dams are likely to see huge increases in 
inflows initially and then highly reduced inflows in subsequent decades. This effect is 
likely to threaten the safety and the economy of the dams.’384 At the same time, climate 
change and the priority placed internationally on reducing greenhouse gas emissions has 
‘led, since the WCD [World Commission on Dams] report, to a re-awakening of interest in 
hydropower.’385 That means more dams – and more dams means more risk associated with 
climate change. 
Water supply will also be affected by climate change. In the words of Evans, ‘[w]ater for 
irrigation and hydropower production is threatened, as is water for cooling of thermal 
power production. The annual mean monsoon levels will increase by 10 percent, with a 15 
percent increase in variability, making the monsoon stronger and less predictable.’386 
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Climate change will likely affect seasonal water supplies more than annual water 
supplies.387 In the Ganges basin, dry season, monsoon, and post-monsoon flows are 
projected to increase by up to 20 per cent in the 2050s, while pre-monsoon flow is 
expected to decrease by 15 per cent; in the Brahmaputra and Meghna basins, flow is 
projected to increase in all seasons, with a marked increase in the Brahmaputra basin in 
the dry season (17 per cent), and in the Meghna basin in pre-monsoon (20 per cent).388 
Studies also indicate that mean upstream water supply on the Ganges and Brahmaputra in 
the period 2046–2065 will be approximately only 80 per cent of what it had been in 2000-
2007.389 
Much of the dry season flow of Himalayan rivers is from glacial meltwater, but over the 
last 30 years this has fallen by 11 per cent as average temperatures rise and snowlines 
retreat.390 In contrast to Europe and North America, however, where glacial melt 
contributes substantially to low summer flows, the glaciers of the greater Himalaya region 
melt during the monsoon season when temperatures are highest but rainfall is also 
heaviest. Thus, while changes in glacial melt may be an existential challenge for some 
melt-dependent mountain communities, it is not a major challenge for the problemshed as 
a whole.391  
Nonetheless, a major concern is that the rapid retreat of glaciers in recent decades has 
resulted in the formation and growth of glacial lakes. These are held back by unstable 
moraine material and are prone to burst in a type of flash flood called a Glacial Lake 
Outburst Flood (GLOF). Research from ICIMOD notes that ‘[c]limate change is expected 
to result in an increase in the number and size of such lakes, and thus to an increase in the 
risk of such outbursts.’392 Regular floods are also expected to increase in frequency and 
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severity, and to alternate with drought.393 Protracted droughts combined with rising sea 
levels may cause inland backflow of salt water that contaminates low-lying, fertile delta 
regions.394 
Despite these gloomy predictions, some international actors remain optimistic that the 
effects of climate change in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed will be manageable, 
and – crucially for proponents of dam-building in the Himalayan region as a means of 
controlling water – that climate change will not adversely affect the hydropower potential 
of the region. Jeuland et al., who were all involved with the World Bank’s Ganges Strategic 
Basin Assessment, argue that ‘[d]espite uncertainties in predicted future flows, they are 
not, however, outside the range of natural variability in this basin.’ More importantly, they 
find that:  
‘the hydropower potential associated with a set of 23 large dams in 
Nepal remains high across climate models, largely because annual flow 
in the tributary rivers greatly exceeds the storage capacities of these 
projects even in dry scenarios. The additional storage and smoothing of 
flows provided by these infrastructures translates into enhanced water 
availability in the dry season, but the relative value of this water for the 
purposes of irrigation in the Gangetic plain, and for low flow 
augmentation to Bangladesh under climate change, is unclear.’395  
International actors, however, are not united in calling for infrastructure to regulate the 
vagaries of water flow in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. The Ganges Strategic 
Basin Assessment, which was made public more than a year after Jeuland et al. published 
their assessment of climate change on hydropower development in the region, concludes 
that ‘the effectiveness of large-scale infrastructure for flood control, and the reliability of 
existing large-scale diversions of surface water for irrigation, could prove susceptible to 
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climate change.’396 The report argues that improved policy is key to rising to the challenge 
of climate change:  
‘A focus on managing current hydrological variability (whether or not it 
is attributable to climate change) is, therefore, a good place to start 
addressing the future climate change challenges … Regardless of changes 
in rainfall and hydrology, an emphasis on enhanced forecasting and 
warning systems, in concert with a suite of tailored, localized responses, 
is urgently needed.’397  
Yet, this policy-centric approach to hydrological variability fell on deaf ears as the Ganges 
Strategic Basin Assessment was rejected by Nepal, India and Bangladesh. This suggests, 
among other things, that supply-side, engineering solutions are deeply entrenched in this 
problemshed. 
Food security 
A further predicted effect of climate change is on food security. Saltwater inundation and 
increased coastal erosion will affect food production,398 as will rising temperatures.399 To 
maintain crop production levels that counterbalance these effects and are sufficient to 
feed growing populations, annual water withdrawals for agriculture are projected to 
increase in South Asia by 9 per cent from 2000 to 2050.400 This will further exacerbate the 
pressures on and competition for the finite and stressed freshwater resources of the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. Furthermore, the nexus of food and water security, 
and the ‘cascading of impacts in South Asia is particularly worrisome because pressure in 
just one factor, such as decreased crop yield, can severely impact huge populations for 
generations. Malnutrition and stunting in childhood leads to health risks later in life.’401 
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Evans predicts that decreasing food availability in 2050 will cause a 35 per cent increase in 
childhood stunting as undernourishment worsens.402 
Agriculture absorbs 90 per cent of the total usage of water and remains the most 
significant factor in food security and rural livelihoods throughout India.403 Yet it was not 
until 2012 that India included food security within its National Water Policy.404 And, as 
Prasai and Surie observe, the lack of regional cooperation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed continues to prevent sustainable development and management of 
transboundary water resources for food security and livelihood improvement.405 
Nonetheless, international organisations and foreign aid donors understand that ‘[t]o 
ensure sustained food security, economic growth and political stability in the future, water 
must be managed better.’406 Part of the Australian commitment to the World Bank-led 
South Asia Water Initiative lies in ‘[g]rowing more food with less water’ and conservation 
agriculture in the eastern Ganges basin in partnership with the Australian Centre for 
International Agricultural Research. This is because ‘[m]anaging water resources is critical 
to food security as is improving the productivity of the water used.’407 
Main issues on the transboundary water governance agenda 
In this general context of water-related challenges, there are a number of specific issues for 
transboundary water governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. Each presents 
unique risks and opportunities, but they are largely interrelated and, as with any wicked 
problem, addressing one issue in the problem set may adversely affect another. 
Considering this complexity, it may be difficult to prioritise which issues are most 
pressing. Yet, the lack of policy priority and political will on any one issue between India, 
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Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh also means that none of the issues receive adequate 
attention. Without a single crisis to galvanise action, the many water crises remain 
governed on a ‘business as usual’ principle.  
Part of the problem lies in the lack of systematic knowledge about the Ganges-
Brahmaputra and Meghna basins. As the World Bank points out,  
‘Until now, there has been no basin-wide knowledge base and analytical 
framework that could be used by riparian states to explore options and 
facilitate cooperative planning in the Ganges. Information and data are 
surprisingly scarce and difficult to obtain. In particular, very little 
information is available on hydrology and irrigation withdrawals in 
India.’408  
To that end, the World Bank has taken on the task of documenting the water governance 
issues facing the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers. The Brahmaputra study is forthcoming. 
The 2014 Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment is a ‘state of the basin’ stocktake of 
hydrological, economic, social and political information, much of it based on primary 
research and the latest modelling techniques.  
The study intended to dispel many commonly held assumptions and demystify the 
misconceptions that have driven freshwater development in the basin to date. It was to be 
the blueprint for a new era of evidence-led policymaking. In the absence of any other clear 
and consistent agenda for transboundary water governance between India, Nepal and 
Bangladesh, it was an attempt to focus effort and foment action on water issues of mutual 
concern, although it has not (yet) succeeded in this. The problematic issues with the 
Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment are discussed at length in Chapter 5. For the purpose of 
this chapter, however, the significance of the report lies in its systemic assessment of 
transboundary water issues. 
The Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment is also a de facto catalogue of what the World Bank 
considers the most pressing issues for this basin – water storage, water for irrigation, 
hydropower generation, flood mitigation, and sedimentation. These issues are also of 
concern in the Brahmaputra basin (although at time of writing the Strategic Basin 
Assessment of Brahmaputra System in Northeast India, the companion report to the 
Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment, was not complete). Because these are the most 
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important issues for the most prominent foreign-led in the problemshed they are 
addressed in this section.  
Upstream water storage: the view from riparians  
Considering the importance of agriculture in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, it 
would be logical to assume that the most pressing issue for water governance is that of 
irrigation. If not irrigation, then flood control and mitigation could be the main concern 
considering the effects of climate change and the large, dense and poor population of this 
region. Hydropower production could also be considered a high priority because of the 
rising energy demand. Underlying these three issues, however, is the problem of water 
storage.  
The Hindu-Kush-Himalaya mountain range, from which the Ganges and Brahmaputra 
rivers flow, holds one of the largest bodies of ice outside the polar caps, and these glaciers, 
ice fields, and snow packs provide important intra- and inter-annual water storage 
facilities. During the summertime monsoon, however, the contributions of meltwater and 
rainfall coincide, creating a situation of too much water in the wet season and too little 
water in the dry season. The increasing gap between water availability and demand in 
months other than the monsoon season is threatening livelihoods and economic 
development in the region, but could be alleviated with man-made water storage 
facilities.409  
As analysts from ICIMOD argue, water storage is increasingly important in the Hindu-
Kush-Himalaya region:  
‘It can be used to even out supply in areas where the intra-annual 
precipitation is uneven, it can be used as a buffer to reduce risk from 
high precipitation events, and it can be used to store water at times of 
low requirement for use at times of high requirement. This is especially 
true in hilly areas where water storage can improve access to water in 
dry periods.…Future scenarios of water availability suggest that water 
storage may also become a key strategy for climate change 
adaptation.’410  
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As the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment suggests, the storage of water high in the 
Himalayas could have profound benefits far downstream; ‘The effects of increased low 
flows may make important contributions in the Ganges delta areas to better manage saline 
intrusion, enhance the Sundarbans ecosystem, and maintain navigation services. These are 
important issues that require additional research.’411 
Water storage is a particularly important transboundary issue because it can be used to 
even out water supply between where it is comparatively plentiful – Nepal and Bhutan – 
and where it is scarce – India. India's per capita yearly water storage (200 cubic meters) is 
low relative to global averages,412 and approximately 35 per cent of water needed for 
irrigation comes from Indian reservoirs.413 The remainder of India’s irrigation needs are 
fulfilled by groundwater, thus contributing to the overexploitation of aquifers. The storage 
of monsoon runoff in the Nepali hills could, according to Gyawali, replace groundwater for 
irrigation in the northern Indian states of Uttar Pradesh or Bihar.414  
In addition to flow augmentation for downstream irrigation, Nepal’s storage potential of 
88bcm could bring other mutual benefits, such as hydropower generation, flood control 
during the monsoon, flow augmentation for navigation and thus, in Onta’s words, ‘it is 
natural that India has a vital concern about Nepalese waters and will have keen interest in 
Nepal's water resources development.’415  
At the same time, Nepal’s lack of diversion or storage capacity is at the root of water 
disputes with India, according to Condon et al.416 More specifically, the root of water 
disputes between India and Nepal lies in how each side values the benefit sharing options 
arising out of potential water storage. As Gyawali argues:  
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‘if a dam is thought of as a factory, the one major investment in it gives 
at least five major output products: electricity, improved downstream 
environmental flow as well as regulated water for irrigation, flood 
control and navigation. The beneficiaries of all these outputs must pay 
their share of the investments and cannot be expected to become free-
riders. Even though Nepal’s primary interest is in hydroelectricity, it is in 
her interest to make sure that the cost of a dam is also paid for by the 
other sector beneficiaries, especially irrigation where the gains from 
increased dry season flow are enormous.’417 
While for Nepal the issue of water storage is largely one of untapped potential, for 
Bangladesh it is a question of mitigating the negative effects of India’s upstream projects. 
Bangladesh has a seeming abundance of water resources, but most of its annual flow 
comes from monsoonal floods that quickly flush out to the Bay of Bengal because 
Bangladesh is a predominantly flat, deltaic country with limited water storage potential.418 
At the same time, Bangladesh has not benefitted from water storage and diversion in 
neighbouring India.  
The Farakka Barrage on the Ganges River in the Indian state of West Bengal is a particular 
and ongoing point of contention between the two countries. Indeed, as Hill illustrates, the 
tension over the Farakka barrage is symptomatic of the broader relationship between India 
and Bangladesh, and while ‘India has aggressively asserted its own interest to the 
detriment of Bangladesh,’ on the other side of the border ‘almost every negative 
development in rural Bangladesh is linked to the Farakka Barrage.’419  
Both India and Bangladesh, however, agree that the 1996 Ganges Water Treaty, which 
regulates the division of water resources at the Farakka Barrage, does not guarantee 
sufficient water for either party and thus negotiations have shifted to the question of how 
to augment storage.420 Bangladesh proposed building storage facilities in the upper Ganges 
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basin, that is, in Nepal, to collect monsoonal rainwater for release during the dry season.421 
This plan would also allow Nepal to generate hydroelectricity for sale to India, and provide 
some flood control benefits and enhanced inland navigation on the Kosi River, a tributary 
of the Ganges.422 India, however, avoids multilateral solutions and prefers to maintain 
strictly bilateral relations (this being the hydro-hegemon’s prerogative, a situation 
examined in Chapter 5). In response to Bangladesh’s plan, India proposed the construction 
of a canal to divert water from the Brahmaputra to the Ganges. As Tiwary explains, ‘[t]his 
suggestion was unacceptable to Bangladesh on the ground that the link canal excavation 
will cause loss of fertile land as well as displacement of population in the country.’423 
The question of water storage is also on the domestic water governance agenda in India. 
As Kumar and Furlong point out, India’s 2012 National Water Policy is based on the 
assumption that increasing water storage is the most favourable solution to various water 
problems:  
‘The water crisis in India is portrayed as a crisis of availability and the 
answer to this crisis, according to the new policy, is to increase water 
availability through supply solutions. This means increasing storage, 
mainly through large dams, and redistributing water from areas of 
“surplus” to areas of deficit, mainly through inter-basin transfers and 
long distance transfers.’ 424 The Policy itself makes this line of thinking 
explicit by determining that ‘[a]ll water resources projects, including 
hydro power projects, should be planned to the extent feasible as multi-
purpose projects with provision of storage.’425  
There are, however, critics of this approach to water storage in India. The South Asia 
Network for Dams, Rivers, and People (SANDRP), for example, calls this statement about 
multi-purpose projects ‘dangerous’ because ‘[g]iving such a privileged position to such 
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mega storage options is uncalled for, when other storage options (e.g. increasing soil 
capacity to retain moisture, local storage, underground storage) and optimum use of 
existing storage capacities can be explored.’426  
Furthermore, the importance put on supply side solutions and large infrastructure 
projects, according to Kumar and Furlong, ‘means that India had a blind spot to reducing 
pollution and demand, and has neglected small-scale conservation efforts such as water 
harvesting, and promoting less water intensive crops, industry and energy plants.’427 These 
points about the detrimental effects of a supply-side approach to water management, 
however, have not sparked a public discussion in the way that dams have. Hill argues that 
‘[a]s valuable as civil society has been in drawing attention to the issues involved in 
hydropower in India, examining the storage and distribution of water is far more complex 
in a country that is so diverse and heterogeneous than this populist depiction would 
allow.’428 
Upstream water storage: the view from the World Bank 
In the absence of a constructive dialogue between riparians about water storage in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, the World Bank has begun to tease out the relevant 
issues and to separate myth from reality. The Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment identifies 
water storage as one of the most important issues for water governance in the Ganges 
basin, and one that could be the basis for creating positive-sum outcomes over other 
pressing issues – hydropower development, flood control, irrigation. Of the Assessment’s 
ten key questions, five refer directly to water storage:  
‘1. Is there substantial potential for upstream reservoir storage in the 
Himalayan headwaters of the basin? 2. Can upstream water storage 
control basin wide flooding? 3. Can upstream water storage augment 
low flows downstream? 4. Are there good alternatives or complements 
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to reservoir storage? ...7. What are the cost- and benefit-sharing 
dynamics of upstream water storage development?’429 
At the same time, the study interrogates the assumption that there is potential for large 
water storage in the Himalayan rivers and that ‘this potential could be harnessed through 
large multipurpose dams to produce hydropower, deliver more timely irrigation water, and 
regulate the extreme flows of the Ganges River.’430 The findings of the Ganges Strategic 
Basin Assessment  
‘refute the broadly held view that upstream water storage (i.e., 
reservoirs) in Nepal can control basinwide flooding; however, at the 
same time it finds that such dams could potentially double low flows in 
the dry months. The value of doing so, however, is surprisingly unclear 
and similar storage volumes could be attained through better 
groundwater management.’431  
The analysis of the World Bank team suggests that very little water can in fact be stored in 
the steep terrain and mountain gorges of the region, even behind high dams; developing 
all the structures currently proposed ‘would provide additional active storage equivalent to 
only about 18 percent of the basin’s annual average flow. This is very little storage on a 
basinwide scale.’432 
Flood control is also shown to be a negligible benefit of increased water storage in the 
Himalayas. Large dams in the region are, according to the Ganges Strategic Basin 
Assessment, ‘commonly seen as the answer to the flooding that plagues the Ganges plains 
and delta, especially in areas of Bangladesh, Bihar, and eastern Uttar Pradesh’ yet ‘[o]n a 
basinwide scale, the potential to control floods using upstream storage is very limited’ and 
this ‘severely constrains riparians’ ability to ever truly regulate this river system, even 
assuming an aggressive development of system storage.’433 On the other hand, the lack of 
substantial regulation and water storage ‘will preserve a more natural hydrology in the 
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river system, which provides a wide variety of services that have not been quantified in this 
report, such as ecosystem services and navigation.’434  
A further assumption about water storage is that it could be used to retain wet season 
rainfall upstream for use in the dry season downstream. The Ganges Strategic Basin 
Assessment largely confirms this logic, albeit with some caveats. The construction of all 
currently planned dams could almost double flows during the months with the lowest 
flows, but while this may be large relative to current low flow, it is negligible compared to 
peak flow. Thus dry season flow augmentation through increased water storage is unlikely 
to significantly alter the integrity of the Ganges basin hydrological system as it currently 
stands.435 Moreover, ‘the economic value of this low-flow augmentation is unclear because 
of low agricultural productivity and localized waterlogging.’436 In other words, agricultural 
modernisation will be required to increase productivity, and this modernisation will be 
beneficial irrespective of upstream dam construction.437  
The point that other strategies will have to complement or maximise the benefits of water 
storage in the Himalayas is strongly made in the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment. The 
study also puts forth the argument that there are many attractive alternatives to meeting 
the region’s water needs; constructing new water storage infrastructure is not the only 
option. This is a novel and important argument in a water governance context dominated, 
as discussed above, by the prevailing preference in the region for engineering solutions to 
water supply policy problems. It is not one, however, that has (yet?) been embraced by 
riparian states (the reasons for this are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6). 
The Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment shows that contrary to the prevailing command-
and-control paradigm, there are numerous forms of water storage already present in the 
Ganges basin that are not human-constructed, namely underground aquifers, lakes, 
glaciers, snow, ice, and even soils. The quantity of water held in these natural reservoirs 
may not be as insignificant as is widely believed.438 The study reveals that in contrast to 
the over-abstraction of groundwater elsewhere in South Asia, ‘there are vast, untapped 
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groundwater resources in the central and lower reaches of the Ganges Basin. These 
additional groundwater resources, held in natural underground aquifers, can be 
sustainably used.’439 
More importantly, the sustainable use of this groundwater in strategic conjunction with 
well-managed surface water, could provide the same benefits, and on a similar scale, as 
those that could be gained from the current and proposed multi-purpose dams; ‘Achieving 
all of this, however, would require significant reforms particularly in the policy and 
energy-pricing environment, and real changes in farmers’ behavior.’440 Yet, policy reform, 
in combination with cultural and attitudinal change, is more difficult to bring about and 
measure than storing water behind multi-purpose dams. 
With almost no flood control benefits, and the benefits of dry season flow augmentation 
being limited by low agricultural productivity, the overwhelming share of economic 
benefits from proposed dams will be, according to the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment, 
derived from hydropower. The benefit-sharing calculus is thus simple: the benefits and 
costs to be shared between Nepal, India and Bangladesh in the near term will be 
predominantly associated with hydropower.441 As Kayastha argues, these countries are less 
concerned with the other benefits of dams – irrigation, flood control, navigation – than 
they are with hydropower production, and thus agreement must be reached on cost-
sharing for this benefit before the other benefits can be realised.442 
Hydropower generation: the view from Nepal and Bhutan 
Gyawali takes a different view to Kayastha in regards to the cost-sharing and benefit-
sharing of Nepal’s hydropower potential. He argues that even though Nepal’s primary 
interest is in hydropower development, all potential costs and benefits must be accurately 
calculated so that there are no ‘free riders’.443 The lack of consensus on how to share the 
benefits and the costs of developing transboundary water resources lies, according to 
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Gyawali, at the heart of disputes over dam-building. There is no one right way of benefit 
sharing. 
Tensions between riparians in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed continue to fester 
over existing and planned hydropower projects. Hill argues that ‘as dam building in the 
Indian Himalayas continues, future large-scale hydro development will increase tensions 
across borders, perhaps to a greater extent than projects such as the Farakka Barrage 
(West Bengal), Mahakali Irrigation Project (Nepal) or Wullar Barrage (Jammu and 
Kashmir) did in the past.’444 This accords with Chellaney’s view that ‘[t]he construction of 
dams on international rivers to generate hydropower is often the principal cause of water-
related tensions between neighbours in Asia.’445 
Nonetheless, the development of Himalayan hydropower potential is the primary pursuit 
of hydrocrats and investors in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, especially in Nepal. 
India is the main beneficiary of these investments. It is said that water and energy pose the 
biggest constraint on India’s growth because demand for both is increasing at a rate faster 
than current capacity can provide.446 Part of India's energy shortfall can be addressed 
through domestic hydropower generation,447 though there is strong civil society 
opposition to dam building in India.448 Nepal’s enormous hydropower potential could 
provide a convenient and significant supply of ‘clean’ energy for India's growing needs, 
particularly in the north of the country.449 
Nepal’s theoretical hydropower potential is enormous, at 83,000 MW (although the 
identified power potential is half of that).450 Revenues from hydropower sales could 
multiply the growth rate in several Nepalese sectors, including industry, agriculture and 
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tourism.451 But Nepal’s current lack of capacity for river diversion or water storage hinders 
hydropower generation.452 Nepalese hydropower potential remains largely undeveloped for 
domestic uses and export. Nepal produces only 714 MW of electricity for its 30 million 
citizens from all sources of energy, with the result that power outages for several hours a 
day around the year are common.453 Only 15 per cent of the population has access to 
electricity and per capita electricity consumption is among the lowest in South Asia.454 
Indeed, a country that could be a major exporter of electricity actually imports power from 
India.455 
Nepalese hydro-electricity is particularly valuable because it is what is called ‘peak power’ 
– electricity that is needed at the time of maximum demand for grid stabilisation. This is 
important for India because the more inflexible thermal and nuclear power in the north 
Indian grid, the bigger the need for flexible electricity generation (such as hydropower) to 
balance the system and prevent its blackout.456 But negotiations over the pricing of peak 
power have stalled with both camps firmly entrenched in their positions; India refuses to 
pay more than about three cents per unit, while Nepal feels aggrieved that in return India 
proposes selling electricity to Nepal during its hour of load-shedding at double that cost.457 
One major peak power production hydroelectric project is the planned West Seti dam on 
the confluence of the Seti and Karnali rivers in western Nepal. The dam was originally to 
be constructed by the Snowy Mountain Engineering Corporation (SMEC) of Australia, but 
will now be financed by the China Three Gorges Corporation.458 The West Seti dam will 
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have an installed capacity of 750 MW, most of it for export to India.459 At 195 metres high 
the West Seti dam will be one of the world’s highest concrete faced rockfill dams, and will 
impound about 1,500 million cubic meters. The failure of the West Seti Dam would have 
dire consequences for Nepal, resulting in catastrophic loss of life and property.460 The 
Himalayas being a highly seismic region, frequent and high intensity earthquakes post 
particular risks to dam infrastructure in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed.461 
The development of Nepal’s hydropower potential is also partly driven by what Gyawali 
identifies as the myth that ‘water agreements have to be done in hot haste otherwise 
Bhutan will capture the Indian power market, or that India will develop nuclear power and 
will have no need for Nepali hydropower.’462 Yet, Bhutan has no Terai plains to irrigate, 
nor is India’s riparian territory adjacent to Bhutan short of water; the state of Assam, 
which borders on Bhutan, is comparatively water-rich. In contrast, Gyawali argues, Nepal  
‘sits upstream of large swathes of UP [Uttar Pradesh] and Bihar that are 
not only water scarce but happens to be the electoral constituencies of 
most of independent India’s prime ministers and almost half of the 
Indian parliament... India will need storage dams in Nepal for water 
alone, even if there were no electricity involved, and Nepali 
hydroelectricity can only be a very valuable by-product. How valuable it 
is, is what the vigorous debate currently happens to be concentrated on 
between state agencies and the socio-environmental activists.’463 
Bhutan has also developed only a small proportion of its hydropower potential. Although 
Bhutan has been developing its hydropower capacity since 1967, only a small fraction of 
the total estimated potential of 20,000 MW has so far been harnessed.464 The kingdom is 
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planning to realise half of this identified potential by 2020.465 Bhutan’s existing 
hydroelectric dam projects have been developed with foreign aid, primarily from India, 
and India is the largest customer of Bhutanese hydropower.466 India is connected to 
Bhutanese hydropower through the 336 MW Chukha project, as well as the Kurichu, 
Chukha Stage II projects, and the 1,000 MW Tala dam.467 The India-financed Chukha 
projects are widely regarded as an example of successful bilateral cooperation for mutual 
benefit, and the revenues from the sale of electricity to India have been so large in 
proportion to Bhutan’s GDP that they have made the country prosperous.468 
Hydropower generation: the view from the World Bank 
The World Bank notes that ‘[t]he Himalaya has long been seen as holding enormous 
hydropower potential, adequate to meet domestic energy needs in Nepal (where potential 
supplies far outstrip potential demand) and provide a significant surplus for trade in the 
region.’469 The Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment has taken this narrative as the starting 
point for a scientific study into the actual hydropower potential of the basin. The 
Assessment aims to counter with hydrologic and economic evidence the prevailing 
assumption that there is untold ‘blue gold’ waiting to be exploited.  
The World Bank team asked, is there substantial untapped hydropower potential in the 
Ganges Basin? The Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment largely confirmed that, yes, there is 
substantial untapped hydropower potential in the basin. The team found that in Nepal 
there are more than 40,000 MW of economically feasible hydropower potential, and that 
less than 2 per cent of this potential has been developed. Furthermore, the 23 largest dams 
currently under consideration in Nepal would have an installed capacity of about 25,000 
MW and could enrich Nepal by some US$5 billion annually – a significant sum relative to 
Nepal’s 2011 GDP of $18.9 billion. The Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment warns, however, 
that hydropower development on this scale would take many years, require considerable 
capital investment, and entail effective management of sedimentation. The Assessment 
concludes that ‘[n]onetheless, hydropower is an important source of clean energy in a 
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region that is enjoying high economic growth and hence rapidly growing power 
demands.’470 
Irrigation 
Although the issue of hydropower generation seems the most controversial one in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, it is irrigation that has broader effects in terms of 
human security, livelihoods and food production. Indeed, India’s top two water 
governance priorities (as listed in the National Water Policy of 1987 and 2002) have been 
drinking water followed by irrigation. The 2012 National Water Policy did away with the 
explicit priorities list,471 but irrigation remains a fundamental issue for India and the 
region. As Dinar et al. point out, ‘[a]griculture accounts for nearly one half of all freshwater 
usage in the [Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna] basin, making water supply one of the most 
significant barriers to economic development.’472 In India alone, 80 per cent of total water 
resources are used for irrigation.473 Irrigation using both groundwater and surface water 
resources has increased significantly since the Green Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s but 
continues to be a largely inefficient practice that does not on the whole maximise 
agricultural output and, according to Hill, is a contributing factor to the region’s multiple 
water crises.474  
Irrigation presents a significant challenge for water governance. In India, it is a challenge 
that has not been met through institutional reform. There is no separate department for 
irrigation in India. Instead, irrigation falls under each state’s Department of Public Works, 
the primary function of which is the construction of roads and governmental buildings, 
and providing material requirements and construction of infrastructure for drinking water 
and irrigation water needs. This results, as Saravanan highlights, in limited attention to 
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water planning and management.475 At the same time, the main thrust of policy and 
planning throughout the twentieth century regarding irrigation was to make more water 
available for use through what Iyer calls an engineering-dominated supply-side approach 
that understands water as a commodity.476 This approach to water, combined with a 
reliance on irrigated agriculture, has led to India becoming one of the ‘big dam’ countries 
and supplying approximately 35 per cent of irrigation water from large storage 
reservoirs.477 Indeed, one reason given by Indian officials for the controversial Inter 
Linking Rivers Project ‘is the need to increase the country’s irrigation capacity in order to 
meet the growing demand for grain, which, by 2050, would have to be sufficient to feed an 
estimated 1.5 billion people.’478 
The Inter Linking Rivers Project, should it go ahead, may alleviate some irrigation water 
shortfalls for India, but will likely exacerbate water problems for downstream 
Bangladesh.479 For Bangladesh, the question of irrigation is one of water quality as well as 
quantity. As Dinar et al. explain,  
‘Thirty percent of Bangladesh’s land is below high-tide level, making it 
very sensitive to seawater intrusion to groundwater aquifers. Therefore, 
during the dry season, intrusion of saline water makes even the little 
water available in Bangladesh’s rivers… of poor quality for both drinking 
and irrigation. Therefore, it is necessary for Bangladesh to maintain a 
minimum water flow in certain rivers for salinity control.’480  
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India’s current and planned upstream water withdrawals endanger this minimum flow 
into Bangladesh.481  
At the same time, there exists scope for Bangladesh to negotiate with India mutual 
benefits from an inter-basin transfer scheme. Diverting the Brahmaputra water to the 
Ganges basin could benefit both countries by putting more water in the Padma and the 
Gorai Rivers in Bangladesh during the dry season.482 The transboundary water interaction 
between India and Bangladesh, as explained below, are currently not amenable to 
negotiating a benefit sharing arrangement such as this. There is also, according to Dinar et 
al., a prevailing attitude within the Indian hydrocracy that the water of the Ganges ‘is 
somewhat wasted on Bangladesh, a nation that suffers from floods even more than others 
in South Asia, while India is crying for water. That need, combined with being the upper 
riparian, justifies keeping the water.’483 
For Nepal and Bhutan, irrigation is also an important issue but not one that can readily be 
addressed by water transfer schemes. As Kayastha argues, diverting rivers is not a 
complete solution to Nepal’s irrigation problems, meaning that it will have to develop its 
groundwater resources to fulfil irrigation needs.484 As for Bhutan, the agricultural sector 
consumes the highest percentage of water485 although a mere 8.8 per cent of the land in 
Bhutan is under agricultural use, and only 25 per cent of cultivatable land is under 
irrigation.486 As the Bhutanese population grows and demand for water increases, the 
Royal Bhutanese Government is concerned about increased efficiency (‘more crop per 
drop’) through adaptive and applied research, rather than increasing the availability of 
water for irrigation.487 Nonetheless, despite these attempts at improving irrigation 
practices through means other than large scale infrastructure, engineering-dominated 
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supply-side approaches dominate the management of water for irrigation throughout the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed.  
Flooding 
Much like the issue of irrigation, the issue of flooding hinges largely on the prevailing 
paradigm of ‘command and control’. One illustration of this is the devastating floods that 
took place in India’s northern Bihar province in 2008. The flooding, argues Colopy, was 
framed as a fault of nature, rather than a fault of the ‘command and control’ approach to 
water management which led to the construction of numerous embankments along the 
naturally unpredictable Kosi River, which flows from Nepal into northern India and into 
the Ganges.488  
Upward of two thousand miles of embankments had been built to control the annual 
monsoonal floods that briefly cover the plains of Bihar and enrich the soils with sediment 
for post-monsoon crops. The consequences of the embankments, however, have been the 
opposite of that which was intended. As Colopy shows, ‘[w]here there were six million 
acres of flood-prone area in 1952, now there are seventeen million. And where there was 
inconvenience there is now a yearly disaster.’489 Those living on the inside of the 
embankments now face the risk of a much higher flood than previously when the water 
covered a larger area but in a thinner layer. Meanwhile, those living on the outside have 
been pitted against them because of the vested interest they now have in maintaining the 
system of embankments, which also serve as roads.490 
The problem of the embankments is not that they overflow, but rather that they are often 
poorly maintained and fail. The Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment shows that most 
flooding events in the basin are caused by embankment failures, high flows in small 
tributaries, and localised rainfall. The study finds that lowering flood peaks within 
embanked rivers through dam storage is unlikely to have a significant effect on flooding 
events.491 Asthana and Shukla show that the flood-control strategy using dams has been 
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only moderately successful in practice.492 Yet, the ‘command and control’ school of 
thought continues, according to Colopy, to dominate responses to flooding in this 
region.493 
The ‘command and control’ approach to water governance is a hangover from the colonial 
era, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter. The British brought the first 
embankments to the Kosi River because, as Colopy explains, they saw floods as something 
that should be controlled by amending the river rather than more through flexible 
lifestyles that accommodate regular flooding.494  
The Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment attempts to reframe the discourse as one of flood 
management rather than flood control. The study asks ‘Is large infrastructure the best 
strategy for protecting communities from floods?’ and finds that, contrary to popular 
belief, a strategy exclusively focused on large infrastructure cannot protect basin 
communities. There is, the authors argue, no simple solution to the problem of flooding 
on the Ganges plains because the highly variable monsoon-driven Ganges system with its 
thousands of tributaries cannot be effectively controlled with a one-size-fits-all approach. 
Instead,  
‘a shift in focus is needed from “flood control” to “flood management,” a 
combination of structural and nonstructural interventions marked by a 
greater emphasis on regional forecasting and warning systems, 
embankment asset management, drainage, and, importantly, more 
localized “soft” responses including disaster preparedness, land use 
zoning, safe havens, flood insurance, and training and communications 
campaigns…Flood protection for basin communities and the livelihoods 
of their people requires a broad, balanced combination of “hard” and 
“soft,” as well as local and transboundary, responses.’495  
Floods are a natural part of the hydrology of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed and 
serve essential ecosystem functions such as groundwater recharge, soil fertilisation, and 
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fish stock renewal.496 Flooding also brings nutrient-rich sediment. At the same time, 
flooding is destructive, but agricultural practices were amended to safeguard against some 
flood risks. For example, rice harvests were segmented in pre-colonial times throughout 
the year to hedge against flood pattern fluctuations.497 The understanding of floods as 
bringing benefits as well as danger was once part of water management. But this 
understanding, which is fundamental to flood risk management, has been lost with the 
development of the ‘command and control’ approach to water governance. 
The mental shift from flood control to management presents its own challenges for water 
governance, but may, counter-intuitively, simplify one aspect of transboundary 
interactions in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. Dr Claudia Sadoff, one of the 
authors of the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment, has said that ‘[i]f you can’t reduce 
floods in Bihar or saline intrusion in the Sunderban with infrastructure in Nepal, then that 
simplifies the discussion. Maybe you don’t have to negotiate everything across 
boundaries.’498 Flood management, then, becomes largely a local issue (even in border 
areas) rather than a transboundary one because it cannot be effectively managed across 
the entire basin. Taking a problemshed view, rather than a watershed one, allows for 
reconceptualising transboundary water issues according to these social, economic and 
management realities rather than constricting them to the hydrological boundaries. 
In the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, Bangladesh is the country most prone to floods, 
but India and Nepal also face flooding risk during the wet season.499 If, as the Ganges 
Strategic Basin Assessment shows, all these flood events cannot be controlled or mitigated 
through upstream water storage infrastructure in Nepal, then the issue need not remain 
on the transboundary water governance agenda except insofar as mutual assistance and 
the sharing of best practice are concerned. 
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Sedimentation 
The problem of flooding, especially for Bangladesh, is not just one of a surfeit of water, but 
also a surfeit of sedimentation. Compounding the diversions of Ganges River flow to 
Bangladesh is the rapid rise in silt deposition rates since the Farakka Barrage was erected 
upstream in India in 1975. Such sedimentation substantially reduces the river bed’s storage 
capacity and further increases flood risks.500 This is another example of how environmental 
processes coincide and create natural disasters in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed.501 Because of the risks posed by high levels of sedimentation, the Ganges 
Strategic Basin Assessment asks ‘Is it possible to control sediment in the Ganges?’502 
There is a belief within the Ganges basin that, as elsewhere in the world, a combination of 
erosion management and upstream storage structures might control sedimentation in the 
river. According to the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment, however,  
‘the Ganges is different. The Ganges is one of the three most sediment-
laden rivers in the world. Most of the sediment comes from erosion in 
the high Himalaya. Both the high volume and the source of this 
sediment make it extremely difficult to manage. The volume of sediment 
is so large that capturing it behind large dams would be extremely 
costly; the reservoirs behind these large, expensive structures would fill 
quickly and, thereafter, produce very few benefits. The high altitude and 
terrain of the sediment source regions, as well as the nature of the 
sediment and the ongoing tectonic processes, make it impossible to 
undertake the scale of watershed management interventions necessary 
to have any measurable impact on basin sediment loads.’503  
The problem of sedimentation cannot be readily resolved with infrastructure and water 
storage. Indeed, sedimentation may be, in the words of analysts from ICIMOD, ‘the 
greatest challenge for both large and small surface water storage reservoirs in the [Hindu-
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Kush-Himalaya] region’ and the problem is likely to increase with climate change.504 It is 
also currently unclear to what extent dams in Nepal can efficiently pass the large amounts 
of sediment eroded from high in the Himalaya.505 
The fact that sedimentation endangers dams and that dams cannot be effectively used to 
mitigate the effects of sedimentation downstream are both questions of control. As with 
the issue of flooding, however, the question of control misses the most important point for 
water governance. As the authors of the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment argue, 
‘[s]ediment, like floods, is a challenge that must be managed in the Ganges; it cannot be 
fully controlled.’506 The prevailing water paradigm implies that rivers – including the 
sediment they carry – must be controlled, and that they must be controlled through 
human engineering. Instead, a management approach may prove more fruitful for 
increasing transboundary water cooperation 
The other problem with storing sedimentation is that it may have unintended 
consequences. Sedimentation is not necessarily undesirable; indeed, it brings many 
benefits. High-silt floods fertilise soils, for example.507 In the pre-colonial era, floods on the 
Gangetic plain had been understood as a duality of calamity and benefits.508 Even the 
devastating 2008 flood in Bihar state brought with it nutritious sediment that enriched 
soil.509  
High sedimentation and flooding are a mixed blessing, but under the ‘command and 
control’ paradigm they are both seen almost exclusively as a problem. This limits the 
potential for developing positive-sum outcomes and maximising mutual benefits between 
riparians. There needs to be a return to the non-binary understanding of sedimentation 
and flooding, i.e., an understanding that each brings both advantages and disadvantages 
(similarly to the nuanced understanding of water conflict and cooperation coexisting, with 
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conflict sometimes having positive outcomes and ostensible cooperation leading to 
negative ones). 
Transboundary water interaction between India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh 
As the discussion above indicates, there are numerous and pressing issues affecting water 
governance. Yet, the quality of transboundary water interaction in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed is low. There is little cooperation between riparian states over 
shared water issues, and there is a prevailing resentment of India’s hydro-hegemony. With 
the exception of water interaction between India and Bhutan, the relationships between 
India-Nepal, and India-Bangladesh are marked by distrust that impedes the development 
of positive water interaction. As Earle et al. argue, ‘the trust deficit is extremely high in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra basin, and many consider India to be the regional bully.’510 This lack 
of trust between these riparians also undermines the work of international organisations 
and foreign aid donors in facilitating the development of transboundary water 
cooperation. 
On Mirumachi’s Transboundary Water Interaction Nexus (TWINS) outlined in Chapter 1, 
the interaction between India and co-riparians can be categorised as mostly neutral, and 
occasionally negative. Only the interaction between India and Bhutan can be characterised 
as positive according to this matrix.  
In the interactions between India-Nepal and India-Bangladesh, the levels of cooperation 
fall in the categories of confrontation of the issue, ad hoc, and technical cooperation. In 
both cases, the levels of conflict fall into the politicised category, and occasionally into the 
securitised/opportunitised category. The interactions between India-Bhutan sit within the 
technical and risk-averting categories of cooperation, and the non-politicised and 
politicised categories of conflict. These are represented visually in Figure 3 below. 
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Figure 3: TWINS analysis of India-Nepal, India-Bhutan and India-Bangladesh 
 
Understanding the quality of transboundary water interaction in these terms is important 
because the explicit objective of foreign-led interventions in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed is to improve the quality of hydropolitics and increase cooperation over 
shared water resources. In other words, international organisations and foreign aid donors 
aim to nudge the interaction as far as possible toward the top right corner of the TWINS 
matrix.  
A benchmarking of the transboundary water interactions through TWINS allows for a 
future evaluation of the extent to which international actors may have affected any 
changes in the quality of these interactions. Furthermore, examining interactions with the 
awareness that conflict and cooperation coexist allows for a nuanced analysis of the 
problemshed that moves beyond the false dichotomy of peace being the absence of war. 
This analysis, in turn, may reveal which aspects of the water dynamics in the problemshed 
can be addressed to improve the overall quality of interaction. As is shown in Chapters 5 
and 6, however, international actors have on the whole not understood the quality of 
transboundary water interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed in these terms 
and this may be undermining the interventions that aim to increase cooperation. 
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Water interaction between India and Nepal 
Nepal and (British) India began cooperating over water resources in 1920.511 But this 
cooperation has been largely ad hoc (joint action but no shared goals) or technical (shared 
goals but no joint action). Certainly, there have been benefits to Nepal from these 
interactions. Chellaney points out that, for example, Indian-aided projects, besides 
establishing modest hydropower-generating capacity, have helped bring 300,000 hectares 
of farmland in Nepal under irrigation.512  
Many of these early Indo-Nepal water resources projects, however, though considered 
reasonable from India’s viewpoint, were, argues Onta, seen as a ‘sell out’ by many in 
Nepal.513 For instance, the failure of the Kosi and Gandak river treaties of the 1950s to live 
up to their promise (even following amendments in the 1960s) has left a bad legacy 
weighing down bilateral cooperation.514 Nepal continues to feel cheated over the Kosi and 
Gandak agreements, writes Bhattarai,515 and the bitterness generated by these experiences 
has coloured all subsequent dealings between the two countries. Suspicion and mistrust 
have grown on both sides, though Iyer, a former Indian water minister, argues that India’s 
handling of that difficult and complex situation can hardly be said to have been wise or 
sensitive.516  
More recently, the 1996 Mahakali Treaty has become a source of discontent and Nepalese 
resentment of India. Indeed, Gyawali and Dixit argue that the saga of the Mahakali Treaty 
presents itself as a case in point of Nepali polity and its relationship with its big southern 
neighbour.517 What should have been, according to Iyer, a new chapter in India-Nepal 
                                                     
511 Shah, RB 2001, ‘Ganges-Brahmaputra: the outlook for the twenty-first century’ in AK Biswas, & JI 
Uitto (eds), Sustainable development of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basins, Oxford University 
Press, New Delhi, pp. 24-25 
512 Chellaney, B 2011, Water: Asia's New Battleground, Georgetown University Press, Washington DC, 
p. 284 
513 Onta, IR 2001, ‘Harnessing the Himalayan waters of Nepal: A case for partnership on the Ganges 
basin’ in AK Biswas, & JI Uitto (eds), Sustainable development of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna 
basins, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp. 109-110 
514 Chellaney, B 2011, Water: Asia's New Battleground, Georgetown University Press, Washington DC, 
p. 283 
515 Bhattarai, R 2005, Geopolitics of Nepal and International Responses to Conflict Transformation, 
Friends for Peace, FFP Publications Series 006, Kathmandu, p. 15 
516 Iyer, RR 2008, ‘Floods, Himalayan Rivers, Nepal: Some Heresies’, Economic and Political Weekly, 
vol. 43, no. 46, p. 39 
517 Gyawali, D, & Dixit, A 1999, ‘Mahakali Impasse and Indo-Nepal Water Conflict’, Economic and 
Political Weekly, vol. 34, no. 9, p. 561 
132 
 
relations ‘has remained stalled because of certain differences between the two countries’518 
One of these differences is over the risks involved in building ‘the highest rockfill dam in 
the world in seismic Himalaya’519 – the beleaguered Pancheswar multipurpose dam, which 
is mandated in Article 3 of the Mahakali Treaty.520 A more vexing difference is in how the 
terms of the treaty are perceived within Nepal versus how they are perceived in India.  
The Mahakali Treaty is at first glance a cooperative interaction between India and Nepal. 
In 1996, Nepal and India came to an agreement concerning the integrated development of 
the Mahakali River basin, including building the Tanakpur and Sharada barrages and the 
Pancheswar multipurpose project. The treaty (which, according Gyawali and Dixit, was 
‘rammed through parliament’ with ‘unseemly haste’521) entitles both countries to utilise the 
waters of the river on the condition that Nepal’s requirements ‘shall be given prime 
consideration,’ and establishes the Mahakali River Commission. The United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP) argued that the Mahakali Treaty will provide ‘India and 
Nepal with an opportunity for meaningful cooperation to benefit the millions of people in 
the two countries who livelihood depends on the waters of the Mahakali River.’522 Yet, the 
principles of rights and obligations enshrined in the Mahakali Treaty remain contested.  
The most controversial point of the Mahakali Treaty according to Subedi is the nature and 
scope of the term ‘existing consumptive use’, and the exclusion of the amount of water 
already in use by the parties from the definition of the equal entitlement of the parties in 
the utilisation of the waters of the Mahakali River. Article 5 provides that water 
requirements of Nepal shall be given prime consideration. But Nepal claims that India’s 
existing consumptive use is much higher than Nepal’s, and that if this is excluded from the 
new definition of equal entitlement (as established in Article 3) then Nepal will be the 
loser – especially if the water sharing principles enshrined in the Mahakali Treaty were to 
form a precedent for future transboundary water agreement with India. Subedi argues that 
                                                     
518 Iyer, RR 2008, ‘National and Regional Water Concerns: Setting the Scene’ in K Lahiri-Dutt, & RJ 
Wasson (eds), Water First: Issues and Challenges for Nations and Communities in South Asia, Sage, 
New Delhi, pp. 23-24 
519 Gyawali, D, & Dixit, A 1999, ‘Mahakali Impasse and Indo-Nepal Water Conflict’, Economic and 
Political Weekly, vol. 34, no. 9, p. 561 
520 Treaty Between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and the Government of India Concerning the 
Integrated Development of the Mahakali Barrage Including Sarada Barrage, Tanakpur Barrage and 
Pancheshwar Project, signed 12 February 1996, Article 3. 
521 Gyawali, D, & Dixit, A 1999, ‘Mahakali Impasse and Indo-Nepal Water Conflict’, Economic and 
Political Weekly, vol. 34, no. 9, p. 561 
522 Chellaney, B 2011, Water: Asia's New Battleground, Georgetown University Press, Washington 
DC, p. 284 
133 
 
in this water thirsty region, with fully utilised rivers, any upstream use of Mahakali waters 
by Nepal is likely to be claimed as harmful to it by downstream India.523 
This dispute has been exacerbated, Subedi claims, by India’s insistence that the ‘existing 
consumptive use’ also includes the waters being used by India for the Second Auxiliary 
Sharada Canal. According to Nepal, the term ‘existing consumptive use’ was intended to 
only include the waters being used by India under the 1920 Sharada Canal treaty, but not 
the waters of the Second Auxiliary Sharada Canal. From the Indian point of view, however, 
India’s entitlement to use the waters of the Mahakali River for all the projects that were in 
existence in 1996 remain unaffected by the sharing formulae of the Mahakali Treaty, and 
are wholly covered by the ‘existing consumptive use’ clause.524 
Although the Mahakali Treaty was signed a year before the 1997 UNWC, the principles of 
that seminal instrument of international water law were known in 1996. Subedi argues that 
Nepal would have been better off rejecting India’s ‘equal entitlement’ principle (as it is 
undermined by India’s insistence on excluding prior consumptive uses from the calculus) 
and instead proposing the principle of ‘equitable and reasonable utilisation’525 that is at the 
heart of the UN Watercourses Convention. He notes that  
‘Nepal is a small and weak country virtually surrounded by a powerful 
neighbour. That is why it should have adhered to the principles of 
international watercourses law rather than to the deceptively attractive 
propositions such as the principle of equality that is conditioned to one 
factor, and one that is beneficial to India.’526 
Gyawali and Dixit call the Mahakali Treaty a classic case of ‘marry in haste and repent at 
leisure’ and argue that Nepal, not India, is responsible for the disadvantageous terms of 
the agreement. For Gyawali and Dixit, the Mahakali Treaty  
‘is standing proof that for the major political forces in Nepal and their 
leaders, international treaties have value more for their outward form 
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than for their internal substance, more to look “nice” as “development-
oriented” politicians in the short term than to have the nation benefit 
from their substance in the long term…However, selective amnesia that 
filters out difficult questions of resource management seems to be 
pandemic among Nepal's political set, which does not leave much room 
for sanguinity.’527 
The domestic politics within Nepal, and factors unrelated to water governance, affect the 
controversy around the Mahakali Treaty (as argued in Chapters 1 and 2, transboundary 
water interactions do not exist in a vacuum but rather are part of a complex socio-political 
interplay). As Iyer points out, the stalled implementation of the Mahakali Treaty is in part 
due to political will being channelled into domestic security issues rather than questions 
of transboundary water governance: ‘no talks about these matters seem possible in the 
near future, given the troubled situation prevailing in Nepal. Further progress on water or 
energy or any other matter will have to wait for a degree of internal stability in that 
country.’528 Iyer also claims that ‘if the Mahakali Treaty between India and Nepal has 
become virtually inoperative, the cause lies less in water-related issues than in the 
complexities of the political relations between the two countries.’529 Singh too argues that 
as a rallying point of anti-India sentiment, the Mahakali Treaty was ‘caught in Nepal's 
domestic as well as Indo-Nepal imbroglio.’530  
A further factor in the Indo-Nepal imbroglio is the dispute over the Tanakpur Barrage, 
which illustrates how India has been able to use its hydro-hegemony to securitise water 
issues between the two countries. The controversy over the Tanakpur Barrage on the 
Mahakali River is an instance of opportunitised interaction, argues Mirumachi. She shows 
how India begun construction on the barrage on its own side of the Mahakali River then 
used discursive power to create a narrative of ‘panic politics’ that put pressure on the 
Nepalese government to allow construction on the Nepali side.531 
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Gyawali and Dixit explain the particulars of the case thus:  
‘By 1988, India had completed the construction of the Tanakpur barrage 
and the powerhouse with the exception of the left afflux bund that was 
needed to tie the barrage to the high ground on the left bank in Nepal. 
Despite its earlier insistence that this was a wholly Indian project in fully 
Indian territory and thus of no concern to Nepal, it became necessary for 
India to request for 577m of Nepali land for this purpose. However, 
around this period, relations between Nepal and India deteriorated with 
Nepal importing Chinese light arms and India imposing a peacetime 
economic blockade of Nepal in March 1989. The matter of extending the 
left afflux bund was not pursued further in view of other pressing 
concerns, but the essential strategic thrust of Indian government vis-a-
vis Nepal's water resources made itself felt in its diplomatic proposals.’532  
Again, the significance of non-water related issues on transboundary water interaction is 
exemplified.  
At the same time as being affected by non-water related concerns, the controversy over 
the Tanakpur Barrage came to affect domestic politics within Nepal. In 1991 the Nepalese 
Prime Minister signed an agreement with India regarding the construction of the left 
afflux bund. The terms of the agreement were not in dispute, but the source of the 
controversy lay in way the agreement was reached. Subedi argues that the Prime Minister 
conducted negotiations in secret, and when he tried to avoid parliamentary scrutiny, he 
was forced to submit to the scrutiny of the judiciary instead.533 This caused much political 
turmoil within Nepal, and the ruling party was heavily criticised.534  
The crux of the issue was definitional: was the agreement reached Memorandum of 
Understanding, or a Treaty? The answer had serious political implications within Nepal. 
Mirumachi shows that  
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‘[w]hen the MOU was exchanged, the ruling Nepali government treated 
the document as an expression of mutual understanding of the 
Tanakpur Barrage project. Consequently, the document would not 
classify as an international agreement requiring ratification of two-
thirds parliamentary majority under the clauses of the constitution. 
Opposing political parties argued the contrary, staging political 
demonstrations and calling for the Prime Minister to resign …The legal 
status of the MOU was even brought to the Supreme Court in Nepal for 
expert decision.’535  
Eventually the party that had signed the agreement with India lost power in subsequent 
general elections and was replaced in 1994 by a party that favoured negotiating with India 
an agreement about the development of the Mahakali River as a whole, rather than 
renegotiating the Tanakpur Barrage agreement; this precipitated the Mahakali Treaty.536 
The Tanakpur Barrage episode is not the only instance of water being securitised – made 
to seem as an existential threat537 – by India. Resentment lingers, for example, over Nepal’s 
obligation to inform India of its proposed non-consumptive developments (including the 
construction of small and medium hydropower plants). Meanwhile, Dixit and Gyawali 
show that India does not have to inform Nepal of the same, even when it developed large-
scale irrigation schemes in the states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, both of which border 
Nepal.538  
India has not been sensitive to Nepal’s concerns, nor has it handled the difficult and 
complex transboundary water negotiations wisely.539 This is widely acknowledged even 
within India and by commentators like Iyer and Chellaney, who on the whole have 
differing approaches to water conflict and cooperation in the region. As hydro-hegemon, 
however, India retains the prerogative to establish the agenda for water interactions, and 
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has no obligation to extend courtesies to its co-riparians above and beyond that which is 
stipulated in international water law and any other relevant treaties to which India is 
signatory. India has leveraged power asymmetry between the two countries to establish a 
status quo in the transboundary water management that, from Nepal’s perspective, does 
not adequately address its interests. But, unlike Bhutan, Nepal has not adapted to India’s 
hydro-hegemony in a way that engenders non-zero-sum thinking. 
Nepal is complicit in India being able to set the bilateral water agenda. The hydro-
hegemon has certainly not been willing to share the downstream economic benefits of 
irrigation and flood control from storage dam-building in the Nepal Himalaya, nor does it 
want to price hydropower at peaking rates – a major point of contention. But Gyawali 
argues that  
‘[t]he fault for this…lies on the Nepali side for not putting these 
positions across in a convincing manner. It is, therefore to my mind, the 
main challenge before Nepali diplomacy to convince their Indian 
counterparts that it is in our mutual interests for India to recognize 
these substantive benefits and to propose sharing them equitably. For 
this to happen, strengthening diplomatic capacity in Nepal vis-à-vis 
water is the first prerequisite.’540  
There are two impediments to Gyawali’s call for Nepal to strengthen diplomatic capacity 
vis-à-vis water and India. First, Nepal has low issue power (defined by Habeeb as an actor’s 
resources and capabilities within the context of a specific issue,541 and distinct from what 
Cascão and Zeitoun call material power542). This is because it is of less consequence to 
India whether or not Nepal’s water resources are developed, even if most of the benefits 
are to India. In other words, Nepal cannot dictate to India the terms of developing 
Himalayan rivers because India has other options for addressing its energy security, water 
security and food security needs. Second, even though the development of Nepalese rivers 
is of more consequence to Nepal than to India (that is, it would be a proportionally much 
larger boost to Nepal’s economy than to India’s), it is not the most pressing item on the 
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political agenda. The distracting effect of domestic issues has already been discussed in 
this chapter. 
Without impetus to increase cooperation with India, resentment lingers about India’s 
hydropower projects in Nepal. At the same time, Nepali party functionaries fear political 
allegations that a project, any project, is not moving forward due to their action or 
inaction regardless of technical, economic or developmental demerits of such projects. 
They prefer to be seen ‘for’ projects rather than questioning them.543 There is, according to 
Gyawali and Dixit, enormous political pressure within Nepal to harness water resources 
vis-a-vis India, particularly through mega projects, which are believed to bring more 
economic benefit and political kudos than more moderately sized undertakings.544 The 
crux of the problem, however, is, according to Shakya, the lack of political consensus on 
any projects, big or small.545 
There have been many grand plans for hydropower development but few beneficial 
outcomes. The Maoist-led government that came to power after Nepal was declared a 
republic formed a task force of prominent water experts to see how the existing capacity 
for generating electricity of approximately 600 MW could be increased to 10,000 MW in 
ten years. When the Maoist government fell and a coalition of Marxists and democratic 
socialists formed the subsequent government, the target, expected to be reached in 20 
years, was increased to 25,000 MW. No real effort, however, has been made to encourage 
small- and medium-scale Nepali developers, who are capable of increasing production by 
30 to 60 MW a year.546 This may be because, as Gyawali and Dixit argue, since the 1970s, 
‘Nepal's water resources development activities had begun to acquire a donor-led, statist 
bias, precluding other (private or community-based) institutional possibilities.’547 At the 
same time, Hill points out that Maoist leaders ‘steadfastly oppose Nepal’s liberalisation of 
its water markets. Indeed, the cancelling of prevailing treaties with India and reducing the 
influence of Indians in the Nepalese economy was, along with abolition of the monarchy, 
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one of the major platforms of the Maoists.’548 In turn, this, argues Hill, ‘problematises 
current and future arrangements for the sharing of water resources between India and 
Nepal.’549 
Nepal’s relationship with its hydropower potential is a conflicted one: the Nepalese feel 
entitled to reap the benefits of this potential, but are unable to capitalise on it. There is not 
enough electricity produced domestically to satisfy demand, and results in massive daily 
power cuts, even in the capital city Kathmandu.550 Individuals and businesses have figured 
out a work-around – decentralised electricity production through privately owned and 
operated diesel-run generators551 – but that is not a viable solution to endemic problems of 
weak governance. The weakness of the domestic polity lies in the pervasive and, according 
to Gyawali and Dixit, naive belief that foreign aid should drive the hydropower 
development and electricity sales to India, from which the Nepalese could be ‘as rich as 
the sheikhs of Arabia’.552  
Nepal’s economy relied heavily on foreign aid since the 1950s, and over the years, foreign 
aid became an integral aspect of Nepal’s political and social landscapes, to the extent that 
little can be achieved in the country without it.553 The over-reliance on foreign aid has, 
according to Gyawali, bred complacency and learned helplessness in the water sector in 
Nepal: water development has been aid-led rather than domestic enterprise led, which has 
led to a ceding of the driver's seat to experts from aid agencies and Nepali taking on a 
liaison role.554 This not only leaves Nepal ill-prepared for autonomous negotiations and 
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fortitude in the face of market forces, but may perpetuate a post facto feeling of having 
always received a raw deal.555  
Since the 1950s, it has been a political truism in Nepal that the country’s greatest problem 
is poverty and its greatest asset is its enormous hydropower potential. The phrase ‘Nepal’s 
vast unutilised water resources potential’ remains largely unquestioned even though the 
scientific basis for this claim is not unequivocal.556 Yet in more than half a century of effort 
by various Nepali governments, its powerful neighbours and international aid agencies, 
the nirvana of hydro-dollar fuelled development has not been realised. Indeed, wags have 
turned the truism around, joking that poverty is Nepal’s biggest asset (since it seems to 
attract so much foreign aid) and hydropower its biggest problem (since it has led to so 
much conflict and bad political blood).557  
The domestic discourse about water resource management in Nepal has, claims Gyawali, 
fallen into a solipsism which does not see as utilisation anything that was not ‘aided’, 
‘official’ or ‘modern’. Similarly, the word ‘national’ is confused with ‘governmental’ when, 
in reality, national efforts in water utilisation are the sum total of official and non-official 
efforts, the latter often being the silent majority.558 This makes for limited domestic 
impetus, or political will, for actively pursuing the national position of socio-economic 
development through hydropower development and sale to India.  
Development of hydropower capacity is also a secondary political priority because Nepal is 
caught up in a cycle of instability and violence, making security a more urgent 
consideration for the government than transboundary water cooperation.559 Nepal has 
been in political flux since the early 1990s.560 The state’s failure to initiate socio-economic 
development has been one of the factors of the conflict that has led Nepal to its current 
state of chaos and violence, which in turn hinders its ability to initiate socio-economic 
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development.561 Most development activities had halted in rural Nepal as a result of the 
recent civil war, and the government slashed development funds, diverting them to 
security expenditures. Moreover, rebel attacks on hydropower plants, access facilities, 
communication networks and development projects caused substantial economic losses 
and general devastation.562 The point here is not that security concerns have stymied 
hydropower development, but rather that they have divided political attention. 
At the same time, civil society opposition to dam building is growing. The 2001 World 
Commission on Dams (WCD) report into Dams and Development galvanised collective 
engagement among a triumvirate of hydropower actors – the state, the market and civil 
society – as to the future of dam-building in Nepal. Since Nepal’s national interest lies in 
development, which requires some dam building, the opposition line is not ‘no dams’ but 
rather, ‘no bad dams.’563 The Water and Energy Users’ Federation-Nepal (WAFED), for 
example, was an important activist group challenging the official development agenda in 
Nepal.564 However, opposition to dam-building on environmental grounds is still mostly 
driven by international interests, claims Iyer.565 In large part this sort of movement is part 
of a global paradigm shift. There is a growing international trend, discussed further in 
Chapter 4, of acknowledging that dams sometimes give rise to distributional conflicts and 
increase political tensions as downstream and upstream communities receive inequitable 
benefits.566 
A further domestic complication to Nepal’s position on developing its hydropower for 
export is the convention of International Labour Organisation (ILO 169) that protects 
indigenous tribal rights. Nepal is a signatory to this convention, and local political 
workers, especially from indigenous ethnic groups, claim the right to control the resources 
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in their area, which means no central government can decide on a project without their 
prior and informed consent.567 
These issues – domestic opposition to dam-building, reliance on foreign aid, ongoing 
political unrest – affect Nepal’s ability to effectively negotiate favourable water governance 
arrangements with India. Most of these issues are not present in Bhutan, and this means 
that transboundary water interactions between India and Bhutan are of a different quality 
than those between India and Nepal. These are discussed in the following sub-section. 
Water interaction between India and Bhutan 
In contrast to the numerous issues that distract and divide political will in Nepal away 
from improving transboundary water interaction with India is the case of Bhutan, which 
has made a concerted effort to come to terms with the hydro-hegemon on issues of mutual 
interest. The fact that Bhutan is small, ethnically, religiously and politically homogenous, 
with a stable government, and few other socio-economic issues to distract it, means that it 
has been able to channel political will into resolving contentious water resource 
development issues with India. This arrangement is positive-sum and the export revenue 
that Bhutan receives from the sale of hydropower to India is not only a major source of 
GDP but has also fuelled remarkable socio-economic growth.568  
While the quality of water interactions between India and Bhutan provides an interesting 
juxtaposition to those between India and Nepal, the comparison between the two 
countries is not perfect: Bhutan is one fifth the size of Nepal, has no Terai lowlands to 
irrigate,569 and is governed by a stable central government. The ‘Bhutanese model’, if there 
is one, is therefore not appropriate for the Nepal case. The core water issue between 
Bhutan and India is hydropower as Bhutan is upstream of the water-rich state of Assam 
(fed by the Brahmaputra river), while Nepal is upstream of the water-scarce and populous 
states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh thus making irrigation and flood control significant 
issues to resolve with India.570 The purpose of juxtaposing Nepal and Bhutan, then, is to 
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illustrate that water interactions are complex and determined by different factors on 
different scales, and not just riparian position vis-a-vis the hydro-hegemon. 
India can use its hegemony to elicit compliance from Bhutan (and, indeed, Nepal) because 
Bhutan is heavily dependent on India for trade and almost entirely reliant on India for 
navigation and transport routes.571 Nonetheless, Bhutan has been able to turn that to its 
own advantage. Bhutan’s stance toward the hydro-hegemon can be said to be an instance 
of ‘bandwaggoning’. This is a counter-hegemonic tactic whereby weaker states in a 
regional system seek accommodation with the local hegemon in order to receive economic 
and military benefits.572 The collaborative and seemingly friendly nature of the relationship 
between Bhutan and India over transboundary water resource management can be 
attributed in large part not to India’s attempts at creating more equitable regional 
relations, but to the kingdom’s far-sightedness and political savvy in fostering the non-
zero-sum-thinking that allows the interests of both Bhutan and India to be addressed 
through hydropower development.  
The flip-side of this accommodating stance is that Bhutan is arguably limiting its political 
sovereignty. India in essence dictates Bhutan’s foreign policy, stations troops on Bhutan’s 
northern border (i.e., with China, thus using Bhutan as a buffer) and under the 1949 Treaty 
of Friendship limits Bhutan to purchasing defence materiel exclusively from India.573 Thus, 
while Bhutan has developed an overall symbiotic relationship with India, it has been at the 
cost of some political independence. 
At the same time, Bhutan is increasingly engaging with China. Chinese travels are an ever-
growing contribution to the Bhutanese tourism sector, and China is negotiating to invest 
in the kingdom’s planned hydropower plants.574 But, as Earle et al. point out, ‘[t]he advent 
of China in the [Ganges-Brahmaputra] basin’s hydro-politics’, like in the Mekong and the 
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Nile, has brought further complications and uncertainties.’575 These are mostly geopolitical 
and relate more to strained relations with India than to transboundary water governance.  
The India-Bhutan interaction over transboundary water resources can be categorised on 
Mirumachi’s TWINS matrix as exemplifying technical and risk-averting types of 
cooperation, and the non-politicised and politicised types of conflict. In technical 
cooperation, there are shared goals but no joint action, and in risk-averting cooperation 
there is joint action and shared goals in addition to the belief that the other will do as 
expected to execute the action. On the conflict scale, non-politicised interaction is that 
over issues that do not concern the state, while politicised interaction is over issues that 
are part of public policy discourses.576 
For India too there have been clear and important benefits of this cooperative 
arrangement. As Hill points out, India’s newly-elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi 
visited the kingdom on his first official state visit. He asserted that hydropower is the 
centrepiece of the Indo-Bhutanese relationship and, according to Hill, reinforced the 
perceived need to counter the growing influence of China in the areas that have 
traditionally been within India’ sphere of influence.577 
For Bhutan, the assistance gained from India in developing its hydropower capacity has 
been crucial in the socio-economic development of the country. Indeed, Bhutan has the 
distinction of achieving the highest per capita income in South Asia by exploiting its ‘blue 
gold’. Bhutan has capitalised on its hydropower potential through projects that are mostly 
small in scale and based on run-of-the-river technology. India has funded the majority of 
Bhutan’s hydropower development and imports the electricity produced.578 This 
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arrangement is positive-sum and export revenues from hydropower transfers constitute 
more than half of Bhutan’s total revenue.579  
This financial boon of selling hydropower to India has been channelled into social 
development in Bhutan. For example, approximately 78 per cent of the population has 
access to safe drinking water,580 even in rural areas.581 For this reason, the Royal 
Government of Bhutan has taken the position that ‘[h]ydropower shall continue to be the 
backbone of the Bhutanese economy providing adequate energy for growth.’582 In addition 
to the socio-economic benefits, shifting Bhutan’s energy mix away from timber (the 
dominant fuel source) to electricity will reduce the rate of deforestation.583 This aligns with 
another of Bhutan’s domestic priorities: environmental sustainability. 
Bhutan has a long-standing and well-articulated position on the preservation of its 
environment and natural resources. Its stance on water was developed through the Bhutan 
Water Partnership, which was established in August 2001 to coordinate the development 
of the water policy and prepare the Bhutan Water Vision for the next 25 years.584 It stresses 
harmony and balance in the environmental, social, cultural and economic value and uses 
of water.585 Bhutan is not only concerned about its own environment, but is building a 
reputation as a best-practice leader for the world in nature conservation.586 In a global 
polity increasingly embracing a paradigm of environmental sustainability, this is a clever 
strategy for international alliance making, but it is also disingenuous. Bhutan has not been 
in a position to develop heavy industry or other unsustainable practices that could 
jeopardise its unspoilt environment and therefore is a model that other countries cannot 
readily emulate. 
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As for transboundary water management, Bhutan’s water policy calls for a whole-of-basin 
approach that respects ‘the natural integrity of the rivers as well as the legitimate water 
needs of riparian states.’587 It is unusual for the upper riparian to voluntarily espouse the 
restricted sovereignty view of transboundary basins and lead the discussions on Integrated 
Water Resources Management (IWRM). This is because a whole-of-basin approach such as 
IWRM is collaborative and thus evens out some of the power asymmetry that is often 
(though not always) skewed in favour of upstream countries.  
In the case of Bhutan, India’s hydro-hegemony far outweighs any upper riparian advantage 
the kingdom may have. Thus, Bhutan’s position on whole-of-basin water resources 
management arises as much out of an interest in shifting the power balance with India as 
it does out of a sincere concern for the natural environment. Similarly, Bhutan projects 
itself as a proponent of the currently popular global narratives around sustainable 
development, climate change resilience, ecology-centric approaches, et cetera. As these 
narratives largely originate in and are driven by western epistemic communities, it is 
possible that Bhutan is strategically positioning itself so as to appeal to international 
organisations, such as the World Bank, that also espouse these ideals. This may have the 
effect of strengthening third party support for Bhutan vis-à-vis India, and thus increasing 
Bhutan’s material power with what Cascão and Zeitoun identify as international political 
and financial support.588 
There is also a social justice component to the way most domestic issues are approached in 
Bhutan (with the notable exception of the treatment of ethnic minorities and refugees589). 
This is also true of Bhutan’s position on water resources management. In Bhutan, water for 
human consumption has direct links to poverty, so water related programs should have 
poverty alleviation as an objective and contribute to Gross National Happiness (GNH).590 
Adopted in the late 1980s,591 the GNH is a philosophical approach to policy for equitable 
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socio-economic development; conservation of environment; preservation of culture; and 
promotion of good governance.592 It is applied to water resources management,593 and 
aligns with the principles of IWRM. How the honourable intentions of GNH and basin-
wide management fare against the increasing temptations modernisation and 
development remains to be seen. 
It is unclear how Bhutan’s insistence on holistic, sustainable development and social 
justice will stand up to the growing pressures to modernise at a faster pace. The kingdom 
is still navigating the troubled waters of what ‘development’ and ‘progress’ should mean 
for this Buddhist state. To what extent is an intimate relationship with India beneficial and 
to what extent is it limiting? And how can the ideals of Gross National Happiness be 
balanced with the environmental toll and economic boon of hydropower generation? A 
Bhutanese idiom has it that the person who consumes the least is respected the most.594 
But with the attractions of consumerism so close to hand, Mukherjee points out that 
Bhutan may find it difficult to resist the temptation. The kingdom cannot isolate itself 
forever, and there is a political compulsion to develop more rapidly to meet the aspirations 
of its people.595 
Bhutan is highly conscious of its ‘blue gold’ potential but also wants to achieve socio-
economic development without compromising the preservation of its environment and 
cultural heritage. This ambivalence toward large scale development of hydropower is 
evident in Bhutan’s Water Policy. On one hand the document emphasises the need for a 
holistic ecological approach with sensitivity to human and social concerns. On the other, it 
is full of the language of economics, management, and the marketplace – the language of 
the global water establishment. Because of the ‘middle path’ that Bhutan has chosen to 
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adopt, it is bound to face conflicts and dilemmas from time to time.596 Bhutan might find 
it difficult, warns Iyer, to reconcile the holistic and marketplace approaches.597  
Water interaction between India and Bangladesh 
Of all the South Asian states, Bangladesh is in the weakest negotiating position with India. 
It is downstream of the hydro-hegemon, has little material power relative to India, and is 
low on what Cascão and Zeitoun call bargaining and ideational power.598 Moreover, 
Bangladesh does not seem inclined to use the negotiation tactics that may improve its 
outcomes. One such tactic is issue linkage. Zeitoun and Warner point out that a weak 
negotiation position in one sector may be somewhat compensated for by relatively high 
issue power in another sector; this is the essence of issue linkage.599 Tiwary explains that:  
‘[n]ations negotiating over international water resources (quantity, 
quality, hydroelectric energy, etc.) may demand/expect benefits which 
are neither of the same kind/value nor of immediate nature. They can 
accommodate vast deviations from stated claims based on prospective 
and diffused benefits like cooperation in regional security, trade 
benefits, transit routes, energy cooperation, resolution of boundary 
disputes, etc.’600  
In the case of Bangladesh’s weak negotiating position vis-à-vis India over transboundary 
water governance, Bangladesh could link the resolution of specific concerns to benefits to 
India from a new Bangladeshi deep sea port at Chittagong. Bangladesh could also impress 
upon India the potentially dire consequences of a mass migration into India of 
Bangladeshi farmers and fisher folk displaced by environmental degradation caused in part 
by changed conditions on shared rivers. This is, to some extent, occurring slowly and 
relatively quietly at high level negotiations between the two countries, but it may be many 
years before this process results in tangible outcomes.  
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Yet, there are many issues in Bangladesh that take priority over addressing transboundary 
water issues. Bangladesh does not, for example, systematically gather data on 
transboundary rivers. Instead, a frequent complaint from within Bangladesh is that India 
withholds this type of information and that it should be shared. A sort of learned 
helplessness pervades Bangladesh’s attitude to India in regards to transboundary water 
governance. The dominant narrative is that India deliberately and consistently ignores 
Bangladeshi interests, and that it is up to India – not Bangladesh – to take active steps to 
rectify the souring relationship. There is nothing in the narrative about Bangladesh 
resolving its own problems, either through its own data gathering, its own water diversion, 
or finding ways to leverage issue-linkage to get the outcomes it wants from India.  
Bangladesh, despite this passive stance on transboundary water issues and its weak 
negotiation position vis-à-vis India, is also the riparian in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed that faces the most serious consequences of river diversions upstream and 
transboundary water resource mismanagement. Bangladesh’s external water dependency 
(the percentage of water that originates outside a country’s political borders) is 91.33 per 
cent and thus one of the highest in the world. Yet, its per capita freshwater availability 
(7,569 cubic metres per year) is almost five times higher than India’s.601 This, however, is as 
much a curse as it is a blessing. Bangladesh’s low elevation makes it prone to flooding 
during the monsoon season, and also prone to drought during the dry season between 
January and May. Management of shared river resources is therefore particularly critical 
for Bangladesh.602 
Bangladesh is criss-crossed by 230 major rivers, with 54 of them (including the largest 
ones) flowing in from India. Watercourses cover seven per cent of the country’s total land 
area. The Brahmaputra is the most important river of Bangladesh, but the Ganges and 
Meghna are also significant.603 The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin sustains 
approximately 10 per cent of the world’s population, but is also one of the poorest regions 
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in the world.604 This poverty makes Bangladesh particularly vulnerable to the deleterious 
effects of upstream water engineering, such as large hydropower dams in the Himalayas 
and numerous diversions and water-storage dams in the middle and lower portions of the 
Ganges. These have had significant side effects on Bangladesh, including dislocation of 
human communities, through loss of resources such as fishery stocks, and increased 
hazards from flooding, to saltwater incursions and erosion of the Ganges delta.605 
Bangladesh is always on the receiving end of these disasters, and so it is all the more 
important for it to reach agreements that affect water flow upstream. It is also a high 
priority for Bangladesh in developing a constructive domestic water policy and attaining 
development goals associated with this.606 
There is much criticism of the water-sharing arrangements between India and Bangladesh, 
which are, argues Hill, inequitable and symptomatic of the broader relationship between 
the two countries.607 Singh points out that there is also a perception within Bangladesh 
that India secretly diverts a portion of the Ganges upstream during dry months, causing 
acute water stress and environmental damage to Bangladesh. The Indian External Ministry 
counter-claims that it releases more water than is Bangladesh’s genuine requirement and 
that Bangladesh exaggerates its needs.608 
Hill argues that ‘India’s modification of rivers in the Brahmaputra – Meghna continues to 
be a source of tension within Bangladesh and a significant feature in the relationship 
between the two countries.’609 One specific source of tension is the 1996 Ganges Treaty. 
The Ganges Treaty610 is an agreement about surface water allocation at the Farakka 
Barrage. India constructed the Farakka Barrage in the 1970s in the state of West Bengal 
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near the border with Bangladesh to divert dry season flow away from the Ganges main 
trunk and into an offshoot, the Hooghly River, to increase flows – and therefore ease river 
transport – into the port of Kolkata. The Ganges Treaty provides for a volumetric 
allocation; it divides water flow without sharing the value and uses of the river between 
the two countries. It does not include the uppermost riparian, Nepal.  
The Ganges Treaty takes neither a whole-of-basin approach to river management, nor does 
it factor in the effects of India’s consumptive water uses on the Ganges upstream of the 
Farakka Barrage.611 Instead, the allocation is determined by water availability at the barrage 
itself, and based on flow averages from between 1949 and 1988.612 Since then, the dry 
season discharge of the Ganges at Farakka has declined due to increased upstream uses for 
agriculture and other purposes,613 and this has led on several occasions to Bangladesh not 
receiving the treaty apportioned flow.614 By focussing exclusively on dividing water flow, 
the Ganges Treaty has not taken into account how current and future uses further 
upstream are likely to affect availability at Farakka.  
The apportioning of dry season flows between India and Bangladesh at the Farakka 
Barrage means not only that Bangladesh sometimes receives less water than it needs when 
it needs it most, but also that there is no mechanism to alleviate dangerously high flows 
during the monsoon. Because India is allowed to withdraw a maximum of 40,000 cusecs 
irrespective of the overall flow of the river, when the flow reaches 2,000,000 cusecs – the 
point at which the Ganges River within Bangladesh breaches its banks – there is no 
recourse in the Ganges Treaty for flood alleviation through diverting excess flows at 
Farakka Barrage into the Hooghly River. The flood risk is compounded by the rapid rise in 
silt deposition rates occurring since the Farakka Barrage was erected.615 
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Bangladesh has argued that the Farakka Barrage harms the agro-ecological and economic 
wellbeing of southern Bangladesh.616 It disregards Bangladesh’s ecology, water needs and 
the survival of its people, claims Singh, and is therefore seen as unfair treatment meted out 
to a smaller country by a ‘big brother’. He argues that the Ganges Treaty embodies all that 
is wrong in the water relationship between Bangladesh and India.617 Hill too shows that 
‘almost every negative development in rural Bangladesh is linked to the Farakka barrage’ 
but points out that ‘[t]he Indian perspective, in contrast, asserts that Bangladesh has been 
unwilling to compromise and has expected that its share of water resources will always 
remain undiminished.’618 
From the Indian perspective, the Ganges Treaty is fair and even invokes the principle of 
reasonable use.619 The principle of ‘equitable and reasonable utilisation and participation’ 
is enshrined in the Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Waterways,620 which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1997 – 
one year after the Ganges Treaty (and also the 1996 Mahakali Treaty between India and 
Nepal). Although India is not a signatory to the UN Watercourses Convention, the appeal 
to the internationally accepted norms of transboundary water governance (the draft of the 
UN Watercourses Convention had been debated for years prior to its adoption in 1997) is 
deliberate. India’s interest lies in minimising the perception of taking advantage of a 
weaker neighbour while maximising benefits. In the case of the Ganges Treaty, the 
principle of reasonable use applies only to an approximately 20km stretch of river between 
the Farakka Barrage and the border with Bangladesh – a stretch so short as to make the 
application of this principle meaningless in practice.621 Overall, the Ganges Treaty 
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illustrates that a legally binding agreement is not the same as meaningful cooperation 
between the parties. The treaty favours the hydro-hegemonic state (India) and solidifies 
the status quo. It does not create a community of interest in the shared management of 
the river and has left Bangladesh with numerous concerns and unresolved issues.622 
Another unresolved issue between Bangladesh and India is that of the proposed agreement 
over the Teesta River. As with the Ganges Treaty, the point of contention over the Teesta 
River is the quantity of water to be allocated to each country during the lean season.623 The 
Teesta begins in the Indian state of Sikkim, flows through the state of West Bengal, and 
joins the Brahmaputra River in Bangladesh.624 The flow of the Teesta into Bangladesh is 
controlled by a barrage at Gazaldoba, which India constructed to provide water to 
northern parts of West Bengal. Bangladesh also has a barrage on the Teesta. It is the Dalia 
Barrage in downstream Lalmonirhat District, and supplies water for agriculture and 
irrigation to drought prone areas of northern Bangladesh. According to Prasai and Surie, 
Bangladesh argues that the construction and diversion of water from the Gazaldoba 
Barrage has drastically reduced water availability at the Dalia Barrage, particularly in the 
dry season. 625 This is the crux of the dispute.  
Negotiations between India and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) over the Teesta River 
date back to the 1950s and 1960, but it was not until the independence of Bangladesh in 
1971 that the Indo-Bangladesh Joint River Commission was established. In 1983, India and 
Bangladesh agreed to an ad hoc arrangement to share 75 per cent of the Teesta waters; 
India was entitled to 39 per cent and Bangladesh to 36 per cent, with the remaining 25 per 
cent to be allocated following further study.626 But this temporary arrangement was not 
satisfactory. In 2005, the Joint River Commission found that ‘the lean season flows in [the] 
Teesta will not meet the needs of both the countries and hence any sharing formula for the 
lean season flows should be based on shared sacrifices’ and by 2010, the Prime Ministers of 
India and Bangladesh issued a Joint Communiqué calling for the Teesta issue to be 
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resolved expeditiously.627 Soon after a draft of the Teesta agreement was written up, 
including a statement of principles for sharing the river waters in the lean season. India 
and Bangladesh were scheduled to sign the final agreement in 2011 and again in 2013, but 
both times the state government of West Bengal stood in the way.628 
The terms of the proposed Teesta agreement are largely focused on fixing the lean season 
share of the river water and the hydrological structures required to regulate the sharing. 
But, argue Prasai and Surie, the politics around the agreement extend far beyond the 
waters of the Teesta; ‘the Teesta negotiations are first and foremost about politics, yet 
rarely about the politics of the basin alone.’629 The 2011 attempt to reach agreement was 
largely stymied by public outcry within Bangladesh over perceived concessions to India 
regarding transit routes through Bangladesh to India’s north-eastern states.630 Meanwhile, 
in 2013 the ‘West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s refusal to endorse the proposed 
Teesta agreement on the grounds that her government had not been adequately consulted 
demonstrates the exclusive nature of the discourse even at the national level.’631 Since 
then, the political situation in Bangladesh has remained unstable, due in part to the fallout 
in 2013-2014 between ruling and opposition parties over the war crimes trial against 
Jamaat-e-Islami, although ‘Dhaka has reiterated its commitment and interest in expediting 
the treaty as soon as possible.’632 
Hill shows that the Teesta Agreement is problematic within India, too. He argues that 
framing the dispute in terms of one Indian states versus all of Bangladesh obfuscates more 
problematic aspects of the issue:  
‘What is lost in this description is that the modification of the Teesta is 
also a significant issue of domestic politics within India, and arguably 
demonstrates once again how marginal people, in this case indigenous 
people in Sikkim, are frequently disregarded and rendered invisible in 
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debates around transboundary water sharing. The significant cultural 
values associated with the Teesta by upper riparian people do not 
feature prominently in a discourse dominated by debates around the 
quantification and allocation of water for agriculture and hydro-
electricity.’633 
Similarly, a dispute between India and Bangladesh over the 1,500MW Tipaimukh dam in 
the Indian state of Manipur is not problematic only on the transboundary level. Hill shows 
that there is actually significant opposition to the project in both India and in Bangladesh. 
He argues that this ‘clearly shows the limitations of thinking about transboundary water 
resources only in terms of the unified interests of nation-states. A similar yet different 
dynamic is evident with regard to the River Teesta.’634  
The disputes over the Teesta agreement and the Farakka Barrage illustrate that the 
transboundary water interaction between India and Bangladesh is limited to single rivers 
rather than basin-wide or problemshed governance. They also illustrate that domestic 
issues and political priorities unrelated to water can exert significant influence on the 
quality of transboundary water interaction.635 There is more at stake, in other words, than 
the allocation of lean season flows at the Farakka and Gazaldoba barrages. 
Another significant point of contention between India and Bangladesh is over the 
proposed National River Linking Project, which Bangladesh claims will lead to flooding in 
Bangladesh and intensify the country’s dry season.636 As Hill argues, ‘India’s determination 
to press on with its river-linking schemes has the potential to cause significant domestic 
political issues as well as exacerbate pre-existing suspicion of that country among some 
groups in Nepal and Bangladesh.’637 
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Conceived in 1982, the megaproject would transfer 178 billion cubic metres of water from 
India’s northern rivers including the Ganges and the Brahmaputra to the drier southern 
rivers through 3,000 storage reservoirs and 14,900km of canals.638 The plan had been 
dormant for two decades but was revived in 2002 when India ordered that it be completed 
by 2016.639 This has not been achieved.  
One reason that India gives for the urgency of the project is the need to increase the 
country’s irrigation capacity in order to meet the growing demand for grain, which, by 
2050, would have to be sufficient to feed an estimated 1.5 billion people.640 India is an 
irrigation intensive country,641 and the National River Linking Project could provide 
enough water to increase irrigated farmland by more than 50 per cent and to power 34,000 
MW of hydropower capacity.642 
If this project comes to pass, it may increase hydropolitical tensions in South Asia. Like 
Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal have voiced their opposition.643 The National River 
Linking Project has also been met with widespread criticism by environmentalists and 
protests within India.644 It remains unclear, however, to what extent the regional fears 
about the project are justified, and to what extent they are a manifestation of anti-Indian 
sentiment pervasive in South Asia. Moreover, the fears about the consequences of the 
National River Linking Project may be moot – it is possible that the project will never be 
fully realised.  
Lastly, Singh argues that Bangladesh is also frustrated by exclusion from Indian and 
Nepalese negotiations over the Sapta-Kosi barrage despite the project having implications 
for Bangladesh. Bangladesh has proposed all three countries should work together because 
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the diversion of the Ganges will affect water flow to Bangladesh during the dry season. Yet, 
discussions over the dam, which will likely produce 3,500 MW, have remained bilateral 
between India and Nepal.645  
In conclusion, the transboundary water interaction between Bangladesh and India can be 
said to represent neutral and occasionally negative interaction on Mirumachi’s TWINS 
matrix. The levels of cooperation fall in the categories of confrontation of the issue (the 
issue is acknowledged but there is no specific joint action or identification and sharing of 
goals), ad hoc (joint action but no shared goals), and technical cooperation (shared goals 
but no joint action). The levels of conflict fall into the politicised category (issues on the 
political agenda,) and at times into the securitised/opportunitised category (issues that are 
seen as an existential threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside 
the normal bounds of political procedure).646 
Obstacles to positive transboundary water interaction 
There are several obstacles to trust between India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh, and the 
prospect of transboundary water cooperation. The first obstacle is the still nascent civil 
society.  
The second obstacle is the weakness of a regional identity within South Asia, which means 
there is no effective regional body for governing social and economic issues, such as the 
development of water resources. This vacuum of formal governance, however, is being 
partially filled by an increasingly vibrant civil society and network of sub-state and non-
state actors. Nonetheless, how these can be harnessed by international actors for the 
purposes of increasing transboundary water cooperation remains to be seen.  
Furthermore, there is a lack of trust between riparians and a zero-sum attitude to water 
sharing prevails. This is compounded by the securitisation of water issues in the region. A 
further and related factor is the culture of secrecy that surrounds hydrological data. These 
five obstacles are the subject of this section. 
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Underdeveloped civil society  
South Asia is one of the most poorly governed regions in the world, with inefficient and 
inequitable deployment of resources, crippling debt burden, social divisions along ethnic 
and sectarian lines, as well as rampant corruption and vulnerability of civil society 
organisations.647 As Baqai argues, ‘[t]he South Asian state is both strong and weak. On one 
hand, a high degree of “state-ness” is witnessed, whole on the other hand, the breakdown 
of state authority, as a result of social disorder makes political upheaval the norm.’648  
In addition to being ‘soft states’ (that is, ones unable to make citizens obey laws and 
regulations, or impose discipline over them),649 the states of South Asia are still defining 
themselves as nations. South Asia is still in the process of nation-building, and the region 
has been described as one of ‘nations in hope’ but not in being.650 To further the process of 
nation-building, or to compensate for it not being far enough advanced, there is a 
dominant nationalist discourse in the region that accords precedence to nations and 
nationalism over the region.651 Prasai and Surie see this nationalist discourse as affecting 
transboundary water too. One of the characteristics that they identify as defining water 
governance in South Asia is that it is nationalistic in terms of discourse.652  
With nationalistic discourses dominating, political leadership in South Asian countries has 
been unable, according to Behera, to imagine and evolve a mind-set that could be truly 
characterised as ‘South Asian’.653 The task of creating a regional mind, then, has fallen to 
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civil society. Unfettered by the nation-state ideology, the players in the civil society are 
better placed to conceive, shape and nurture the idea of ‘South Asia’.654  
Civil society – meaning the network of political, economic and social institutions, and 
interest groups such as political parties, religious and cultural associations, et cetera – is 
critical to governance in general and can further democracy as well as ‘safeguard 
individual rights from any kind of authoritarianism.’655 In South Asia, ‘[t]he phenomenal 
growth of NGOs…has opened a multitude of communication channels, at the grassroots 
level, on a broad spectrum of issues ranging from gender issues and human-rights 
violations to ecology. They play an active role in civic mobilisation and public advocacy 
and in organising activities across national boundaries in their areas.’656 Civil society has 
also been key in creating the idea of ‘South Asia’ in the absence of a regionalist outlook in 
the polity. Unfettered by the nation-state ideology, the players in the civil society are, 
according to Behera, better placed to conceive, shape and nurture the idea of ‘South 
Asia’.657 At the same time, in South Asia there is mutual hostility between civil society and 
the state.658  
Civil society has not been particularly active in addressing environmental concerns. 
Environmental concerns are widespread in South Asia, according to Iyer, but they are not 
equally strong or influential in all countries. There are some powerful environmental 
movements, but they are not very effective and cannot be said to be mainstream.659 
Historically, environmental movements in South Asia have been lined to anti-dam 
movements, but as Whitehead shows this has had mixed results in terms of bolstering 
domestic environmentalist:  
‘The use of transnational linkages [in the anti-Narmada dams 
movement] is shown to be, in some ways, a double-edged sword, 
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producing a “middle ground” of international environmentalism that 
gained strength through its international constituency, but also 
suppressed emerging local currents, contradictions and dynamics, 
particularly in its use and representation of indigenous peoples.’660 
In regards to transboundary water governance, however, the role and effectiveness of civil 
society in South Asia is limited. As Hill shows, NGOs in the region are preoccupied with 
donor-related ‘developmentalism’, and often are unable to express dissent. It is also very 
difficult for pan-South Asian networks to regularly meet because of the politically 
fragmented nature of the subcontinent.661  
Despite these challenges, there are alliances beginning to form between civil society 
groups across the region. Examples include the South Asian Solidarity on Rivers and 
Peoples (SARP), Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), the South Asian Network for Dams, 
Rivers and Peoples (SANDRP), while Imagine New South Asia (INSA) is an example of a 
new breed of regional think tanks that look at, among other things, transboundary water 
issues. Hill argues that ‘these are fairly nascent and, as yet, their influence on broader 
policy debates is hard to discern.’662 Chokkakula suggests that one effect of ‘[t]he multi-
actor driven multi-scalar everyday politics in the transboundary spaces of interstate water 
disputes’ is that they ‘de-centre’ the state – they diffuse the drivers of action away from 
state-actors.663 Nonetheless, as discussed below, the water governance in South Asia 
remains on whole state-centric and inter-governmental. 
There is also a growing network of national and international universities, think tanks, 
NGOs, public commentators, et cetera, working on and influencing the resolutions of 
transboundary water issues. Many of these are listed in Appendix 2: Organisations 
engaged in water governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. The salient point 
here is that there are many different actors involved in transboundary water governance in 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, and not all are state actors. They collaborate 
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across borders, build trust, et cetera and it is part of hydro-diplomacy to consider how 
these informal dynamics can be harnessed in formal and informal settings.664  
Synchronising the increasing complexity of these networks (that is, the emergence of 
water users with multiple identities and belonging to different systems; national, state, 
political, social economic class, and caste) is also a prerogative and challenge for IWRM.665 
This has resulted, among other things, in increased interest in the traditional knowledge 
systems which, according to Kurup, ‘attempt to study reality not as a linear conception of 
cause and effect, but rather as a world made up of constantly forming multi-dimensional 
cycles, in which all elements are part of an entangled and complex web.’666 This is in 
contrast to Western science ‘with its positivist leaning, that favours analytical and 
reductionists methods.’667 
In short, a critical realist or social constructivist approach is needed to best understand the 
transboundary water governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. Taking a 
constructivist approach is not to deny the importance of the states. Constructivists, as 
Asthana and Shukla point out, do agree that policies, ideologies and ideas have a more 
significant effects ‘when backed by powerful states and reinforced by enduring material 
forces.’668 Nonetheless, it is the interactions across levels and between non-state and sub-
state actors that influence states. As such Gyawali argues that state-centrism is the wrong 
lens through which to view transboundary hydropolitics, even though that is the 
commonly accepted paradigm from international relations and political science.669  
Nonetheless, in South Asia the state-centric narrative still dominates hydro-politics – and 
the development of hydropower in particular – despite a growing civil society. Hill shows 
that 
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‘there are hopeful developments in terms of the potential of civil society 
and people’s movements, and India is often highlighted in this regard 
because of its extensive and long-running networks of organisations 
devoted to contesting the terms under which hydropower takes place. 
However, most states, including India, continue to be highly centralised 
in terms of their water bureaucracies and it is difficult for these groups 
to have a significant impact. In the smaller nations, NGOs are 
predominately focused upon service delivery and have limited resources 
or capacity to devote to advocacy or political mobilisation.’670  
Advocacy groups in particular, argues Hill, are constrained in how they can express 
dissent. These difficulties faced by civil society groups are amplified when it comes to 
transboundary networks in South Asia, and so despite several promising attempts, there 
are few genuinely regional initiatives, or even those that successfully operate across 
international boundaries.671  
Weak regionalism, strong state-centrism 
Partly due to the weakness of civil society and non-state groups, water governance in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed continues to be seen – both by riparian stakeholders 
and by international actors – primarily as an inter-governmental undertaking. That is 
incompatible with what Iyer describes as ‘a consultative, interactive approach to conflict-
resolution’ that also ‘include[s] and involve[s] those who have a vital interest in the 
decision, namely the farmers, industrial establishments, municipalities, and people in 
general because all of us are water-users.’672 Iyer’s ideal is far from the reality of water 
governance in the region. Prasai and Surie argue that ‘water governance policies in South 
Asia are characterized by three features. They are: 1) statist in terms of decision-making, 2) 
nationalistic in terms of discourse, and 3) reductionist in terms of scope’673 
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The characterisation of water governance in South Asia as being statist and nationalistic 
stems, in part, from a weak regional identity in South Asia. Regionalism in a political, 
economic and national security sense may be a long way off yet. But it is considered 
desirable by international organisations and foreign aid donors. One normative claim of 
international actors engaging in transboundary water governance in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed is greater regionalism.  
Why is regionalism desirable for transboundary water interactions? As 
Hill explains: ‘regional integration is thought to lower the cost of trade 
and increase market access, which is purported to be particularly 
beneficial for economically marginalised people living in remote and 
landlocked areas. Along with increased investment, it is projected that 
efficient and sustainable technologies will replace and augment previous 
ways of doing things. These flows of expertise, investment and 
technology will all have the benefit of reducing poverty and the 
likelihood of conflict.’674 
He continues that in the Hindu-Kush-Himalaya region, hydropower development is 
frequently discussed as central to infrastructure-led integration: hydropower is often 
viewed as a cleaner source of energy than other alternatives and there is clear potential for 
it to play a role in regional electricity grids.675 But, as discussed elsewhere in this thesis, 
hydropower development is also largely dominated by the supply-side, neo-liberal, 
engineering paradigm, and often seen in zero-sum terms. Thus, though desirable, 
regionalism is not being created through transboundary water governance. 
Dash sees four major challenges to the development of true regionalism: India’s 
hegemonic status and Pakistan’s relentless challenging of that position; the existence of 
weak ruling coalitions; ethnic crises; the nuclear issue.676 As already discussed, Hill also 
sees the state-centric, top-down bureaucratic culture in India as a barrier to transboundary 
water cooperation more significant than inter-state bickering. In making this argument, 
Hill quotes a World Bank report that speaks of Indian bureaucracy as being characterised 
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by ‘the paternalism of central-level bureaucrats, coercive top-down planning, and little 
support or feedback from locals.’677 This bureaucratic culture is also likely to affect India’s 
relationship with its neighbours. 
Regionalism in the truest sense is unlikely any time soon in South Asia, but that should 
not be a surprise or a worry; Jain notes that it took decades for a free-trade and a common 
market regime to be established in Europe.678 Furthermore, as Jones points out, every 
region in the world is unique and purist notions of what constitutes a regional community 
are unlikely to be relevant to South Asia.679 Indeed, while South Asia is poorly integrated, 
it is also, in Kugelman’s words, ‘linked together by water co-dependencies’ and this 
paradox is at the heart of transboundary water arrangements in the region.680 
Despite the high level of interdependence over water issues, ‘the Ganges is one of the few 
large international basins in the world with no permanent institutional mechanism that 
involves multiple riparians.’681 The same is true for the Brahmaputra. Despite years of 
discussions and negotiations, there are no basin-wide mechanisms for communication and 
cooperation. Instead, bilateral arrangements (such as the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers 
Commission, or the Indo-Nepal Joint Committee on Water Resources) continue to be the 
preferred mode of cooperation within the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed.682 India’s 
role in establishing and maintaining strictly bilateral arrangements is examined in the 
fourth section of this chapter. 
There is one major regional organisation, the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) but, as Kugleman argues, it ‘is not nearly as dynamic as regional 
grouping like the European Union or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
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(ASEAN).’683 The formation of the SAARC in 1985 was preceded by eight years of 
negotiations, but since its inception it has experienced only limited growth in terms of 
institutional development and program implementation.684 Moreover, most SAARC 
activities ‘are confined to “soft” areas of cooperation and to the holding of seminars, 
workshops, and short training programs. These activities may be useful, but they do not 
address priority core areas of trade and security and therefore lack visibility and regional 
focus, so essential for evolving a South Asian identity, leading to non-implementation of 
most of its projects.’685 
Transboundary water issues are not high on the SAARC agenda. As Hill points out, ‘water-
sharing negotiations are conspicuously absent from discussions at SAARC, the regional 
body that would otherwise have seemed an obvious forum for such multilateral 
coordination.’686 Yet, SAARC was not originally mandated to address regional water issues, 
but in the context of global action on climate change it has begun to consider water-
related problems. It has also created regional institutions for disaster management and 
meteorological research such as the SAARC Disaster Management Centre, and the SAARC 
Meteorological Centre, which promotes collective research in meteorology and weather 
forecasting in the region.687 There are also numerous multilateral dialogues as part of the 
SAARC process. Yet, according to Behera, there is an assumption that the governmental 
channels of the SAARC process have often failed to deliver and it needs ‘outside’ support 
in terms of ideas, processes, and mechanisms from non-official players.688  
Other reasons for the SAARC’s middling effectiveness have been identified by Dash as 
being ‘India’s hegemony, the lack of trust among South Asian states, and Pakistan’s 
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continuing challenge to India’s domination in South Asia.’689 It is perhaps not surprising 
that other South Asian countries are apprehensive about what they perceive to be India’s 
hegemony.690 As Asthana and Shukla point out, ‘[t]he relations between small and weak 
riparian states and their powerful neighbour [India] continue to be affected by suspicion, 
mistrust, envy, and domestic political concerns driven by the electoral politics of the 
respective states.’691 This general atmosphere of mistrust in the region is in addition to the 
apprehension about India’s hegemony.692 This too, Dash notes, contributes to the very 
weak regional solidarity and identity with ‘South Asia’ in the region.693 
Weak regionalism is a factor in the low levels of political will for collective action on 
shared water issues. Despite numerous transboundary water governance issues, there is 
little political will among the riparians of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed to 
address these. This limits the potential for increased transboundary water cooperation. As 
Earle et al. show, ‘there is certainly a lack of political will in the basin, particularly in India, 
to provide the space for multilateral river institutions to effectively emerge.’694 Multilateral 
approaches are limited by the state-centrism and nationalistic discourses that Prasai and 
Surie argue characterises water governance policies in South Asia.695 
One of the results of the weak solidarity and regional identity in South Asia is that the 
region lacks a security community. A security community means that a group of states has 
‘achieved such a level of cooperation, or even integration that they simply do not consider 
fighting each other as a realistic possibility to resolve disputes, and stop preparing to do so 
(although such states may well continue to prepare to fight others.)’696 Jones argues that 
this model of a security community is not currently applicable to South Asia, and is 
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unlikely to develop in the foreseeable future.697 At the same time, he points out, some 
positive dynamics are occurring, especially in regards to India adopting a ‘strategic 
altruism’ (that is, considering the concerns of neighbours in its own security actions, 
especially for the purpose of fostering closer relationships).698  
Zero-sum attitudes to water sharing  
At the root of the weak regional solidarity in South Asia, and resentment of India’s hydro-
hegemony, lies the lack of trust between states in the region. As Uprety points out, 
collective multilateral attention to the problems of transboundary waters in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed has been rare because of the prevailing mutual distrust 
between riparians. This distrust means that ‘the strategic approach of most of the 
countries is merely to theoretically engage in water-related initiatives, but practically 
advance only those serving their own specific interests.’699 
A further consequence of distrust between riparians is that a zero-sum attitude to water 
sharing prevails. A zero-sum view of transboundary water resources presumes that the 
water can only be used once, and only by one party. ‘Not surprisingly,’ argue Islam and 
Susskind, ‘it yields outcomes in which one side “wins” and others “lose.”’700 In contrast, a 
positive-sum view enables win-win arrangements, but ‘it is predicted that riparian states 
will cooperate because they have a shared interest in doing so.’701 Positive-sum approaches 
to water sharing are generally about optimising benefits for all riparians rather than 
dividing water.702  
‘A zero-sum water resource atmosphere is clearly building up in Himalayan Asia’ claim 
Wirsing et al., and ‘that in turn is fuelling already intense geopolitical rivalry among all the 
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concerned powers’703 Chellaney too sees the prevailing notion that sharing water is a zero-
sum game as driving the rivalry and water nationalism in the region.704 That notion is not 
unique to the transboundary scale; it is also apparent on the domestic scale. In India, for 
example, inter-state water disputes are subject to zero-sum thinking. As Paranjpye argues, 
‘the lack of integrative thinking among all parties concerned’ explains in part the failure of 
arbitration of these domestic water disputes.705  
The zero-sum, ‘winner takes all’ approach to water management allows for the 
securitisation of transboundary waters by establishing an adversarial dynamic between 
riparian states. Asthana and Shukla note that the securitisation of water means ‘[w]ater is 
treated as a geostrategic military tool instead of being elevated as a global common and a 
common resource recognised as vital for life.’706 The most prominent illustration of this is 
China, which is popularly perceived within South Asia as using its rivers as a ‘weapon’ and 
thus, according to Hangzo, treating them ‘as a means of asserting control over its lower 
riparian neighbours.’707 This is a particularly powerful narrative in light of China’s dam-
building plans for the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra River, which alarm Wirsing et al.708 
and Chellaney.709 Water, along with other non-traditional security threats such as the 
effects of climate change, can also be, according to Asthana and Shukla, ‘securitised across 
borders due to a bitter past, mistrust and hatred that dominates the socio-political 
structure in these countries.’710 
At the same time, the prevalence of non-traditional security threats also presents an 
opportunity for increased regionalism and cooperation across different levels. As Hill 
argues,  
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‘[i]f we consider non-traditional security in a way that incorporates a 
nexus of food, water and energy…then the regional integration of 
upstream and downstream communities in the Himalayas must be done 
in ways that achieve integration across the many ecosystems of the 
Hindukush Himalayas, and in doing so pay equal attention to the 
region’s watersheds, catchments and headwaters.’711 
But the increasing emphasis on addressing non-traditional security threats, especially 
through the traditional security apparatus, can also lead to the securitisation of water. 
Securitisation of transboundary waters 
The securitisation of water can lead to conflict, and thus undermines transboundary water 
cooperation. Countries, argues Chellaney, cooperate over transboundary water resources 
only insofar as it serves their national interest, and so ‘when a nation pushes a sense of 
grievance against a riparian neighbor, or when the transboundary water competition over 
economic development becomes fierce…the potential for conflict grows.’712 Prasai and 
Surie understand that  
‘[w]ater is an emotive subject and the notion of excessive nationalism on 
water undermining the scope of reasonable compromises is not unique 
to South Asia. Drumming up of nationalistic fervour on water is 
politically expedient, particularly when securitising water becomes a 
strategic intent and governments in South Asia (as elsewhere) routinely 
indulge in that enterprise.’713 
Understanding the riparians’ vested interests is, according to Mirumachi, important in 
understanding when and why a state may securitise water issues.714 Furthermore, 
Mirumachi and Allan show that  
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‘[c]onflict intensity over transboundary waters increases as the 
perception of the issues by the state changes. To be more specific, as 
issues become more of threat to the state, they are prioritized in the 
national agenda, thus receiving more attention and attracting 
allocations of various state resources. Issues that do not concern the 
state, or issues that are not in the public domain, are “non-politicized” 
issues. Once it gains a place on the political agenda, the issue is 
“politicized.”’715  
Non-politicised issues are not ones for state action, and not included in public debate. 
Politicised issues are managed within the standard political system, and are part of the 
public policy debate. An issue is securitised when it requires (or is perceived to require) 
emergency actions beyond the state’s standard political procedures.716 Significantly, a 
securitised issue can be intensified, claims Williams, ‘to the point where it is presented 
and accepted as an “existential threat.”‘717 That existential or extraordinary threat may, 
according to Warner and Meissner, legitimise extraordinary measures, thus ‘elevating a 
non-security issues to a security issue’ through a ‘speech act’.718 Speech acts can also lead 
to the opposite process, that of desecuritisation, which moves issues off the ‘security’ 
agenda and back into the realm of public political discourse and ‘normal’ political dispute 
and accommodation.719 One example of this is Apartheid in South Africa moving from a 
security issue to a generally political one.720 
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What, then, does the securitisation and desecuritisation of transboundary waters look 
like? Except in a Realist understanding of international relations721 water is not often the 
mainstay of a state’s security. Yet, transboundary rivers do involve security and risk 
concerns for both the environment and humans, and can be the focal point of a broader 
conflict.722 Crucial to an understanding of the securitisation of water is, according to 
Mirumachi, an understanding of the hydropolitical context because it will help explain the 
vested interests that exist between various actors.723  
Mirumachi shows that securitisation theory ‘considers not only the physical threats to and 
from the environment, but also the threats based on imagined and discursive 
constructions that relate to the environment. Environmental security incorporates 
questions of “who securitises what and how” through an examination of narratives and 
discourses.’724 Warner and Meissner add that ‘[b]ecause all is fair in political struggle, one 
often cannot tell whether securitization is a genuine cry of despair or a cunning 
strategy.’725 There is, in other words, no objective measure of water security. 
Water security is, according to Julien, socially constructed:  
‘To politicise, to securitise or to violise an issue is always a collective 
choice, conscious or not, rather than a necessity. Securitisation, in 
particular, is the result of a successful manoeuvre by (normally socially 
influential) actors to convince the relevant audience(s) that something 
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represents an existential threat to some cherished value, and that 
extraordinary measures are needed in reaction.’726  
Julien’s point about the influence of actors is particularly salient for the securitisation of 
transboundary water issues in South Asia. It is the hegemon’s prerogative to securitise an 
issue and ‘[n]on-hegemons have much less ability to de-politicise a matter that a hegemon 
considers an issue, and environmental agendas set by the powerful inevitably lead to non-
hegemons securitising the resource.’727 This is the case in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed. 
Transboundary water security is an issue on the political agenda of India, Nepal, Bhutan 
and Bangladesh. In particular, the energy and resource security aspects of water have, 
according to Wirsing et al., risen to a position of great importance on Asian strategic 
agendas and are fuelling geopolitical rivalries.728 At the same time, water itself is an 
emotive subject, and Prasai and Surie show that ‘[d]rumming up of nationalistic fervour on 
water is politically expedient, particularly when securitising water becomes a strategic 
intent and governments in South Asia (as elsewhere) routinely indulge in that 
enterprise.’729  
One example of the securitisation of transboundary waters in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed is that of interaction between India and Nepal over the Tanakpur agreement. 
In 1983, India began construction on a barrage close to the border with western Nepal. The 
initial construction was wholly on Indian territory, but India failed to consult Nepal.730 By 
the 1990s it become clear that to maximise the objectives of the barrage – regulated flows 
to irrigate 1.61 million hectares of land downstream, as well as run-of-the-river hydropower 
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production, both of which would benefit India only – some construction in Nepali territory 
was needed.731  
To create the left afflux bund (or the eastern wall to hold back water), India request 
577meters of Nepali land, which in effect would also submerge 2.9 hectares of land in 
Nepal.732 This request was, according to Mirumachi, essentially a speech act that 
securitised the shared waters. The letter of May 1991 from the Indian Prime Minister to the 
Nepali head of state took a strong position on the need for hydraulic infrastructure. 
Mirumachi argues that the letter ‘clearly emphasises that India and Nepal are both at the 
mercy of nature, with monsoon rains bringing about potential disaster. Human 
intervention in the form of engineering is seen as the rational approach that would reduce 
risk and provide long-term safety (i.e. a “permanent solution”).’733  
Thus India constructed an existential threat, then presented a seemingly obvious and 
unalterable solution to it. Mirumachi continues that India seized the opportunity to 
unilaterally construct the legal status of the Tanakpur agreement even while it was still 
being debated in Nepal. She argues  
‘[s]ecuritisation was possible because of the material resources and 
institutional experience of the Indian hydrocracy, which underpin the 
power asymmetry between India and Nepal. Successful securitisation in 
fact produced a situation where India’s unilateral barrage development 
could not be reversed, as it was now officially recognised in the legally 
binding Mahakali Treaty. Moreover, this basinwide agreement was 
limited in promoting equitable water allocation despite clarifying many 
governance aspects of the river, including the Tanakpur Barrage.’734 
There are other examples of how transboundary waters are securitised in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed. As discussed below, the secrecy around water related 
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knowledge securitises water because it elevates it into the realm of national security even 
though, as Prasai and Surie have said, hydrological data is of no use to military 
strategists.735 Nonetheless, influential commentators such as Brahma Chellaney continue 
to fear ‘water wars’ in the region.736 Baqai shows that the Indian media in particular 
favours war-terminology, especially in coverage of water issues with Pakistan, in its 
frequent uses phrases such as ‘battle for peace’, ‘arch enemies’, ‘ancient feud’, et cetera.737 
Local media too tends to present transboundary water issues in an alarmist way, often 
blaming upstream or downstream communities for water related disasters such as 
flooding.738  
Once water is securitised, it can have detrimental effects on the production of knowledge 
around transboundary water issues. For example, individual researchers, or those not 
affiliated with an Indian government institution, are often restricted in where they can 
travel to within India for their research, especially in the north-eastern part of the country 
– the mountainous region with significant hydropower potential and on-going insurgent 
activity.739 Some scholars have even been strongly advised against doing research on 
transboundary waters by India’s security agencies.740 There is also scepticism and 
suspicion from the Arunachal Pradesh government towards research, NGOs and others 
wanting to work on or research water-related issues because it fears any negative outcome 
may hurt the state’s economic interests.741 Thus the securitisation of water is not only a 
rhetorical or abstract phenomenon. It has real and profound effects on water interaction. 
Water gets securitised in many ways and by many actors. As Hill shows, ‘social 
construction of this threat emanates from many sources, including security intellectuals, 
religious extremists, circulation savvy media houses and popular representations.’742 In 
relation to the Hindu-Kush-Himalaya region specially, he writes that because water is 
securitised, ‘accelerating the construction of hydropower in the Himalayas becomes 
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portrayed as something akin to a geostrategic imperative, with the effect that some 
commentators demand the silencing of dissent and the scrapping of due process around 
the social, environmental and economic impacts of planned projects within their 
borders.’743 The consequence of this, argues Hill, is that  ‘the ongoing securitisation of 
water constrains the terms of debate under the guise of a unified national interest and 
enables large-scale dams to be constructed without due process.’744 The remedy he calls for 
is the desecuritisation of transboundary waters in the region,745 a point elaborated on in 
Chapter 6. 
Secrecy around water knowledge 
The securitisation of transboundary waters is also made possible because of the limited 
availability of accurate hydrological data in the region and a culture of secrecy that 
surrounds the knowledge that is available. As Vaidya and Sharma argue, ‘[k]nowledge gaps 
with respect to present and future hydrology pose a real constraint to water resource 
management’ in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed.746 There are a number of 
challenges that arise out of these water gaps.  
The first challenge is the culture of secrecy that not only hinders cooperation and 
collaboration, but could also create political tensions and lead to conflict. Chellaney, for 
example, sees the denial of hydrological data in a critically important season as 
tantamount to political leverage against a downriver state.747 As one Bangladeshi analyst 
pointed out, India is able to reject environmental impact assessments conducted in 
Bangladesh as incorrect on the grounds that such assessments do not use accurate 
upstream data – data that India refuses to share.748  
Why is the lack of water data a problem for transboundary interaction? As Prasai and Surie 
show:  
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‘[i]n the absence of accurate, verifiable data that are shared across 
borders, co-riparian constituencies including the media, civil society 
organisations and communities frequently end up using dubious 
information to accuse one another of diverting or exploiting 
transboundary water sources to the detriment of others. For example, 
the Bangladeshi press has long accused India of diverting more than its 
fair share of water from the Ganges River through the Farakka Barrage 
and Bangladeshi political parties have expressed similar concerns over 
India’s proposed diversion of Teesta River waters. Similar contentions 
have arisen frequently around implementation of Indus, Kosi and 
Mahakali treaties in the Pakistani, Nepali and Indian media.’749 
The limits on information about hydrology and irrigation withdrawals in India are largely 
a matter of policy, not availability. The Indian government has, for example, a 
sophisticated satellite information system for monitoring water resources (India-WRIS), 
but this database restricts public access to all hydrological data and information for India’s 
northern transboundary rivers (that is the Indus, Ganges and the Brahmaputra) on the 
grounds that it is classified.750 India’s Central Water Commission also consistently rejects 
requests for information. Information such as sediment flow data or planning documents 
about barrages and other structures on transboundary rivers (the Kosi River, for example, 
a tributary of the Ganges) are classified in the interest of national security. Prasai and Surie 
argue that ‘[t]his illustrates the highly securitised approach towards water and climate 
data in India, as compared to Bangladesh and Nepal where general information pertaining 
to transboundary rivers is not considered classified or secret, but rather this information is 
not collected, retained or disseminated in a sustained manner.’751  
India’s policy of secrecy regarding transboundary hydrological data does not preclude 
other riparians from conducting their own research and hydrological monitoring – but 
they do not do so methodically.752 That is a further example of the low political will in 
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Nepal and Bangladesh for tackling transboundary water issues. A culture of secrecy and 
suspicion prevails across all governments in South Asia, not just the Indian one, and stifles 
any inclination to declassify or share data.753  
One feature of many transboundary hydropower projects in South Asia is that they were 
not known through government-to-government communication, but through public 
media; timely and adequate information is never easily or fully given, claims Singh.754 The 
lack of information sharing is not only a government-to-government phenomenon, but 
also a government-to-people one. As Behera argues, in South Asia there is a distinct 
barrier between officials and the public; between those ‘inside’ the establishment, and 
those ‘outside’, that is, civil society. The two operate from fundamentally different 
information bases. The government information base remains too narrow and that of the 
non-government sources is wide but not well-informed. As a result, Behera claims, there is 
considerable mutual suspicion rather than mutual interaction.755 
There have been recent attempts to break through this culture of secrecy. India’s 2012 
National Water Policy, for example, does promise the declassification of some hydrological 
data.756 Yet, around the time that this policy was being drafted, India rejected the Ganges 
Strategic Basin Assessment in part on the grounds that the report did not, according to 
Siddiqui, use any Indian government data – data that the Indian government was not able 
to share with the World Bank because it is classified.757 Indeed, the Ganges Strategic Basin 
Assessment notes that  
‘[u]ntil now, there has been no basin-wide knowledge base and 
analytical framework that could be used by riparian states to explore 
options and facilitate cooperative planning in the Ganges. Information 
and data are surprisingly scarce and difficult to obtain. In particular, 
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very little information is available on hydrology and irrigation 
withdrawals in India.’758 
The Indian Government’s Hydro-Meteorological Data Dissemination Policy 2013 also 
outlines a procedure for public access to hydrological information on India’s river systems, 
but disclosure or use of this information in its original format is strictly prohibited. Thus 
while formally there is a commitment to greater information disclosure, in practice there 
is weak compliance with the letter of law at a departmental/bureaucratic level.759 
In addition to the prevailing culture of secrecy around hydrological data, there are several 
other obstacles to information sharing in the problemshed. In a recent Asia Foundation 
study, Prasai and Surie identify these as: discrepancy between formal and informal 
disclosure of information; limited proactive disclosure; weak implementation of the Right 
to Information Acts; and poor data and records practices.760 
Prasai and Surie have found that the government departments in Bangladesh and Nepal 
appeared more willing to provide water-related information ‘informally’ – on the phone or 
in an email – rather than through official Right to Information channels.761 They have also 
found that ‘data can be sporadically accessed at the local level and it is here that the 
restrictions on data-sharing that exist at the national level, tend to occasionally fail’ 
although information at the local level is limited and fragmented.762  
The inconsistency with which information is disclosed – or not – is also highlighted by 
Molden, who points out that difficulties may unexpectedly ease up over data sharing 
during crises or unforeseeable events such as large floods.763 At the same time, as Prasai 
and Surie show, ‘even in the aftermath of the 2008 floods [in India’s Bihar province and 
bordering Nepal], government agencies on either side of the [India-Nepal] border have 
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made limited efforts to purposefully disclose relevant information to local communities on 
critical issues such as relief and rehabilitation efforts.’764 This inhibits even politically 
neutral work, such as humanitarian and disaster relief efforts by non-government 
organisations.765 Significantly, even when some information is available, there seems to be 
a gulf between what end-users need, and what they have access to.766 
The restrictions on access to information are, say Prasai and Surie, easy to understand: 
‘governments in the three countries either lack the political will or have not developed the 
capability to administer managed or regulated access to hydrological data. Subsequently, 
the essential choice is between open access and blanket restriction and governments 
appear to find the latter approach easier to adopt.’767 This preference, they argue, prevails 
over any ‘internal and external clamouring for increased transparency.’768  
The ease of imposing a blanket restriction on information sharing is facilitated by poor 
data and records management practices. Prasai and Surie note that ‘in many instances, 
while departments appeared willing to provide information, the data/information could 
either not be traced or were not always held by the department mandated to collect them’ 
and that where it was available ‘it was often found to be incomplete, difficult to interpret 
and/or provided in a format that was not very user-friendly.’769 They note, however, that 
the poor state of record-keeping is not unique to water governance in the region.770 The 
low quality or incomplete nature of information that is available impedes water 
management. Accurate and comprehensive data is a requirement of good water 
management, especially planning and monitoring, and is thus, according to Molden, a 
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critical aspect of transboundary water cooperation; without thorough data exchange, there 
cannot be proper planning.771  
At the same time, information sharing is only one aspect of cooperation. Relationships, 
argues D’Souza, are more important than data, no matter how comprehensive, and that 
focussing excessively on the problems of sharing hydrological data between India, Nepal, 
Bhutan and Bangladesh is missing the point of what is the cause of discord between them 
over transboundary water issues.772 Gyawali concurs that the problem of managing South 
Asia’s river basin is not a question of inadequate river modelling data; it is a question of 
hydro-diplomacy.773 
Hydro-diplomacy, however, can be served through information and knowledge sharing. 
The act of exchanging data and bringing stakeholders together to negotiate what should 
be exchanged is in itself valuable insofar as it strengthens relationships and builds trust. 
Likewise, the river basin modelling projects that are being undertaken by international 
organisations such as the Australian Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organisation (CSIRO) have the benefit of not only creating a body of accurate data but 
also of creating connections between stakeholders and a forum in which they can 
articulate what types of information are important to them. As such, data sharing does 
play a role in creating or strengthening trust between riparians.  
Prasai and Surie argue that the exchange of basic information can help communities better 
understand what is happening upstream or downstream. It thus creates sympathy, which 
is important because ‘[p]erception matters in politics, and conflict often intensifies when 
one side poorly understands the other. The proactive release of information can help to 
moderate the positions of both parties, since finding common ground starts with having a 
common understanding of the situation.’774 They show that ‘local communities harbor an 
understanding of the ecology of the basin only in reference to the events and processes 
that occur within their immediate environs.’775 The consequences of this localised 
understanding of ecology is that  
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‘people downstream had no way of knowing whether a recent flood was 
caused by excessive rain upstream, a glacial outburst, or human action 
at a particular barrage. This compartmentalized understanding of the 
basin’s ecology makes it difficult for communities to generate a common 
platform of action or to propose solutions that have broad acceptability 
across the basin. In other words, people living in the basin, do not have 
a holistic and coherent “counter narrative” to propose to the state for 
inclusion in bilateral negotiations.’776 
Although improved knowledge sharing is one of the aims of international actors in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, it has not (yet?) significantly altered the culture of 
secrecy around hydrological data.  
The small issue of the big brother; the effect of India’s hydro-hegemony 
In addition to these obstacles to transboundary water cooperation discussed above, India’s 
hydro-hegemony is another major challenge to improving interactions between riparian 
states. Distrust between riparian states underlies the main obstacles to transboundary 
water cooperation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. Distrust also characterises 
the transboundary water interaction between India-Nepal, India-Bangladesh and, to a 
lesser extent, India-Bhutan. In large part, the distrust of India is rooted in the perception 
of India as bully – a domineering hydro-hegemon, rather than a constructive leader. This 
section assesses India’s hydro-hegemony and discusses the effects it has on transboundary 
water cooperation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. 
The first of four sub-sections discusses the perceptions of hegemony in the region. The 
second examines India as hegemon: India is neither a bully, nor a leader. The third 
addresses India’s preference for bilateralism (as opposed to multilateral approaches to 
transboundary water issues), while the fourth assesses efforts at countering India’s hydro-
hegemony. 
Perceptions of hegemony 
The hydropolitics of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed are, according to Hill, ‘defined 
by the dominance of India and issues surrounding whether trans-boundary disputes 
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should be handled bilaterally or internationalised continue to provoke tensions.’777 India’s 
relative political, military and economic power allows it to mitigate the fact of geography 
that it does not control the headwaters of all the rivers that pass through its territory. 
India is able to influence its upstream riparians – Nepal and Bhutan – to gain access to 
their water resources, and its downstream riparian – Bangladesh – to overlook 
transboundary water arrangements that may adversely affect it. As Earle et al. show, ‘many 
consider India to be the regional bully’ and the trust deficit in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed is relatively high.778  
Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh are among the poorest nations on earth with extremely 
limited supply of cultivable land; water will always remain a key political issue with them. 
Yet, as Ray argues, India’s political relations with these countries, except for Bhutan, are 
far from cordial.779 Furthermore, India is not bound to abide by the internationally 
accepted principles of equitable and reasonable utilisation, and an obligation not to cause 
appreciable harm.780 In 1997 India abstained from voting for the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UNWC) 
and has not since then signed on to this foundational instrument of international water 
law.781  
While some of the distrust towards India comes from India’s sheer geographical and 
economic size, a lot of it also comes from India playing a dominant role in the region.782 
Indeed, as Jain claims, all the states of South Asia, except Bhutan, look upon India with 
suspicion.783 This is because, as Bhasin explains, India expects to hold the position of 
hegemonia (conferred headship), while the rest of South Asia view India’s position as arche 
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(asserted headship). Both are arguably true of India at different times and in different 
contexts.784 In any case, as Sneddon argues, it is more useful to think of multiple 
hegemonies or hegemonic projects rather than a single hegemony because hegemony acts 
in a nuanced way and the way consent is manufactured is constantly being rearticulated.785 
Zeitoun et al. add that ‘[j]ust as conflict and cooperation co-exist, so do hegemony and 
counter-hegemony.’786 
In the context of transboundary waters, Cascão and Zeitoun argue that hegemony rests on 
four pillars: material power (political, economic, and military power, technological 
prowess, international political and financial support, et cetera), geographical power 
(upstream or downstream riparian position), bargaining power (capability of actors to 
control the rules of the game and set agendas), and ideational power (capacity of a riparian 
to impose and legitimise particular ideas and narratives).787 The overall balance of power 
along these pillars determines each riparian’s degree of control over shared water 
resources. Moreover, Zeitoun and Warner show that ‘upstreamers use water to get more 
power, downstreamers use power to get more water.’788  
In the case of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, India is the hydro-hegemon because 
it has the most material, bargaining and ideational power, and the strength of these pillars 
more than offsets the downstream position vis-à-vis Nepal and Bhutan (India is also 
upstream of Bangladesh). India uses this power to get more water (in the form of 
hydropower, dry-season flow regulation and flood control) from upstream Nepal and 
Bhutan. At the same time, India is able to develop its own water resources without taking 
into account downstream Bangladesh, which is in the overall weakest position in terms of 
the four pillars of hydro-hegemony. Nonetheless, as Mitra points out, India does not use 
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its power to overwhelm its neighbours, instead creating a sort of political stalemate in 
South Asia.789 
The theory of hydro-hegemony, according to Zeitoun and Warner, posits that ‘the hydro-
hegemon can establish the form of interaction over transboundary waters that it 
prefers.’790 It does so through coercive, utilitarian, normative, or ideological mechanisms.791 
The first of these mechanisms means that compliance with the order can be assured 
through pressure created by the use of force or the threat of the use of force, e.g., the 
unilateral construction of infrastructure. Utilitarian compliance-producing mechanism are 
used to encourage compliance with the status quo. These are the ‘carrots’ to the ‘stick’ of 
coercive mechanisms. Utilitarian mechanisms can include inducements or rewards that 
bring either political pay-offs, such as recognition and similar rewards and alliances for 
legitimacy-challenged regimes, or financial pay-offs such as a share of the capital 
generated by a transboundary water project.  
Normative compliance-producing mechanisms rely on instilling the belief that compliance 
with the order is right, or a duty, even an obligation. Transboundary water treaties, ‘best 
practice’ of transboundary water management, and the operational procedures of 
international financial institutions may be considered examples of normative compliance-
producing mechanisms active in transboundary water interaction. Ideological hegemonic 
compliance-producing mechanisms rely on unquestioned acceptance of the order, 
independent of the sense of obligation, or rewards or pressure on offer. When these 
mechanisms are effective, not complying with the order is unconsciously ruled out. The 
knee-jerk reactions invoked when political issues (such as the sharing of transboundary 
waters) are portrayed as national security issues are an example of ideological 
mechanisms, as are deeply-held facts derived from the construction of knowledge and 
sanctioned discourse.792 
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Neither leader nor bully; India as hydro-hegemon 
India has on the whole, according to Zeitoun and Warner, created compliance through 
utilitarian, normative and ideological mechanisms rather than relying on coercion to 
maintain the status quo.793 As such, they argue, India’s hydro-hegemony has been a factor 
in preventing rather than causing violent conflict. But this understanding of hydro-
hegemony – as a phenomenon that may lead to positive-sum outcomes as well as zero-
sum ones – is often missing from water conflict analysis, claim Zeitoun and Warner.794 
Applied judiciously and with foresight, hydro-hegemony could translate into constructive 
regional leadership. The hydro-hegemon can take on a guiding, leadership role in the 
basin and establish positive interaction with co-riparians, for example through an 
integration strategy. But the hydro-hegemon can also engage in unilateral, negative, 
exploitative interactions, such as resource capture or containment strategies, and exert 
domination. Which path is chosen when depends on factors other than those related to 
transboundary water interaction. As Zeitoun and Warner point out, ‘[w]hether the 
hegemon chooses leadership or domination in the water sector is ultimately governed by 
the broader political context.’795 
In the political context of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, India vacillates between 
being the ‘regional bully’ and the ‘regional pushover’, according to Mitra.796 India, claims 
Bhasin, tends to support or endorse rather than initiate and facilitate regional ventures. It 
rarely champions the group interest at regional fora, instead preferring to address and 
manage issues at the bilateral level. If the defining feature of a hegemonic power is the 
ability to induce change in the policies of the target group so that the interest of the 
dominant nation is served, argues Bhasin, then India is not a fully realised hegemonic 
leader. Instead, India’s policies reflect supervisory postures rather than a more 
fundamental participatory leadership character. Bhasin continues that India has failed to 
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provide political advice and economic guidance to neighbours without appearing 
domineering.797  
In short, India has not (yet?) become a constructive regional leader on transboundary 
water issues; but it has also not realised overwhelming domination of the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed. Neither India’s power variable nor its policies have succeeded 
in inducing transboundary cooperation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. But the 
support, if not the leadership, of the hydro-hegemon is critical in any transboundary 
initiative because without it very little can get done. This is especially so in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed where Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh do not share borders 
with one another and thus are limited in developing transboundary initiatives among 
themselves without India’s participation or consent. Lack of active support from the 
hydro-hegemon for increasing transboundary cooperation has also undermined the work 
of international actors in this regard (a point discussed at length in the next section and 
the next chapter). 
India has been able to limit transboundary water cooperation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed because, as Warner and Zawahri show, in asymmetric power structures 
‘strong states have the option to select the approach consistent with their best interests, 
while significantly weaker states can rarely afford to opt out of cooperation or 
communication. Consequently, cooperation under these conditions can limit the room for 
manoeuvre of non-hegemonic powers.’798 They cite the Ganges basin as an example: India 
has been able to govern this international basin through strictly bilateral – rather than 
multilateral – accords, and this ‘has enabled the hegemon to secure its interests and 
prevent Nepal and Bangladesh from offsetting its power. Yet, this fragmented governance 
has come at a cost in that it prevented the riparians from developing the basin in an 
integrated manner recommended by scientists for the basin’s efficient development.’799 
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India’s preference for bilateralism 
A further characteristic of the hydropolitics in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is 
India preference for bilateral, rather than multilateral, arrangements for transboundary 
water management. ‘India’s refusal to take up any river management issue in a multilateral 
forum,’ claim Earle et al., ‘reduces the scope for possibility of any basin-based 
organisational framework to emerge.’800 Hill argues that India’s persistence in maintaining 
purely bilateral arrangements and not involving the international community in matters of 
transboundary water governance in South Asia has certainly been decisive in shaping the 
politics of water sharing in the region.801 He adds that ‘bilateral treaties, have been a source 
of considerable enmity between countries such as India, Bangladesh and Nepal.’802 
Even though all the rivers flowing through India are international and pass more than one 
country, all the treaties on these rivers are bilateral.803 India did not even acknowledge that 
usage of the Ganges is an international issue until 1970.804 On the other hand, Nepal, 
Bhutan and Bangladesh all share political borders with India, but not with each other.805 
This makes it obvious and important for them to engage in treaties directly with India, but 
not each other. Yet tensions remain about whether transboundary water disputes should 
continue to be handled bilaterally (the hydro-hegemon’s prerogative) or 
internationalised.806  
Tellingly, India’s current National Water Policy (2012) devotes only two paragraphs to 
transboundary waters, and these emphasise bilateralism as the sole approach.807 This need 
                                                     
800 Earle, A, Cascão, AE, Hansson, S, Jägerskog, A, Swain, A, & Öjendal, J 2015, Transboundary Water 
Management and the Climate Change Debate, Earthscan Studies in Water Resource Management, 
Routledge, Abingdon, pp. 41-42 
801 Hill, D 2008, ‘The Regional Politics of Water Sharing: Contemporary Issues in South Asia’ in K 
Lahiri-Dutt, & RJ Wasson (eds), Water First: Issues and Challenges for Nations and Communities in 
South Asia, Sage, New Delhi, p. 60 
802 Hill, D 2015, ‘Where Hawks Dwell on Water and Bankers Build Power Poles: Transboundary 
Water, Environmental Security and the Frontiers of Neo-liberalism’, Strategic Analysis, vol. 39 no. 
6, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2015.1090679, p. 734 
803 Singh, R 2008, ‘Trans-boundary Water Politics and Conflicts in South Asia: Towards Water for 
Peace’, Centre for Democracy and Social Action, New Delhi, p. 36 
804 Hill, D 2009, ‘Boundaries, Scale and Power in South Asia’ in D Ghosh, H Goodall, & S Hemelryk-
Donald (eds), Water, Sovereignty and Borders in Asia and Oceania, Routledge, New York, p. 91 
805 Chellaney, B 2011, Water: Asia's New Battleground, Georgetown University Press, Washington 
DC, p. 277 
806 Hill, D 2008, ‘The Regional Politics of Water Sharing: Contemporary Issues in South Asia’ in K 
Lahiri-Dutt, & RJ Wasson (eds), Water First: Issues and Challenges for Nations and Communities in 
South Asia, Sage, New Delhi, p. 75 
807 Government of India 2012, National Water Policy (2012), Ministry of Water Resources, 
Government of India, New Delhi. 
188 
 
not be surprising; hegemonic powers benefit through bilateral arrangements, while small 
and medium powers enjoy greater leverage within multilateral institutions.808 Yet the lack 
of multilateralism in South Asia regarding transboundary water management is not solely 
a manifestation of India’s hegemonic ambitions. The large number of riparian countries in 
the region complicates the processes of multilateral diplomacy and negotiation – of 
finding common ground for reaching agreement on collective action, norms or rules.809 In 
the interest of avoiding conflict, bilateralism is a faster and surer approach than 
multilateralism. For similar reasons, it may in some cases be more appropriate to forgo a 
basin-wide approach to transboundary water cooperation (that is, a framework wherein all 
riparian states must reach consensus) in favour of a problemshed approach (that is, a 
framework where only stakeholders in the issues at hand must reach consensus, 
irrespective of whether they are within the hydrological basin or not).  
Furthermore, some issues that affect all the riparians may nonetheless be better managed 
locally, even if they do cross borders. For example, flooding and sedimentation control are 
problematic issues for all the riparians in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, but they 
do not necessarily require multilateral agreements. As Sadoff points out ‘If you can’t 
reduce floods in Bihar or saline intrusion in the Sundarbans with infrastructure in Nepal, 
then that simplifies the discussion. Maybe you don’t have to negotiate everything across 
boundaries.’810 Again, conceptualising water issues within problemsheds may be more 
appropriate than within basins or political boundaries. 
One of the problematic aspects of bilateral treaties, however, is that they may belie conflict 
and asymmetry of outcome; treaties are not the embodiment of unequivocal 
cooperation.811 There are usually power asymmetries at play that can lead to less than 
equitable outcomes for the weaker party. The hydro-hegemon may structure a treaty to 
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reflect existing inequalities and use utilitarian mechanisms or soft power to attain the 
weaker riparian’s compliance.812  
An example of a hegemon enshrining inequalities in international agreement is the 
Treaties of Friendship that India instigated in the region. The treaties arose at a time when 
India gained independence from the British and wanted to prevent a communist influence 
spreading south from China. Consequently, India concluded what Subedi characterises as 
three lopsided treaties with its small neighbours; Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim in order to 
bring them into its sphere of influence in order to make the Himalayas a strong natural 
border with China.813 A similar treaty was signed with Bangladesh in 1972.814 
India has since been reluctant to update any of these treaties815 But while this is a source of 
some discontent (especially in Nepal816), there has been no real momentum from these 
smaller states to agitate for change. One tactic available to the non-hegemon is that of 
issue linkage wherein non-water-related issues are including in negotiations over water as 
a point of leverage.817 This, however, has not been a tactic utilised by India’s co-riparians to 
alter the status quo of the Treaties of Friendship.  
Another example of the hydro-hegemon instigating a treaty that institutionalises an 
inequitable status quo is India’s signing of the double bilateral Ganges River treaties with 
Nepal and Bangladesh. The treaties helped maintain the status quo in favour of India and 
Zeitoun et al. view them as exclusionary devices within an inclusive process, which did 
confer some benefits onto the other, weaker riparians.818 Condon et al. argue that India is 
likely to continue its pattern of resolving water disputes with Bangladesh through bilateral 
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negotiation rather than a regional approach.819 As hydro-hegemon, it is able to set the 
terms of cooperation and Bangladesh is likely to continue consenting to this stable 
arrangement. 
Countering India’s hydro-hegemony 
India’s insistence on maintaining strictly two-sided relations has not been successfully 
challenged by individual states, sub-regional groupings or multilateral institutions in 
South Asia, although opportunities exist for the development of such bulwarks to India’s 
hydro-hegemony. Dash identifies four ways in which states can constructively counter 
hegemony. The first is by creating sub-regional groupings to improve their balance of 
power vis-a-vis a regionally dominant or threatening state. The second is regionalist 
entrapment; states support the creation of regionalist institutions to limit the free exercise 
of hegemonic power. The third is called bandwaggoning, which means that weaker states 
seek accommodation with the regional hegemon in order to receive military and economic 
rewards. The final approach is declining hegemony, or forcing the hegemon to initiate 
common institutions to pursue its interests, to solve common problems, and to generate 
international support and legitimacy for its policies.820 
Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh have not created a sub-regional grouping to counter 
India’s hydro-hegemony, and thus are not engaging in the Dash’s first approach. The 
second approach has not been successful in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed either. 
The only regional institution that could counter-balance India’s hydro-hegemonic 
ambitions, the SAARC, is, as discussed above, weak and ineffectual.821 The fourth approach 
has been applied – but with limited success. Attempts at involving India in solving 
common water problems through multilateral cooperation – for example, by Nepal and 
Bangladesh over the Ganges River,822 or by China over the Brahmaputra823 – have been ad 
hoc. 
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Dash’s third way of countering hegemony, that of bandwaggoning,824 is the one that has 
been utilised most successfully in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. Even so, it has 
only been used to maximum advantage and minimum anxiety in one case, that of Bhutan. 
Bhutan, as discussed above, has been able to successfully seek accommodation with the 
hydro-hegemon to receive political, military and economic rewards. Dash notes that 
Bhutan and the Maldives remain the only SAARC members who have never sought 
external assistance to limit India’s exercise of hegemonic power in the region.825 
External or third parties may also be able to counter hydro-hegemony. Zeitoun and 
Jägerskog write of international organisations and foreign aid donors challenging power 
asymmetry in two ways: ‘one can either level the “players”, or level the “playing field”.’826 
But international actors in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed seem unwilling or 
unable to address the issue of India’s hydro-hegemony and the effects this has on 
transboundary water cooperation. 
Conclusion 
There are many challenges in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed – rapid population 
growth, urbanisation, climate change, food security risks, socio-political conflict related to 
resource scarcity – and numerous issues on the transboundary water governance agenda – 
upstream water storage, hydropower generation, irrigation, flood control, sedimentation, 
et cetera. None of these, however, have attracted sufficient political will from India, Nepal, 
Bhutan and Bangladesh to drive cooperative interaction (with the notable exception of the 
issue of hydropower development between India and Bhutan). There is also very little 
motivation to improve transboundary water interaction and build a cooperative 
governance regime. As Earle et al. have noted, ‘there is certainly a lack of political will in 
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the basin, particularly in India, to provide the space for multilateral river institutions to 
effectively emerge.’827 
In part this is because there are too many crises and not one main crisis, and partly 
because all the riparians except for Bhutan have other pressing socio-political issues to 
deal with that take precedence over transboundary water cooperation. The problem, 
however, is that lack of political will for transboundary water cooperation undermines the 
work of international actors in this regard. Political will is critical for water cooperation 
because, to paraphrase Israeli hydrologist, Uri Shamir, if there is a political will for peace, 
water will not be a hindrance; but if you want reasons to fight, water will give you ample 
opportunities.828  
Chellaney points out that multilateral water cooperation in any basin is more about 
politics than about law, and that without improved hydropolitics and better trust between 
riparians the transboundary interaction will remain neutral or negative: ‘Strained political 
relations in most of Asia’s subregions make an Asia-wide security structure or more 
effective resource cooperation difficult to achieve.’829 In other words, foreign-led 
interventions to improve transboundary water cooperation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed are undermined by low political will for it among riparians. 
Transboundary water interactions in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed are 
characterised by lack of regionalism and low trust between riparians. Significantly, ‘India’s 
refusal to take up any river management issue in a multilateral forum reduces the scope 
for possibility of any basin-based organisational framework to emerge.’830 This presents 
both a challenge and an opportunity for international organisations and foreign aid donors 
to engage in transboundary water governance in the region (a topic discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 4). 
With the exception of the India-Bhutan case, transboundary water interaction in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed remains neutral or negative in Mirumachi’s taxonomy 
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of water conflict and cooperation. This is largely because of the high levels of distrust in 
the India-Nepal and India-Bangladesh cases. In contrast, there is some trust between India 
and Bhutan, and political will on both sides to develop cooperative relations over 
hydropower development. Thus transboundary water interaction between these two 
countries is on the whole positive. The issue of trust – or lack thereof – is significant in this 
problemshed. As Earle et al. note, ‘the trust deficit is extremely high in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra basin, and many consider India to be the regional bully.’831 This affects 
transboundary water interaction, and results in generally low levels of cooperation. 
Because India and Bhutan have largely addressed their transboundary water issues on their 
own, there is little scope for foreign-led interventions in these interactions. On the other 
hand, the interactions between India-Nepal and India-Bangladesh are not entirely 
cooperative and thus there is some rationale for pursuing increased cooperation through 
Track II dialogue facilitated by international actors. The paradox of this rationale is that 
the lack of trust and political will between India-Nepal and India-Bangladesh may 
undermine the efficacy of Track II dialogue, which is predicated on some degree of trust 
and shared willingness to improve relations. Trust lies at the heart of transboundary water 
cooperation, and as Chellaney argues, ‘[w]ithout improved inter-country relations and 
better trust, Asia’s hydropolitics will remain grating.’832 Yet, trust cannot be imposed by an 
outside party or built in a series of workshops. As Pohl points out, ‘[t]rust can only be built 
through longterm transparency in terms of data-sharing and intentions regarding future 
infrastructure, which in turn requires long-term engagement.’833 
What does this imply for international organisations and foreign aid donors aiming to 
increase transboundary water cooperation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed? 
Putting aside for a moment the question of whether or not international actors should 
intervene in transboundary water governance even if there is a high probability of success, 
the point remains that cooperation between conflicted riparians is difficult, if not 
impossible, to impose or plan. It is all the more difficult with low levels of trust between 
riparians – but the paradox of transboundary water cooperation is that with high levels of 
trust between riparians, the rationale for third party intervention (i.e., facilitated dialogue 
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or mediated negotiation) is weakened. The next chapter takes these questions as its 
starting point, and discusses what international actors are doing in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed, and why. 
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Chapter 4: Why are international actors interested in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed? 
Why have the hydropolitics in South Asia attracted the attention and funding of foreign 
aid donors in the past decade? And what is the nature of these third party interventions? 
This chapter discusses the drivers of aid donors into the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed, and outlines the development of the Abu Dhabi Dialogue (ADD) and the 
South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI), the largest and most important of the foreign-led 
initiatives of interest to this thesis. 
Chapters 3 illustrated that there are many unresolved issues on the transboundary water 
agenda in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, and that the interactions between 
riparian states are less than cooperative. There are, in other words, numerous areas of 
transboundary water governance that could be improved for the benefit of the people of 
the problemshed.  
International organisations and foreign aid donors, however, are driven by more than just 
the needs of the problemshed – they are also driven by global dynamics and their own 
agendas. The first section examines the global context in which these international actors 
operate, and how this affects the choice to intervene in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed. For a start, there is increasing international interest in South Asia generally, 
while at the same time, the influence of the World Bank and other foreign aid donors in 
this region is waning. These donors, especially Australia and the United Kingdom, are 
changing their foreign aid objectives for India in particular as India itself becomes a net 
aid donor rather than net aid recipient. The general attitude towards dams and dam-
building has also shifted since the 1990s, and that too has influenced what international 
organisations and foreign aid donors are trying to achieve in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed in regards to transboundary water governance.  
The second section of this chapter discusses the paradigms and discourses that factor into 
the justifications for foreign-led interventions in transboundary water governance. For 
example, the primacy of good governance has become a value in many areas of 
international development, including water management. Meanwhile, the rise of non-
traditional security threats and collective action problems such as climate change has 
increased global attention on environmental risks in volatile parts of the world, such as 
South Asia. Water security is also an increasingly important challenge for development 
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agencies, especially considering the nexus with food and energy security. At the same 
time, the emergence of the sustainable development agenda (made explicit in 2015 with 
the United Nations sanctioned Sustainable Development Goals) has changed the way in 
which international donors approach environmental factors in developing countries. One 
example of this is the beginnings of a shift away from ‘command and control’ approach to 
one based on ecological principles.  
Global factors driving international organisations and aid donors 
The global context from which international organisations and foreign aid donors emerge 
is the subject of this section. The first contextual factor is the globally increasing interest 
in South Asia, and thus the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. The second factor is the 
waning influence of the World Bank in South Asia, especially in India, and the way it is 
changing its priorities in the region to rebuild its relevance. One issue that has slipped 
down the priority list is that of dam building, especially the building of large dams, as a 
means of boosting socio-economic development. Although dams are now returning to the 
international development agenda (largely because in a world moving away from reliance 
on fossil fuels, hydropower presents a renewable alternative energy), the ones most likely 
to attract international donor funding are so-called multi-purpose or micro-hydro dams. 
This shift in funding priorities is related to the fourth contextual factor, which is that of 
changing foreign aid strategies for the major donors to South Asian countries. Each factor 
is discussed in turn below. 
Increasing international interest in South Asia 
South Asia is increasingly recognised as particularly vulnerable to climatic and 
demographic shocks. The region is thus a potential hotspot of instability, even conflict, 
arising out of environmental risks, including water scarcity and water insecurity. Recent 
literature acknowledges that ‘in the next several decades, South Asia may be the linchpin 
of humanity’s collective effort’834 on non-traditional security threats. Water scholars are 
more and more likely to believe that ‘hydropolitics between India and its neighbouring 
riparian states is one of the most urgent, complex, and contentious issues facing the 
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regional community in the twenty-first century.’835 This represents a shift in scholarship on 
transboundary waters.  
Up until recently, scholars of transboundary water interaction have tended to study basins 
with the potential for ‘real’ conflict (e.g., the Jordan, Nile, Tigris-Euphrates, and in South 
Asia, the Indus) rather than those with potential for non-traditional conflicts. As one 
regional analyst argues, there is still an ‘Indus bias’ among the scholar and aid donors in 
South Asia; much of the foreign aid money goes towards the Indus basin because it is 
considered more fragile, even though the tensions over the Indus are not a geopolitical 
threat to India and Pakistan because the basin is governed by the Indus Waters Treaty, a 
relatively stable mechanism.836 Hill, too, notes that in recent years many think tanks have 
been collaborating with external agencies to promote dialogue in the Indus basin rather 
than the eastern Himalayas.837 This ‘Indus bias’, however, may slowly disappear as non-
traditional security threats, rather than the threat of state-on-state warfare, become 
increasingly important to international organisations and aid donors. 
Yet, the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed presents a perfect storm for non-traditional 
security threats and collective action problems: socio-political instability;838 rapidly rising 
populations;839 increasing demand for food, energy and water;840 high poverty rates;841 
ecological degradation842 and, of course, the most pressing of contemporary global 
concerns, climate change.843 The World Bank envisions that climate change will have 
‘cascading impacts’ on South Asia and predicts extreme monsoon variability, increases in 
mortality rates, regional crop production failing to meet food demand, leading to 
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malnutrition and stunting for generations to come.844 These bleak scenarios are part of the 
reason for the World Bank is investing heavily in climate change resilience strategies845 
and engaging in water security and transboundary river management issues in South 
Asia.846  
Another aspect to increased engagement on non-traditional security threats is that they 
incorporate the nexus of food, water and food security. As such, argues Hill, ‘regional 
integration of upstream and downstream communities in the Himalayas must be done in 
ways that achieve integration across the many ecosystems of the Hindukush Himalayas, 
and in doing so pay equal attention to the region’s watersheds, catchments and 
headwaters.’847 This, in turn, provides opportunities for international engagement and 
capacity building. 
Waning influence of the World Bank in South Asia  
The collective action problems, such as transboundary water conflicts, facing South Asia 
are of concern to foreign aid donors, but they are not the only driver of international 
actors intervening here. Geopolitics is also a factor. In the recent decades the World Bank’s 
influence in South Asia, especially in regard to large infrastructure projects such as 
hydropower dams, has been waning. This may be in part why the World Bank has been 
shifting towards capacity building and governance projects in this region (perhaps a 
further reason is to repeat the success of the 1950s of mediating negotiations between 
India and Pakistan until the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960. The role of the 
World Bank, however, was somewhat different in that process. As per the roles defined in 
Chapter 2, the World Bank acted as a mediator between India and Pakistan in the 
negotiations over the Indus Waters Treaty. In contrast, the role of the World Bank in the 
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Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed today is that of a facilitator of a broader governance 
process that may or may not result in formal treaties between riparian states).  
Earle et al. argue that the World Bank had also hoped to replicate in South Asia the 
common water-sharing framework of the Nile Basin Initiative.848 As for the other 
significant aid donors engaging in transboundary water governance in the region – 
Australia, Japan, Norway and the UK – these states have been decreasing their bilateral aid 
spending to South Asian countries, and to India in particular. As such, they are finding 
new ways of retaining presence, influence and relevance in the region.  
The World Bank has historically been very influential in setting the water governance 
agenda in developing countries. Initially, this influence was exerted through financial 
mechanisms and incentives; later it came to be ideational. Stein shows that in the first 
decades of its existence, the World Bank focussed on structural adjustment of developing 
economies, liberalisation of markets, and privatisation of state assets on the assumption 
that private property ownership would encourage greater efficiency, investment, and 
growth. But by 1989 ‘the World Bank began to expand its developmental lexicon to include 
other issues, such as governance and capacity building, social capital, poverty reduction, 
sustainable development, decentralisation, and country-level ownership of aid policies.’849 
Both of these approaches – financial assistance and capacity building – have facilitated the 
World Bank’s water governance agenda, one predicated on the commodification of natural 
resources. 
The World Bank has its genesis in the disintegration of the colonial world order and the 
paradigm shift from colonial economics to development economics.850 As Piper argues, the 
creation of the World Bank also signified a shift in global power from European to 
American interests following World War II.851 Since then, the World Bank has been a 
primary proponent of the commodity approach to water, which supports the idea that 
economic and market tools are to be used to ensure the efficient provision of water.852 
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Poor countries are thus pushed into privatisation of water facilities by agencies such the 
World Bank, which provide incentives through foreign aid and loan packages.853  
The financial incentives of the World Bank, as Homer-Dixon argues, inform commentary 
in influential business-oriented newspapers, magazines and books,854 and thus have 
become the dominant paradigm of water governance. According to Allan, this represents 
the fourth wave of five water management paradigms. This fourth waver was ‘inspired by 
economists who had drawn the attention of water users in the North to the economic 
value of water and its importance as a scarce economic input. These ideas gained currency 
in the early 1990s. There has been an attempt to export them to the South via agencies 
such as the World Bank.’855 This affirms Sneddon’s claim that hegemonic concepts are 
tangibly connected to mechanisms of world hegemony such as international organisations 
which legitimise certain norms that serve specific interests or co-opt the elites of 
dependent countries.856 As such, Piper argues that the World Bank is propagating colonial 
attitudes and that these are manifest in its policies on water.857  
In South Asia, the World Bank has historically applied the neoliberal rationale to dam 
building. By the late 1980s, the World Bank was the world’s biggest financier of big dams, 
but also found it difficult to promote big dams in light of rising protests against its 
policies.858 As Goodland illustrates, ‘from the 1970s to the mid-1990s, the World Bank 
created a monumental imbroglio of the entire hydroelectric dam sector, and worse, denied 
there were any shambles; and even if there were, the [World Bank Group] was not 
responsible for them.’859 Several World Bank funded large dam projects in India in 
particular prompted in the early 2000s a significant review of the Bank’s dam-building 
worldwide. These reviews undermined the World Bank’s position in South Asia as the 
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main financier of large dams and also shifted international attitudes toward dams 
generally. The advent of China as a major financier of large dams, for example in the 
Mekong and Nile basins, has also challenged the World Bank’s near-monopoly on funding 
such infrastructure projects.860 These factors contribute to the World Bank interest in 
improving water governance in South Asia. 
Changing public attitudes toward dam building 
The waning public support for dams around the world, but especially in India, has also 
shaped the World Bank’s stance on transboundary water governance in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed. Large dams enjoyed their heyday in the twentieth century, but 
the tide of popularity turned against them around the year 2000 with the World 
Commission on Dams. Since then, dams have been slowly returning to the agendas of 
international funding organisations (including the World Bank), albeit not all dams; large 
and mega dams are still out of favour, but multi-purpose and micro-hydro projects are on 
the rise. This is the case in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed too. The World Bank 
has been, for example, carefully promoting multi-purpose projects in the Ganges Strategic 
Basin Assessment.  
The World Commission on Dams was in part a response to the popular movement against 
multi-purpose hydro-engineering projects on the Narmada River in India. Another 
controversial project was, according to Asthana and Shukla, Tehri Dam,861 a large dam on a 
northern tributary of the Ganges in India’s Uttarakhand province, close to the Chinese 
border. Opposition to the Tehri dam began in the 1970s and the anti-Tehri movement, 
argues Sharma, has been a significant marker for Indian environmentalism in general and 
struggles against big dams in particular, especially against the social dislocation that large 
dams in densely populated areas may cause.862 The protests in India brought these issues 
to international attention, and in 2000, the World Commission on Dams found that large 
dams had displaced forty to eighty million people worldwide.863  
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At first glance the Commission’s findings may seem like a win for the anti-dam movement 
(which Briscoe argues strongly influenced – even hijacked – the World Commission on 
Dams864), but the Commission was not wholly anti-dam: its stance can be summed up not 
as ‘no dams’, but rather ‘no bad dams’. The Commission’s final report, Dams and 
Development: A New Framework For Decision-Making, finds that ‘[d]ams have made an 
important and significant contribution to human development, and the benefits derived 
from them have been considerable’ but that ‘[i]n too many cases an unacceptable and 
often unnecessary price has been paid to secure those benefits, especially in social and 
environmental terms, by people displaced, by communities downstream, by taxpayers and 
by the natural environment.’865 
The international focus in the 1990s on the ‘unnecessary price’ of dams had unintended 
consequences. The anti-dam sentiment was precipitated by what Briscoe calls ‘red-green 
coalitions’ (a ‘combustible mixture of rich-country anti-capitalists and environmentalists’) 
and resulted in the baby being thrown out with the bathwater: numerous small, locally 
unopposed dam projects in developing countries were stalled or otherwise undermined by 
opposition in the global North and hesitation within the World Bank to fund potentially 
controversial projects.866 Finding a way to maximise the benefits of dams and while 
reducing the toll on people and planet was the primary purpose of the World Commission 
of Dams. 
Briscoe describes the World Commission on Dams as ‘an attempt to bring stakeholders 
from all sides of the debate together, to develop a shared fact base and a shared set of 
recommendations which would ensure (a) that bad dams were not financed or built and 
(b) that good dams were financed and built without inordinate costs or delays.’867 The 
result was what Goodland calls ‘the most global, holistic, systematic, comprehensive, 
participatory, and scientifically valid assessment of large dam building to date.’868 The 
Dams and Development report challenged World Bank practices and established guidelines 
for the selection of new dam projects. But these were not eagerly adopted. As Goodland 
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shows, ‘the Bank, along with the hydropower industry, resisted the guidelines and 
struggled with reformers’869 (although, as Briscoe points out, many of these guidelines 
were onerous, impractical, and even undesirable).870 
The World Bank was not the only major opponent of the World Commission on Dams 
report. The Indian government was also initially resistant to the findings of the 
Commission. Iyer shows that the report was seen as a conspiracy against the complex and 
controversial Sardar Sarovar Project on the Narmada River, and the Government of 
Gujarat in particular lobbied the Indian central government to reject the Commission’s 
‘anti-dam’ findings.871 He also argues that ‘Developing countries see it [the Dams and 
Development report] as yet another instance of the imposition on them by the developed 
countries of an agenda designed in the latter’s interests.’872 Be that as it may, Wood shows 
that ultimately the World Commission on Dams findings and the popular movement 
against the Sardar Sarovar dams did affect both India’s water policy and the World Bank’s 
dealings in India.873 For instance, the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment produced by a 
World Bank-led team goes to great lengths to stress ‘no bad dams’ should be built in the 
Ganges basin. 
The protests against Sardar Sarovar and other dams on the Narmada River in India began 
in the 1980s and 1990s.874 As Wood argues, the human rights and ecological issues raised 
by the anti-dam movement also formed part of a larger theoretical critique of 
modernisation, which called into question many of the assumptions and value-
orientations of either market-driven or state-driven efforts at ‘development’875 (this is a 
critique of modernisation also largely favoured by Briscoe’s ‘red-green coalitions.’876) 
Wood adds that the public concern over these issues, both within India and 
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internationally, and the protest against dams on the Narmada, led to a re-examination of 
India’s water policy and an exploration of alternative means of developing the country’s 
water resources. The lasting legacy of the Sardar Sarovar controversy, according to Wood, 
is that large dams are seen not to live up to expectations in terms of cost, construction 
time and efficiency of output.877  
The Sardar Sarovar controversy left a legacy on the World Bank too. The Bank conducted 
an independent review of the beleaguered project878 and consequently changed its policies 
on dams, resettlement and rehabilitation and the monitoring and assessment of 
development projects.879 These new policies are evident in the way the World Bank has 
scoped and conducted the South Asia Water Initiative, focussing mostly on governance 
and capacity building. 
Shifting focus of the World Bank away from infrastructure and toward governance  
With the unpopularity of large dams, and growing complications of funding such projects, 
the World Bank began to turn towards ‘softer’ areas of development aid, such as capacity 
building and governance. In South Asia, this transition echoes the World Bank’s first 
major foray into the region, when in the early 1960s it was still the Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development and mediated the negotiations over the Indus Waters Treaty. The 
Bank’s role was initially to provide good offices (i.e., mediation services) for India and 
Pakistan, but over time evolved into conciliation between the two parties, actively finding 
a solution and ultimately providing significant financial assistance as a condition of their 
consent to the terms of settlement.880 
In recent years, the World Bank has also taken a leadership role in a number of large-scale 
partnerships designed to improve the delivery of global public goods – such as knowledge, 
water and sanitation, education, et cetera – for developing countries.881 Thus, what the 
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World Bank is doing has changed, but so has who they are doing it with. As Evans et al. 
show, in the past 15 years, partly as a result of the Millennium Development Goals, the 
World Bank has dramatically increased engagement with a broader range of stakeholders, 
especially those from civil society organisations and sub-state actors. While such 
collaboration is dynamic and innovative, it is also a challenge for the World Bank, which 
was designed to work on an international scale to engage with sovereign nations.882 The 
Abu Dhabi Dialogue (discussed in the next section) is an example of this type of 
engagement with a broad range of state and non-state stakeholders. 
The largest investment the World Bank has made in recent years in a collaboratively-
governed, non-infrastructure related enterprise has been in the pursuit of climate change 
related goals, and climate change comprises the largest share of the World Bank’s 
environment portfolio.883 This emphasis on climate change adaptation has had the effect, 
as Smith argues, of bringing dams and water infrastructure back up the development 
financing agenda.884 In part this is because hydropower is sometimes considered to be 
renewable energy, and in part because the World Bank is, according to Briscoe, ‘re-
embracing infrastructure in general and water infrastructure in particular.’885 Briscoe 
argues that the World Bank is a global institution, which is able to set the development 
agenda more than any other organisation: ‘if the Bank takes a position…this has an 
enormous knock-on effect for other players in the development business. This has clearly 
happened in this case, with infrastructure returning to front and centre stages for most 
development agencies.’886 
The type of infrastructure creeping up the international development agenda is not the 
type of infrastructure that was previously there. The current emphasis is on multi-purpose 
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projects, and the delivery of multiple benefits. In recent World Bank documents, proposed 
dam projects are touted for their ostensible function of flood control and water storage for 
irrigation, et cetera. One example of this is the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment, which 
concludes that on the Ganges basin, upstream water storage (that is, man-made 
reservoirs) can augment dry season water flows downstream, and that there is significant 
untapped hydropower potential that could bring big benefits and few trade-offs to the 
riparians in the Ganges basin.887 At the same time, the report is careful to point out that 
the benefits of multi-purpose dams – such as flood control – do not exist in a vacuum, and 
instead can only be realised in conjunction with robust governance and ‘soft’ 
intervention.888 As such, the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment embodies the World 
Bank’s evolving position on large infrastructure projects, governance and the provision of 
global public goods. 
This change in operational focus explains what the World Bank is currently trying to do in 
South Asia, but why it is there at all is best explained by strategy. The World Bank had 
been instrumental in negotiating and funding the Indus Waters Treaty and then in 
funding of major infrastructure projects in South Asia. Now, as one Indian water analyst 
pointed out, there are other sources of such funds, such as new regional development 
banks.889 Indeed, whereas the World Bank finances ‘a handful of dams around the 
developing world, China now finances over 200 outside of China.’890 China is also 
increasingly using foreign aid as a powerful tool of statecraft.891 Moreover, most new 
infrastructure projects, especially in India, are privately funded, and so the traditional role 
of the World Bank as financier of infrastructure is quickly diminishing.892 This too in part 
explains the shift to a new role in governance, capacity building, and the two-for-the-
price-of-one sale of multi-purpose projects. 
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The World Bank is operating in an increasingly competitive market in South Asia. The 
emergence of the New Development Bank893 (a.k.a. the BRICS Bank) and the Chinese-led 
Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank894 brings two competitors for the World Bank in the 
region. With its hegemony thus threatened, and the countries of South Asia – India in 
particular – less reliant on its funding, the World Bank is forced to redefine its role in the 
region if it is to stay relevant, effective and influential there. 
New foreign aid objectives for India, Australia, and the UK 
The dynamics of foreign aid in South Asia, both in terms of donor objectives and recipient 
priorities, are changing too. Most significantly, India is shifting from being a net recipient 
of foreign aid to being a regional aid donor in its own right and this is affecting the 
strategies of previously significant donors to India. In the past decade, India has been 
transitioning to being an ‘emerging donor’ country, and as part of its ‘South-South' 
strategy, ‘India seeks to use its foreign aid programs as a tool to further its own economic, 
political, and strategic interests while also taking into account the needs of the recipient 
country.’895 Accommodating the needs of neighbours may also support India’s interest in 
emerging as a regional, and even global, leader. As Jones argues, ‘the way for India to 
achieve its goals on the world stage is to operate beyond South Asia, but that this requires 
India to take a lead role in stabilising its own region as part of being accepted by other 
great powers as a member of the club.’896 This may be why India ultimately has been 
participating in the World Bank-led Abu Dhabi Dialogue despite, as discussed in Chapter 
5, being reluctant to do so.  
Jones was writing about India’s global leadership ambitions in 2008, but his words are just 
as applicable, if not more so, to Narendra Modi’s prime ministership of India commencing 
in 2014. During Modi’s term in office, India has been continuing to increase regional 
leadership while reducing its dependence on foreign aid. India’s net foreign aid receipts 
                                                     
893 VI BRICS Summit, 2014, http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/media2/press-releases/219-agreement-on-
the-new-development-bank-fortaleza-july-15 Agreement on the New Development Bank – 
Fortaleza, July 15 [Accessed 7 May 2015] 
894 Chapman, 2014, ‘Australia now expected to join Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’, 
Australian Institute of International Affairs, 
http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australian_outlook/australia-now-expected-to-join-asian-
infrastructure-investment-bank/ [Accessed 7 May 2015] 
895 Library of Congress, ‘Regulation of Foreign Aid: India’, 2014, 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-aid/india.php Accessed 2 May 2015 
896 Jones, P 2008, ‘South Asia: Is a Regional Security Community Possible?’, South Asian Survey, vol. 
15, no. 2, pp. 183-193 
208 
 
have fallen sharply each year since 2010-11, and will likely continue to drop.897 India no 
longer accepts bilateral aid from the main international actors in water governance in the 
region, Australia898 and the United Kingdom,899 and this has fundamentally shifted the 
way in which these countries project and maintain influence into South Asia. Focusing on 
transboundary water governance is a way for international actors to continue buy-in and 
presence in the region without impinging on India’s emerging strategy. Water resource 
management is a convenient policy niche for these actors, not only because it aligns with 
the prevailing values of the international development agenda (climate change resilience, 
good governance, sustainable development, et cetera) but also because it is not (yet?) a 
priority for India (although, as discussed in Chapter 5, the lack of political will within India 
for addressing transboundary water issues also undermines the efficacy of interventions 
led by foreign aid donors). 
In recent years Australia has been increasing its diplomatic, foreign aid, and trade 
engagement in South Asia, and a significant manifestation of this is the work on water 
governance issues. The focus on strengthening the political relationship is a consequence 
of Australia’s strategy to increase influence in the region, and the relationship with India 
in particular is a bulwark against China’s power in South Asia. As Earle et al. argue, ‘[t]he 
advent of China in the [Ganges-Brahmaputra] basin’s hydro-politics’, like in the Mekong 
and the Nile, has brought further complications and uncertainties.’900 Some of these 
complications include a shift in the geopolitics, and it is this that is of interest to Australia. 
Australia’s development aid strategy for the region supports and strengthens the political 
goals, while the increasing trade partnerships bring economic benefits. 
In 2009, Australia entered into a ‘strategic partnership’ with India901 but the growing 
interest and engagement in South Asia is part of Australia’s recent focus on Asia more 
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broadly. The strategy for this is outlined in the Australia in the Asian Century white paper 
from 2012. It argues that ‘the rise of Asia provides great opportunities for Australia’ and as 
the global centre of gravity shifts to this region, Australia is located in the right place at 
the right time—in the Asian region in the Asian century.902 There is a significant trade 
component to this strategy, but in terms of diplomacy and political relationships, Australia 
intends to ‘build trust and cooperation, bilaterally and through existing regional 
mechanisms’ and ‘continue to support a greater role for Asian countries in a rules-based 
regional and global order.’903 This strategic intent applies equally to Australia’s increasing 
engagement in South Asia generally, and water governance specifically. Indeed, water 
scarcity is identified as a growing challenge for Asia, and India in particular, and Australia 
aims to work towards a water secure region.904 
Strengthening regional cooperation is the primary objective of Australia’s diplomatic 
efforts in South Asia. Regional cooperation is linked in government documents to 
achieving sustainable development and boosting economic growth.905 For this reason 
Australia became an observer of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) in 2008 and is active in the East Asia Summit, of which India is also a member.906 
Various Australian leaders, including Kevin Rudd,907 Julia Gillard,908 Tony Abbott,909 and 
Tanya Plibersek910 (as leader of the Opposition) have also made official visits to India in 
recent years. These strengthening ties are reciprocal. In 2014, Narendra Modi became the 
first Indian Prime Minister in 28 years to visit Australia.911 In regards to diplomacy and 
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water governance, the Australian government is actively encouraging international 
students to study water governance in Australia. For example, one of the research areas 
supported by a scholarship available to citizens of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal and 
Pakistan is water resource management.912 
Australia in the Asian Century, a strategy that centres on regional stability, integration and 
openness to support trade and investment opportunities, is also the basis for Australia’s 
regional development program for South Asia.913 Australia’s current development aid 
strategy for South Asia ‘aims to reduce poverty and promote sustainable and inclusive 
growth by improving regional cooperation and connectivity’ and is based on two pillars: 
sustainable development (water, food and energy security), and regional connectivity 
(trade facilitation and infrastructure connectivity).914  
Australia is addressing sustainable development challenges in the region through the 
Sustainable Development Investment Portfolio, which targets the three major Himalayan 
river basins – the Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra. This portfolio has a 12-year time 
horizon and is comprised of six partner organisations: Australian Centre for International 
Agricultural Research (ACIAR), Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organisation (CSIRO), International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development 
(ICIMOD), Consumer Unity Trust Society International (CUTS), International Centre of 
Excellence for Water Resource Management (ICE WaRM), and World Bank – South Asia 
Water Initiative Phase II (SAWI).915 There are also several industry-led initiatives 
supported by the Australian government, namely eWater and the Australian Water 
Partnership. 
Addressing climate change is also an impetus for Australia’s development goals in South 
Asia. The link between climate change and negative repercussions for economies, regional 
stability, livelihoods, and long-term development gains is made strongly in Australia’s 
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South Asia Regional Development Program Strategy 2013-2017.916 This reflects the prevailing 
international concern about climate change. Another international trend reflected in 
Australia’s development aid strategy in South Asia is the focus on ‘partner-led assistance’. 
This model of foreign aid is allegedly ‘preferred in South Asia’ and Australia ‘will not lead 
the design of development programs, but support the priorities and commitments of 
partner governments.’917 The rhetoric of partner-led assistance is a manifestation of the 
‘good governance’ paradigm (discussed below) that influences international actors.  
This regional development strategy also makes explicit Australia’s national interest in 
increase commercial ties with South Asia: ‘We stand to gain through trade and investment 
opportunities and partnerships as South Asia grows as a result of increased openness, 
including through integration within the region and with other parts of Asia.’918 India in 
particular is an increasingly important trade partner for Australia. The two countries have 
been negotiating since March 2011 the Australia-India Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement, which, when signed, will promote trade in goods and services, 
and encourage investment by reducing barriers, increasing transparency and enhancing 
investment protections.919  
Australia’s national interests in fostering closer political, foreign aid, and trade 
relationships in South Asia come together most clearly in regards to transboundary water 
governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. South Asian states are ‘increasingly 
asking for support to build capacity in these sectors, to work with Australia to undertake 
research, and for access to Australian technology’ and Australia feels compelled to offer its 
expertise (especially lessons learned from extensive work on water management in the 
Greater Mekong sub-region) while working through partners (e.g., the World Bank) to 
‘help strengthen regional coordination.’920 The focus on collaboration and working with 
regional partners reflects Australia’s commitment to partner-led assistance.921 One of the 
                                                     
916 Australian Agency for International Development 2013, South Asia Regional Development 
Program Strategy 2013-2017, July 2013, AusAID, Canberra, p. 4 
917 Australian Agency for International Development 2013, South Asia Regional Development 
Program Strategy 2013-2017, July 2013, AusAID, Canberra, p. 12 
918 Australian Agency for International Development 2013, South Asia Regional Development 
Program Strategy 2013-2017, July 2013, AusAID, Canberra, p. 9 
919 DFAT, 2015, ‘Australia-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement’ 
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/aifta/Pages/australia-india-comprehensive-economic-
cooperation-agreement.aspx Accessed 14 May 2015     
920 Australian Agency for International Development 2013, South Asia Regional Development 
Program Strategy 2013-2017, July 2013, AusAID, Canberra, p. 9 
921 Australian Agency for International Development 2013, South Asia Regional Development 
Program Strategy 2013-2017, July 2013, AusAID, Canberra, p. 12 
212 
 
manifestations of this partnering approach is Australia’s sponsorship of India Water Week 
2015,922 which included a large delegation of Australia companies and institutes 
showcasing their technology and know-how to Indian counterparts, and which was 
conducted in conjunction with Australia Business Week in India.923 A year later the newly 
established Australian Water Partnership (a government-funded collaboration between 
the development and water sectors to help manage water scarcity in the Indo-Pacific 
region) was awarded a contract to provide, in conjunction with the World Bank, technical 
support to the India National Hydrology Project.924 
Australia considers itself a world leader in water resource management, sustainable 
agriculture and energy efficiency.925 As per the Australia in the Asian Century strategy, 
‘[w]e are well placed to collaborate and share our experience of replacing centrally planned 
water allocations with a market’ and Australian firms have developed valuable expertise 
through recent experiences of drought, which has prompted considerable technological 
innovation in water recycling and irrigation infrastructure.926 One manifestation of this is 
the arrangement between the Australian and Indian governments to manage water 
security, primarily through technology transfer and scientific research partnerships.927 
It is not just the Australian Government that is actively building capacity in water resource 
management in South Asia. Private sector and sub-state actors are also exporting their 
know-how. The Murray Darling Basin Authority, for example, sent a delegation to India 
Water Week 2015 and has been consulting to the Indian government over matters of inter-
jurisdictional water governance.928 It is very well regarded in South Asia, though its water 
                                                     
922 Government of India 2015, ‘River Development & Ganga Rejuvenation’, press release 17 January 
2015, Ministry of Water Resources, viewed 16 May 2015, 
<http://www.indiawaterweek.in/docs/2015/press_release.pdf>. 
923 Australian Trade Commission, India, 2015, ‘Australian water delegation aims to enhance 
relationship with India’ http://www.austrade.gov.au/local-sites/india/news/australian-water-
delegation-aims-to-enhance-relationship-with-india Accessed 16 May 2015 
924 Australian Water Partnership, 2016, ‘India National Hydrology Project proposal approved’ 
http://waterpartnership.org.au/india-national-hydrology-project-proposal-approved/  
925 Australian Agency for International Development 2013, South Asia Regional Development 
Program Strategy 2013-2017, July 2013, AusAID, Canberra, p. 9 
926 Government of Australia 2012, Australia in the Asian Century, White Paper, October 2012, 
Government of Australia, Canberra, p. 241 
927 Australian High Commission, India, 2013, ‘India Water Week: Australia and India partner to 
manage water for scarcity’, 10 April 2013, http://www.india.embassy.gov.au/ndli/pa1513.html 
Accessed 16 May 2015 
928 Australian High Commission, India, 2014, ‘The Ganga And The Murray Darling - Common 
Lessons From Two River Basins’, 31 July 2014, http://www.india.embassy.gov.au/ndli/pa2414.html 
Accessed 17 May 2015 
213 
 
governance of the Murray Darling basin in Australia remains controversial.929 Australia’s 
eWater consortium has also been exporting its river basin modelling technology and 
expertise to India.930 
These Australian engagements in South Asia on water resource management tend to focus 
on technology transfers rather than policy and governance. One aspect of the Australia in 
the Asian Century strategy, is that Australia ‘will continue to showcase our technology, 
providing commercial openings for innovative Australian firms.’931 In October 2012, for 
example, Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard visited India to launch the India-Australia 
Water Science and Technology Partnership.932 This may further Australia’s commercial 
interests but, as discussed in Chapter 5, the pursuit of scientific, technological and 
engineering solutions to wicked problems of policy is not necessarily the most effective 
way of strengthening regional hydro-diplomacy.  
Part of Australia’s strategic interest in South Asia lies in building partnerships with other 
western nations, including Germany and the UK. The German Federal Enterprise for 
International Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 
GIZ) is supporting activities aimed at promotion of intra-regional trade potentials in the 
SAARC region, while the UK Department for International Development (DFID), which 
has provided GBP21.21 million in grant assistance from 2012-16 to multilateral agencies to 
increase regional trade and economic integration in South Asia (from Central Asia to 
Bangladesh) as part of a larger ‘Economic Corridors’ facility.933  
The largest share of the UK’s overall aid budget is spent on India,934 and the UK was until 
very recently the largest donor of direct aid to India935 (the World Bank and Japan are now 
                                                     
929 Connell, D 2007, Water Politics in the Murray-Darling Basin, The Federation Press, Sydney 
930 eWater 2012, ‘New Australia-India partnership’, Friday 19 October 2012, viewed 26 March 2015, 
<http://www.ewater.com.au/news/media/?news=214>. 
931 Government of Australia 2012, Australia in the Asian Century, White Paper, October 2012, 
Government of Australia, Canberra, p. 241 
932 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2013, ‘India-Australia Water 
Science and Technology Partnership’ 
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/HotTopics/Pages/Display.aspx?QID=840  
Accessed 24 July 2014 
933 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Government of Australia 2014, Aid Program 
Performance Report 2013-14: South Asia Regional Program, September 2014, DFAT, Canberra, p.5 
934 Niloofar Rafiei, Devex blog, 19 March 2012, ‘Peanuts to India? The controversy over British aid’ 
http://devpolicy.org/peanuts-to-india-the-controversy-over-british-aid20120319/ Accessed 25 May 
2015 
935 Indian Express, 2010, ‘MEA to Finance: Tell London we won’t accept aid from next April’, 15 
September 2010, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/mea-to-finance-tell-london-we-wont-
accept-aid-from-next-april/681612/ Accessed 25 May 2015 
214 
 
the top two aid donors to India.936) The UK’s aid in the region, especially India, is also tied 
with commercial interests (foremost among them the sale of UK-made fighter jets to 
India,937 which ultimately did not have the desired effect.938) Although the UK no longer 
gives new aid grants to India,939 there may be residual British post-colonial ties to South 
Asia that underpin the economic, political and foreign aid strategies there, especially in 
terms of development.940 For Norway, meanwhile, the primary national interest in the 
region is commercial, followed by support of ‘Cooperation on climate change, 
environmental and clean energy issues.’941 
In conclusion, the commercial, geopolitical, and strategic interests of international actors 
are all drivers of interventions in the transboundary water governance of the Ganges-
Brahmaputra. These interests are as significant in motivating them as is the interest in 
increasing water cooperation between India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh.  
Paradigms and discourses influencing international actors 
International organisations and foreign aid donors engaging in transboundary water 
interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed do not do so in an intellectual or 
ideological vacuum. They are instead the product and the propagators of numerous 
narratives, ideas and ideals. These values are also the basis of the normative claims that 
international organisations and foreign aid donors make in regards to transboundary 
water governance. The global paradigms and discourses discussed below are used, in part, 
as a justification for international organisations and aid donors to operate in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed, and guide what they aim to achieve there.  
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As Nishat shows, the principles of water management being applied in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed are not necessarily those that come from within the region, but 
rather are those driven by multinational institutions such as UN Water, UNDP, FAO and 
international civil society organisations such as Global Water Partnership and the World 
Water Council.942 Water policy discussion within the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed 
can therefore be said to be generally influenced by overarching global discourses. One 
such global discourse is, according to Routray, that of Integrated Water Resource 
Management (IWRM).943 Kurup shows that in the last decade in particular has given an 
increased emphasis in South Asia on the understanding of the management of water 
resources using the IWRM paradigm, and this is due directly to its adaptation and 
endorsement by powerful international agencies like the Global Water Partnership and the 
World Water Partnership.944 
The recent focus on what Mollinga calls the ‘water question’ is in itself a value-laden 
prospect. Mollinga and Gondhalekar argue that since the early 1990s, water resources 
management has become globalised and aligned with the ‘three big ideas’ of the ‘age of 
environmental critiques’ that dawned around the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. These three big 
ideas are:  
‘the idea of the market, the idea of democracy (often phrased as “good 
governance”) and the idea of sustainability. These ideas were assembled 
in the concept of IWRM (Integrated Water Resources Management), 
whose conceptual closure as a “sanctioned discourse” happened around 
2000.’945 Since then, this ‘new paradigm’ of water governance has been 
‘actively propagated through international development funding 
                                                     
942 Nishat, A 2014, ‘A review of the institutional framework for management of water resources in 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna system’ in G Pangare (ed.), Hydro Diplomacy; Sharing Water 
Across Borders, Academic Foundation, New Delhi, p. 110 
943 Routray, S 2010, ‘The Water Sector in India: An Overview’ in NS Mohan, S Routray, & N 
Sashikumar (eds), River Water Sharing: Transboundary Conflict and Cooperation in India, 
Routledge, New Delhi, p. 33 
944 Kurup, A 2010, ‘Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM): An Alternative Paradigm’ in 
NS Mohan, S Routray, & N Sashikumar (eds), River Water Sharing: Transboundary Conflict and 
Cooperation in India, Routledge, New Delhi, p. 157 
945 Mollinga, P & Gondhalekar, D 2014, ‘Finding structure in diversity:  A stepwise small-N/medium-
N qualitative comparative analysis approach for water resources management research’, Water 
Alternatives, vol. 7, no. 1, p. 180 
216 
 
agencies and, for instance, knowledge organisations involved in capacity 
building.’946  
International actors in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed can also be said to be part of 
this epistemic community.  
The paradigm of water resource management that espouses the values of the free market, 
good governance, and sustainable development has come into its own in the era of climate 
change and other non-traditional security threats. As Mollinga and Gondhalekar point out, 
‘The recent surge in attention to climate change, in debates on which water resources play 
a central role, has added to the perceived global nature of the “water question”, most 
recently popularly framed as a “water security” question.’947 Indeed, water security is 
emerging as a discrete policy area, with distinct applications for both national security and 
human development. Water is also increasingly prominent on the international 
development agenda, as evidenced by the Sustainable Development Goals focussing on 
water issues other than just sanitation and health. Meanwhile, the international 
development agenda is increasingly closely aligned with the international environmental 
conservation agenda – again, as evidenced by the growing policy focus on sustainable 
development. Throughout these interlinked discourses the recurring theme is that of 
governance; bad or weak governance is at the root of many contemporary global 
challenges, while good governance is touted as a necessary factor in addressing them. 
These trends are discussed in this section in relation to how they affect foreign-led 
interventions in the transboundary water governance of the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed. This section begins by explaining the principles of good governance, 
especially as applied to transboundary water. The next two sub-sections discuss the 
emergence of non-traditional security threats, such as water security, and climate change 
in particular. The fourth sub-section illustrates how water security issues are increasingly 
incorporated into the international development agenda. Sustainable development is also 
high on both development and environmental conservation agendas. That is discussed in 
the fifth sub-section. The final sub-section focuses on the competing narratives of 
‘command and control’ and ecological approaches to natural resource management.  
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The ideas and values discussed in this section can be categorised as what Sneddon calls 
‘hegemonic concepts’. He argues that understanding hegemonic concepts illustrates how 
seemingly ‘global’ ideas hatched in the forums of powerful transnational actors and 
organisations become applied across special scales (international, national, local).948 This 
is of particular importance in the case of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed; the 
hegemonic concepts of good water governance, sustainable development, et cetera, are the 
basis of normative claims made by international actors intervening in transboundary water 
governance in this problemshed. 
Good governance 
The concept of good water governance is now well entrenched in the scholarship on and 
praxis of water resources (how this came to be has been the subject of many studies, see 
for example Pahl-Wostl 2015). According to UN Water, it is critical to Goal 6, the water 
goal, of the Sustainable Development Goals: good governance ‘underpins all the water 
targets and supports linkages to other development themes.’949 But it was not always at the 
forefront of water discourse.  
The concept of good water governance has evolved from the relatively recent 
understanding of water as being inherently political. As Mollinga points out, as recently as 
the late 1990s, ‘politics and the political were anathema in most water policy circles. The 
social engineering paradigm reigned largely unquestioned.’950 He goes on to argue that the 
rise of the theme of good governance generally brought politics into the discourse of water 
resources development.951 At the same time, this discourse was being broadened to include 
aspects of human development and environmental conservation.  
The role of water management in reconciling human development with environmental 
considerations has its genesis in the 1992 International Conference on Water and the 
Environment. According to Muller, the so-called Dublin Principles, which were an 
outcome of the conference,  
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‘emphasised environmental protection and stakeholder participation, 
identified water as an economic good, downplaying its social and 
cultural dimensions, ignored provisions of Agenda 21 about water 
resource “development” and set up new global organisations. It was an 
ambitious attempt to promote, in the water sector, radically new forms 
of deliberative democracy, environmental governance and 
multilateralism and to impose an ecosystems approach on the 
Anthropocene.’952  
The emphasis in this new conceptualisation of social and environmental systems is on 
good governance. 
According to the United Nations, good governance ‘is participatory, consensus oriented, 
accountable, transparent, responsive, equitable and inclusive, effective and efficient and 
follows the rule of law’953 That is simultaneously a narrow definition, but also one that 
remains open to interpretation. As Sachs emphasises,  
‘Good governance…means many things. It applies not only to 
government but also to business. It means that both the public sector 
(government) and the private sector (business) operate according to the 
rule of law, with accountability, transparency, responsiveness to the 
needs of stakeholders, and with the active engagement of the public on 
critical issues such as land use, pollution, and the fairness and honesty 
of political and business practices.’954  
Sachs does not refer to the role of civil society in his definition of good governance, but the 
inclusion in governance processes of actors that are neither government nor business is 
also implicit in the understanding of good governance. 
In 1987 the World Commission on Environment and Development in its seminal report 
Our Common Future (a.k.a. the Brundtland Report) called for the collaboration of various 
actor groups in the good governance of environmental resources: ‘Environmental 
protection and sustainable development must be an integral part of the mandates of all 
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agencies of governments, of international organizations, and of major private sector 
institutions.’955 Similar sentiments were echoed in 2012, at the Rio+20 conference. The 
Future We Want, the outcome document of those proceedings, noted ‘the valuable 
contributions that non-governmental organizations could and do make in promoting 
sustainable development through their well-established and diverse experience, expertise 
and capacity, especially in the area of analysis, sharing of information and knowledge, 
promotion of dialogue and support of implementation of sustainable development.’956 The 
same report acknowledges the importance of multi-level cooperation: ‘We recognize that 
effective governance at local, sub-national, national, regional and global levels 
representing the voices and interests of all is critical for advancing sustainable 
development.’957 
In relation to water resources, the inclusion (and exclusion) of various stakeholder groups 
in governance processes has been linked to the concept of water justice. Patrick points out 
that  
‘Who decides what is just and for whom depends on who or what is 
excluded or included in the water-allocation decision-making process. If 
social inclusion is achieved, the variety of perspectives on what and why 
water is needed by the different users for different uses and the 
underlying rationale for these reasons is best described as a continuum 
of potential just outcomes. On the other hand, the social exclusion of 
any particular stakeholder group can result in injustices simply because 
certain opinions, needs or world-views are excluded.’958  
This emphasis on inclusion is also a fundamental aspect of deliberative governance – a 
method of good governance. 
Deliberative governance is, according to Dore, a constructive engagement between 
stakeholders over issues of mutual interest, such as water resource. This type of good 
governance promotes ‘inclusive, deliberative processes that emphasise different 
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perspectives, critical analysis, learning and institution-building whilst respecting rights, 
accounting for risks, acknowledging responsibilities and fairly distributing rewards.’959  
Deliberative governance can be applied to transboundary water issues, and indeed this is 
the basis of the main foreign-led interventions in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. 
Dore, who himself has been instrumental in shaping Australia’s water governance 
interventions in South and South-East Asia, defines deliberative water governance as ‘a 
social process of dialogue, negotiation and decision-making.’960 He argues that ‘[t]he 
deliberative water governance agenda should be attractive to proponents of fairness, 
effectiveness and social justice in water governance arenas and their consequent decisions 
and impacts.’961 
An important element of deliberative governance specifically, and good governance more 
generally, is that of communication and information sharing. The Brundtland Report 
observes that ‘[c]ooperation on environmental issues among developing countries has 
often been made difficult by poor communications.’962 The Rio+20 outcome document also 
notes that access to information is essential to the promotion of sustainable 
development.963 It resolves to ‘promote the science-policy interface through inclusive, 
evidence-based and transparent scientific assessments, as well as access to reliable, 
relevant and timely data in areas related to the three dimensions of sustainable 
development, building on existing mechanisms, as appropriate.’964 
Access to ‘reliable, relevant and timely data’ is at the heart of evidence-led policymaking – 
another aspect of good governance. Good governance and evidence-led policymaking are 
also connected with a relatively recent focus in international development on capacity 
building. The authors of The Future We Want report emphasise ‘the need for enhanced 
capacity building for sustainable development and, in this regard, we call for 
strengthening technical and scientific cooperation.’965 
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Technical and scientific cooperation is a pillar of good water governance. As Gyawali and 
Schwank make clear, ‘water sharing agreements that flow from a good scientific 
understanding by both the riparians of the river system, of its behaviour and capabilities, 
will lead to peace and understanding that last, while those with scientific uncertainties will 
always provide opportunities for strife and dispute.’966 But as discussed in Chapter 3, there 
is a culture of secrecy around water-related data in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. 
Furthermore, as A. Dinar et al. point out, it is difficult if not impossible to find accurate 
hydrological data on the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna mega-basin in part because the 
system of rivers is so complex it is difficult to disaggregate how much water comes from 
where.967  
The World Bank is particularly aware of the limited technical and scientific cooperation in 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, and the difficulty of accessing accurate 
hydrological data. As the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment makes clear,  
‘Until now, there has been no basin-wide knowledge base and analytical 
framework that could be used by riparian states to explore options and 
facilitate cooperative planning in the Ganges. Information and data are 
surprisingly scarce and difficult to obtain. In particular, very little 
information is available on hydrology and irrigation withdrawals in 
India.’968  
This knowledge gap is part of the World Bank’s rationale for the Ganges Strategic Basin 
Assessment. The data from this study is intended to be the basis of evidence-based 
policymaking in the near future, and the process of the study itself was an attempt at 
capacity building and increasing technical and scientific cooperation.  
The Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is not generally characterised by good water 
governance. As Asthana and Shukla argue, ‘Current water resource development in South 
Asia is not sustainable. There needs to be a shift in emphasis on demand management 
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practices and further incentives for conservation of water resources.’969 They show that a 
range of water governance strategies and policies have been suggested by various 
epistemic communities, NGOs, civil society groups and, of course, international actors like 
the World Bank. But there is no uniform prescription and the system is a complex one.970 
Complex or not, as the Global Water Partnership makes clear, ‘Usually improving 
governance means reform.’971 One avenue for reform in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed is amending institutional arrangements. As the World Bank points out, ‘the 
Ganges is one of the few large international basins in the world with no permanent 
institutional mechanism that involves multiple riparians.’972 Institutionalised collaboration 
across borders and sectors is, for the major international organisations and Western aid 
donors, a hallmark of good water governance. 
The Global Water Partnership defines water governance as ‘the range of political, social, 
economic and administrative systems that are in place to develop and manage water 
resources, and the delivery of water services, at different levels of society.’973 Furthermore, 
‘Governance looks at the balance of power and the balance of actions at different levels of 
authority. It translates into political systems, laws, regulations, institutions, financial 
mechanisms and civil society development and consumer rights – essentially the rules of 
the game.’974 Sneddon notes that the balance of power and authority are also central to the 
concept of hegemony.975 Thus there exists a relationship between water governance and 
hydro-hegemony. However, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, in the case of the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed, India struggles to move beyond the realm of the ‘big brother’ 
and into that of good water governance.  
Because water governance encompasses ‘diverse environmental, social, economic and 
cultural values, and is influenced by many social, institutional, economic and political 
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processes’, Patterson et al. argue that water governance should be considered a distinct 
field of research.976 This field of research also has a normative component. Water justice 
falls into the rubric of water governance; both are about the allocation of water resources. 
As Pahl-Wostl argues, ‘Without adhering to good governance principles, it is unlikely that 
water governance takes the needs of the less powerful or the environment into account.’977 
UN Water has also provided recommendations to the Sustainable Development Goals 
along similar lines: ‘Only through an integrated approach can the allocation of water 
resources benefit the many and not the few. Water governance is essential to balance 
available resources with demands from a multitude of often conflicting water users as well 
as ensuring critical eco-systems continue to maintain the resource base’978 
We now understand good governance, and water governance. What, then is good water 
governance? Feldman has adapted from Gleick seven criteria of good water governance 
that aim for the sustainable development of water resources: maintaining human health; 
maintaining ecosystem health; minimum standards of quality; long-term freshwater 
renewability; data collection and accessibility; institutional mechanisms for resolving 
conflict; and, democratic decision-making.979 For UN Water, ‘good water governance 
enables people to participate in decisions affecting their lives. To ensure this, 
accountability mechanisms need to be in place.’980 Good water governance is also, 
according to Falkenmark et al., ‘absolutely the top priority’ for human security, because 
only good water governance can enhance access to adequate quantity and quality of water 
for people’s wellbeing.981 For this reason Jägerskog et al. remind us that ‘[m]any studies at 
international level have indeed identified the water crisis not as one of scarcity but as one 
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of governance.’982 There is a nexus between water governance and water related security 
crises – and these are increasingly prevalent.  
Emergence of non-traditional security threats 
The past two decades have seen a general increase of interest in the non-traditional 
security threats and collective action problems around the globe. Over the course of the 
twentieth century, ‘the relationship between the human world and the planet that sustains 
it has undergone a profound change’ according to the 1987 report of the World 
Commission on the Environment and Development: 
‘unintended changes are occurring in the atmosphere, in soils, in waters, 
among plants and animals, and in the relationships among all of these. 
The rate of change is outstripping the ability of scientific disciplines and 
our current capabilities to assess and advise. It is frustrating the 
attempts of political and economic institutions, which evolved in a 
different, more fragmented world, to adapt and cope.’983  
The understanding of the inter-connectedness of human and environmental systems has 
been seeping out of ecology and science silos and onto the global stage. Now, argues 
Matthew, ‘we find ourselves on the eve of the Hydrocene, an era in which the well-being of 
humankind depends in great measure on the resourcefulness we bring to managing the 
planet’s most abundant resources.’984  
Environmental issues have been slowly moving into the centre of global politics since the 
latter half of the twentieth century. Milestones such as the Club of Rome, the Stockholm 
environmental conference 1972, the Brundtland Report (a.k.a. Our Common Future) on 
sustainable development in 1987 and the Dublin and Rio meetings in 1992 have, according 
to Jägerskog et al., marked the incremental progress of environmental issues emerging as a 
security problem of sorts.985 But while the environmental security discourse in the 1990s 
was preoccupied with violent conflict (including state-on-state conflict) over scare 
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resources, it has since then moved on to understanding environmental risks as ‘threat 
multipliers’ in conflict-sensitive regions.986  
Conflict is increasingly driven not by external state-based aggressors, but rather by 
internal or local pressures, and the consequences of poverty or socio-political instability, 
including vulnerability to environmental threats such as water scarcity.987 For Wolf et al., 
‘These changes suggest that tomorrow's water disputes may look very different from 
today's.’988 Because the very character of conflict is changing along with emergent non-
traditional security threats, Mirumachi suggests that thinking in terms of conflict (and its 
binary opposite, cooperation) may be unhelpful: in the new security paradigm conflict and 
cooperation co-exist. In regards to water disputes, Mirumachi proposes that more insight 
and understanding will be gained in speaking of water-related interaction rather than 
water conflict or water cooperation.989 This concept was explored in the methodology and 
literature review. 
In the era of non-traditional security threats, moving beyond the conflict/cooperation 
binary may be a particularly fruitful approach to what Keohane and Nye call 
interdependence conflict, that is, disputes arising out of ‘situations characterised by 
reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries’990 such as the 
collective action problems (including transboundary water governance). They do not 
suggest that international conflict disappears when interdependence prevails, but rather 
that ‘conflict will take new forms, and may even increase. But the traditional approaches to 
understanding conflict in world politics will not explain interdependence conflict 
particularly well. Applying the wrong image and the wrong rhetoric to problems will lead 
to erroneous analysis and bad policy.’991 Therefore the traditional approach to security 
(with states as primary agents, and a strict dichotomy between conflict and cooperation) 
may no longer be appropriate for non-traditional security threats. 
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To some extent, the global agenda is beginning to embrace this nuanced understanding of 
security and conflict. Nonetheless, as O’Lear et al. point out, there are still differences in 
how non-traditional security threats are understood in developed versus developing 
countries: ‘Environmental security is…viewed in Western countries … as a “threat 
multiplier” in already conflict-sensitive regions’ but developing countries first and 
foremost ‘consider security implications with regional neighbors when responding to 
extreme events.’992 This is the case in South Asia, where, as discussed in Chapter 5, there is 
no security community, and India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh tend to consider 
security in realist terms (i.e., state-centric; as Jägerskog et al. point out, ‘traditional 
security perceptions have centred on the state and its survival in a realist or neo-realist 
fashion.’993) However, as global security threats become increasingly non-traditional, and 
new forms of conflict emerge, Werz and Conley warn that ‘our security can no longer be 
guaranteed by military strength or economic clout alone, but only by our ability to compel 
collective action.’994 
Collective action is the obvious response to collective action problems. Many of the most 
serious challenges facing the world today (such as climate change; water scarcity; 
communicable disease; volatility in international food, fuel, and financial markets; and the 
depletion of common-pool resources such as fisheries) affect entire regions, or even the 
entire globe. As Davies and Evans stress, these challenges ‘generally require international 
cooperation if they are to be met.’995 Loorbach et al. expand on this point when they argue 
that ‘[a]t the end of the day, provision of clean energy, air, water, land, food, shelter, 
sanitation, healthcare, education, security, and other services that satisfy human needs 
requires collective solutions at an international level and new policy responses that 
transcend across multiple levels.’996 
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Werz and Conley add that the action of governments alone is not enough to address non-
traditional security threats:  
‘Water shortage, desertification, and erosion do not respect 
international boundaries, and desperate climate migrants will strain 
even the best prepared government bodies...Sustainable security is a 
bold rethinking of national security that introduces the notions of 
collective and human security and rebalances the three tools of foreign 
policy – defence, diplomacy, and development’997 
This rethinking of collective and human security is slowly beginning to happen:  
‘Action on global challenges is increasingly taken forward by coalitions 
of likeminded parties, incorporating sovereign states, cities, civil society 
organizations (CSOs), businesses, institutional investors, regional and 
international organizations, and youth movements, with coalition 
governance geared toward achieving “collective impact” on large-scale 
challenges. The vehicles for dealing with such challenges are 
increasingly special-purpose, internationally coordinated, and long-term 
mega-programs designed to solve the problems, rather than put dents in 
them.’998  
The South Asia Water Initiative is one example of this sort of special-purpose, long-term 
mega-program led by an international coalition of likeminded parties. 
The management of international river basins exemplifies the pervasive collective action 
problem.999 The problems arising out of shared water resource are, as S. Dinar highlights, 
both national and regional in nature; ‘the solutions that are needed to solve such problems 
are both national and regional.’1000 Yet, in the absence of an overarching governing 
mechanism, Qaddumi argues, cooperation between individuals or states will be difficult, if 
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not entirely impossible.1001 This is the crux of the new security dilemma. S. Dinar shows 
that  
‘Most importantly for the debate on the environment and security, 
however, the impediments to cooperation and the instigation of conflict 
over water are both national and international in their sources. States in 
particular regions will continue to see water as a national security 
concern. Even though a regional agreement may be the best solution to 
states’ water problems, they will continue to couch their need to access 
sufficient and clean freshwater in security and nationalist terms.’1002  
This, as illustrated in Chapter 5, is the case in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, 
where water is securitised and a zero-sum, state-centric approach to water governance 
prevails. 
Given the difficulty of collective action, Wolf claims it is not surprising that ‘“water” and 
“war” are two topics being assessed together with increasing frequency’1003 especially in 
light of ‘[t]he high number of shared rivers, combined with increasing water scarcity for 
growing populations.’1004 Jägerskog et al. argue that this increasing awareness of the 
relative scarcity of water, combined ‘with an increasing sense of competition for it, water 
came to be politicized, “securitized”, and to a higher degree subject to international 
conflicts, a security dilemma.’1005 
The once prevalent fear that the wars of the 21st century will be about water has been 
largely dispelled by scholars (as discussed in the literature review), but the United Nations 
warns that water is an important collective action problem. ‘As countries develop and 
populations grow,’ one recent UN report says, ‘the potential demand for water is projected 
to increase by 55% by 2050. … Water supply crises have been identified by industry, 
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government, academia and civil society as one of the top three global risks.’1006 Keskinen et 
al. concur:  
‘Water is gaining higher political attention locally, nationally, regionally 
and globally – as it should be. Importantly, the need for cooperation at 
different levels is being increasingly acknowledged. There is thus a 
momentum to promote water diplomacy, which we consider a vital 
element of water cooperation, particularly in transboundary settings.’1007  
The momentum to promote hydro-diplomacy is also evident in the interventions of 
international organisations and aid donors in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, 
especially SAWI. Largely hydro-diplomacy and other approaches for increasing 
transboundary water cooperation are a response to the perceived rise of non-traditional 
security threats. 
The spectre of climate change 
Perhaps the most ominous (or, at least, most prevalent in the public imagination) of the 
non-traditional security threats is that of climate change. The 2012 United Nations report, 
The Future We Want, reaffirms that ‘climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our 
time… We are deeply concerned that all countries, particularly developing countries, are 
vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change’1008 Because the effects of climate 
change are, among other things, threatening food security, poverty eradication and 
sustainable development, the United Nations emphasises that ‘adaptation to climate 
change represents an immediate and urgent global priority.’1009 Although this provides a 
focal point for policymakers, Groenfeldt argues that ‘climate change adds urgency to more 
and bigger technical fixes.’1010  
Within the conventional water management paradigm, ‘The inclination is to go “back to 
the future” of command-and-control approaches and re-engineer a solution to climate 
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change: Build more dams to store more water, more pipelines to cross basin boundaries 
and more pumping to tap ever-deeper sources of groundwater.’1011 At the same time, there 
is a clear trend within the scientific community in favour of ecological, rather than 
engineering, solutions because these ‘lend themselves to unanticipated synergies, rather 
than conventional responses which often result in unexpected collateral damage.’1012 
Climate change is an increasingly important focus for the World Bank too. The growth of 
climate change-related activities supported by the World Bank has been tremendous, and 
today climate change is the largest share of the Bank’s environment portfolio (in 2012, 
almost $4.6 billion of lending supported climate change adaptation and more than $7.1 
billion was directed toward climate change mitigation.)1013 Nonetheless, collective action 
problems such as climate change remain, according to Evans and Davies, low priorities for 
both national governments and the international development agencies that support 
them. Climate change, they claim, is, at best, somewhere in the middle of the spectrum: 
‘although significant efforts have been made, they do not even begin to approach the scale 
of action needed to adequately mitigate greenhouse gas emissions or to build resilience to 
the unavoidable impacts of global warming.’1014 
The difficulty of taking collective action on climate change lies, in part, in the fact that it is 
‘a “malignant” as distinct from a “malevolent” problem...sophisticated but, being derived 
from nature, not driven by an evil-intentioned adversary.’1015 It is harder, therefore, to 
target actions directly. Indeed, as Campbell et al. point out, ‘a narrow interpretation of the 
term “national security” may be woefully inadequate to convey the ways in which state 
authorities might break down in a worst case climate change scenario’1016 because the 
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threats climate change poses cannot readily be combated as though they were posed by a 
state actor. This is a defining feature of the new global security challenges, which, as per 
the discussion above, is characterised by the emergence of non-traditional security threats 
and collective action problems.  
In this new global security environment, the nature of conflict is changing too, and climate 
change is likely to be one of the new accelerants of instability or conflict.1017 Climate 
change is likely to worsen existing tensions, especially over natural resources,1018 but as 
O’Lear et al. point out, climate change itself ‘is neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of 
conflict.’1019 As a threat multiplier, the relationship between climate change and conflict is 
best understood in the context of the vulnerability of populations, ecosystems, economies 
and institutions.1020 
Social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities could be exacerbated by climate 
change through, for example, effects on levels of agricultural output and basic 
subsistence.1021 Food shortages, water crises and catastrophic flooding are likely to be 
driven by climate change,1022 as is the incidence of diseases transmitted through water, via 
vectors such as mosquitos.1023 Resource scarcity is another vulnerability and for Evans, 
there are three linkages between resource scarcity and climate change. The first is that of 
acute shocks (such as extreme weather events of price spikes) that then have knock-on 
social, economic or security impacts. The second is that of large-scale unplanned 
migration as the result of increasing environmental degradation. The third potential area 
                                                                                                                                                              
Security Implications of Global Climate Change, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Center for a New American Security, Washington DC, p. 9 
1017 Werz, M., & Conley, L., 2012, 'Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict; Addressing complex 
crisis scenarios in the 21st Century', Centre for American Progress, Heinrich Boell Stiftung, p. 5 
1018 Campbell, KM, Gulledge, J, McNeill, JR, Podesta, J, Ogden, P, Fuerth, L, Woolsey, RJ, Lennon, 
ATJ, Smith, J, Weitz, R & Mix D 2007, The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National 
Security Implications of Global Climate Change, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Center for a New American Security, Washington DC, p. 8 
1019 O’Lear, S, Briggs, CM, Denning, GM 2013, ‘Environmental Security, Military Planning, and 
Civilian Research: The Case of Water’, Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 
vol. 55, no.5, p. 3 
1020 Evans, A 2010, ‘Resource Scarcity, Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict’, World 
Development Report 2011, Background Paper, 9 September 2010, Centre on International 
Cooperation, New York University, New York, p. 6 
1021 Campbell, KM, Gulledge, J, McNeill, JR, Podesta, J, Ogden, P, Fuerth, L, Woolsey, RJ, Lennon, 
ATJ, Smith, J, Weitz, R & Mix D 2007, The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National 
Security Implications of Global Climate Change, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Center for a New American Security, Washington DC, pp. 106-107 
1022 Werz, M., & Conley, L., 2012, 'Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict; Addressing complex 
crisis scenarios in the 21st Century', Centre for American Progress, Heinrich Boell Stiftung, p. 2 
1023 Werz, M., & Conley, L., 2012, 'Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict; Addressing complex 
crisis scenarios in the 21st Century', Centre for American Progress, Heinrich Boell Stiftung, p. 20 
232 
 
of ‘indirect conflict risk that could arise from climate change and increased resource 
scarcity is the potential for existing international legal structures to be rendered outdated 
or irrelevant by changing environmental circumstances, thus paving the way for novel 
disputes that existing law may struggle to manage.’1024  
This vulnerability in legal structures is particularly relevant to transboundary water 
governance. As Evans points out,  
‘Trans-boundary water sharing agreements may become sources of 
conflict rather than co-operation as flows and water levels change, 
particularly where agreements are based on a set volume of water rather 
than a percentage of what is available (and above all when the rate of 
change in access outpaces institutions’ capacity to adapt); hydropower-
sharing agreements also risk being undermined by changing water 
flows, particularly in regions affected by glacial melting with the risk of 
above-average flows as glaciers melt being followed by droughts once 
they have disappeared.’1025  
Tensions could increase within and between states that experience shrinking water supply, 
while at the same time hydroelectric power generation may be substantially affected by 
reduced glacial runoff or by upstream nations diverting rivers in some parts of the 
world.1026 In short, as Warner and Zawahri attest, ‘the relationship between freshwater 
scarcities and conflict has regained momentum in light of climate-induced global 
change.’1027 Furthermore, the discourse on water security has, according to Jägerskog et al. 
broadened not only to include the risks and challenges posed by climate change, but also 
to other emerging concerns such as the food-energy-water nexus.1028 These are the non-
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traditional security threats described above. As discussed, water is a threat multiplier, 
which interplays with other conflict-inducing factors such as religious animosity, 
ideological disputes, border disagreements, economic competition, et cetera.1029 As such, 
Keskinen et al. urge that ‘we should consider the key water-related sectors, such as energy 
and food security as well as climate change, population growth and urbanisation as the 
“hard” drivers of transboundary cooperation as opposed to the sometimes perceived 
notion of cooperating on “soft” environmental values.’1030 This is approach to water – as a 
hard driver of transboundary cooperation – is prominent in the language of international 
actors engaging in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, and underpins their normative 
objectives. 
Increasing importance of water security in international development 
The emergence of climate change and other non-traditional security threats that require 
collective action has broken what Jägerskog et al. call the monopoly of the nation-state 
and their armed forces on the security concept. Water is also gaining higher political 
attention globally because it ‘may be one of the absolutely most crucial commodities for 
safeguarding people’s wellbeing.’1031 As Wolf et al. point out, ‘[a]n unprecedented number 
of people lack access to safe, stable supply of water’1032 and this has serious repercussions 
for human security. As such, the debate on water security has broadened from the classic 
international relations field to new areas of scholarship and policy, including development; 
rights perspectives on water; legal aspects; and the water, food and energy nexus.1033 Thus, 
just as water has become an issue of high politics, it is also increasingly treated as a 
development challenge – and a challenge that is only likely to rise in significance, argue 
Jägerskog et al.1034 
The significance of water as a challenge for development lies partly in the nexus between 
water security and food security. As Uitto and Duda point out, ‘[a]bout 70% of all water 
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withdrawal globally is due to irrigated agriculture, which only represents 17% of the total 
area under agriculture but produces 40% of the world’s food. It is likely that water 
availability will in the near future limit food production potential, at least regionally.’1035 As 
discussed throughout this thesis, water availability is not just a question of supply. It can 
also be achieved through decreasing demand and improving efficiency, especially in 
irrigation. 
Access to food, nutrition, and the livelihoods in the agricultural sector are key issues for 
international development. Asthana and Shukla claim that the issues on the nexus of food 
and water security, as well as energy security, are a particular problem in South Asia, 
especially in India.1036 Chellaney explains the intricacies of the food-energy-water nexus: 
‘Food production is closely intertwined with water and energy, whereas water and energy 
are closely connected with each other. Water is essential for energy extraction, processing, 
and production, while energy is vital to treat, distribute, and supply water.’1037 Any 
disruption in the fragile balance in food, water and energy systems is likely to have 
profound effects on human security and development. 
Yet, the water-related development challenge that most readily gained international 
moment has been that of sanitation and public health. The Millennium Development 
Goals, which defined the international development agenda between 2000 and 2015, aimed 
to halve the proportion of the world’s population without sustainable access to safe 
drinking water and basic sanitation by increasing access to improved drinking water 
sources and sanitation facilities.1038 The focus on drinking water and sanitation took 
primacy over water governance largely because ‘[s]trong connections were never 
developed between water development and management and reducing hunger and 
household poverty’ even though efforts had been made to connect integrated water 
resource management to the full set of the Millennium Development Goals.1039 
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Nonetheless, the Millennium Development Goals were instrumental in connecting water 
to other development challenges, and establishing them firmly on the agenda for global 
action. Sachs argues that these international objectives are important because they 
mobilise social and political action, and they create a sort of positive peer pressure 
between countries to act and compete on outcomes. They also provide a focal point for 
epistemic communities to come together and recommend the best courses of action, and 
mobilise stakeholder networks.1040 Moreover, the Millennium Development Goals resulted 
in increased aid pledges and financial commitments, and ‘by strengthening the focus on 
the social dimensions of development, they have led to a shift in the type of aid 
delivered.’1041 
At the same time, the Millennium Development Goals arguably neglected issues rising to 
prominence on the international security and environmental conservation agendas, such 
as climate change, and ‘they do not capture the overarching goal of sustainability’ or ‘take 
account of how growth can contribute to development outcomes.’1042 The Sustainable 
Development Goals were established in 2015 as the new development agenda up to 2030 in 
part to correct these omissions, and in part to better reflect the changing landscape of 
international development (particularly the fact that ‘many emerging economies are no 
longer eligible for official development assistance (ODA) and have become aid donors 
themselves, and developed countries have become increasingly dependent on capital from 
developing countries.’1043)  
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One of the Sustainable Development Goals is dedicated to water management, including 
cooperation over transboundary water resources, and stresses equitable distribution.1044  
Because water supply crises ‘have been identified by industry, government, academia and 
civil society as one of the top three global risks’ the inclusion of water management as one 
of the Sustainable Development Goals is likely to ‘send a clear message that policymakers 
should focus on this impending threat.’1045 This has indeed been the case, and the 
international attention on transboundary water governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed is one manifestation of this growing policy focus on water related risks. The 
importance of the Sustainable Development Goals, therefore, is not that they include a 
water-focussed goal, or that they somehow directly drive foreign-led interventions in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. Rather, the significance lies in the Sustainable 
Development Goals being one prominent manifestation of the burgeoning international 
interest in water, water security, water governance, and the sustainable development of 
water resources. The discourse on water as a challenge for international development 
informs international actors, and the emerging global consensus on the principles of 
addressing these challenges drives them – in conjunction with other drivers discussed in 
this chapter – to intervene in transboundary water in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed. 
Sustainable development 
As the name suggest, the Sustainable Development Goals are also significant in cementing 
the concept of sustainable development on the international agenda. Sachs sees 
sustainable development as ‘both a way of understanding the world and a method for 
solving global problems.’1046 It is an idea that is quite familiar to many people the world 
over now, but this has been a long time coming. Although, as Allan points out, ‘[t]he water 
sector in the North adopted principles of sustainable development during a protracted 
                                                     
1044 United Nations 2015, Zero draft of the outcome document for the UN Summit to adopt the Post-
2015 Development Agenda, viewed 25 July 2015, <http://www.un.org/youthenvoy/2015/06/zero-draft-
outcome-document-adopt-post-2015-development-agenda/>, Goal 6 
1045 United Nations Water 2014, A Post-2015 Global Goal for Water: Synthesis of key findings and 
recommendations from UN-Water, 27 January 2014, viewed 2 October 2016, 
<http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/pdf/27_01_2014_un-
water_paper_on_a_post2015_global_goal_for_water.pdf>, p. 8 
1046 Sachs, JD 2015, The Age of Sustainable Development, Columbia University Press, New York, p. 1 
237 
 
discursive struggle from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s’1047 the concept has not gained 
widespread acceptance until recently.  
How did sustainable development become, in Sachs’ words, the ‘central concept of our 
age’?1048 The convergence international development and environmental discourses paved 
the way for the emergence of sustainable development as a popular concept because in 
essence it is about combining economic growth with environmental sustainability. Evans 
shows that ‘[b]y the late 1970s, most rapidly developing countries were in the process of 
conceiving national environmental policies. Most of these agendas evolved into broader 
sustainable development agendas and are now being transformed further to include a 
global agenda of cooperation for the greater public good.’1049 By 2011 the Bonn Nexus 
Conference furthered the global discourse by moving beyond conventional sector thinking 
and highlighting the interlinkages of natural resource pressures in water, energy and 
food.1050 A year later, the Rio+20 conference began the processes of establishing global 
Sustainable Development Goals, which replace the Millennium Development Goals and 
set out the post-2015 development agenda.  
The Millennium Development Goals have also been a catalyst for international collective 
action on various development issues, especially in relation to the provision of global 
public goods such as water and sanitation.1051 This has changed the way that international 
institutions, including the World Bank, interact and partner with local non-governmental 
organisations, non-state and sub-state actors. Together, the World Bank and a large 
section of the international donor community are increasingly pursuing an agenda 
addressing global threats, collective action problems and providing global public goods, as 
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well as focusing on regions – such as South Asia – particularly vulnerable to these 
threats.1052 This is likely to continue in the post-2015 era of Sustainable Development Goals. 
Significantly, the outcome document of the Rio+20 conference, The Future We Want, 
makes explicit that water is at the core of sustainable development.1053 Water is therefore 
be prominent among the Sustainable Development Goals in a way that it was not in the 
Millennium Development Goals, which focused only on the sanitation and public health 
aspects of water.1054 Furthermore, the Sustainable Development Goals, unlike the 
Millennium Development Goals, are universal; they apply to all countries of the world, not 
only to poor countries while referencing the rich countries only as donors. For this reason, 
Sachs sees the Sustainable Development Goals as historic and ‘a powerful way to move to a 
new global agenda.’1055 
What, then, is on this global agenda of sustainable development? At its most basic, it is 
‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs.’1056 And ‘a process of change in which the 
exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological 
development, and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both current and 
future potential to meet human needs and aspirations’1057 This is a definition from the 1987 
World Commission on Environment and Development which first coined the term, 
though the idea of restrained natural resource exploitation has been around long before it 
was popularised in the Commission’s report, Our Common Future, also known as the 
Brundtland Report after the Commission’s Chairperson.1058 
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The Our Common Future report is significant in that it is the first attempt to link 
environmental concerns with socio-economic ones, and to make them universal:  
‘The environment does not exist as a sphere separate from human 
actions, ambitions, and needs, and attempts to defend it in isolation 
from human concerns have given the very word “environment” a 
connotation of naivety in some political circles. The word “development” 
has also been narrowed by some into a very limited focus, along the 
lines of “what poor nations should do to become richer”, and thus again 
is automatically dismissed by many in the international arena as being a 
concern of specialists, of those involved in questions of “development 
assistance”. But the “environment” is where we all live; and 
“development” is what we all do in attempting to improve our lot within 
that abode. The two are inseparable.’1059 
As such, sustainable development is complex. Sachs argues that sustainable development 
must incorporate the interactions of three complex systems: the world economy, the 
global society (including politics), and the earth’s physical environment.1060 These systems 
are also alluded to in the Rio+20 document, The Future We Want, which states that 
sustainable development can be achieved by sustained economic growth, equitable social 
development, and integrated management of natural resources.1061 These pathways to 
sustainable development indicate that it is not just an outcome, but also a process. Sachs 
points out that  
‘Sustainable Development is also a normative outlook on the world, 
meaning that it recommends a set of goals to which the world should 
aspire. In this normative (or ethical) sense, sustainable development 
calls for a world in which economic progress is widespread; extreme 
poverty is eliminated; social trust is encouraged through policies that 
strengthen the community; and the environment is protected from 
human-induced degradation.’1062  
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The normative aspects of sustainable development, irrespective of Sachs’ eloquent 
definition, are contentious. The means of achieving sustainable development have always 
been disputed even though, as Agnew and Woodhouse point out, the definition of 
sustainable development established in the Our Common Future report is widely 
accepted.1063 Sachs does, however, concede ‘It is a mistake to believe that the world’s 
sustainable development problems can be boiled down to one idea or one solution’ 
because complex systems, such as those of global economics, society, and the 
environment, ‘require a certain complexity of thinking as well.’1064 Thus, there many 
different ways of, for example, eliminating extreme poverty or protecting the environment 
from human-induced degradation, and these are the point of contention. 
The priorities for sustainable development are also contentious. Pollution, famine and 
nuclear weapons proliferation are prime concerns of Our Common Future, as indeed, they 
were in the late 1980s when the World Commission on Environment and Development 
was convened. Today, however, the more pressing global environmental concern seem to 
be, as discussed in this section, climate change and the nexus of food-energy-water 
security. Yet water management is addressed in only one paragraph of the report – 
although water pollution, poor sanitation, and marine resource make frequent 
appearances, as Agnew and Woodhouse point out.1065 Similarly, food security is an explicit 
challenge listed in Our Common Future, but water security is not.  
By the 2000s, however, water governance, water security, and the right to water had risen 
to prominence on global agendas. The United Nations General Assembly adopted a 
resolution (A/RES/64/292) in July 2010 that ‘recognizes the right to safe and clean drinking 
water and sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all 
human rights.’1066 By 2012, the Rio+20 conference accepted that ‘water is at the core of 
sustainable development as it is closely linked to a number of key global challenges. We 
therefore reiterate the importance of integrating water in sustainable development.’1067 
Water for sustainable development has been defined as ‘the use of water that supports the 
ability of human society to endure and flourish into the indefinite future without 
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undermining the integrity of the hydrological cycle or the ecological systems that depend 
on it.’1068 As such, a sustainable water resources system is one ‘designed and managed to 
fully contribute to the objectives of society, now and in the future, while maintaining their 
ecological, environmental, and hydrological integrity.’1069 The importance of the integrated 
approach to managing water for sustainable development is echoed in the Sustainable 
Development Goals, especially Goal 6.5: ‘By 2030, implement integrated water resources 
management at all levels, including through transboundary cooperation as appropriate.’1070 
The explicit mention of transboundary cooperation is also significant. It underscores the 
rising importance of transboundary water governance on the international agenda, and is 
another push factor for international organisations and foreign aid donors in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed.  
Furthermore, the United Nations Office of Sustainable Development stresses that  
‘water should not be treated as a “sector” alone, but as a crosslinked 
issue given its crosscutting nature and essential roles in social and 
economic development and environmental integrity. Water is both a 
resource and a sector; a key to social development, environmental 
integrity and economic growth. As a sector, water requires 
infrastructure development and operational funds, while as a resource it 
cuts across sectors and requires integrated approaches to management 
and a recognized value in economic terms.’1071 
The emphasis on economic growth and economic value is a recurring theme in the 
sustainable development discourse. The Future We Want report stresses that sustainable 
development can be achieved by ‘promoting sustained, inclusive and equitable economic 
growth.’1072 Sachs, too, equates sustainable development with economic progress.1073 In 
terms of water management, ‘[m]any researchers have made the connection between 
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hydrologic extremes and economic losses’ and ‘[a] strong link has been demonstrated 
between water resources development and economic development.’ 1074 In particular, many 
economies in transition (such as India and China) have made major investments in water 
infrastructure in the pursuit of socio-economic benefits, and in general place a premium 
on physical capital investments, while human capacity and institutions can take much 
longer to build and adapt.1075 This, and the practice of using economic values, such as 
water pricing, to determine water allocation priorities is, in the words of Agnew and 
Woodhouse, a hallmark of neo-liberal ideas. They argue that the resurgence of neo-
liberalism in the 1980s ‘coincided with the concept of “sustainable development”. Indeed, 
the emergence of the sub-discipline “environmental economics” in the 1980s was the 
principal means through which both environmental concerns were incorporated into neo-
liberal policy and, as a consequence, “sustainable development” was operationalised as 
tangible action in the form of “polluter pays”, “valuation of ecological services”, etc.’1076 
Tied to the idea of sustained and sustainable economic growth in the discourse of 
sustainable development is the idea of poverty eradication. Indeed, the report The Future 
We Want states ‘[e]radicating poverty is the greatest global challenge facing the world 
today and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development.’1077 For Sachs, by 
definition ‘sustainable development calls for a world in which…extreme poverty is 
eliminated.’1078 Moreover, poverty eradication should, according to several United Nations 
institutions, be one of the guiding principles of the Sustainable Development Goals – along 
with economic growth, equity and, of course, sustainability.1079  
The objective of poverty eradication puts the onus of responsibility for sustainable 
development on rich countries and international institutions. Back in 1987, the Our 
                                                     
1074 United Nations University & United Nations Office of Sustainable Development 2013, Water for 
Sustainability: Framing Water within the Post-2015 Development Agenda, United Nations University 
Institute for Water, Environment and Health, UN Office of Sustainable Development and 
Stockholm Environment Institute, p. 3 
1075 United Nations University & United Nations Office of Sustainable Development 2013, Water for 
Sustainability: Framing Water within the Post-2015 Development Agenda, United Nations University 
Institute for Water, Environment and Health, UN Office of Sustainable Development and 
Stockholm Environment Institute, p. 4 
1076 Agnew, C & Woodhouse, P 2011, Water Resources and Development, Routledge, New York, p. 34 
1077 United Nations 2012, The Future We Want, paragraph 2 
1078 Sachs, JD 2015, The Age of Sustainable Development, Columbia University Press, New York, p. 3 
1079 United Nations University & United Nations Office of Sustainable Development 2013, Water for 
Sustainability: Framing Water within the Post-2015 Development Agenda, United Nations University 
Institute for Water, Environment and Health, UN Office of Sustainable Development and 
Stockholm Environment Institute, p. iv 
243 
 
Common Future report called on international organisations, particularly the World Bank, 
to take a leadership role on sustainable development:  
‘Developing countries…need a significant increase in financial support 
from international sources for environmental restoration, protection, 
and improvement and to help them through the necessary transition to 
sustainable development. At the global level, there is an extensive 
institutional capacity to channel this support…Indeed, it is difficult to 
envisage developing countries making this transition [to sustainable 
development] in an effective and timely manner without [the] full 
commitment and support [of international organisations and 
agencies].’1080 
By 2012, the focus on institutions and financing had shifted to a focus on capacity building 
and good governance. The Rio+20 conference asserted that ‘[w]e need institutions at all 
levels that are effective, transparent, accountable and democratic’ because ‘democracy, 
good governance and the rule of law, at the national and international levels, as well as an 
enabling environment are essential for sustainable development, including sustained and 
inclusive economic growth, social development, environmental protection and the 
eradication of poverty and hunger.’1081 Sachs agrees that good governance is one of the 
supporting objectives of sustainable development,1082 and the founding document of the 
Sustainable Development goals envisions a world of good governance.1083  
Good governance, and good governance of water resources, is an integral component of 
sustainable development, as well as a significant guiding principle of international actors 
in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. This was discussed at the beginning of this 
section. What is interesting about the Sustainable Development Goals is that in 
emphasising the good governance of water resources, they also make the explicit link with 
                                                     
1080 World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, Our common future, Oxford 
University Press, New York, Part III, Chapter 12, Section II, Paragraphs 6.2.100-102 
1081 United Nations 2012, The Future We Want, paragraph 10 
1082 Sachs, JD 2015, The Age of Sustainable Development, Columbia University Press, New York, p. 3 
1083 United Nations 2015, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
General Assembly Resolution A/RES/70/1, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations 
on 25 September 2015, p. 4 
244 
 
transboundary water cooperation. Goal 6.5 is to ‘implement integrated water resources 
management at all levels, including through transboundary cooperation as appropriate.’1084 
The importance of transboundary cooperation and good governance to sustainable 
development cannot be underestimated, but as Plummer points out, ‘[i]mplementation 
strategies for sustainable development generally focus on the value of a "top-down" or 
"bottom-up" approach’1085 yet ‘sustainable development requires an approach that is 
simultaneously top-down and bottom-up.’1086 Plummer asserts that just as a top-down 
approach is not the sole path to sustainable development, local actions alone are not a 
panacea either.1087 Sustainable development is, in other words, a collective action problem 
that requires – like the non-traditional security threats described above – innovative, 
collaborative approaches: ‘for sustainability requires a new governance mode that builds 
on knowledge of social, ecological, economic, and technological complexity, while 
understanding how such uncertain processes can be triggered and steered toward 
cooperative and sustainable provision of the GPGs [Global Public Goods].’1088 In the 
perceived lack of direction on these collective action problems in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed, international actors are stepping in to take the lead. 
‘Command and control’ vs. ecological principles in environmental resource 
management 
The emphasis on sustainable development reflects a changing understanding of and 
approach to the environment. That nature could and should be controlled was, according 
to Allan, the dominant paradigm for ‘both capitalist and socialist versions of industrial 
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modernity during the first 75 years of the 20th century.’1089 Groenfeldt shows that in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries water management in particular was based on 
the ‘command and control principle’:  
‘Dams were built to impound rivers and release the water for power 
generation, or into canals for irrigation, industry, or urban water supply. 
River channels were straightened and deepened for ease of river 
transport and/or to evacuate flood waters faster; levees kept rivers 
contained and away from their natural floodplains.’1090  
State agencies and entrepreneurs involved in delivering water for economic and social 
purposes believed that nature in general, and water specifically, could ‘be subject to the 
mastery of science and industry’ and this, writes Allan, ‘was possible because of the 
revolutions in science and industry in the early 19th century and the achievements of 
capitalist organisation in marshalling the resources of labour, the environment and 
capital.’1091 
Significantly, the command and control principle was and still is, Groenfeldt argues, 
‘intricately intertwined with the principle of “beneficial use” and, most particularly, 
economically beneficial use. Under the conventional paradigm, water should be tightly 
controlled in order to direct its service to a “stream” of economic benefits. If water is not 
providing economic benefits for somebody, it is not being put to beneficial use.’1092 The 
pursuit of maximised economic benefits has led, claim Kibaroglu et al., to an 
environmental crisis that is also the second failure of capitalism (the first being the 
mismanagement of labour) because it is a ‘result of the reckless use and abuse of too many 
resources by too many people.’1093 In recent years, however, the values and principles 
guiding environmental resource management are shifting; since the 1980s and 1990s, the 
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discourse has become, according to Groenfeldt, more complicated and nuanced, and in 
the past decade in particular the role of nature has taken on a different tone.1094  
D’Souza shows that ‘[t]he belief that rivers are merely moving masses of water crying out 
to be regulated and dammed has been dramatically challenged, since the 1980s, by a fresh 
spirited theoretical turn amongst river ecologists’ who have succeeded in bringing into the 
public consciousness a reconceptualization of rivers as living ecosystems.1095 The role of 
ecologists – as well as other scientists, activists, and ‘the hippies of the 1960s who have 
now come into power’ – argues Allan, cannot be underestimated in bringing the attention 
of policymakers ‘[t]he recognition that the past mismanagement of water resources 
required new attitudes to be adopted by those at the commanding heights of the rich 
economies of the North.’1096 As Jägerskog et al. have shown, this recognition has grown 
slowly in the latter half of the twentieth century, moved bit by bit through the publication 
and popularity of books such as The Silent Spring (1962), The Tragedy of the Commons 
(1968) and Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth (1979); books that emerged in great numbers, 
and effectively placed the debate on global resilience on the political agenda.1097  
The rights of nature are now increasingly considered in addition to human rights and 
human development.1098 Nevertheless, this paradigm reflecting environmental concern 
has, according to Allan, only achieved very limited purchase on water policy-making in the 
South.1099 As discussed in Chapter 3, the command and control approach to water 
resources management is still prevalent in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. 
There is, Groenfeldt argues, far more rhetoric than action in adopting ecological 
principles. Water related crises, he adds, continue to be defined as a series of physical 
challenges to be solved through engineering, even though the conventions of water 
management are slowly shifting towards an emphasis on ecosystem services and 
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sustainability.1100 The concept of sustainability has certainly been useful, claims Allan, in 
ensuring the reliable delivery of environmental services and raising the profile of the 
importance of the environment, but it has ‘proved to be impossible to operationalise in a 
narrow environmental sense. This was because the environment was conceptualised as 
being a separate focus of policy rather than one that was integral to society’s and the 
economy’s use of water in the political economy as a whole.’1101 In other words, there has 
not yet been a broad and committed adoption of what Groenfeldt calls ecological water 
management, which ‘builds on natural riparian principles and ecological relationships that 
are becoming increasingly well understood’ and ‘offers a way of working with, rather than 
against, nature’s water cycles of precipitation, flow, and infiltration.’1102  
One significant policy application of ecological water management could be a 
commitment to environmental flow. A minimum environmental flow is the smallest 
amount of water required at any given time to allow the proper functioning of the natural 
water regime of a river, wetland or coastal zone which maintains the ecosystem. 
Groenfeldt argues that ‘[e]nvironmental flows provide critical contributions to both river 
health and ultimately to economic development, ensuring the continued availability of the 
many benefits that healthy river and groundwater systems bring to society.’1103 This sort of 
approach, however, has not been prevalent in the strategies of international actors 
engaging in transboundary water governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, 
despite the rhetoric around sustainable development. 
Conclusion 
International organisations and foreign aid donors are driven by more than just the many 
water governance issues and relatively uncooperative transboundary water governance in 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. There are also many other motivations. 
International organisations and aid donors are increasing engagement in South Asia. The 
World Bank is no longer the main financier of water infrastructure (e.g., dams) in the 
region and is attempting to rebuild its influence there while facing increasing competition 
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from new funding agencies, such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, and India’s 
growing wealth. India is no longer a net aid recipient and that has led to a shift in aid 
strategies from donors such as Australia and the United Kingdom. These are now less 
focussed on direct bilateral aid and more focused on regional partnerships in collective 
action problems, such as water governance.  
Another set of drivers for the normative aspects of foreign interventions lies in the 
paradigms and discourses around international development, environmental resource 
management, and security. Foremost among these is the prevailing concept of good 
governance, which espouses the principles of participation, deliberation, consensus-
building, and transparency.  
Understanding the ideas and values that dominate discourses on transboundary water 
cooperation is important not only because they drive international actors into the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed, and affect the scope of their interventions there. As Sneddon 
shows, understanding hegemonic concepts – such as those of good governance and 
sustainable development – also allows for an exploration of counter-hegemonic 
alternatives to water governance.1104 This idea is explored further in Chapter 5, which 
assesses from the perspective of riparian stakeholders the effectiveness of international 
organisations and donor agencies in their normative aims of improving transboundary 
water interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. 
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Chapter 5: Can international actors achieve their objectives? The 
view from within the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed 
‘Fine minds in South Asia are seeking solutions for the looming water and river crisis in 
this region,’ argues Colopy. She points out that ‘[s]ome outsiders would like to help. Many 
feel genuine concern about the rivers and people of South Asia…Perhaps South Asia could 
use help from outsiders, perhaps not; but governments in the rest of the world are starting 
to pay attention.’1105 Are these outsiders likely to improve transboundary water interaction 
in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed? That is the central question of this chapter.  
International actors are, as discussed thus far, driven by different factors to intervene in 
the transboundary water governance of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. There are 
the numerous water related crises in the region that the riparians are seemingly unwilling 
or unable to addressed. These were examined in Chapter 3, which also showed that there 
is little transboundary water cooperation between India-Nepal and India-Bangladesh. 
Only the water interaction between India-Bhutan can be categorised as positive. There are 
also external drivers of foreign-led interventions, such as geopolitical factors and 
dominant international paradigms (for example, the concepts of good governance or 
sustainable development). These were discussed in Chapter 4.  
International organisations and foreign aid donors are interested in increasing 
transboundary water cooperation as a way of decreasing water conflicts. The Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed is particularly vulnerable to water conflicts, which are generally 
understood to be the result of state fragility (recent violence, obstacles to economic 
development, weak management institutions), and high water stress.1106 As water 
governance issues gain higher political attention locally, nationally, regionally and 
globally, cooperation and hydro-diplomacy are increasingly seen as means of attenuating 
water-related disputes, particularly in transboundary settings.1107 This is one of the explicit 
objectives of the South Asia Water Initiative and the governments of Australia, United 
Kingdom and Norway in their facilitation of Track II dialogue in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed. These factors explain why international actors are intervening in the 
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Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed to increase transboundary water cooperation. They 
also offer clues as to the likelihood of this overarching goal being accomplished.  
This chapter examines the experience of riparian stakeholders of the Abu Dhabi Dialogue 
(ADD) and the South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI), and draws conclusions about the 
effects that these foreign-led interventions have had on transboundary water interaction in 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. Much of the analysis in this chapter, as well as the 
next, is based on information gathered during fieldwork in India, Nepal and Bangladesh in 
2014. A full list of the stakeholders consulted with can be found in Appendix 1: Fieldwork 
interviewees. 
First, however, this chapter establishes what exactly these foreign-led interventions do, 
and what their normative goals are. In 2006, the World Bank established the ADD for 
increasing water cooperation in the Hindu-Kush-Himalaya region. SAWI eventually arose 
out of this process. The increasing activities of the World Bank in regards to water 
governance in South Asia paved the way for several international interventions. The 
genesis of these interventions, and how they work toward improving transboundary is 
discussed in the first section of this chapter. 
The convergence of the discourses discussed in Chapter 4 is evident in the explicit 
objectives of these foreign-led engagements in transboundary water governance in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. These objectives are four-fold: instating good water 
governance; ensuring overall regional stability; supporting climate change resilience; and 
maintaining sustainable development and poverty eradication. These interlinked 
objectives are discussed in the second section of this chapter.  
The third section examines riparian stakeholder views of SAWI and based on these 
evaluates the effects that international actors have had on transboundary water 
interactions in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. There is resentment within the 
problemshed about the top-down approaches of the World Bank and other aid donors, but 
some reluctant acceptance that there may be advantages to the involvement of a neutral 
third party. At the same time, however, India has not been an enthusiastic participant in 
the ADD and SAWI, and this undermines the credibility and effectiveness of these foreign-
led interventions. 
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From conflict to cooperation through the ADD and SAWI 
‘Considering the enormity of the climate change challenges in South Asia,’ claim Earle et 
al., ‘there is at present no paucity of collaborative efforts to explore effective response 
strategies.’1108 In the mid-2000s, the confluence and culmination of these climate change 
challenges with the factors described throughout Chapter 3 resulted in an international 
round of talks called the Abu Dhabi Dialogue (ADD). The ADD periodically brings 
together senior members of government, academia and civil society from Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Nepal, and Pakistan in a non-formal, consultative 
process intended to foster regional cooperation on various challenges facing Himalayan 
Rivers.1109 Experts from the region also meet at various international conferences.1110 An 
issue of specific concern is ‘climate change and its future impacts on livelihoods from the 
headwaters to the floodplains.’1111 The ADD also funds small grant projects for non-
government organisations (NGOs).1112 
The vision of the Abu Dhabi Dialogue is mid-term, with agendas looking a decade in 
advance.1113 The Abu Dhabi Dialogue was intended to be a neutral forum for open 
conversations among participants, and statements are non-attributable and there is no 
requirement for a consensus outcome.1114 Earle et al. describe the ADD as ‘the only 
multilateral framework involving all the riparian countries of the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
basin that is engaged in an informal and consultative process’ and they point out that it 
aims to build trust between riparians primarily through information exchange and the co-
management of development projects.1115 This is an important undertaking because, as 
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discussed in Chapter 3, transboundary water management is a politically sensitive topic in 
South Asia, yet one that is not necessarily a top political priority for all riparians. 
Moreover, there is little trust between these riparians. 
The ADD is of significance here because it is the genesis of concerted efforts by 
international actors to improve transboundary water governance in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed and South Asia more broadly. The first round of talks (called 
the ‘First International Conference on Southern Asia Water Cooperation’ and held in Abu 
Dhabi in September 2006) was hosted by the International Institute of Strategic Studies 
(IISS)1116 with the support of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office.1117 At these talks, 
participants of the Abu Dhabi Dialogue Group (that is, representatives from Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Nepal, and Pakistan) decided that the World Bank 
should facilitate sustained dialogue on rivers of the Greater Himalaya region.1118 For the 
World Bank, this was an opportunity to create a ‘common water-sharing framework in line 
with the Nile Basin Initiative.’1119 The Nile Basin Initiative has not been an unmitigated 
success in terms of increasing transboundary water cooperation1120 and so perhaps there is 
an element of the World Bank wanting to apply the lessons learned from the Niles basin to 
another part of the world (the Ganges-Brahmaputra is an appropriate choice as there is no 
other basin-wide collaborative process but the potential for conflict remains high). 
Since its inception, the Abu Dhabi Dialogue Group (ADDG) has convened six times.1121 In 
2007, the seven countries met to ‘share global experience on international waters and 
benefit-sharing, with the goal of achieving constructive convergence on common 
challenges.’1122 The language of benefit sharing and common challenges to be overcome 
collectively reflects that of the dominant international narratives. The 2007 meeting of the 
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Abu Dhabi Dialogue Group is also when the South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI) was 
established by the World Bank to ‘support future ADDG activities’ and to ‘promote the 
goals of poverty reduction, economic growth, mitigation and adaptation to climate 
change, water security and regional peace through significant and measurable 
improvements in water resources management and development.’1123  
Significantly, SAWI is funded exclusively by external donors (Australia, United Kingdom, 
Norway)1124 without even symbolic contributions from the Abu Dhabi Dialogue Group 
member states. The Nile Basin Initiative also did not receive funds from riparian states, 
and Swain points out that ‘the NBI’s almost total dependence on external funding for its 
inception and operation raises doubts about its long-term sustainability…there is a clear 
absence of commitment of the basin countries to achieve satisfactory progress in the area 
of basinbased water management.’1125 How this affects the efficacy of SAWI is discussed 
below. 
In 2008, country level dialogues were held in India, Nepal and Bangladesh and the Abu 
Dhabi Dialogue formed the Abu Dhabi Knowledge Forum under the auspices of the 
International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD).1126 The Knowledge 
Forum convened more than 50 institutions from across the region and was thus more 
inclusive than the Abu Dhabi Dialogue Group, but the two are complementary. The main 
function of the Knowledge Forum is knowledge creation and knowledge sharing. Again, 
the focus on evidence-led decision-making and data driven policy echoes the prevailing 
international narratives discussed in Chapter 4. This theme was reiterated in the 2009 Abu 
Dhabi Dialogue during which ‘it was agreed that greater data sharing could help to 
catalyze further regional cooperation.’1127 To this end, the Small Grant Program was 
established by the Abu Dhabi Dialogue in 2011 to ‘initiate new knowledge generation, 
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expand current national research activities to extend across boundaries, and disseminate 
knowledge within the region.’1128 
In addition to the focus on knowledge creation and sharing, there are three other 
recurring themes of the Abu Dhabi Dialogue. These are: lessons learned from other 
international basins (e.g., the Mekong), the application of international water law to the 
transboundary basins of South Asia,1129 and the deliberative/consultative processes 
required for collective action.1130 These are all recurring themes throughout the work of the 
South Asia Water Initiative and the other foreign-led interventions in the transboundary 
water interaction of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. 
At the fourth Abu Dhabi Dialogue (held in 2009), an international, inter-disciplinary team 
lead by World Bank economists embarked on a ‘multi-sectoral study to understand the 
Ganges basin, its present behaviour and possible futures.’1131 The study synthesises publicly 
available data (while acknowledging the limitations of the availability of such data)1132 into 
‘a set of nested hydrological and economic river basin models used to examine alternative 
scenarios across a range of possible Ganges futures, and a social component that studies 
the social implications of water variability in the basin.’1133 The Ganges Strategic Basin 
Assessment manifests the international values of data-led policy and evidence based 
decision making, and as such provides the basis for what could be (in the near future – the 
report was not published until late 2014) the main thrust of western-led solutions to 
transboundary water governance in the Ganges basin.  
Objectives of SAWI and other donor-led initiatives 
The paradigms and discourses discussed in Chapter 4 have informed and influenced the 
foreign-led interventions described above. They are recurring themes in the strategic 
planning documents and program rationale documents of these interventions. The explicit 
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objectives of many of these international organisations and foreign aid donors can be 
grouped into four main (and overlapping) categories, namely: 
1. Instituting good governance and hydro-diplomacy 
2. Ensuring overall regional stability 
3. Supporting climate change resilience 
4. Maintaining sustainable development and poverty eradication. 
Each objective is discussed below. 
Instituting good governance and hydro-diplomacy 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the prevailing international paradigm of governance favours 
multilateral, deliberative processes that aim for consensus and result in positive-sum 
outcomes. As UN Water points out, fundamental to the water goal and sub-goals of the 
Sustainable Development Goals is good governance based, among other things, on 
participatory decision-making, regulatory frameworks, knowledge transfer, and skills 
development. Moreover, ‘improved governance can be viewed as a pre-condition for the 
successful achievement of the…water targets.’1134 
To recap, water governance is a social process of dialogue, negotiation and decision-
making.1135 Deliberative water governance, then, is the constructive engagement in water 
governance through the promotion of ‘inclusive, deliberative processes that emphasise 
different perspectives, critical analysis, learning and institution-building whilst respecting 
rights, accounting for risks, acknowledging responsibilities and fairly distributing 
rewards.’1136 According to the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development (DFID), a deliberative approach is especially relevant in transboundary 
water governance because ‘decisions involve many stakeholders, complex issues, trade-offs 
between policy options, high levels of uncertainty and low levels of trust’ and it can ‘help 
resolve complexity by building trust, promoting a shared understanding amongst 
stakeholders of the issues (in particular where these issues are common across national 
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boundaries).’1137 This is the theory of change on which the objectives of international actors 
intervening in the transboundary water governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed is based. 
The influence of this paradigm is evident in the stated goals of the South Asia Water 
Initiative (SAWI), as well as the strategies of the United Kingdom and Australia vis-à-vis 
transboundary water governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. The main 
objective of SAWI is to promote regional cooperation in the sustainable management of 
water resources of the Himalayan Rivers1138 based on the principles of Integrated Water 
Resource Management (IWRM), inclusive and multi-disciplinary dialogue, and 
participatory and deliberative processes.1139 For Australia – a key partner in SAWI – the 
goal is to promote trans-boundary water resource management in line with the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s South Asia strategy.1140 The United Kingdom, 
another key partner in SAWI, also aims for increased regional cooperation in the 
management of the Himalayan Rivers through the establishment of transboundary and 
national governance arrangements that move away from a technical approach to a 
deliberative approach.1141 
A further objective of international organisations and aid donors lies in establishing 
deliberative governance processes in this problemshed is ‘to help achieve the mutual 
benefits of transboundary cooperation across shared river basins.’1142 A key principle of 
SAWI is to deliver mutual benefits.1143 The theory of change here is that mutual benefits 
accrue ‘from coordinated planning and joint investment for new infrastructure that ensure 
equitable upstream-downstream sharing of both benefits and impacts, and from 
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coordinated planning and joint investment into upstream watershed rehabilitation that 
deliver both local benefits and downstream water quality benefits.’1144 
Track II dialogue, which was discussed in the Introduction and Literature Review of this 
thesis, is a mechanism of deliberative governance and one that is favoured by SAWI and its 
donor states in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. Deliberative processes such as 
Track II dialogue ‘are a way of involving people in decision-making’ according to the UK 
Department for International Development, and ‘[a] deliberative approach is particularly 
relevant to the question of trans-boundary water governance, as decisions involve many 
stakeholders, complex issues, trade-offs between policy options, high levels of uncertainty 
and low levels of trust.’1145 This is also the basis of hydro-diplomacy. 
Ensuring overall regional stability 
Related to hydro-diplomacy is the goal of regional stability. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the emergence of non-traditional security threats and collective action problems 
such as climate change has shifted the way in which regional security is addressed. 
Conflict, be it over water or otherwise, is increasingly being driven by internal or local 
pressures, or subtler issues of poverty and stability, and is thus becomes less traditional.1146 
Moreover, these non-traditional security threats do not respect international boundaries, 
and sustainable security requires collective action that addresses human security and 
rebalances the three tools of foreign policy – defence, diplomacy, and development.1147  
In the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, low transboundary water cooperation poses a 
threat to regional stability because poor water management imposes economic and social 
costs, leads to inefficiencies in water supply and increases vulnerability to floods and 
droughts, which in turn can create disputes that, if left unresolved, play into broader 
political tensions. Water issues can therefore exacerbate existing disputes, such as those 
found between Bangladesh and India on the Ganges basin, and in turn may increase the 
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potential for escalating tension both within and between countries.1148 Water related 
disputes can and do occur within as well as between countries.1149 
The theory of change for international actors intervening in this problemshed is that by 
increasing cooperation between riparian states there will be a net stabilising effect and 
that in turn will reduce the likelihood of regional conflict, especially conflict related to 
water. The World Bank has a political agenda for creating general regional stability in 
South Asia.1150 The overarching objective of SAWI is therefore to increase regional 
cooperation (and the goals of facilitating deliberative water governance and increasing 
climate change resilience support this.)1151 For Australia, political stability in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed rests on improved management of water because 
transboundary collaboration on water management issues may reduce one of the drivers of 
regional political tension.1152 Regional stability is also an explicit goal of Australia’s climate 
change adaptation programs.1153 
This is a theory of change that the United Kingdom also subscribes to. That idea is that 
better transboundary river management will open up communication channels between 
countries and create greater interdependence between them thus leading greater regional 
stability.1154 Indeed, the conflict pool strategy of the United Kingdom’s Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and DFID, ‘considers transboundary 
waters as a key issue for reducing security risks in the region.’1155 The DFID South Asia 
Water Governance Programme (SAWGP) works in support of the United Kingdom’s 
Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE), including by helping in the 
identification of emerging risks and in pre-empting crises in a strategically important 
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region.1156 The strategic business case for this program claims that ‘improved cooperation 
on water and energy will reduce the potential for water and energy issues to act as irritants 
to bilateral relations, reducing tensions and enhancing security across the region.’ and 
expects regional stability to be a co-benefit in addition to improved water governance and 
the building of climate resilience.1157 
Supporting climate change resilience 
The third explicit objective of international actors intervening in the transboundary water 
governance of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is to build climate change resilience. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, South Asia is particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate 
change. Climate change is already changing precipitation patterns, increasing floods and 
droughts, causing Himalayan glaciers to melt at unprecedented rates, and thus adversely 
affecting tens of millions of people in this poor, densely populated and predominantly 
agrarian region.1158  
The unique challenge for the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna mega-basin is that monsoon 
rain makes river flows highly variable, and climate change will further exacerbate this 
variability. At the same time, rapid population growth and unregulated urbanisation will 
increase demand for water from less predictable rivers – a governance challenge that may 
be particularly devastating considering that the region’s inability to manage current 
climate variability bodes poorly for tackling the climate change impacts of the future.1159 
Indeed, the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is ill-prepared institutionally for climate 
change. For example, none of the treaties and agreements that Nepal has with India 
address climate change or the uncertainty posed by potential effects of changing melt 
dynamics from Himalayan glaciers.1160 
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The World Bank has a political agenda that includes climate change adaptation1161 and that 
is reflected in the objectives of the World Bank-led SAWI, which addresses the challenges 
of development and climate change.1162 One of the guiding principles of SAWI is an 
integrated water management approach that encompasses adaptation to climate 
change.1163 Similarly, the Australian objective in supporting SAWI is ‘to increase climate 
resilience’ and its funding originally came from the AusAID International Climate Change 
Adaptation Initiative.1164 Indeed, the overall Australian strategy for the development of 
South Asia makes an explicit link between climate change and adverse consequences for 
social, political and economic stability.1165 Likewise, the United Kingdom’s South Asia 
Water Governance Programme (SAWGP) is seeking to achieve greater climate resilience in 
the region.1166 For Norway, promoting low-carbon development, with particular emphasis 
on renewable energy and sustainable management of natural resources, is part of a 
broader international campaign for ‘greener development’.1167 
Maintaining sustainable development and poverty eradication 
Greener development, or sustainable development, is a top priority for international 
organisations and aid donors on the post-2015 international development agenda. The 
discourse of sustainable development has also shaped the logic of international actors in 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed.  
The intimate relationship between sustainable environmental management and human 
development is of particular importance to the Norwegian justification for involvement in 
the transboundary water governance in this problemshed. Indeed, Norway has been an 
international champion for sustainable development since former Norwegian Prime 
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Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland chaired the United Nations’ World Commission on 
Environment and Development.1168 
The Government of Norway’s 2011 white paper on Greening Development is unequivocal 
on the inextricable links between environment and development, and what should be 
done about it: ‘Lasting progress in the fight against poverty depends on long-term 
economic growth and equitable distribution of social and economic goods. Without 
radical restructuring of the world economy, continued global growth will cause serious 
environmental damage.’1169 This commitment to sustainable development is also part of 
the rationale for Norway’s contribution to SAWI.1170 
For the Australian1171 and UK governments,1172 the decision to engage in transboundary 
water governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is also based on the 
understanding that sustainable environmental resource management is part of the 
solution to development challenges. Australia’s regional development strategy for South 
Asia is based on two pillars, the first of which is sustainable development. The number one 
priority under this pillar is to ‘support the region in promoting greater water security 
through collaborative trans-boundary water resource management, particularly through 
transferring Australia’s best-practice technology and science, and strengthening policy and 
civil society discussion.’1173 Australia is addressing sustainable development challenges in 
the region through the Sustainable Development Investment Portfolio, which targets a 
sub-region of South Asia defined by three major Himalayan river basins – the Indus, 
Ganges and Brahmaputra – and which aims to increase water, food and energy security in 
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the region to facilitate economic growth and improve livelihoods.1174 Poverty alleviation in 
South Asia is also a major concern for the Australian Government.1175 
For SAWI, the delivery of ‘sustainable, fair and inclusive development’ is the overarching 
objective.1176 For the United Kingdom in particular, sustainable development and improved 
water governance is linked to poverty reduction.1177 The DFID South Asia Water 
Governance Program, for example, is explicitly based on the theory of change that its 
support for ‘more sustainable and more accountable policy decisions and investments’ in 
the water governance sector will reduce overall poverty in the region.1178 These poverty 
eradication and sustainable development objectives are in all cases linked to the goal of 
climate change resilience. 
  
Mixed reactions to foreign-led initiatives from riparian stakeholders 
Understanding how policymakers, water security analysts, hydrocrats and water justice 
activists within the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed perceive foreign-led interventions 
is important in ascertaining likely they are to achieve their goal of improving 
transboundary water interaction. As Chapter 3 illustrated, the riparian states in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed place a low priority on seriously addressing 
transboundary water issues and on increasing cooperation among each other. The 
stakeholders within the problemshed also have limited support for international actors. 
Within the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, opinion among policymakers, hydrocrats, 
water development practitioners, analysts and other stakeholders is mixed regarding the 
utility and efficacy of foreign-led interventions into transboundary water governance, 
especially the South Asia Water Initiative. 
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This section discusses these perceptions and how they affect the likelihood of 
international organisations and foreign aid donors improving transboundary water 
interaction between riparians in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. First is an 
examination of the prevailing attitudes toward these third parties. Second is a discussion 
of India’s lukewarm participation in the Abu Dhabi Dialogue and what this could mean for 
the improvement of transboundary water interaction in the short term. Lastly, this section 
considers what the rejection by riparians of the initial Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment 
indicates about the success of third parties in leading Track II dialogue in this region. 
Resentment about top-down approaches 
The Abu Dhabi Dialogue and subsequent interventions of international organisations and 
foreign aid donors into transboundary water governance have come at a time of growing 
nationalism among the countries of South Asia. This nationalism is marked by resentment 
of that which implies putting aside perceived sovereign rights in favour of multilateralism. 
As Pachova et al. argue, transboundary water cooperation has been traditionally seen and 
interpreted as infringing the sovereignty of riparian states.1179  
In the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed too there is resentment and distrust of that 
which may impinge (or be perceived to impinge) on sovereignty and independence. 
Likewise, in this previously colonised region there is a widespread distrust of any initiative 
that could even remotely be construed as neo-colonial. This includes foreign-led 
intervention in transboundary water governance. An instance of this can be found in the 
reaction from Nepal, Bangladesh and even India toward the World Bank’s Ganges Strategic 
Basin Assessment. This comprehensive report was perceived by these countries as an 
external imposition on their sovereign right to manage their own water resources.1180 The 
Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment, and by extension SAWI, are both seen as failures 
because they are both top-down initiatives.1181 The attempt to impose a bottom-up, 
deliberative process from an external source in a top-down way is sometimes perceived as 
neo-colonialist and thus resented within South Asia.1182 
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There are also objections from within the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed to the top-
down drive for what is in essence a bottom-up process – deliberative and inclusive 
governance. For example, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
Bangladesh-India Initiative is considered by some analysts to be more successful than 
SAWI at initiating government-to-government cooperation because it is a bottom-up 
process and thus embodying the principles of deliberative governance.1183 There is more 
buy-in from stakeholders for the IUCN initiative and this may be because, though funded 
by international donors, it is essentially a local solution. Facilitating local solutions and 
letting host countries develop on their own has, according to Riddell, been shown to be a 
more effective approach to international development than the imposition of solutions 
from the outside, which tends to create resentment towards the aid donors and undermine 
their work.1184  
Instead of facilitating local solutions, SAWI is interested in bringing to the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed solutions driven by global discourses on good governance, 
climate change resilience, IWRM, et cetera (this was discussed in Chapter 4). As such, one 
analyst has observed that among the international actors intervening in transboundary 
water governance there are ‘a lot of solutions looking for problems’ and that ‘when all you 
have is a hammer, then every problem becomes a nail.’1185 The implications is that a basin-
wide approach, Track II dialogue, and evidence-led policymaking – all buzzwords of 
foreign aid donors and international organisations – may not be always appropriate, or 
appreciated, in the context of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed.  
The resentment about the top-down initiatives is compounded by resentment toward the 
perceived imposition of ‘foreign’ ideas, especially through the system of international 
development aid, which is widely perceived as flawed, corrupt and inefficient.1186 For a 
start, the language of the international development sector is seen by some analysts in the 
region as unrealistic. It tends to focus on outputs and outcomes, rather than the idea that 
progress is a long term struggle and can be nebulous and unquantifiable.1187 Yet, the work 
of SAWI, Australia, the United Kingdom, et cetera, in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
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problemshed is based on the same assumptions that most international development 
projects are based on; that quantifiable progress can be made within one funding cycle, 
and that there will be outputs and outcomes directly proportional to the amount of money 
expended.1188  
Transboundary water governance in the 21st century is moving away from unilateral action 
to shared strategies for multi-lateral cooperation and putting human development at the 
centre of water governance. This is also increasingly true for South Asia, although 
conventional approaches to water governance (which have prioritised the role of the state 
in decision making and management of water resources and been dominated by technical 
experts and hydrocrats rather than civil society engagement) are still prevalent.1189 
Moreover, some within the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed see the ideal of cooperation 
through dialogue a patronising and naïve one.1190 
A further criticism of the international interventions in the transboundary water 
governance of this region is that, according to one western bureaucrat, they are ‘a lot of 
solutions looking for problems’1191 while at the same time these ‘solutions’ are predicated 
on the flawed assumption that quantifiable progress towards a lofty goal can be made 
within one funding cycle.1192 By others, SAWI is perceived as ineffective because it focuses 
almost exclusively on facilitating meetings rather than on projects with tangible 
outcomes.1193  
Critics of the way in which deliberative governance is being implemented in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed also come from within the ranks of international organisations 
and proponents of liberalism, that is, those who see international institutions as the most 
appropriate agents of global governance.1194 Many are well aware that the facilitation of a 
broad, deliberative process is still not a core competency for the World Bank,1195 despite 
the shift in recent years (discussed in Chapter 4) away from funding major infrastructure 
projects and toward capacity building, good governance, et cetera.1196 Colopy argues that in 
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some cases World Bank funding is not only not resolving water crises, but it is actually 
adding to the problem.1197 
Reluctant acceptance that there may be advantages to some foreign-led interventions 
Despite these shortcoming and criticisms, the World Bank and other donor agencies 
intervening in the transboundary water governance of the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed are also seen to be doing that which no other organisation is doing. For 
example, SAWI is actively trying to involve China in the dialogue about the management 
of the Brahmaputra and that is important and laudable.1198 (Despite the anti-China 
sentiment in Indian media, and the prevalence of commentators such as Brahma 
Chellaney who warn of an impending water-water instigated by China, Hill argues that 
there are some signs of increasing water cooperation. He writes that while China is not 
moving as quickly towards forging cooperative mechanisms as might be desirable, ‘there 
are indicators of encouraging shifts towards an emerging broader regional engagement, 
including a treaty with lower riparian Kazakhstan, a longstanding role as a dialogue 
partner in the Mekong River Commission, and some encouraging agreements signed for 
the sharing of data with India.’1199) 
There is also a significant need and appreciation for the knowledge that SAWI and the 
other donor-led interventions (particularly the more scientific ones such as ICIMOD) are 
producing, especially as that information remains in the public domain.1200 Capacity 
building is another valued contribution of the World Bank to the region. As the World 
Bank’s role decreases in funding infrastructure projects, it is shifting its focus onto capacity 
building in water resource management and that is a very welcome change for some 
hydrologists and hydrocrats in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed.1201 
A further perceived benefit of international actors in the water governance of the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed is that they are often seen as a neutral third party. They have a 
role to play in facilitating dialogue or mediating between actors who may otherwise be 
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distrustful of each other.1202 For all its faults, the World Bank is also sometimes perceived 
as providing the ‘adult supervision’ to the ‘children’ of South Asia and thus ensuring an 
order and procedural fairness on negotiations about shared waters.1203 One Bangladeshi 
scholar admitted that it is only through the presence and interest of international actors 
that Bangladesh has been able to negotiate at all; third parties help keep India 
accountable.1204 
Others in the region see international interventions in the transboundary water 
governance of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed as necessary and beneficial, albeit 
flawed. One prominent Indian analyst has called SAWI the region’s ‘biggest talk shop’ but 
has also admitted that it has been successful at instigating a much-needed conversation 
about transboundary water governance.1205 Dialogue is necessary, but only the first step 
and it is difficult to quantify its effect on overall increased levels of cooperation 
throughout the problemshed. This, in turn, limits the effectiveness of international 
actors.1206 Likewise, the fact that SAWI is creating a multilateral forum for the discussion of 
shared water issues is welcome, but undermined by India’s lack of interest in 
multilateralism.1207 Thakkar argues that although it is good that SAWI is creating a 
multilateral forum (especially one that includes China) for the discussion of transboundary 
water issues, it is not able to get at the heart of the vested interests of the various 
stakeholders.1208 In short, SAWI and the other international interventions are seen by 
many in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed not as fundamentally flawed or a waste of 
time, but rather as having only a limited utility or potential for success.1209 
In summary, third parties should not expect radical improvement in transboundary water 
interaction to happen rapidly,1210 but they are part of the slow, steady, and largely 
uncoordinated work that constitutes what one analyst calls ‘chipping away’ at the 
problem.1211 As such, the international interventions in the management of the rivers of the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, irrespective of how they are perceived and received, 
are part of the nudge governance of transboundary waters. 
                                                     
1202 Mittra, S., 2014, personal communication, 3 June 2014, New Delhi 
1203 Ray, P., 2014, personal communication, 20 October 2014, Kolkata 
1204 Anonymous 3, 2014, personal communication, 16 October 2014, Dhaka 
1205 Anonymous 6, A., 2014, 26 June 2014, New Delhi 
1206 Prasai, S., 2014, personal communication, 7 July 2014, New Delhi 
1207 Thakkar, H., 2014, personal communication, 24 June 2014, New Delhi 
1208 Thakkar, H., 2014, personal communication, 24 June 2014, New Delhi 
1209 Anonymous 5, 2014, personal communication, 19 August 2014, Kathmandu 
1210 Anonymous 4, 2014, personal communication, 18 July 2014, Mumbai 
1211 Prasai, S., 2014, personal communication, 7 July 2014, New Delhi 
268 
 
India has not been an enthusiastic participant in the Abu Dhabi dialogue 
International organisations and foreign aid donors may be making an overall positive 
contribution to transboundary water governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed, but this contribution is weakened by the lukewarm support of regional 
powerbrokers. SAWI, for example, has had middling support from the South Asian states, 
and lacklustre support at best from the hydro-hegemon, India. While SAWI has to a 
certain extent forged good relationships within the Indian central government, it has not 
been able to develop close relations with other powerbrokers in the system, such as state-
level politicians and others who may have the influence to spearhead or stymie water 
governance projects.1212 
One factor in the low buy-in of stakeholders is that the riparian states do not contribute 
funds to SAWI; only Australia, the United Kingdom, and Norway do.1213 Host countries are 
often asked to contribute financially to international development projects to ensure their 
commitment. This has not been the case here, and the commitment of the participating 
countries is relatively low because they have not invested in SAWI and thus do not put in 
an effort to ensure a return on that investment. Asthana and Shukla argue that this is a 
lost opportunity, as the collective investment in the ‘creation of an institution that could 
fund regional experts and epistemic communities in a neutral space and unbiased 
environment away from the historical and regional biases that they are officially a part of 
when they work in the region’ could result in ‘[b]etter regional strategies and cooperation 
in water.’1214  
Part of the inability to engage with the most powerful actors in the system is a 
consequence of the poor reputation that the World Bank has within India.1215 This distrust 
also encompasses SAWI, thus rendering the initiative largely ineffective in India.1216 India 
has also been largely distrustful of the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, out of which SAWI was 
created. As discussed above, the Abu Dhabi Dialogue was started in 2006 and brings 
together senior members of government, academia and civil society from Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Nepal, and Pakistan in a non-formal, consultative 
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process intended to foster regional cooperation on various challenges relating to the 
Himalayan Rivers.1217  
Because regional water management is a sensitive topic among member countries, the Abu 
Dhabi Dialogue has attempted to provide a neutral forum for open conversations among 
participants, and statements are non-attributable and there is no requirement for a 
consensus outcome.1218 Nonetheless, India did not want to participate in the Abu Dhabi 
dialogue, but without the hydro-hegemon, the process would have been greatly 
weakened.1219 India did, in the end, participate in all six meetings of the Dialogue, but 
manifested its lack of commitment by sending a different, low-level representative each 
time, thus degrading the high-level intent of the process and undermining the continuity 
required for the success of these sensitive meetings.1220 
India is not strongly committed to multilateralism in water governance issues in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed – despite Prime Minister Modi’s promising rhetoric in 
this regard – and this undermines SAWI’s primary function of establishing a multilateral 
forum for transboundary water cooperation.1221 Thakkar argues that SAWI will remain 
ineffective until India truly commits to multilateralism.1222 Earle et al. agree: ‘India’s refusal 
to take up any river management issue in a multilateral forum reduces the scope for 
possibility of any basin-based organisational framework to emerge.’1223  
But India’s middling commitment to multilateral processes may also be undermining its 
hegemony in South Asia. As Jones argues, India has global ambitions, but achieving them 
‘requires India to take a lead role in stabilising its own region as part of being accepted by 
other great powers as a member of the club. Thus, rather than seeing a new approach to its 
region as “trapping” India as a South Asian power only, a new approach to regional affairs 
may be a necessary requirement for India to take up its proper role on the world stage.’1224 
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In light of Jones’ analysis, it can be argued that India’s reluctance to embrace the Abu 
Dhabi Dialogue and SAWI, and to forge a leadership role for itself within these regional 
water governance processes, weakens not only foreign-led interventions, but may also be a 
missed opportunity for India to strengthen its leadership position and profile 
internationally.  
The hydro-hegemon is also not strongly committed to the idea of transboundary water 
cooperation. India’s National Water Policy illustrates that the values espoused in the Abu 
Dhabi Dialogue process have not been embraced by India’s hydrocrats and ruling elite. 
The National Water Policy was adopted in 2012, the same year that SAWI Phase II 
commenced, and the year of the sixth and final Abu Dhabi Dialogue meeting. Yet, the 
Indian National Water Policy does not reflect any of the language prevalent in the 
discourses around water governance in South Asia at that time, i.e., the language of 
deliberative governance, multilateral cooperation, regional stability, sustainable 
development, et cetera. Of the policy’s total 16 article, only one is devoted to 
transboundary waters. It consists of two short clauses and stipulates a strictly bilateral 
approach to transboundary water governance rather than a multilateral one. The policy is 
clear: ‘keeping paramount the national interest’ is key in any negotiation over 
transboundary waters.1225 This is not the rhetoric of benefit sharing and positive-sum 
outcomes. And although the policy stipulates that India’s water resources are to be 
managed as a common pool resource, there is no mention of deliberative governance, or 
other collaborative approaches to governance. Climate change is mentioned in the 
National Water Policy, but not climate change resilience – another focus area for foreign 
interventions in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed.  
In summary, India is neither enthusiastic about the idea of transboundary water 
cooperation through deliberative or multilateral approaches, nor is it an active supporter 
of international actors that pursue this agenda in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. 
This curtails the ability of third parties to facilitate transboundary water cooperation as 
the hydro-hegemon’s active participation in or, at the very least, tacit support for, such 
initiatives confers legitimacy on them. As Asthana and Shukla suggest, India’s hydro-
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hegemony makes ‘multilateralism or third-party interventions in a regional waterscape… 
not only difficult but also impossible.’1226 
Rejection of the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment undermines international efforts 
A further illustration of the weak support of riparian states for international organisations 
and aid donors engaging in the transboundary water governance of the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed lies in the reaction to the Ganges-Strategic Basin Assessment. 
India, Nepal and Bangladesh initially rejected this World Bank-led study that tried to 
collaboratively establish the scientific basis for possible benefit-sharing arrangement 
within the Ganges basin.  
At the fourth Abu Dhabi Dialogue (held in 2009), an international, inter-disciplinary team 
lead by World Bank economists embarked on a ‘multi-sectoral study to understand the 
Ganges basin, its present behaviour and possible futures.’1227 The study synthesises publicly 
available data (while acknowledging the limitations of the availability of such data)1228 into 
‘a set of nested hydrological and economic river basin models used to examine alternative 
scenarios across a range of possible Ganges futures, and a social component that studies 
the social implications of water variability in the basin.’1229 Up until then, the World Bank 
points out, ‘there has been no basin-wide knowledge base and analytical framework that 
could be used by riparian states to explore options and facilitate cooperative planning in 
the Ganges. Information and data are surprisingly scarce and difficult to obtain. In 
particular, very little information is available on hydrology and irrigation withdrawals in 
India.’1230 
The conceptual underpinnings of the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment are rooted in the 
idea (discussed in the literature review chapter) that transboundary water cooperation can 
be improved through benefit sharing. However, benefit sharing is a negotiation tactic (one 
in which parties to the negotiation come to see the contested issue as an opportunity for 
creating positive-sum outcomes – arrangements with many winners – rather than zero-
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sum outcomes – a winner-takes-all scenario). Benefit sharing is not a method of conflict 
resolution, nor a means of creating positive transboundary water interaction. It may, 
however, come about that within positive transboundary water interaction, benefit sharing 
negotiations are pursued because the parties are already willing to cooperate and trust 
each other. In other words, benefit sharing may be a consequence of cooperation rather 
than its cause. But this nuanced understanding of transboundary water cooperation is not 
explicitly present in the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment.  
The findings of the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment answer ten fundamental questions 
relating to some commonly held assumptions about the transboundary water governance 
of the Ganges basin.1231 Significantly, the report dispels several myths about the hydrology 
of the basin and challenges the perceptions of how to manage shared water problems, 
especially flooding, water storage and hydropower development.1232 Specifically, 
‘[h]ydropower development and trade are confirmed to hold real promise’ at the same 
time as ‘the findings of this study refute the broadly held view that upstream water storage 
(i.e., reservoirs) in Nepal can control basin-wide flooding’1233 The findings of the Ganges 
Strategic Basin Assessment have, among other outcomes, influenced the design of World 
Bank supported investments on flood management and agricultural water management in 
northern India as well as climate resilience programs in Nepal.1234 
Why, then, was the report widely rejected by stakeholders? The intent of the Ganges 
Strategic Basin Assessment was, after all to instigate collaborative, evidence-based, 
problem solving. The World Bank team ‘started with the conventional wisdom, which is 
that what you need is large dams in Nepal to stop flooding and provide water for 
agriculture – that there was a way to regulate the system all the way into Bangladesh’ and 
wanted to encourage discussion about that accepted wisdom as an antidote to ‘so much 
contentious history over treaties.’1235 
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Yet, when a draft of the report was released in mid-2011, instead of instigating discussions 
between riparians about benefit sharing options, it was considered controversial and was 
widely rejected.1236 India rejected the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment on the grounds 
that the report did not use any official Indian data – a disingenuous argument considering 
that India’s government did not share any data with the World Bank in the first place.1237 
(As discussed above, maintaining secrecy around hydrological data offers India the option 
of rejecting or otherwise undermining the validity of social or environmental impact 
assessments that do not use the ‘correct’ data that the authors of such assessments have 
been denied access to.)1238  
The fact of the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment being weak on Indian data was also of 
concern to Nepal. Among other objections, Nepal noted that ‘data from Indian side has 
not been used to that extent as it should be’ and questioned ‘the reliability of the model as 
the model considers the data of Nepal and Bangladesh only.’1239 Many other concerns were 
raised in an official rejection of the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment, which provided 
comprehensive point-by-point counter-arguments to the report.1240 Furthermore, a 
consultative workshop was organised in Kathmandu in mid-2012 by Jalsrot Vikas Sanstha 
(a Nepalese NGO that promotes IWRM throughout the region)1241 and the Global Water 
Partnership, Nepal. The consultative workshop aired concerns about ‘such type of 
misleading report’ and raised objections to ‘the attempt of World Bank to undermine 
Nepal’s contribution in the Ganges basin.’ 1242 The workshop’s findings were submitted to 
the World Bank, which in turn attempted to turn the critique of the Ganges Strategic 
Basin Assessment into an opportunity for further dialogue.1243 Resentment, however, has 
lingered over the ‘Indo-centric’ report, and the sentiment remains that ‘Nepal…has every 
right to say NO to large projects that submerge for perpetuity vast tracts of fertile lands 
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and villages in Nepal’ and that ‘Nepal, in the meantime, should implement projects that 
will cater to her own domestic water and energy needs.’1244 
As for the third Ganges basin riparian, Bangladesh, it is of little concern to the Ganges 
Strategic Basin Assessment (which, according to some Bangladeshi analysts, may be 
symptomatic of a broader trend of foreign aid donors and international organisations 
paying less attention to Bangladesh than to India or Nepal.)1245 Bangladesh rejected the 
Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment unofficially, but at least one Bangladeshi contributor to 
the report is now embarrassed to be associated with a report that has apparently 
misrepresented their work.1246 
The rejection of the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment was a problem for the World Bank 
because the report was to provide the justification for future infrastructure investment in 
the region.1247 This, too, was a concern for India, Nepal and Bangladesh: the Ganges 
Strategic Basin Assessment puts forth solutions to transboundary water governance 
problems that are primarily about engineering, infrastructure or technology, and this is 
another major reason why the report was rejected.1248  
Considering that the economic paradigm1249 of river management is one that Indian, 
Nepalese and Bangladeshi hydrocrats largely favour (as discussed in Chapter 3), perhaps 
the underlying reason for the unanimous rejection of the Ganges Strategic Basin 
Assessment is not that it advocated for predominantly scientific solutions to wicked 
problems of policy. Rather, the report was rejected because it implied those solutions 
should be, or could only be, implemented through external actors such as the World Bank, 
thus diminishing the agency of the riparian stakeholders themselves. As discussed above, 
the more effective solutions to international development problems tend to be the locally 
devised ones; no matter how sound an external solution may be, if it is driven by third 
parties it is likely to be resented or rejected, and thus rendered ineffective. 
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A further issue with the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment is the manner in which it was 
conducted. The World Bank did not lead the study according to the principles of 
deliberative governance that the World Bank is advocating (through SAWI) for the 
management of the transboundary rivers in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. That 
is to say, the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment was not a consultative process, nor was it 
based on wide-ranging and open discussions even though ‘to promote an open, evidence-
based dialogue’1250 was one of the stated objectives of the report. The contributors were not 
able to see what the other contributors were writing.1251 In short, the Ganges Strategic 
Basin Assessment was a failure because the study – and, indeed, SAWI – are perceived as 
top-down initiatives.1252 As discussed above, the attempt to impose bottom-up, deliberative 
processes by third parties working in a top-down way is problematic and resented within 
South Asia.1253 
The paradox of the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment is that it was not intended as a top-
down initiative but rather as an inclusive one, in line with the World Bank’s recent 
attempts at taking a ‘lighter touch’ within larger coalitions1254 and becoming ‘more agile 
and effective as a participant in broad coalitions.’1255 Perhaps the experience of the less-
than-inclusive process of developing the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment will provide 
some lessons for a similar state-of-the-basin study of the Brahmaputra basin, which was 
commenced in 2014.1256 
The Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment was ultimately published by the World Bank in 
2014. It is one of the most thorough and up to date reports on the hydrological, economic 
and social state of the Ganges basin. The reputational damage, however, has been done to 
SAWI and this will likely affect its future efficacy. The World Bank’s position as the 
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champion of deliberative governance in the transboundary water governance of the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed has been undermined by the less-than-deliberative 
development of Ganges Strategic Basement Assessment.  
Conclusion 
The World Bank and other foreign aid donors have been making a concerted effort at 
improving transboundary water interactions in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed for 
the past decade. The reasons for this a manifold. The emergence of non-traditional 
security threats and collective action problems has put an emphasis on creating regional 
security through ‘soft’ means such as hydro-diplomacy. This is reflected in the objectives 
of foreign-led interventions in this problemshed. Climate change resilience and 
sustainable development are two prominent preoccupations of the international 
community currently, and thus also find expression in the goals of international actors 
intervening in the transboundary water governance here. The idea of instituting ‘good 
water governance’ also feature prominently in the documentation of these interventions. 
Are the normative aims of international organisations and aid donors likely to be achieved 
in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed? Based on the insights and experiences of 
riparian stakeholders, international actors engaged in increasing transboundary water 
cooperation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed are unlikely to have a direct and 
significant effect in the short term on improving water interaction between India, Nepal, 
Bhutan and Bangladesh. They are but a drop in the ocean in the complex hydropolitics of 
the region – but that is not to say that they are unwanted, unnecessary, or making matters 
worse. After all, every drop counts. It is just as difficult to attribute failure of governance as 
it is to attribute success.1257 
At the same time, the normative question remains of whether or not international 
organisations and aid donors should intervene in transboundary water governance 
between sovereign states at all. But that question is moot. As this thesis has shown (in 
Chapter 4), third parties will intervene in transboundary water governance for numerous 
reasons, not just because an opportunity exists for improving interactions between 
riparian states, or because of the possibility of water disputes escalating. 
                                                     
1257 Pahl-Wostl, C 2015, Water Governance in the Face of Global Change: From Understanding to 
Transformation, Springer, London, p. 32 
277 
 
Instead, the more pressing question is how all parties – those from within the 
problemshed, the elites of riparian states, stakeholders that are dispossessed, as well as 
interested third parties – can or should better address the complex environmental, 
security, and policy challenges of today and tomorrow. Swain points out that the urgency 
‘to meet the new challenges that might arise from climate change’1258 is increasing.  
Verady et al. show that in light of global pressures, such as climate change, driving 
demand for freshwater,  
‘diplomacy will be called on increasingly to anticipate, mitigate and 
resolve conflicting claims on shared water resources. Nowhere will this 
contest be more stark than in transboundary regions, where bordering 
states will need to balance national interests with regional welfare and 
economic security. Therein lies the great challenge of hydro-diplomacy 
and the concomitant potential of hydro-solidarity.’1259  
This challenge, however, is not currently met by international organisations and foreign 
aid donors working to improve transboundary water interactions in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed. There are numerous reasons for this. First, there are 
contextual obstacles to greater cooperation developing between riparian states in the 
foreseeable future: an underdeveloped civil society and weak regionalism in South Asia, 
the securitisation of transboundary waters, and a culture of secrecy around hydrological 
data. India’s hydro-hegemony is also a major impediment to building trust between 
riparian states. These were discussed in Chapter 3. 
At the same time, there have been mixed reactions from riparian stakeholders toward 
these internationally-led initiatives for improving transboundary water interactions in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. There is a lot of resentment toward top-down 
approaches, as well as reluctant acceptance that there may be some advantages to the 
assistance of external actors. Significant, however, in the failure of these foreign-led 
interventions has been India’s unenthusiastic support for the ADD and SAWI, and the 
rejection of the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment by riparian states.  
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Chapter 6: Insights for international actors in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed and beyond 
In light of the obstacles to positive transboundary water interactions emerging in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, and bearing in mind the perspectives of riparian 
stakeholders, what can be done now to increase cooperation between India, Nepal, Bhutan 
and Bangladesh? That is the central question of this chapter. It begins by providing some 
alternate approaches to improving transboundary water interaction in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed. These approaches are based on the insights of riparian 
stakeholders, and include: addressing the political context and historical grievances; 
building trust and addressing power asymmetry between riparian states; creating political 
will for cooperation; de-securitising water; taking a problemshed view; strengthening 
water sharing institutions; and moving beyond narratives of water scarcity and supply-side 
solutions. 
In contrast to what international organisations could be doing is what they are doing. The 
second section of this chapter critiques some of the approaches favoured by international 
actors. It argues that they have not sufficiently taken into account the historical and 
contextual factors contributing to neutral or negative transboundary water interaction in 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. This impedes the efficacy of interventions aiming 
to increase cooperation between riparians. This section also argues that taking a basin-
wide approach – as favoured by the principles of Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM) – is not always practicable or appropriate. A further argument made is that 
increasing transboundary water cooperation will not necessarily result in regional stability. 
Lastly, this section illustrates that knowledge sharing and Track II dialogue – two methods 
favoured by SAWI – are not the solution to all transboundary water conflicts.  
The third and final section turns to the system of international foreign aid and addresses 
some of the systemic challenges that are not specific to transboundary water governance 
or the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed but that may nonetheless be an impediment to 
third parties achieving their stated objectives. Understanding the effectiveness of foreign 
aid generally is important because the effectiveness of international actors in increasing 
transboundary water cooperation supports the justification for future interventions into 
transboundary water governance. In other words, if the international actors in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed are unlikely to substantially or directly increase transboundary 
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water cooperation between India-Nepal and India-Bangladesh, then the rationale for 
similar interventions in other problemsheds in the future is weakened. 
What now? Insights from within 
As Chapter 5 has illustrated there is room for improvement in how third parties conduct 
interventions into improving transboundary water interaction – though as this thesis 
argues, there is no one path to greater cooperation between riparian states, and even with 
the best methods and intentions there is no guarantee that the hydropolitics can be 
improved. This is because transboundary water interaction is complex and unpredictable. 
Nonetheless, there are ways in which international actors currently engaged in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed could improve their efficacy. These recommendations 
are largely based on what stakeholders from within the problemshed would like to see. 
This section begins with a discussion of how addressing historical grievances and the 
complexities of political reality could create a stronger foundation for the development of 
transboundary water cooperation. Similarly, countering India’s hydro-hegemony and 
‘levelling the playing field’ could dispel some resentment and build trust between 
riparians. This is discussed in the second sub-section, while the third examines how 
international organisations and foreign aid donors could increase political will within the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed for addressing transboundary water issues. The fourth 
sub-section examines the possible effects of taking a water justice approach to 
transboundary interactions, while the fifth advocates for framing issues according to the 
‘problemshed’ rather than the hydrological watershed. The sixth sub-section argues for the 
strengthening of water sharing institutions, while the final sub-section discusses how to 
shift away from narratives of water scarcity and supply-side solutions. 
Addressing the political context and historical grievances 
One Indian water security analyst claims that SAWI has been successful at bringing about 
a conversation about transboundary waters, but not at bringing about cooperation because 
little effort has been made to understanding what the most pressing problems are.1260 
Defining or prioritising water conflicts is the first step to improved transboundary water 
governance.  
The first issue to be addressed is a scoping one. What is at the crux of the problem with 
transboundary water governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed? Chokkakula 
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contends that ‘the search for solutions is obscured by our failure to understand the 
problem itself completely: the problem lies in lack of acknowledgement of the critical 
significance of politics in emergence and recurrence of disputes.’1261 Politics at all levels – 
local, national, regional, global – affects transboundary water interaction by shaping 
dynamics between riparians and other stakeholders, and by presenting priorities for the 
state that may not be related to water. As Julien notes, ‘[h]ydropolitics is first and foremost 
about politics, not water. Therefore, it is the political dynamics inside which 
transboundary water management occurs that must be the focus of analysis. And these 
dynamics cannot be reduced to simple interstate power ratios or economic calculation. 
They also have to do with culture, history and ideology.’1262 Understanding and addressing 
the political dynamics inside which transboundary water management occurs in South 
Asia, then, may help international actors better deal with the emergence and recurrence of 
disputes over water. 
A large part of the political context in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is the history 
of disputes over transboundary rivers that continue to affect current water interaction. 
Speaking of Asia as a whole, Chellaney posits that ‘[u]nassuaged historical grievances have 
constricted diplomatic space for building political accommodation and reconciliation. 
Asian states must find ways to overcome their histories of antagonism to build 
cooperation.’1263 in other words, addressing historical grievances is a prerequisite for 
transboundary water cooperation. As Perlman-Petersen and Wolf argue, ‘[i]t is necessary 
both to address past and present grievances as a prerequisite for market-driven 
solutions’1264 for enhancing transboundary water cooperation. As such, third parties 
already engaged in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed ought to consider how some of 
these past grievances – such as those discussed in Chapter 3 – can be resolved and serve as 
the foundation for building positive transboundary water interaction. 
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Building trust and addressing power asymmetry 
One of the effects of addressing historical water disputes may turn out to be increased 
trust between the riparian states of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. As Earle et al. 
have noted, the trust deficit is particularly high in this region.1265 This is a real barrier to 
transboundary water cooperation. Chellaney argues that ‘[w]ithout improved inter-
country relations and better trust, Asia’s hydropolitics will remain grating.’1266 
Trust is a prerequisite for improved transboundary water interaction. As Asthana and 
Shukla argue, ‘trust building can lead to institutions of regional water governance with a 
set of rules and mechanisms to mitigate conflict and disputes.’1267 But how to build trust? 
Asthana and Shukla suggest that a ‘regional information base where all countries can have 
access to information’ may reduce data secrecy and thus ‘be a positive pathway to 
increased cooperation and peace building.’1268 To a certain extent, international actors are 
already facilitating knowledge sharing in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed with the 
objective of building trust and weakening the culture of data secrecy in the region.1269 This 
was shown in Chapter 4. But these efforts have not built trust or shifted power dynamics 
between riparian states. As Zeitoun and Mirumachi write of SAWI: 
‘on the surface, the outputs in the form of joint reports and publications 
indicate the efforts at creating space for knowledge that may provide 
some new perspectives to transboundary water resources management 
but not necessarily to transforming the existing transboundary water 
arrangement. These efforts generally seek to build consensus on the 
importance of regional cooperation over water, however, without 
challenging the fundamental power relations. The efforts are thus taking 
the reformist approach that is not likely in the future to transform 
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transboundary water arrangements or to resolve the transboundary 
water conflict.’1270 
Without addressing the effects of India’s hydro-hegemony, internationally-led efforts at 
knowledge sharing are unlikely to change the status quo between riparian states. 
‘Given India’s hegemonic position in the region,’ argue Asthana and Shukla, 
‘multilateralism or third-party interventions in a regional waterscape are not only difficult 
but also impossible. Perceptions of India’s hydro-hegemony domination still remain in the 
eyes of smaller neighbours.’1271 Many consider India to be the regional bully, point out 
Earle et al., and ‘India’s refusal to take up any river management issue in a multilateral 
forum reduces the scope for possibility of any basin-based organisational framework to 
emerge.’1272  
How can international actors better address this situation of India’s hydro-hegemony and 
the mistrust of Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh? Zeitoun and Jägerskog suggest that 
‘[p]ower asymmetry in transboundary water settings can be confronted in two ways: it can 
be strategically influenced or it can be challenged.’1273 There are two general ways to 
influence power: by deriving positive-sum outcomes, and by creating conditions that ‘to 
encourage basin bullies to transform into basin leaders.’1274 The negotiation of ‘win-win’ 
outcomes may satisfy all parties and thus render power asymmetry irrelevant, while bullies 
may be less likely to force an inequitable arrangement if, for example, they are held 
accountable to an objective standard, or risk being ‘named and shamed.’ As Zeitoun and 
Jägerskog point out, ‘not all hegemons are leaders. This makes the role of third-parties all 
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the more crucial.’1275 In the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, third parties such as SAWI, 
ought to encourage India to more consistently take the position of leadership. 
There are also two general ways to challenge power: third parties can either level the 
‘players’ or level the ‘playing field’.1276 ‘To help level the players,’ suggest Zeitoun and 
Jägerskog, ‘capacity-building programmes can improve the technical, administrative or 
negotiation abilities and empower non-hegemons. This can increase their bargaining 
power and enable them to play a more effective role in transboundary water interactions. 
It also helps them generate their own solutions to collective challenges. As the formerly 
weaker actors take on more responsibility, they gain respect and power.’1277 As for levelling 
the ‘playing field’, Zeitoun and Jägerskog show that while ‘[t]ransboundary water 
arrangements set out according to coercive terms determined by a hegemon cannot 
endure in the long term,’ the fact remains that ‘transboundary water settings are generally 
not level, and the only rule of the game in many basins is the “law of the jungle.”’1278 
Effective legislation and a strong regulatory context, they argue, already level the playing 
field at the sub-national level in many countries. At the international level, ‘the 1997 UN 
Convention [on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Waterways] serves as a 
useful guide to fair water-sharing.’1279 International actors in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed, then, should keep the hydro-hegemon accountable and assist riparians in 
strengthening their legislative and regulatory frameworks. 
Creating political will 
Foreign aid donors and international organisations intervening in the hydropolitics of the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed can also assist riparian states in putting transboundary 
water issues higher on the agenda. This may have the effect of increasing political will for 
addressing water conflicts, which, as discussed, is a necessary condition for cooperation to 
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develop. As Tiwary explains, ‘international water conflict resolution requires considerable 
political will on all the sides…It requires sustained motivation to take into confidence 
different parties (both inside and outside the nation).’1280 And in the words of Shamir, ‘If 
there is a political will for peace, water will not be a hindrance. If you want reasons to 
fight, water will give you ample opportunities.’1281 
In the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, the need for peace and cooperation is growing 
as environmental security challenges intensify. Earle et al. note that ‘[b]ecause of the 
impacts of climate change, droughts and floods are expected to become more severe and 
less predictable. To address these extreme challenges, there is an urgent need for basin-
based cooperation, in order to augment the irrigation capacity in low-season periods and 
to decrease flood peaks in the monsoon months.’1282 The role of the third parties already 
engaged in this basin is to continue impressing upon India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh 
the importance of collective action as an approach for tackling these increasingly urgent 
challenges. 
Taking a water justice approach and de-securitising water 
For Iyer, the relationship between politics and water governance is significant because it 
can help answer one of the key questions about water cooperation. Iyer argues that the 
idea of regional cooperation is gaining currency in South Asia, and is seen as an obvious 
good – the question is, cooperation at what level, between whom, and for what 
purposes?1283 To a large extent, that is determined by hydropolitics and power asymmetry 
between riparians. As Patrick points out, ‘who decides what is just and for whom depends 
on who or what is excluded or included in the water-allocation decision-making 
process.’1284 Patrick et al. also notes that sometimes just and unjust outcomes coexist: ‘[i]n 
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some cases a just outcome at one level may cause an injustice at another level for the same 
or a different set of stakeholders.’1285 
Patrick also argues that social inclusion of a variety of stakeholders into the dialogue 
process is a precondition for attaining just outcomes (while the exclusion of any particular 
stakeholder group may result in unjust ones.)1286 Currently, however, water governance 
processes in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed are not always inclusive. For instance, 
Chokkakula shows that existing legal structures in inter-state water dispute in India do not 
allow for the participation of non-state political actors, such as individuals or groups, in 
the adjudication of interstate water disputes.1287 This is problematic because, as Iyer 
argues, any consultative, interactive approach to conflict-resolution must also be an 
inclusive one: ‘it must include and involve those who have a vital interest in the decision, 
namely the farmers, industrial establishments, municipalities, and people in general 
because all of us are water-users.’1288 He continues that the present system of inter-state 
water dispute resolution in India is de facto an inter-government system. As such it cannot 
be said to be one that focuses on water justice outcomes or procedural justice. Moreover, it 
is a bureaucracy that the World Bank claims is characterised ‘the paternalism of central-
level bureaucrats, coercive top-down planning, and little support or feedback from 
locals.’1289 It is this bureaucratic culture that Hill identifies as being a more significant 
barrier to transboundary water cooperation than inter-state water disputes within 
India.1290  
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Mohan explains that the political boundaries of states ‘often subsume issues that are 
humane, common and social in nature’1291 meaning that they are rarely addressed in state-
centric water dispute mechanisms. This is also the case in transboundary water 
governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. As Prasai and Surie point out,  
‘Consideration of broader stakeholder perspectives is vital to effective 
transboundary water governance in South Asia, and particularly to 
addressing its social and ecological dimensions. Bringing the discourse 
on water use, sharing, and management closer to affected communities 
and stakeholders can also help to reduce environmental degradation 
and thereby the potential for conflict.’1292  
But, they continue, ‘the lack of regional cooperation and the absence of local and sub-
national perspectives continue to prevent sustainable development and management of 
transboundary water resources for livelihood improvement, food security, poverty 
reduction, and effective adaptation to climate change.’1293 
Prasai and Surie’s point about the absence of diverse perspectives echoes Asthana and 
Shukla’s argument about genuine (as opposed to merely rhetorical) inclusivity. Asthana 
and Shukla advise that good governance should be more than just rhetoric. ‘In most cases,’ 
they argue, ‘participation of stakeholders begins only when the decision is already 
announced, after which stakeholders engage in activist roles and resort to collective action 
rather than being part of the planning process. Policy making needs to be more inclusive 
of other voices in the formation process, engaging civil society, and moving beyond the 
top-down exclusionary approach.’1294 Patrick points out that  
‘[i]f social inclusion is achieved, the variety of perspectives on what and 
why water is needed by the different users for different uses and the 
underlying rationale for these reasons is best described as a continuum 
of potential just outcomes. On the other hand, the social exclusion of 
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any particular stakeholder group can result in injustices simply because 
certain opinions, needs or world-views are excluded.’1295 
International actors, then, ought to be actively inclusive of diverse perspectives. This does 
not require any additional funding or fundamental change to the way foreign-led 
interventions are conducted. Indeed, inclusivity is in line with the tenets of good 
governance and consistent with Track II dialogue. Focusing on water justice is also a 
legitimate approach for addressing water conflicts. As Zeitoun et al. point out, 
transboundary water justice is ‘influenced by many of the same dynamics that impact 
transboundary water conflict and cooperation. These include the disabling or enabling 
role of power asymmetry, the construction of scale to promote agendas, and the use of 
discourse to frame tradeoffs and legitimacy.’1296 They also argue that water disputes linger 
so long as arrangements over distribution and control of transboundary water resources is 
perceived as unfair by any side, even the weaker one. In this situation, ‘[t]he risk is that 
practical and expedient ideas are reached for as “solutions”, while alternatives are ignored 
or de-legitimised.’1297 Benefit sharing falls into this category of seemingly equitable 
distribution that may nonetheless not mitigate perceptions of injustice. 
How water is distributed is often decided by the most powerful actors. Zeitoun et al. point 
out that ‘politics and powerful agendas often control the space in which they evolve, and 
allow processes that appear procedurally fair to lead to highly asymmetric outcomes.’1298 
They warn that: 
‘recognition and participation may be necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for “just” transboundary water outcomes… The critical 
analyst would thus be wary of justice work or transboundary water 
diplomacy narrowly focused on process, as it may in effect – if not in 
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words – displace the basic condition for (egalitarian) justice, from 
equitability of outcome for different actors, to simply their inclusion in 
an apparently fair process.’1299 
Conca adds that too often hydro-diplomacy and other internationally driven initiatives for 
improving transboundary water governance are ‘limited to dividing water supplies 
equitably between nations and reducing the potential for international conflict [but] do 
little to address the human security of people living in the basin.’1300 
There are no easy solutions to establishing equitable outcomes for all actors at all times, 
and addressing the human security of the people affected. But Hill proposes that one 
starting point is the de-securitisation of water issues. He argues that ‘[t]o desecuritise 
water in the Himalayas is to open up this dialogue and in so doing create the conditions 
for just and sustainable development.’1301 He continues: 
‘the securitisation of water may detract from an adequate discussion 
about how more just and sustainable distribution of water can be 
achieved for the poorest and most marginalised parts of society within 
these countries and de-emphasise the range of environmental, social 
and economic issues related to how hydropower development is 
planned and implemented.’1302 
Ultimately, international actors should work toward de-securitising water, while shifting 
the emphasis away from state-centric understandings of security to human security. Hill 
suggest that ‘[i]f we consider non-traditional security in a way that incorporates a nexus of 
food, water and energy…then the regional integration of upstream and downstream 
communities in the Himalayas must be done in ways that achieve integration across the 
many ecosystems of the Hindukush Himalayas, and in doing so pay equal attention to the 
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region’s watersheds, catchments and headwaters.’1303 That, in turn, requires 
reconceptualising the region in terms of a problemshed – not just a hydrological basin. 
Seeing the problemshed, not just the basin 
B. Sharma suggests that taking a basin-wide approach is one way of increasing 
cooperation. He argues ‘a basin-scale approach would help manage the water resources 
better. This would require close coordination with all the countries sharing the Ganga, 
such as Nepal and Bangladesh, so that the interests of both upstream and downstream 
users are taken into consideration.’1304 Although a basin-wide approach might not always 
be appropriate for all water management issues, and the inclusion of all riparian states 
could slow down decision-making processes, the point remains about developing a shared 
understanding of managing water resources. 
Thakkar points out that SAWI has been relatively successful in taking a basin-wide 
approach. He sees the inclusion of China in the foreign-led led multilateral forums, the 
ADD and SAWI, as particularly commendable.1305 As Earle et al. have noted, ‘[t]he advent 
of China in the [Ganges-Brahmaputra] basin’s hydro-politics’, like in the Mekong and the 
Nile, has brought further complications and uncertainties.’1306 In this sense taking a basin-
wide approach is useful for inclusivity, trust-building, and creating a shared sense of 
mission in regards to the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers. 
At the same time, taking a basin-wide approach is not always appropriate to all 
transboundary water governance issues. Swain shows that a basin-wide approach was not 
successful in the Nile Basin Initiative,1307 on which the Abu Dhabi Dialogue was modelled, 
and that a sub-basin approach may have had more of a chance of successfully increasing 
transboundary water cooperation in the Nile basin.1308 The basin-wide approach requires 
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consensus from all riparian states, and that can be an impediment for taking action on 
certain issues, especially ones that do not affect the basin as a whole. Moreover, as Islam 
and Susskind point out, ‘[w]atersheds frequently influence – and are influenced by – 
factors outside their boundaries.’1309 This is also the case in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-
Meghna basin.  
Considering the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed as a separate and distinct unit of water 
management may be a more functional scoping of transboundary water governance issues 
than considering the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin as a whole. Noting that a 
problemshed is ‘a geographic area that is large enough to encompass management issues, 
but small enough to make implementation feasible,’1310 Islam and Susskind argue that  
‘The origin of many of our water management difficulties stems from 
our fragmented or bounded view of water as a “natural object”, or at 
other times, as a “societal issue” or at still other moments as a “political 
construct”. The components of a water resource management puzzle can 
fit together in so many different ways that it is practically impossible to 
use “reductionist” or traditional “systems engineering” methodologies to 
resolve complex water management problems. We need a different 
approach that takes account of these complexities.’1311 
These complexities may be better accounted for in the concept of a problemshed or policy-
shed, which are defined by ‘a combination of natural, societal and political considerations’ 
most appropriate for the purposes of water governance or management.1312 Islam and 
Susskind add that ‘instead of thinking about managing systems that are bounded and 
made up of components that interact in predictable ways, it is more helpful to think in 
terms of complex water networks.’1313 International actors may also find it helpful to think 
in terms of problemsheds rather than basins when working to increasing transboundary 
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water cooperation in South Asia (while ensuring that the hydro-hegemon does not 
perpetuate the status quo of inequitable bilateral agreements).  
A further advantage of framing water issues within a problemshed rather than a basin is 
that it may, in the words of Prasai and Surie, promote ‘alternative imaginations in 
transboundary water cooperation.’1314 They argue that reconceptualising the value of water 
and the scope of water negotiations can reshape what transboundary water cooperation 
looks like. Prasai and Surie provide two ‘potentially good examples of what can constitute 
an alternative imagination on water cooperation.’1315 One is the ‘devolution of negotiating 
authority to the local level where stakes are real and the prospects of making reasonable 
compromises on cooperation frameworks are greater.’1316 The second is seeing ‘beyond 
immediate calculations of allocated flows to include other ecological, geopolitical and 
economic benefits.’1317 These non-water related benefits may occur beyond the basin, and 
thus are more likely to be identified through a problemshed approach. 
Understanding that water is a socially constructed concept may help reveal previously 
overlooked benefits, and to desecuritise water. As Hill points out, ‘[s]Since the 
securitisation of water is a social construction that reflects prevailing power relations 
within states rather than an objective existential threat, a more nuanced understanding of 
state–society relations and their impact at a number of levels clearly has a great deal to 
contribute to our understanding of the emerging situation in the Brahmaputra–Meghna 
basin.’1318 He continues: 
‘In mainstream accounts, water security is framed in terms of a contest 
over the use of a river, discussed in terms of a quantifiable volume of 
flow that varies according to the season and exact location, but which 
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can nevertheless be measured, captured and then distributed according 
to whatever formula is agreed upon by negotiating states.31 Indeed, the 
debates between and within countries of the region are frequently 
defined in this way, such as the long-running issues over the Farakka 
Barrage, for example, or the debate around the Teesta river.’1319  
Hill notes that there are many epistemological and ontological assumptions underpinning 
this approach. The river is conceived as a resources detached from and managed outside of 
its broader environments and cultural context. But this conceptualisation neglects the 
wider, and equally important, riparian ecosystems. This, in turn, limits how the benefits to 
and from the river are perceived. Hill argues that ‘if we think beyond the Himalayas in 
terms of its capacity to be harnessed for energy and agriculture, and instead explore the 
function of rivers as important in the livelihoods of a great number of people and as a 
provider of ecosystem services, then a very different picture emerges of the costs and 
benefits of harnessing transboundary water resources.’1320 Taking a problemshed view, 
then, rather than a watershed approach, may help international actors illuminate these 
‘hidden’ costs and benefits of transboundary water. 
Strengthening water sharing institutions 
Strengthening institutions of water governance is another approaching for increasing 
transboundary water cooperation by creating a shared understanding of rivers. ‘The water 
resources of the Hindu Kush Himalayas are a shared resource in many ways,’ point out 
Vaidya and E. Sharma from ICIMOD. Transboundary rivers ‘are shared between upstream 
and downstream users, between people and nature, and between countries. This shared 
nature of the resource brings the promise of multiple benefits, but also the threat of 
increased conflict. To realize the benefits of water resources, it is essential that there is a 
shared understanding of the resource.’1321  
Asthana and Shukla have several suggestions for how to increase ‘regional awareness that 
rivers can be better harnessed through collective efforts and recognition that cooperation 
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is essential to alleviate threats to water security.’1322 First, building trust between riparians 
is key, as is establishing ‘a set of rules and mechanisms to mitigate conflict and disputes. A 
regional information base where all countries can have access to information and take 
adequate steps to mitigate damages can be made to remove problems of data secrecy.’1323 
They would like to see the establishment of a permanent, politically neutral forum similar 
to SAWI but not run by third parties. Any such forum must, according to Asthana and 
Shukla, overcome ‘historical and regional biases’ and ‘[p]erceptions of India’s hydro-
hegemony’ through the ‘creation of an institution that could fund regional experts and 
epistemic communities in a neutral space and unbiased environment.’1324 
The effect of India’s hydro-hegemony on the effectiveness of water sharing institutions in 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed has been a point of contention. Hill shows that 
while some commentators feel that these existing institutions (such as the Mahakali 
Commission between India and Nepal, or the Joint Rivers Commission between India and 
Bangladesh) are in the main effective, ‘much of the commentary dismisses the importance 
of these bodies and argues that the relationships between the basin countries are dictated 
by India’s overwhelming economic and political dominance.’1325 Nonetheless, Hill notes 
that ‘[t]here is an emerging literature that seeks to overcome these historic difficulties.’ 
Transboundary water interactions in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed could be 
significantly improved through strong river basin organisations. Transboundary water 
sharing institutions can, according to Earle et al.,  
‘help to reduce uncertainty surrounding Ganges-Brahmaputra riparian 
relations, which has been the bane of the region for a long time. If 
successful, these institutions can possibly shift the focus from 
disconnected and short-term interactions of the riparian countries into a 
continuous relationship that has scope for future routine gains.’1326  
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Feldman suggests that such institutions should be based on an adaptive management 
approach, which requires: ‘1) an organisation design that permits policymakers to 
recognise mistakes; 2) an ability to monitor and measure change, especially environmental 
change brought about by prior decisions; 3) a capacity to adopt mid-course corrections, 
and 4) and ability to apply what’s been learned to more complex challenges.’1327 
As Hill argues (and as discussed throughout this thesis), ‘[t]he World Bank and a number 
of donor countries have attempted to foster momentum for such a regional organisation 
through the South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI)’ and the ADD.1328 Earle et al. point out 
that ‘[t]o date, however, all these expectations, like in the Jordan basin, have not ventured 
beyond political statements and setting up lofty goals.’1329 But the World Bank is not the 
only international organisation working to establish or strengthen water sharing 
institutions in the region. Crow and Singh, for example, have ‘proposed in 2009 that 
ICIMOD might even play a larger role in the region, beginning to serve in some capacity as 
a water regulatory institution, monitoring the health of river basins and overseeing 
participating nations’ adherence to international agreements’1330 They also, according to 
Hill, ‘argue for establishing a regional organisation that they call the Himalayan Authority 
for Water Services and Environmental Co-operation. To them, it is only through such a 
body that genuine regional co-operation might be possible.’1331 
Strengthening and maintaining river basin organisations is not easy. Hill argues that while 
there is much potential for new political spaces to be opened up in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed, ‘[g]iven how politically contentious many parts of the region 
already are, this will be a long and unenviably difficult process and there are no guarantees 
of any success in this regard.’1332 He also shows that ‘[m]any of these initiatives have, in the 
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past, been faltering and ultimately have had little success in changing the way 
governments think about transboundary water resources.’1333 
Regional cooperation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed may also be possible 
through strengthening civil society. Hill argues that ‘[g]iven the opaque nature of many of 
the bureaucracies in the region, a key component of a regional body for co-ordinating the 
Himalayan rivers must be that it goes well beyond Track I (government to government) 
diplomacy to create space for networks of civil society and people’s movements from 
across the region.’1334 Currently, however, civil society in South Asia is limited (this was 
discussed earlier in this chapter). As Hill shows,  
‘[t]oo often, NGOs in the region are preoccupied with donor-related 
developmentalism, rather than advocacy, or are constrained in the 
extent to which they can express dissent. Part of the difficulty in 
realising the potential of these networks is the politically-fragmented 
nature of the subcontinent, which means that it is very difficult for pan-
South Asian networks to regularly meet and forthrightly take up issues 
associated with trans-boundary water resources.’1335  
Despite these challenges, there are alliances beginning to form between civil society 
groups across the region. Examples include the South Asian Solidarity on Rivers and 
Peoples (SARP), Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), the South Asian Network for Dams, 
Rivers and Peoples (SANDRP), while Imagine New South Asia (INSA) is an example of a 
new breed of regional think tanks that look at, among other things, transboundary water 
issues. Hill argues that ‘these are fairly nascent and, as yet, their influence on broader 
policy debates is hard to discern.’1336 But, he adds, ‘[i]f such [bottom-up] initiatives [that 
urge for greater transparency in hydro development in the region] were to be incorporated 
into regional institutions, then it is conceivable that water resource development might 
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proceed in a way that is more equitable, transparent and sustainable than that which 
currently prevails.’1337 
Moving beyond narratives of scarcity and supply-side solutions 
Asthana and Shukla argue that ‘[c]urrent water resource development in South Asia is not 
sustainable. There needs to be a shift in emphasis on demand management practices and 
further incentives for conservation of water resources.’1338 Chellaney, whose focus is on 
water conflicts and security, agrees that ‘a new strategic approach is needed that centers 
on water conservation and recycling, efficiency and productivity gains, and, more broadly, 
integrated resource management that involves all basin states. Only collaborative paths 
that embrace all stakeholders and break free from the business-as-usual approach can help 
unlock solutions.’1339 
Value creation is necessary to move from competition to non-zero-sum thinking but it is 
difficult when the negotiations arise out of fear of scarcity. This is because conceptualising 
water as a scarce resource precludes it from being a flexible resource. Islam and Susskind 
point out that too many water conflicts arise out of parties fearing they will not have 
enough water.1340 That fear, in turn, skews thinking on water governance problems toward 
supply-side solutions. 
The supply-side approach to water resource management implies that solutions to water 
problems will focus on creating more water availability. This, however, can lead to a 
destructive, self-perpetuating cycle. As Iyer explains, there is a seemingly insatiable 
demand for water, and this has to be brought in from somewhere. Dams, canals, and inter-
basin water transfers are thus built – but these generate new conflicts.1341 Hill agrees and 
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adds that ‘debates concerning hydropower development across the region are constrained 
by the overwhelming dominance of the supply-side hydrological paradigm.’1342 
One way in which this dominant water governance paradigm could be flipped is by 
reframing a problem of ‘insufficient water supply’ as one of ‘excessive water consumption’, 
thereby leading to solutions that favour the way in which water is allocated, used and 
consumed, rather than technological solutions that ‘create’ more water.1343  
In addition to the focus on supply-side solutions to water scarcity problems, Prasai and 
Surie argue that ‘[w]ater governance policies in South Asia tend to be state-centric, 
technocratic, exclusionary, nationalistic, and very often do not adequately recognize 
human, ecological, and social costs and their implications.’1344 Furthermore, they claim,  
‘[g]overnments in South Asia have traditionally endowed themselves 
with the exclusive right to articulate public interests on water resources 
and have continued to show a deep resistance to parting with that 
tradition. In recent years, the situation has been exacerbated by 
collusion among politicians and domestic and foreign investors involved 
in water-related infrastructure projects.’1345  
For the foreign investors, then, and other international actors in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed, there exists an opportunity to influence the governance of the region’s rivers 
to better recognise the human, ecological and social costs involved, especially in 
infrastructure and hydro-engineering projects.  
To some extent, the World Bank is beginning to do this. The Ganges Strategic Basin 
Assessment, for example, is clear that strategies other than hydro-engineering will have to 
complement or maximise the benefits of water storage in the region. The study also puts 
forth the argument that there are many attractive alternatives to meeting the region’s 
water needs; constructing new water storage infrastructure is not the only option. This is a 
novel and important argument in a water governance context dominated, as discussed 
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throughout this thesis, by the prevailing preference in the region for engineering solutions 
to water supply policy problems. 
Engineering solutions tend to be justified on financial and economic ground. But, as Hill 
shows,  
‘in the Brahmaputra–Meghna basin, hydropower development functions 
to channel the most economic benefits to a comparatively small group 
of people while simultaneously ignoring a range of economic, social and 
ecological issues that impact upon the livelihoods of many people who 
depend upon these rivers in various ways.’1346 
He argues that ‘the neo-liberal approach to infrastructure-led growth frequently overlooks 
the significant social, economic and political issues associated with this model of 
development in the region.’1347 As such, moving beyond narratives of supply-side, 
engineering solutions and neo-liberal justifications of infrastructure-led development may 
help create the conditions in which more positive transboundary water interactions could 
emerge because these narratives tend to lead to outcomes that are perceived as unjust. As 
discussed, perceptions of injustice are at the root of water disputes. 
Limitations of foreign approaches 
There are several ways in which international actors operate that may limit their primary 
objective – greater regional stability through increased transboundary water cooperation. 
For a start, creating knowledge about the Ganges and Brahmaputra basins and facilitating 
the sharing of it among riparians is only one small component of increasing transboundary 
water cooperation. Similarly, taking a basin-wide approach to transboundary water 
governance may be appropriate for some of the issues in this region – but not all.  
A further limitation on the conduct of international organisations and foreign aid donors 
is that they do not adequately address some significant contextual factors that contribute 
to the negative or neutral transboundary water interaction between riparians. For 
example, there is little consideration for how low political will within the region 
undermines the possibility of success of these initiatives. The structural power asymmetry 
                                                     
1346 Hill, D 2015, ‘Where Hawks Dwell on Water and Bankers Build Power Poles: Transboundary 
Water, Environmental Security and the Frontiers of Neo-liberalism’, Strategic Analysis, vol. 39 no. 
6, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2015.1090679, p. 741 
1347 Hill, D 2015, ‘Where Hawks Dwell on Water and Bankers Build Power Poles: Transboundary 
Water, Environmental Security and the Frontiers of Neo-liberalism’, Strategic Analysis, vol. 39 no. 
6, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2015.1090679, p. 729 
299 
 
between India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh is another factor not generally considered 
by foreign-led interventions.  
The nature of water conflict and cooperation is also poorly understood, and thus the 
prevailing theory of change is that improved transboundary water interaction will also 
improve regional stability. The root causes – historical grievances and perceptions of 
injustice – remain unaddressed by international actors. Indeed, the principles of water 
justice seem not to have been widely considered by third parties in the design of 
interventions into transboundary water governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed.  
Lastly, the chosen method for improving transboundary water interaction, that of Track II 
dialogue, is a necessary but not sufficient condition of water cooperation. Such dialogue is 
only one factor of positive transboundary water interaction, but in the absence of these 
factors – such as political will and trust among riparians – is unlikely to increase water 
cooperation. These limitations on foreign-led interventions are discussed in turn in this 
section. 
Knowledge sharing is not the solution to all transboundary water governance 
problems 
In addition to facilitating Track II dialogue, one of the main tasks of third parties in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is the gathering and dissemination of hydrological 
data. As discussed in Chapter 5, there is not much accurate data about the availability of 
resources, their distribution over space and time, and the impacts of climate change on 
stream flow variability, sedimentation, and potential GLOF events, et cetera.1348 What 
information does exist is not readily accessible to those who might need it. Prasai and 
Surie document this in their 2015 report ‘Water and climate data in the Ganges basin: 
Assessing access to information regimes and implications for cooperation on 
transboundary rivers’.1349  
The dearth of data has been taken up by international actors as an opportunity for 
intervention in the transboundary water interaction of the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed. Asthana and Shukla see some merit in this approach. They argue that ‘A 
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regional information base where all countries can have access to information and take 
adequate steps to mitigate damages can be made to remove problems of data secrecy.’1350 
Making ‘[s]ignificant advances in the generation and use of relevant data, knowledge, and 
analysis’ about the rivers of the Hindu-Kush-Himalaya region is one of the strategic goals 
of the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD),1351 and many 
of the successes that SAWI claims for the 2013-2014 financial year relate to river basin 
modelling projects.1352 The bulk of the international aid money is funnelled into politically 
blind areas, that is, science, technology, and river modelling.1353 This is justified on the 
grounds that accurate data is critical for planning and monitoring purposes. Scientific data 
is seen a critical aspect of transboundary water cooperation because without appropriate 
data exchange, there cannot be collaboration.1354  
Data creation is an appealing type of intervention for international organisation and 
foreign aid donors because it is relatively straightforward design data gathering projects 
and programs. Data is quantifiable and therefore progress can be easily measured (e.g., in 
terms of basins modelled, or flow data points recorded). It is also easy to claim that 
knowledge creation is a politically neutral endeavour, one for the benefit of all. This is the 
basis of much of the work done by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain 
Development, which is able to bring together scientists and researchers from the region.  
Knowledge creation led by international actors, however, is not significantly improving 
transboundary water interactions in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. As Zeitoun et 
al. argue: 
‘on the surface, the outputs in the form of joint reports and publications 
indicate the efforts at creating space for knowledge that may provide 
some new perspectives to transboundary water resources management 
but not necessarily to transforming the existing transboundary water 
arrangement. These efforts generally seek to build consensus on the 
importance of regional cooperation over water, however, without 
challenging the fundamental power relations. The efforts are thus taking 
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the reformist approach that is not likely in the future to transform 
transboundary water arrangements or to resolve the transboundary 
water conflict.’1355 
River basin modelling is another technique favoured by third parties. For example, 
Australia’s e-Water initiative is bringing river basin modelling technology used in the 
Murray-Darling basin to part of the Ganges in India.1356 The technology itself is impressive, 
but it may not be the whole solution to India’s river management problems. As the head of 
SAWI acknowledges, India requires more than just river basin modelling technology; it 
needs a whole package of modelling combined with capacity building and strengthening of 
governance institutions, et cetera.1357 The Australian government has made some small 
pushes in that direction, and in 2015 established the Australian Water Partnership to 
‘support public and private partnerships for sharing Australia’s water sector expertise in 
the Indo-Pacific region.’1358 But improving water management, even with the best expertise 
in the world, is a long, arduous, and political process.1359 For the time being, therefore, 
focusing on tangible, technological approaches is an easy win for third parties even if it 
does not contribute much to improved water governance in the region. 
The limited hydrological data, according to Gyawali, is not a major problem in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed – lack of hydro-diplomacy is.1360 River modelling alone, he 
argues, is not enough to improve water governance in the region. Siddiqui adds that it is 
especially problematic to put faith in the river basin modelling technology of foreigners 
who are not familiar with the peculiar hydrology of South Asia, i.e., models that are not 
created specifically to account for the vagaries of monsoonal rivers and glacial melt. 
Modelling is also useless when it is based on incomplete or inaccurate government data, or 
when the data is unavailable – and this is too often the case in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed.1361  
                                                     
1355 Zeitoun, M, Cascão, AE, Warner, J, Mirumachi, N, Matthews, N, Menga, F, & Farnum, R 2016, 
‘Transboundary water interaction III: contest and compliance’, International Environmental 
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, DOI: 10.1007/s10784-016-9325-x, p. 14 
1356 eWater 2012, ‘New Australia-India partnership’, Friday 19 October 2012, viewed 26 March 2015, 
<http://www.ewater.com.au/news/media/?news=214>. 
1357 Young, W., 20014, personal communication, 20 May 2014, New Delhi 
1358 Australian Water Partnership 2016, ‘Overview’, Australian Water Partnership, viewed 14 April 
2016, <http://waterpartnership.org.au/about/#page-12018>. 
1359 Young, W., 20014, personal communication, 20 May 2014, New Delhi 
1360 Anonymous 7, 2014, personal communication, 7 August 2014, Kathmandu 
1361 Siddiqui, S., 2014, personal communication, 20 June 2014, New Delhi 
302 
 
Yet, there is some utility to river basin modelling in terms of building transboundary water 
cooperation. River basin technology should not be seen just as the output of data but 
rather as the process of developing the model. Bringing together scientists, engineers and 
community stakeholders together to discuss what is important to them in the basin and 
their assumptions about cause and effect within the system is critical to developing 
meaningful cooperation and local buy-in. This is understood by some international actors 
intervening in the hydropolitics of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. 
The Australian Commonwealth Science and Industry Research Organisation (CSIRO) is 
currently funding a project on the science-policy interface in the Kosi basin, a sub-basin in 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. The project is run by the International Centre for 
Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) and is based on the assumption that sound 
hydrological modelling is important in establishing Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM). Various water policy practitioners, academics, scientists, 
hydrologists, et cetera, are consulted during the project about their water governance 
priorities.1362 This is an example of how the process of developing river basin models may 
indeed facilitate dialogue and cooperation between stakeholder groups who may 
otherwise have not engaged with one another on issue of mutual importance.  
Nonetheless, there are many misconceptions and cultural barriers to overcome before the 
process of river basin modelling can build transboundary water cooperation. For a start, as 
Siddiqui point out, community involvement is considered a nuisance by many in the 
scientific community; hydro engineers, for example, may decide the best place for an 
irrigation canal based on scientific measurements but the local community may object for 
reasons of local politics or traditions.1363 These cultural barriers speak to the need for 
improved hydro-diplomacy at all levels and illustrate that dialogue is a prerequisite for the 
success of more technical solutions to transboundary water issues. 
A further barrier is that of secrecy around hydrological data that does exist. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, transboundary water cooperation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed has 
often been hindered by the limited transparency around hydrological data; where 
information about shared rivers does exist, it is not readily shared. Significantly, Prasai and 
Surie point out that the reluctance to share such data is not a matter of policy but rather of 
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culture.1364 This culture of secrecy is what international actors are attempting to change in 
order to increase cooperation of the region’s transboundary waters.  
SAWI, for example, is trying to bridge the gap in data sharing, and is succeeding in doing 
so at the people-to-people level (though progress on the government-to-government level 
is proving more difficult).1365 The World Bank as a whole has for the past decade styled 
itself as an ‘information bank.’ It produces much of what Roy calls ‘well written rubbish’ 
that is sometimes of questionable methodological soundness but nevertheless brings 
important information into the public domain.1366 ICIMOD too has been instrumental in 
breaking down the culture of secrecy around hydrological data by conducting, for 
example, meteorological data sharing projects between Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan and 
Pakistan.1367  
These foreign-led interventions on the whole produce good data and interesting reports 
that raise awareness of important issues (such as the impact of Glacial Outburst floods 
(GLOFs)) and bridge knowledge gaps. But the pace of progress is not as per expectations. 
One Nepalese stakeholder argues that perhaps international organisations and foreign aid 
donors should be instead focussing their efforts on Track I processes for data sharing i.e., 
government-to-government interactions (including state government to state government 
in India). This would likely speed up the improvement of relations between countries in 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed1368 and contribute significantly to the breakdown of 
the culture of secrecy. As it is, however, the Track II dialogue and low-level scientific data 
sharing initiatives are having only a limited effect on overall transboundary water 
interaction. 
Yet, improving how information is shared between governments may also have only a 
limited effect on improving transboundary water interaction. As D’Souza points out, 
hydrology is only one facet of rivers, and relationships are more important than data. 
Furthermore, what a river means to a fishing community is different to what it means to a 
farming community, et cetera, and thus their information needs will be different.1369 A 
focus on improved communication between stakeholders with complementary 
information needs may be a more effective tactic than improving official channels. After 
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all, as Prasai and Surie have shown, Freedom of Information Acts do exist, but that has not 
necessarily resulted in improved communication or information flow between those who 
need it most.1370 
Taking a basin-wide approach is not always appropriate 
Part of the focus on generating and sharing data about the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed is part of the philosophy of IWRM, which stresses the importance of a basin-
wide approach to water governance. This approach has some fans within the region. 
Sharma sees a basin-scale approach as appropriate for the rejuvenation of the Ganges – a 
massive undertaking that has gained momentum in recent years.1371  
A basin-wide approach is part of the underlying philosophy of foreign-led intervention. 
The Abu Dhabi Dialogue brings together all riparians from the Indus, Ganges and 
Brahmaputra basins, as does the South Asia Water Initiative. Earle et al. argue that  
‘Basin-based institutions can help to reduce uncertainty surrounding 
Ganges-Brahmaputra riparian relations, which has been the bane of the 
region for a long time. If successful, these institutions can possibly shift 
the focus from disconnected and short-term interactions of the riparian 
countries into a continuous relationship that has scope for future 
routine gains.’1372  
The theory, then, is sound: basin-wide approaches can build trust and provide a forum for 
the resolution of transboundary water conflicts. But in the decade of the Abu Dhabi 
Dialogue this has not eventuated. In reference to the Ganges-Brahmaputra basin, Earle et 
al. point out that ‘To date, however, all these expectations…have not ventured beyond 
political statements and setting up lofty goals.’1373  
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305 
 
A basin-wide approach, furthermore, may not be an appropriate solution for many other 
problems in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin. Swain shows that a basin-wide 
approach was not successful in the Nile Basin Initiative,1374 on which the Abu Dhabi 
Dialogue was modelled, and that a sub-basin approach may have had more of a chance of 
successfully increasing transboundary water cooperation in the Nile basin.1375 The basin-
wide approach requires consensus from all riparian states, and that can be an impediment 
for taking action on certain issues, especially ones that do not affect the basin as a whole. 
This is also the case in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin (and for this reason 
considering the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed as a separate and distinct unit of water 
management may be a more functional scoping of transboundary water governance 
issues). 
There is tremendous ecological, social, economic, et cetera, variability in various parts of 
the region and a local rather than a basin-wide approach may be more effective for certain 
problems, such as flooding. International actors, according to one regional analyst, will 
meet their goals only once they have defined the specific problems they are trying to 
address rather than targeting the broad and vague water governance crisis.1376 
There is also a risk in taking a benefit sharing approach – a negotiation tactic favoured by 
third parties – on a basin-wide basis. As Sadoff and Grey point out, ‘[i]f significant benefits 
accrue in one country, while significant costs are borne by another, it is possible that a 
project providing net benefits on a basin-wide scale could actually generate net losses in 
any one country.’1377 This, in turn, may compound perceptions of water injustice and thus 
perpetuate disputes between riparians rather than contributing to cooperation between 
them. Significantly, Zeitoun and Mirumachi list benefit-sharing based on agreements as an 
example of neutral rather than of positive interaction.1378 In other words, benefit sharing is 
not a straightforward solution to increasing cooperation between riparian states.  
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Low political will and high power asymmetry between riparians are not accounted for 
To some extent, international actors have found an opportunity to intervene in the 
transboundary water governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed because of the 
relatively low political will within the region to address shared water issues. But without 
political will for change, it is difficult if not impossible to alter the status quo, especially 
from outside the system. Earle et al. point out that ‘the trust deficit is extremely high in 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra basin’ and that ‘there is certainly a lack of political will in the 
basin, particularly in India, to provide the space for multilateral river institutions to 
effectively emerge.’1379 As another regional water analyst claims, because there is little 
political appetite for transboundary cooperation within these countries (among their 
ruling elite), and even less in India, the work of third parties in this regard becomes more 
challenging.1380 The drive for transboundary cooperation comes almost exclusively from 
international actors, rather than from the riparians.1381  
Tiwary shows that considerations outside of the negotiation table affect the outcome of 
formal negotiations. He argues that above all else, ‘international water conflict resolution 
requires considerable political will on all the sides’ and sustained motivation to reach 
agreement.1382 Tiwary also argues that states negotiate not only in reaction to other 
riparians, but also in reaction to domestic politics. For example, ‘[i]n nations where threats 
of water security are more apparent, or in a relatively weaker state (which strikes a deal 
with stronger states), there are dangers of negotiators – political 
parties/institutions/individuals – being labelled as villains who compromised over national 
well-being’1383 and the fear of this colours the negotiation dynamic. Thus, understanding 
the cultural context and power dynamics between riparians is important in understanding 
informal negotiations over transboundary waters, and political will on the part of the 
stakeholders is an important factor in conflict resolution.  
As Hill argues, co-operation between all South Asian states is essential if the multiple 
crises of water are to be overcome, and multi-scalar civil society networks could play an 
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active and important role in overcoming the impasse of lack of political will. But at present 
such networks are weak, underdeveloped and unable to exert significant influence on state 
policy and inter-state relations.1384 Moreover, foreign-led interventions are not explicitly 
building these sort of networks, but rather focusing on the limited set of relationships 
within and between government actors through Track II dialogue. But while that is one 
part of the puzzle of transboundary water cooperation, the efficacy of SAWI and the Abu 
Dhabi Dialogue is weakened by India’s low commitment to multilateralism.1385 
A further limit on the efficacy of international actors is that they are divorced from the 
political reality in the region. As one strategic analyst explained, international actors must 
operate with the dominant political context and not simply assume a good idea will come 
to pass because it is a good idea; it must be politic too. These third parties must take into 
consideration all the ‘political horse trading’ that goes on and which can either facilitate or 
hinder their initiatives. According to this same analyst, SAWI does not seem to operate 
astutely within the political context of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed.1386 Yet, 
without understanding the current as well as historical political context, half a century of 
ill-will relating to shared waters cannot be undone, argues Prasai.1387 
A significant part of the political context in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is the 
presence of a hydro-hegemon. Yet, the structural power asymmetry between India, Nepal, 
Bhutan and Bangladesh is not factored into the Track II dialogue processes being 
facilitated, and there is little consideration for how lack of political will within the region 
undermines the possibility of success of these initiatives. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, hydro-hegemony and power asymmetry between actors can be 
a factor of both conflict and stabilisation. Yet, the international actors engaged in 
increasing regional stability through cooperative transboundary water governance do not 
incorporate hydro-hegemony theory into their theory of change, nor actively address the 
effects of the power imbalance between India and its Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed 
co-riparians. As the hydro-hegemon in the region, India is able to set the agenda for water 
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governance and this inhibits relations with neighbouring states, who resent and brace 
against India’s dominance.1388  
The presence of external, foreign actors sometimes provides a much needed neutral party 
to water negotiations,1389 but overall the international initiatives are unlikely to 
significantly alter the power dynamic or perception of inequality in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed. Moreover, the hydro-hegemon’s support for any interventions 
into the hydropolitics of the region is crucial for their success. Yet, as discussed above, 
India has been only a lukewarm supporter of the Abu Dhabi Dialogue. India’s hydro-
hegemony rather than the power of consensus continues to set the tone for the 
hydropolitics in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. As Wirsing et al. point out, ‘far 
from heralding a new and more cooperative era, the situation seems reflective of an all too 
familiar state-centric and asymmetrical power-political order’ and does not bode well for 
the region’s future water security.1390 
Understanding the dynamics of hydro-hegemony – and especially counter-hegemony – 
can provide the basis for a strategy to alter the status quo.1391 Power asymmetry, according 
to Zeitoun et al., enables or disables justice claims and conflict resolution efforts.1392 
Hegemonic actors use their power to ‘deny or curtail the claims by non-hegemonic actors 
of past injustices, or of current inequitable arrangements of water use, treaties, or 
institutions’ and thus conflict resolution is most effective if based on analysis that 
appreciates and brings to life these intricacies of justice.1393 But these intricacies of water 
justice and the effect of power asymmetry on conflict is not expressly taken into account 
by SAWI, or the two main international donors of transboundary water governance, 
Australia and the United Kingdom.  
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Increasing water cooperation will not necessarily result in greater regional stability 
International organisations and foreign aid donors engaging in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed are not informed by the literature on natural resource conflicts and water 
interactions. The foundational documents of SAWI, SAWGP and the Australian and 
Norwegian initiatives in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed do not reference even the 
most prominent scholars in this field, such as Aaron Wolf or the London Water Research 
Group’s work on hydro-hegemony. Some documents by other research/policy 
organisations, such as the Asia Foundation1394 or Adelphi,1395 are informed by this research, 
but these are not prevalent or significant enough to meaningfully influence discourse 
about water conflicts and transboundary water governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed. This is important because, as Keohane and Nye warn, applying the wrong 
rhetoric to problems leads to erroneous analysis and bad policy.1396 
As has been discussed in the literature review chapter, there have been several swings in 
the thinking on water conflict and cooperation. The work of Aaron Wolf in the 1990s has 
been instrumental in refuting the once prevalent water wars thesis. However, this has led 
to an arguably over-optimistic mood that sees cooperation as the inevitable march of 
history. More recently, scholarship such as Mirumachi and Allan’s Transboundary Water 
Interaction Nexus (TWINS) model, and Zeitoun and Warner’s work on hydro-hegemony 
have served as cautionary tales against the prevalent optimism without reverting to the 
water wars scenario.1397  
Zeitoun and Mirumachi also offer an important point for the application of deliberative 
water governance initiatives and the evaluation of their success in contributing to regional 
stability: cooperation and conflict are not binary opposites. The reliance on continua for 
plotting cooperation versus conflict in a linear dichotomy has unintentionally led to the 
prevailing understanding that all conflict is ‘bad’ while cooperation is inherently ‘good’. 
Significantly, this tendency has led to policy assuming that relations over transboundary 
waters may be improved simply by promoting movement along one direction or on one 
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element of the water interaction, rather than addressing the broader context as a whole.1398 
This is the case in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. 
Just as the nature of cooperation is poorly understood by international actors in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, so the nature of conflict is misunderstood. In South 
Asia, as elsewhere, the absence of war is not equivalent to an efficient and equitable 
solution to water governance problems.1399 A sense of unfairness and injustice is often at 
the root of conflict, over water or otherwise.1400 For example, tensions may develop 
between those who are rich enough to cope with water shortages, and those who are too 
poor.1401 As such, the goal of creating equitable solutions and establishing water justice 
may be a more appropriate one for foreign aid donors and international organisations 
aiming to increasing stability and cooperation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. 
The assumption underpinning the internationally-driven initiatives for deliberative river 
governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is that is that if countries cooperate 
on common water issues they may be more likely to cooperate on other issues. 
Cooperative transboundary water interactions are assumed to translate directly into 
overall cooperative geopolitics. This assumption comes from functionalist thinking within 
international relations, which posits that cooperation on transnational issues, such as 
trade and environment, will spill-over to other more difficult issues; ‘cooperation on water 
issues could not only be easier to achieve than other more political and protracted issues, 
but also may form the basis for trust and cooperation on more difficult issues.’1402 
This theory, however, is not borne out empirically. India and Pakistan, for example, have a 
formalised and relatively cooperative1403 relationship over the rivers of the Indus basin 
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under the auspices of the Indus Waters Treaty, which has withstood wars between the two 
countries that were not directly related to water.1404 Conversely, countries that have 
conflicted hydropolitics – such as those in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed – may 
well have more peaceful relations in other spheres. In other words, violent conflicts over 
non-water related issues can emerge between states even as water interactions remain 
cordial and vice versa.  
Another problematic aspect of the theory of change for regional stability through 
improved water governance is the assumption of a spill-over effect from cooperation over 
rivers to cooperation over other disputed sectors. Creating an understanding of benefit 
sharing, positive-sum outcomes, et cetera, in transboundary water governance is expected 
to translate into an overall management of natural resources as a common good, and thus 
reduce disputes over other contested resources. That, however, is a paradigm shift that is 
impossible to achieve with any one project or initiative; it requires slow, incremental and 
messy cultural change and genuine, consistent political will from within the region and 
commitment from the ruling elite to these principles. 
Moreover, increasing cooperation over transboundary waters in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed may mitigate certain types of conflict and insecurity while exacerbating 
others. Social and economic interdependence between states, for example, has for a long 
time been considered a factor in decreasing rates of international conflict. Yet conflict 
does not disappear when interdependence prevails; on the contrary, conflict will take new 
forms, and may even increase, but the traditional approaches to understanding conflict 
will not explain interdependence conflict particularly well.1405  
Water-related conflicts may also take new, unexpected forms. For example, transboundary 
water sharing agreements (particularly those based on a set volume of water rather than a 
percentage of what is available) may become sources of conflict rather than cooperation as 
river flows and levels change. One instance of this was discussed in Chapter 3. The Ganges 
Treaty between India and Bangladesh allocated fixed flow amounts at the Farakka Barrage 
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near the border of the two countries, but quickly became a point of contention as water 
availability declined due to unprecedented withdrawals upstream of the barrage.1406 
Hydropower-sharing agreements also risk being undermined by changing water flows, 
particularly in regions (such as the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed) affected by glacial 
melting with the risk of above-average flows as glaciers melt being followed by droughts 
once they have disappeared.1407 This is already seen in some of the hydropolitics 
surrounding treaties in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
This understanding, however, is missing from the theory of change of international actors 
involved in transboundary water conflict and cooperation issues in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed and that is because they on the whole have a limited 
understanding of water interaction. 
A further limitation on international organisations and aid donors working to build 
regional stability through transboundary water cooperation is that they focus on inter-
state disputes rather than sub-state ones. Yet, despite the water wars rhetoric, most 
incidence of violence surrounding water is at the sub-national level and can occur between 
sectors (such as the case with the farmers’ protests surrounding the transfer of water to 
non-agricultural use from the Hirakud reservoir in the Indian state of Orissa) as well 
between different sub-state agencies.1408 That is not to say that the World Bank and other 
foreign aid donors should become involved in sub-state and local disputes in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed. Rather, the salient point is that these disputes can spill over 
state borders1409 and therefore endanger regional stability. 
In larger part, however, it is because ‘we are excessively preoccupied with the details of 
particular disputes, and fail to see river-water disputes as a subset of the larger set of 
water-related disputes in general, and to ask ourselves what the root causes of such 
                                                     
1406 Hanasz, P 2014, ‘Sharing waters vs sharing rivers: The 1996 Ganges Treaty’, Global Water Forum, 
28 July 2014, Canberra, viewed 2 October 2016, 
<http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2014/07/28/sharing-waters-vs-sharing-rivers-the-1996-ganges-
treaty/>. 
1407 Evans, A 2010, ‘Resource Scarcity, Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict’, World 
Development Report 2011, Background Paper, 9 September 2010, Centre on International 
Cooperation, New York University, New York, pp. 13-14 
1408 Routray, S 2010, ‘The Water Sector in India: An Overview’ in NS Mohan, S Routray, & N 
Sashikumar (eds), River Water Sharing: Transboundary Conflict and Cooperation in India, 
Routledge, New Delhi, p. 36 
1409 Chellaney, B 2013, Water, Peace and War: Confronting the Global Water Crisis, Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, p. 55 
313 
 
conflicts are.’1410 The root causes of water conflict lie in the real or perceived injustice of 
water sharing arrangements. 
The root causes of water-related conflict are not addressed by international actors 
Zeitoun et al. argue that transboundary water justice is influenced by the same dynamics 
that impact transboundary water conflict and cooperation, namely: the disabling or 
enabling role of power asymmetry; the construction of scale to promote agendas; and the 
use of discourse to frame trade-offs and legitimacy.1411 
If water conflict is understood as having roots primarily in unjust water governance, then 
it follows that conflict cannot be resolved, and cooperation instilled, without addressing 
the source of that real or perceived injustice. To this end, Zeitoun et al. draw out four 
lessons for taking a water just approach to transboundary water governance: 
1. Seek conflict resolution/transformation instead of conflict management; 
2. Equitability is a pre-condition for ‘positive’ cooperation and a sustainable outcome; 
3. There are limits to the utility of ‘participation’ in transboundary water 
negotiations;  
4. Sustainable transboundary water arrangements can be informed by considering the 
alternatives generated by counter-hegemonic movements, or justice analysis, 
because they can provide the basis for a strategy to alter the status quo.1412  
Broadly speaking, these lessons have not been taken into account by the Abu Dhabi 
Dialogue and other international actors in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. These 
initiatives focus on conflict management rather than resolution, do not prioritise the 
principle of equitability in governance outcomes, and instead over-emphasise procedural 
fairness in the form of broad participation. They are also not informed by or responsive to 
the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic dynamics in the region. 
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The power of a hydro-hegemon may facilitate and expedite water sharing arrangements, 
but this has no bearing on how equitable these arrangements are (indeed, they are likely 
to be perceived as unjust) and thus does not support conflict resolution. As Zeitoun et al. 
point out, ‘in cases where institutions and structures supporting hegemonic claims remain 
entrenched, the original unjust hegemonic arrangements would very likely be replaced by 
new hegemonic configurations, very possibly equally unjust.’1413 Thus, by seeking the 
participation, consent and support of India, international organisations and foreign aid 
donors may be implicitly (albeit inadvertently) continuing the hegemonic status quo that 
is at the root of the water disputes they are also aiming to rectify. Moreover, the uncritical 
or unprincipled hydro-diplomacy efforts that follow the tone established by the hegemon 
may, according to Zeitoun et al., dismiss a water justice approach as impractical.1414 This is 
illustrated in the debacle over the World Bank’s Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment. This 
comprehensive report was rejected by Nepal and Bangladesh in part because of a 
perception that the solutions proposed therein favoured the hydro-hegemon, India.1415  
It can be seen that the international actors intervening in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed have not taken a water justice approach to transboundary water governance. 
Their efforts largely focus on conflict management rather than resolution and do not 
prioritise the development of equitable water sharing arrangements. The focus on 
participation is laudable but of limited utility in addressing the roots of water conflict, 
especially as those roots lie in the vast power asymmetries between riparians. The 
dynamics of hegemony and counter-hegemony are not taken into consideration by the 
third parties intervening in the transboundary water interaction in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed. Lastly, historical grievances, such as those described in 
Chapter 3, are not addressed by SAWI or the other third parties. Yet, as Perlman-Petersen 
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and Wolf argue, ‘[i]t is necessary both to address past and present grievances as a 
prerequisite for market-driven solutions.’1416  
In summary, it is unlikely that these internationally-led interventions will succeed in water 
dispute resolution – and thus the increase of transboundary water cooperation – without 
addressing these power asymmetries and taking a water justice approach. 
There are limits to the utility of Track II Dialogue, procedural justice and participatory 
decision-making 
One facet of a water justice approach is that of participation. This means participation in 
water governance processes, and in the decision-making about water allocation. As Patrick 
explains, ‘[w]ho decides what is just and for whom depends on who or what is excluded or 
included in the water-allocation decision-making process.’1417 This is important for 
achieving water justice, she argues, because  
‘If social inclusion is achieved, the variety of perspectives on what and 
why water is needed by the different users for different uses and the 
underlying rationale for these reasons is best described as a continuum 
of potential just outcomes. On the other hand, the social exclusion of 
any particular stakeholder group can result in injustices simply because 
certain opinions, needs or world-views are excluded.’1418 
The merit of the participatory approach is understood and appreciated in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed. There is a growing understanding that the water resources of 
the Hindu Kush Himalaya region are shared resources and must be managed as such.1419 
Asthana and Shukla, for example, make the case that ‘South Asia needs to move forward 
with a cooperative and participatory approach on river basins and water sharing. There 
needs to be a regional awareness that rivers can be better harnessed through collective 
efforts and recognition that cooperation is essential to alleviate threats to water 
                                                     
1416 Petersen-Perlman, JD & Wolf, AT 2015, ‘Getting to the First Handshake: Enhancing Security by 
Initiating Cooperation in Transboundary River Basins’, Journal of the American Water Resources 
Association, DOI: 10.1111/1752-1688.12348, vol. 51, no. 6, p. 4 
1417 Patrick, MJ 2014, ‘The Cycles and Spirals of Justice in water-allocation decision making’, Water 
International, DOI: 10.1080/02508060.2013.863646, vol. 39, no. 1, p. 70 
1418 Patrick, MJ 2014, ‘The Cycles and Spirals of Justice in water-allocation decision making’, Water 
International, DOI: 10.1080/02508060.2013.863646, vol. 39, no. 1, p. 70 
1419 Vaidya, RA, & Sharma, E (eds) 2014, Research Insights on Climate and Water in the Hindu Kush 
Himalayas, ICIMOD, Kathmandu, p. iv 
316 
 
security.’1420 Colopy too argues that participatory, regional cooperation is the foundation of 
intelligent river basin management.1421 Hill adds that this approach is essential if the 
multiple water crises in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed (described in Chapter 3) 
are to be overcome.1422  
Nonetheless, procedural justice is not the same as equitability in Zeitoun et al.’s 
understanding of the term and thus not a pre-requisite for conflict resolution. They argue 
that recognition and participation of all relevant stakeholders is indeed important, but 
that distributive justice is also a necessary condition for resolving water disputes.1423 
Furthermore, if we accept Zeitoun and Mirumachi’s understanding of water conflict and 
cooperation as coexisting, and their argument that not all cooperation is ‘good’,1424 then it 
follows that ‘participatory processes can be just as strategic, manipulative, and coercive as 
these forms of cooperation…and may be very distant indeed from any world view of 
justice.’1425 An example of this from the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is SAWI over-
stating the breadth and depth of inclusiveness in the Track II dialogues it facilitates. 
In short, there are limits to the utility of participation in transboundary water 
negotiations. That is Zeitoun et al.’s third principle for a water justice approach to 
transboundary water conflict negotiations.1426 It is significant in the context of 
international organisations and donors in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed because 
these interventions favour participation (in the form of Track II dialogue) but do so at the 
cost of distributive justice. As one water justice advocate argues, SAWI will not succeed in 
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increasing transboundary water cooperation as long as it remains only a ‘talk shop.’1427 
Another regional analyst points out that while Track II dialogue is important in bringing 
previously disempowered groups to the negotiation table, it is unlikely make material 
difference unless the interests of those groups are made to be the interests of the ruling 
elite.1428  
There are other weaknesses in the pursuit of transboundary water cooperation through 
Track II dialogue. Problemshed that, like the Ganges-Brahmaputra, are low in both trust 
and political will for increased cooperation seem ideal candidates for Track II dialogue. To 
recap, Track II dialogue is used herein to denote ‘unofficial dialogues, generally between 
two antagonistic parties, and often facilitated by an impartial Third Party and involving 
individuals with some close connections to their respective official communities, focused 
on cooperative efforts to explore new ways to resolve differences over, or discuss new 
approaches to, policy-relevant issues.’1429 
Track II dialogue can also be understood as the informal, non-binding, non-attributive 
discussions with government and non-state actors, and as such is the nexus between Track 
I dialogue (formal, government-to-government relations) and Track III (informal 
discussions between non-state actors only such as NGOs, academia, et cetera.)1430 These 
neat definitions, however, are not easy to apply in practice; everyone understands them 
differently.1431 How and when these process should be pursued is also contested.  
Some scholars see Track II dialogue as the foundation of cooperative transboundary 
interaction, and argue that it is critical that it happens before Track I processes begin 
because government negotiators and diplomats in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed 
tend to have a zero-sum approach to negotiations. Therefore, there is first a need for talks 
between peers who can scope the problems and begin addressing it from the perspective 
of shared interests.1432 The logic is that engaging with non-government stakeholders early 
on in a negotiation process ensures that they can establish an agenda rather than have it 
imposed by external or government actors.1433 
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Others see less value in Track II dialogue alone and instead believe that what drives 
change is collaboration between non-government groups, i.e., Track III dialogue.1434 This, 
however, is difficult to facilitate by third parties because it is in essence a bottom-up and 
organic process. But by focussing exclusively on Track II dialogue, international actors are 
limited in the contribution they can make to improved transboundary water interaction in 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. This is especially so as SAWI in particular engages 
only actors who already engage with government. As Prasai argues, because the 
transboundary water governance impasse in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is 
between governments, not between non-state actors, there is no fresh perspective on the 
problem set; Track II dialogue allows only for discussion between actors who are already 
part of the discussion about transboundary water issues.1435 
Most of the literature on Track II dialogue takes the view that a third party is necessary, 
and Jones argues that the heart of Track II dialogue is the inability or unwillingness of the 
protagonists to the conflict to come together of their own accord. Furthermore, he argues, 
brainstorming by the parties themselves may not be enough, and under the wrong 
circumstances it may do more harm than good. Jones shows that ‘the role of a third party 
is to gently steer the conversation down more productive paths; in effect, the idea behind 
Track Two is not just that the parties engage in brainstorming but that they engage in a 
particular kind of facilitated discussion. Absent this role, the conversation can degenerate 
into a frustrating bargaining session which holds little promise, especially in a highly 
charged, emotional situation where the conflict is deemed to be intractable; in such 
circumstances, what is there to bargain over?’1436 
Jones’ point is at the crux of this thesis: if there is trust between riparians and political will 
to take action, then there is no need for facilitated Track II dialogue (though third parties 
may provide technical assistance). Track II dialogue becomes an option for dispute 
resolution only when those two factors are missing. Yet the absence of trust between 
riparians and lack of political will for building transboundary water cooperation is also 
what undermines Track II dialogue. That is to say, Track II is more likely to succeed if 
there is trust between the parties, or when there is political will for action. Certainly, Track 
II dialogue may contribute to the development of one or both of those conditions, but that 
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is a long term enterprise and highly unpredictable. As Jones shows, ‘real peace is made as a 
result of a complex and interlocking web of factors, and that Track Two, however 
important in getting a dialogue going, is but one of these.’1437 
There is, nonetheless, a role – albeit a circumscribed one – for international actors in this 
sector. They are often seen as a neutral third party, and can therefore facilitate dialogue 
between in-basin actors who may otherwise be distrustful of each other. Thus, while it 
may seem counter-intuitive that a bottom-up process is being led from above and by 
external actors, this may in practice have the positive effect of bringing neutrality to a 
situation fraught with mutual suspicion and a history of poor communication.1438 
Donors and international organisations may also contribute to the overall slow and 
uncertain process of improving transboundary water interaction. Creating an 
understanding of water as a shared resource is no straightforward task. Indeed, it seems 
unlikely that a paradigm shift of that kind can be imposed at all. Progress toward greater 
transboundary cooperation involves slowly but steadily chipping away at small parts of the 
problems. Many organisations and actors need to work in concert, ‘chipping away’ (in 
Prasai’s words) at that problem. But this slow, steady, and largely uncoordinated and 
unplanned work is not reflected by donor language, which expects to bring about an 
attitude shift in one funding cycle.1439  
The global system of foreign aid poses structural challenges 
Donor language and the system of donor-led development is a further limitation on 
international actors engaged in the hydropolitics of the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed. This section examines some of the structural issues foreign aid that affect 
the way that donors and international organisations fund transboundary water governance 
programs, and how these programs are designed. These issues include the cumbersome 
and risk-averse bureaucracies that drive such programs; the difficulty of separating out 
cause from effect; the focus on short-term goals, and the difficulty in sustaining early 
successes into long-term progress; and the foreign agendas that drive international 
development. Each of these points is discussed in this final section. 
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Crowded, inefficient and risk-averse; the global system foreign aid 
International actors intervening in the transboundary water governance of the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed are part of a complex global system of foreign development aid. 
Although it is not the purpose of this thesis to critique international aid, it is worth noting 
that ‘aid’s systemic problems are large and growing, narrowing the gap between aid’s 
harshest critics and broader analyses of aid impact.’1440 Some of these problems affect the 
way foreign donors conduct water governance initiatives. For example, Evans et al. point 
out that the World Bank – one of the largest donors of aid in South Asia – is known for its 
‘heavy and often risk-averse bureaucratic processes—geared more toward large, loan-
financed operations than toward partnership-based and grant-financed programs—which 
tend to impede flexibility, innovation, and speed, and therefore limit impact.’1441 
It is not only the World Bank that is cumbersome and inefficient; the system is largely like 
this. Foreign aid is, according to Riddell, ‘characterised by an ever-increasing number of 
donors overseeing a growing number of discrete projects, creating an ever-more complex 
web of transactions and parallel management systems, many replicating and duplicating 
each other’1442 and therefore ‘the overall allocation of all aid is the (unplanned and 
unpredictable) outcome of the cumulative voluntary decisions made by all individual 
donors.’1443 As such, ‘[i]nefficiencies in terms of impact and effectiveness are thus “built 
into” the current way that aid is allocated.’1444 This is true of the increasing number of 
international actors vying for influence in the transboundary water governance of the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. There are three main donors to SAWI (Australia, 
United Kingdom and Norway), but these donors also each run their own water governance 
programs, policy initiatives, and commercial ventures (for example, Australia’s eWater). 
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The twin problems of effect and attribution 
The crowded and complex system of foreign aid means that it is almost impossible to 
separate out the effects of individual donors on common objectives.1445 This is especially 
relevant to general, high level, long term objectives such as increasing transboundary 
water cooperation. Mayne shows that the question of whether or not desired effects are 
occurring, and the related question of attribution (that is, who or what is responsible for 
bringing those effects about) is well known in both international development and public 
policy.1446 Program evaluation through social science research methods is usually the best 
way to answer these questions of effect and attribution, but they are time consuming and 
expensive.1447 Mayne argues that even with a thorough evaluation study it may not be 
possible to get accurate results about a program’s effect and attribution of positive 
outcomes. The purpose of an evaluation, therefore, is more about knowledge creation 
(that is, getting an approximate sense of whether something may be working or not) than 
scientific measurement.1448  
Even with the most robust of evaluations, there are likely to be multiple causes of and 
explanations for specific social effects. Mayne explains that part of the attribution 
problems is that there are often alternative plausible explanations for certain outcomes – 
the aid program being evaluated is just one of these. He argues that ‘those who are 
sceptical that it really was the program’s contribution that counted will point to other 
reasons for the observed outcome—for example, other related government programs, 
economic or social trends, behaviour unaffected by the program.’1449 In the case of the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed there are some factors outside of initiatives led by 
international organisations and aid donors that may affect the quality of transboundary 
water interaction in the near future. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, though not an 
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unequivocal champion of multilateralism, has nonetheless been reinvigorating water 
agreement negotiations with co-riparians that had stagnated in recent years (the 
Pancheswar high dam project with Nepal and the Teesta River treaty with Bangladesh are 
two prime examples).  
At the same time, and equally importantly, it is just as difficult to attribute failure as it is 
to attribute success. As Pahl-Wostl argues, ‘[i]t is also not clear who is to be made 
accountable for failed governance notions in increasingly diffuse and complex governance 
networks where roles of governing and becoming governed become increasingly 
blurred.’1450 She is speaking specifically about water governance, and her point applies to 
international actors in the transboundary water interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed; just as it is difficult to attribute success to these initiatives, it is also difficult 
to attribute failure.  
Another challenge for evaluating the effectiveness of aid programs is that ‘there is likely to 
be a significant delay before the intended outcomes occur and the attribution picture 
portrayed through tracking performance over time will not be as evident.’1451 Nonetheless, 
argues Mayne, outcomes need to be tracked over the long-term, even though attribution 
becomes even more of a challenge on longer timescales.1452 
Short-term effectiveness, long-term failure 
Ascertaining effectiveness of individual donors on long term goals, however, may be a 
moot point; a further structural problem of the foreign aid system is that sustaining 
immediate benefits of aid into the long term often proves challenging.1453 Riddell argues 
that foreign aid works best for accomplishing short-term effects,1454 but warns that 
‘immediate project success…does not necessarily mean permanent success. The evidence 
shows that the numbers of positive project assessments tend to drop markedly when 
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projects are examined over time: there are clearly problems in sustaining success.’1455 Thus 
the very nature of the objective of improving transboundary water governance in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed limits the possibility of this objective being brought 
about by any one initiative, or sustained into the long-term.  
Paradoxically, the focus of many foreign-led initiatives on ‘quick results actually 
undermines the transformational potential of aid’ according to Andrew Natsios, former 
head of the world’s largest bilateral agency, the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID).1456 The transformational approach to aid-giving means assisting a 
country to build and promote its own development path. But, argues Riddell, the 
systematic priority given to achieving short-term, tangible and measurable results means 
that less aid is available to support more complex initiatives, the intended results of which 
take longer to achieve and the outcomes of which are more difficult to predict.1457  
Even with the essentially transformational objective of improving transboundary water 
interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, international organisations and 
donor-led initiatives are justified and financed according to progress on short term, 
quantifiable measures that have only a superficial relation to the ultimate goal. For 
example, Australia’s South Asia Regional Development Program Strategy is explicit about 
the ‘results’ it intends to deliver:  
‘Australia and the eight countries we work with in South Asia 
(Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and 
Sri Lanka) have signed up to international commitments to delivering 
aid focused on results, consistent with the Paris Declaration for Aid 
Effectiveness (2005), Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and Busan 
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (2012). We will 
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deliver our aid program in line with these international 
commitments.’1458  
The Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness commits to ‘results-oriented reporting’1459 while 
one of the three main themes of the Accra Agenda for Action is ‘Delivering results that will 
have real and measurable impact on development.’1460 As for the Busan Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation, one of its four principles is ‘[a] focus on results: 
Having a sustainable impact should be the driving force behind investments and efforts in 
development policy making.’1461 Effectiveness and accountability are, of course, highly 
desirable in foreign aid programs. But, as discussed above, the focus on tangible results 
can have the unintended consequence of driving donors to focus on short-term, tangible 
and quantifiable programs. In turn this may have the effect, identified by Riddell, of less 
aid fund being available to support complex, long-term initiatives.1462  
A further unintended consequence of a results-oriented approach to international 
development is that ‘value for money’ must be demonstrated. This, in turn, creates a 
misleading relationship between funding and outcomes. The assumption becomes that the 
more money that is thrown at a problem, the greater or surer the outcome is. A trace of 
this assumption can be found in the documentation about SAWI. The basic premise of 
SAWI is that funding for Track II dialogue workshops, conferences, meetings, et cetera, 
will have a proportional effect on levels of cooperation between the riparians of the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. This does not take into consideration the qualitative 
factors of transboundary water interaction.  
In the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed there has been more than 60 years of 
geopolitical impasse on transboundary water issues. Prasai doubts that money alone can 
resolve the underlying tensions, distrust and wicked problems of policy.1463 This 
assumption is another reflection of how far removed from local political realities that 
international actors are at times. As discussed above, these initiatives are unlikely to 
succeed if they are not connected to and work within the existing political context; instead 
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of focusing on how many workshops they can fund, donors and other international 
organisations would be more effective, according to one regional analyst, through 
understanding all the ‘political horse trading’ that can both facilitate and hinder initiatives 
for greater cooperation.1464 
On the other hand, it can be said that SAWI is not interested in meddling in regional 
politics but rather in capacity building within the political establishment and hydrocracy. 
Yet, capacity building is one of the weakest mechanisms of foreign development aid. 
Riddell points out that ‘successive evaluations suggest that … aid has generally not been at 
all successful in its efforts to build capacities, encourage the retention of high level skills 
and strengthen public institutions in a sustainable manner’ and the World Bank in 
particular has acknowledged that its efforts in this area have been extremely 
disappointing.1465 This is an admission because, as discussed in Chapter 4, capacity 
building is an increasingly important aid function for the World Bank. Although the 
World Bank has in the past been seen as ‘serious, engaged partner only when in the lead 
and in control’1466 in recent years it has been deliberately shifting its operational focus 
toward having more of a facilitating role in bringing together diverse stakeholders ‘to 
cooperate on a common agenda and pursue activities within their respective areas of 
strength.’1467  
In the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, the ‘common agenda’ that the World Bank 
pursuing is that of transboundary water cooperation. Yet, there is a disconnect between 
main objective of SAWI and the ‘results’ that are expected. The overarching SAWI 
Program Development Objective is ‘[t]o increase regional cooperation in the management 
of the Himalayan River systems to deliver sustainable, fair and inclusive development and 
climate resilience.’1468 Yet, the outcome indicators linked to this goal are distinctly short-
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term, quantifiable, and with uncertain bearing on the sustainability of increased regional 
cooperation. The outcome indicators for this objective are:  
• Number of existing or new bilateral or multilateral governance processes that 
support cooperative water management that have been informed by SAWI 
activities 
• Value of investments secured though bilateral or multilateral governance processes 
and that have been informed by SAWI activities 
• Quality of the planning processes underpinning new investments in terms of either 
o the breadth and strength of stakeholder consultation,  
o a stronger technical basis for investment designs, and/or 
o the pace at which investment designs are agreed1469 
In other words, a long-term, transformational goal is expected to be reached through 
quantitative improvements in stakeholder process and monetary investments rather than 
qualitative improvements to those processes or investments. The progress toward the 
other goals of SAWI is measured by similarly short-term indicators.1470 Mayne warns that 
program managers need to be realistic about the outcomes of their policies, and the 
accuracy with which effectiveness can be measured.1471 But the language of the 
development sector in South Asia is, according to Prasai, unrealistic because it focuses on 
outputs and outcomes, forgetting that progress is a long term struggle and can be 
nebulous and unquantifiable.1472  
There is little acknowledgement within the planning and documentation of these 
international interventions that the improvement of transboundary water governance in 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is a long term objective, not easily measured, and 
one that cannot readily be brought about by a single program or project. Indeed, progress 
on cooperation involves, in Prasai’s words, slowly but steadily ‘chipping away at small 
parts of the problems’ (for example, the culture of secrecy) by many organisations, small 
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and large, working in concert; change cannot be brought about in one donor funding cycle 
and neatly quantified by static performance indicators.1473  
The Abu Dhabi Dialogue had a ‘ten-year vision’ for what Vaidya and Sharma describe as a 
‘cooperative and knowledge-based partnership of states for fairly managing and 
developing the Himalayan river systems to bring economic prosperity, peace and social 
harmony, and environmental sustainability from the source to the sea.’1474 Yet, a decade 
may be too short a timeframe for achieving goals as profound and far-reaching as these. As 
Earle et al. point out, ‘the World Bank has failed in its hope to bring South Asian countries 
within a common water-sharing framework’1475 in the lifespan of the Abu Dhabi Dialogue.  
The problem of attribution is also not clearly dealt with in the grey literature from 
international actors in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. As discussed above, there 
are often alternative plausible explanations for certain outcomes in addition to the 
explanation that the aid program being evaluated was effective in reaching its objective. 
Mayne suggests that  
‘Dealing with these alternative explanations explicitly is often the best 
way of buttressing an argument in favour of the program’s impact. This 
entails: identifying the most likely alternative explanations; presenting 
whatever evidence or argument you have to discuss and, where 
appropriate, discounting these alternative explanations; and presenting 
whatever evidence there is that the program is a more likely 
explanation.’1476  
Yet there seems to be very little information in the publicly available documents from 
SAWI and other international actors about dealing with the problem of attribution, either 
with Mayne’s method or otherwise. 
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Foreign aid is driven by foreign agendas 
The final structural limitation on donors and international organisations working to 
increase transboundary water cooperation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is 
that international development projects are more often than not guided by foreign 
interests rather than the inherent worth or necessity of the project in question. As Riddell 
points out, ‘the allocation of official aid is still influenced by the short-term political, 
security and commercial interests of donor governments.’1477 Chapter 4 illustrated how the 
World Bank, Australia and the United Kingdom have all been driven to intervene in the 
transboundary water governance of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed by 
considerations other than the quality of interaction between India, Nepal, Bhutan and 
Bangladesh.  
Donors regularly switch the countries to which they provide aid, argues Riddell. Donors 
also annually vary ‘the amounts of aid they provide, influencing in turn the predictability 
of official aid flows.’1478 This variability and unpredictability in the system of foreign aid 
affects effectiveness of development projects and programs, and exacerbates the problem 
of short-term vision because there is little certainty and continuity for long-term 
initiatives. Riddell adds that ‘[f]or some donors, commercial interests, for example through 
aid-tying, have also played an important role in determining aid flows. These factors 
influence which country will receive aid, the amounts provided and the period for which 
aid is given.’1479 
Which country receives aid and what for is also ‘influenced quite critically by what is 
happening in the wider economy and by donor attitudes, which have sometimes been 
assessed as too cautious.’ 1480 For the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed that means 
international actors are keen to fund transboundary water cooperation programs as long 
as water security, good governance, sustainable development, non-traditional security 
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threats, et cetera, remain at the forefront of global discourses. Once that is no longer the 
case, it is possible that interventions for improving water interaction will be discontinued, 
and they may be discontinued irrespective of whether or not sustainable progress has been 
attained. 
Conclusion 
Those within the Ganges-Brahmaputra would generally like to see third parties better 
tackle the historical grievances and root causes of water conflicts – even (or especially) if 
those causes are not related to water directly. They would also like to see transboundary 
waters de-securitised, and water sharing institutions strengthened. At the same time, the 
power asymmetry between riparian states must be mitigated. These approaches may help 
build trust between riparian states, and create political will for addressing shared water 
problems. Of course these approaches are not intended as a one-size-fits-all solution to 
complex challenges. Indeed, it is not likely that there will ever be a single solution or best 
approach given the interconnectedness and complexity of water governance, food security, 
climate change, sustainable development, et cetera.  
Nonetheless, what international actors are currently doing in this problemshed is not 
always leading to the desired outcomes. Have international organisation and foreign aid 
donors directly or substantially contributed to improved transboundary water interaction 
in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed? Earle et al. argue that no, ‘[u]nfortunately, the 
World Bank has failed in its hope to bring South Asian countries within a common water-
sharing framework.’1481 There are several explanations for this. There are limitations 
inherent in the way that international actors conduct their interventions into 
transboundary water governance. As one analyst put it, there are ‘a lot of solutions looking 
for problems’ in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, and that ‘when all you have is a 
hammer, then every problem becomes a nail.’1482 Thus, Track II dialogue, knowledge-
sharing, basin-wide approaches, etc., miss the mark because they are general tactic, not 
tailored to the specific context of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. 
There are also structural limitations on international actors. The system in which 
international organisations and donor agencies operate – the system of foreign aid – is 
crowded, inefficient, short-sighted, and driven by complex agendas. Furthermore, the 
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effectiveness and impact of international actors in the transboundary water governance of 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed will likely never be known because of the twin 
problems of effect and attribution.1483 The crowded and complex system of foreign aid 
means that it is almost impossible to separate out the effects of individual donors and 
external factors on common objectives.1484 And the desired effects can be brought about by 
factors entirely unrelated to the project or program working towards them.1485  
It is unlikely that the third parties engaged in improving transboundary water interaction 
in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed will achieve in the foreseeable future their stated 
goals (listed in Chapter 5) of increasing cooperation, instituting good water governance, 
ensuring overall regional stability, building climate change resilience and sustainable 
development. But how much does that matter, and why? 
As discussed above, proving success of development projects and programs is used to 
‘justify their very existence.’1486 Yet, cause and effect is rarely, if ever, direct and measurable 
in a complex adaptive system such as hydropolitics. To some extent, then, the difficulty of 
creating transboundary water cooperation is not due to inefficient or incapable third 
parties, but rather to the complexity and unpredictability of the system.  
Transboundary water interaction can be understood as an ambiguous, largely 
unquantifiable, and nebulous process that arises out of largely unpredictable dynamics in a 
complex system of other political, social, economic and environmental dynamics that 
interplay on local, national, regional and global scales. In the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed, foreign-led interventions are only one component of transboundary water 
interaction. Improving the quality of interaction is unlikely to occur through the efforts of 
one actor, stakeholder group, or initiative. Instead, transboundary water cooperation 
involves slowly but steadily ‘chipping away’ at aspects of the problem by numerous actors 
working in concert over a long period of time, and it can never be achieved in one foreign 
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aid funding cycle or adequately measured by the sort of short-term indicators favoured by 
foreign aid donors.1487 Foreign-led interventions in the transboundary water governance of 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed are merely a drop in the ocean in terms of their 
overall effect on water cooperation. Yet, the ocean is comprised of individual drops and 
every one counts.  
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Conclusions 
In 2011 Swain summarised the effect of donor-led, basin-wide cooperative frameworks in 
the Nile Basin. Five years later, his conclusions can well be applied to foreign-led 
initiatives into transboundary water cooperation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed: 
‘The so-called basin-based cooperative framework in the Nile was 
initiated with the active involvement of international donor agencies, 
and it still survives with their help and assistance. Even after more than 
a decade of existence, the NBI [Nile Basin Initiative] receives still very 
little contribution from the basins states themselves, exposing the lack 
of interest of the basin states towards joint management of the shared 
river resources. It is true that the Nile Basin Initiative was able to hide 
water-based incompatibilities in this highly volatile region for over a 
decade. However, the present form of water sharing and the quality of 
cooperation is not enough to meet the new challenges that might arise 
from climate change. These existing arrangements need to evolve and 
do so fast, constructively and positively. Unfortunately, there is very 
little sign of that in the Nile basin; rather, there have been movements 
in the opposite direction.’1488 
The Abu Dhabi Dialogue was modelled on the Nile Basin Initiative,1489 and like in the Nile 
basin, the mission of foreign-led interventions to increase transboundary water 
cooperation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed has been limited and weakened by 
several factors. Some of these factors lie in the sheer complexity of the transboundary 
water governance issues – as well as the enormity of other, non-water related political 
priorities – in the region. There are competing issues for political will, and transboundary 
water cooperation is relatively low on the agenda. This was discussed in Chapter 3.  
Other factors limiting the potential for cooperation between India, Nepal, Bhutan and 
Bangladesh lie in a long history of grievances and mistrust between them. This was also 
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discussed in Chapter 3. At the same time, foreign-led interventions are not directly 
targeting the lack of trust between riparians but rather are driven by their own agendas 
and global narratives; good governance, non-traditional security threats, sustainable 
development, water security, climate change resilience, et cetera. These were discussed in 
Chapter 4. Lastly, the approaches favoured by international actors may be inadequate to 
bring about a significant improvement in transboundary water interaction. Track II 
dialogue is a necessary condition of cooperation, but alone – without political will or trust 
between riparians – it is insufficient. Likewise, the relatively short donor funding cycles 
and other weaknesses in the system of foreign aid, may be mismatched with the long-
term, complex, and unpredictable process of improving transboundary water governance.  
What, then, can we learn from the World Bank and other international actors working to 
increase transboundary water cooperation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed? That 
is the central question of this, the final chapter. As Swain’s remarks above illustrate, the 
urgency ‘to meet the new challenges that might arise from climate change’1490 is increasing, 
but workable solutions are not necessarily forthcoming from either the international 
donor community nor the riparian states themselves. 
This last chapter recaps the story of international actors in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed. It begins by establishing why transboundary water interactions in this 
region are fraught. It then describes the genesis in 2006 of the Abu-Dhabi Dialogue, a 
high-level process led by the World Bank that aims to increase cooperation over shared 
water resources in South Asia. The story continues with the Abu Dhabi Dialogue 
establishing the South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI) a few years later. The most significant 
accomplishment of SAWI was the Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment, a comprehensive 
hydrological, economic and social mapping of the Ganges basin. It was intended as a 
blueprint for a benefit-sharing in the basin, but the assessment was rejected by the very 
countries it was intending to support, India, Nepal and Bangladesh. The story of foreign-
led interventions into the transboundary water interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed concludes (at least for the purposes of this thesis) with the end of the 
decade-long Abu Dhabi Dialogue in 2016. 
But why have international actors been getting involved in transboundary water 
governance here? Why and how are they trying to increase cooperation? What challenges 
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does this create? And what can we learn from these challenges about the role of foreign-
led interventions in transboundary water interactions?  
The first section summarises the situation. The Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is 
vulnerable to water related shocks and conflicts. There are many pressing transboundary 
water issues, but governance is weak and the interaction between India, Nepal, Bhutan 
and Bangladesh is fraught. At the same time, good governance and transboundary water 
cooperation are rising on the international agenda as approaches to building stability and 
sustainable development of environmental resources. The combination of (perceived) 
weak governance, and the growing global focus on cooperation is driving aid donors and 
international organisations into the region.  
The second section outlines the problems this situation poses. International organisations 
and foreign aid donors are using the principles of benefit sharing and Track II dialogue to 
increase cooperation, but these methods alone is insufficient to improve transboundary 
water interaction. The historical grievances between riparians remain unaddressed, and 
there is little trust between India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Among the riparians of 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, political will for changing the situation (that is, 
increasing cooperation between riparians) is relatively low, and this undermines efficacy of 
international actors.  
The questions arising out of this problem are discussed in the third section. Are external 
interventions alone sufficient to improve transboundary water cooperation? The response 
to this question comes in the fourth section below. International actors cannot bring 
about transboundary water cooperation, but they may play a limited role in supporting 
conditions in which positive interaction may flourish. This role is limited to building trust 
and political will by addressing historical grievances and power asymmetry between 
riparians. This may be done through Track II dialogue, but Track II dialogue alone (that is, 
dialogue that does not expressly focus on building trust or political will) is unlikely to 
bring about transboundary water cooperation. Other approaches identified by riparian 
stakeholders include: addressing the political context and historical grievances; addressing 
power asymmetry between riparian states; de-securitising water; taking a problemshed 
view; strengthening water sharing institutions; and moving beyond narratives of water 
scarcity and supply-side solutions. 
Finally, this chapter – and this thesis – concludes with some remarks about the future of 
international organisations and foreign aid donors engaging in transboundary water 
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governance in developing countries. Although limited, there are some positive effects that 
third parties may achieve as part of what one riparian stakeholder described as a slow but 
steady ‘chipping away’ at the problem of transboundary water interactions.  
The situation: there are many pressing transboundary water issues but little 
cooperation between India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh 
There are numerous issues for transboundary water governance in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed – the geographic area of Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and 
northern India that is of most concern to third parties, especially the World Bank. For a 
start, it is a region particularly vulnerable to hydrological and ecological shocks; it is one of 
the most densely populated, rapidly growing, and poorest parts of the world. The 
increasing demand for food, energy and water is putting tremendous stress on the 
problemshed’s already strained natural resources. At the same time, governance of these 
resources is generally weak and marred by suspicion, mistrust, and long-standing 
grievances between riparians.  
The Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is vulnerable to water related shocks 
The Hindu Kush Himalayan region, of which the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is a 
part, has one of the largest bodies of ice outside the polar caps, and the mountains are 
often referred to as the ‘water towers’ of Asia. These mountains are the major source of 
both surface and groundwater in the region during the dry season, and have the potential 
to play a vital role in energy security; if properly harnessed, hydropower could transform 
the lives of the people living in these river basins. But, as Vaidya and Sharma point out,  
‘in the wet monsoon season, the contributions of meltwater and rainfall 
coincide, creating a situation of too much water in the wet season and 
too little water in the dry season, which is exacerbated by the lack of 
water storage facilities. The increasing gap between water availability 
and demand in months other than the monsoon season is already posing 
a serious threat to livelihoods and economic development in the 
region.’1491  
The Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is an area of both plenty and of scarcity. Both 
extremes are likely to be exacerbated by the effects of climate change. As Hill notes, ‘[t]he 
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phrase “too much and too little water” has been used as a shorthand for the challenges 
that climate presents for the Hindukush Himalayas, with droughts and floods becoming 
more commonplace.’1492  
The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin is one of the richest basins in the world in terms 
of natural resources (hydropower, fisheries, forestry, irrigated agriculture, navigation, 
environmental amenities, tourism, minerals, et cetera.) Yet India, Nepal, and Bangladesh 
are some of the poorest in the world and sometimes called ‘the poverty triangle.’1493 It is 
also a densely populated region. The greater Hindu-Kush-Himalaya is home to nearly half 
of the world’s population; approximately 630 million people in an area of 1.7 million 
kilometres squared.1494  
India today has to support over 17 per cent of the world’s population on just over two per 
cent of the world’s land area, while Bangladesh supports about 2.27 per cent of the world 
population on 0.11 per cent of the world’s land area. These ratios are bound to widen by 
mid-century.1495 This population growth, combined with rapid urbanisation and fast-paced 
economic development means that demand for water already outstrips supply.1496 Rapid 
urbanisation alone ‘is driving increased water demand both for municipal supply and for 
the industrial and agricultural products in demand in cities.’1497  
Wirsing et al. identify this ‘[w]ater scarcity and demographic plenty’ as one of the 
circumstances that make the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed particularly vulnerable. 
The others include flooding/drought, damming of the rivers, faltering hydro-diplomacy, 
political turmoil. Climate change is also on their list.1498 The compounded effects of rising 
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temperature, flooding, sea level rise, loss of wetlands and cyclones1499 will leave densely 
populated ‘mega-deltas’, such as the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin particularly at 
risk.1500 Other potential effects of climate change include complications with spatial and 
temporal rainfall variability, evaporation rates, and temperatures in different agro-climatic 
zones and river basins.1501 These, in turn, will likely affect ‘agricultural production and food 
security, ecology, biodiversity, river flows, floods and droughts, water security, and human 
and animal health.’1502  
The frequency and intensity of floods in the river basins is expected to increase as a result 
of an increase in precipitation during the monsoon season.1503 Changes in climatic 
conditions also affect diseases transmitted with water, via such vectors as mosquitos.1504 
Moreover, the countries in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed are less resilient to 
water-related disasters than other Asia-Pacific countries, which creates a further challenge 
for transboundary water governance and climate change adaptation.1505  
There are competing transboundary water issues 
In addition to these sources of volatility, there are competing issues on the transboundary 
governance agenda. Each presents unique risks and opportunities, but they are largely 
interrelated and, as with any wicked problem, addressing one issue in the problem set may 
adversely affect another. The issues identified by the World Bank as being most pressing in 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, and therefore of most relevance to this thesis, are 
upstream water storage, water for irrigation, hydropower generation, flood mitigation, and 
sedimentation. (Pollution and groundwater exploitation are also major issues for the 
riparians, but of lesser consequence for transboundary interaction.)  
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The Hindu-Kush-Himalaya mountain range, from which the Ganges and Brahmaputra 
rivers flow, holds one of the largest bodies of ice outside the polar caps, and these glaciers, 
ice fields, and snow packs provide important intra- and inter-annual water storage 
facilities. But, as discussed above, the monsoonal contributions of meltwater and rainfall 
coincide, creating a situation of too much water in the wet season and too little water in 
the dry season. The increasing gap between water availability and demand in months 
other than the monsoon season is threatening livelihoods and economic development in 
the region, but could be alleviated with man-made water storage facilities.1506  
Water storage is a particularly important issue for transboundary governance because it 
can be used to even out water supply between where it is comparatively plentiful – Nepal 
and Bhutan – and where it is scarce – India. In addition to flow augmentation for 
downstream irrigation, Nepal’s storage potential of 88bcm could bring other mutual 
benefits, such as hydropower generation, flood control during the monsoon, and flow 
augmentation for navigation.1507 
It is said that water and energy pose the biggest constraint on India’s growth because 
demand for both is increasing at a rate faster than current capacity can provide.1508 Nepal's 
enormous hydropower potential could provide a convenient and significant supply of 
‘clean’ energy for India's growing needs, particularly in the north of the country.1509 Yet 
hydropower production remains largely undeveloped for domestic uses and export.1510  
Although the issue of hydropower generation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is 
the one most often – and most vigorously – debated within the region and internationally, 
it is water for irrigation that has broader effects in terms of human security; livelihoods 
and food production. As Dinar et al. point out, ‘[a]griculture accounts for nearly one half 
of all freshwater usage in the [Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna] basin, making water supply 
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one of the most significant barriers to economic development.’1511 Agriculture, in turn, is 
vulnerable to drought and flooding. 
Floods are a natural part of the hydrology of the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed and 
serve essential ecosystem functions such as groundwater recharge, soil fertilisation, and 
fish stock renewal.1512 Flooding also brings nutrient-rich sediment, and rice harvests were 
segmented in pre-colonial times throughout the year to hedge against flood pattern 
fluctuations.1513 But the understanding of floods as bringing benefits as well as danger has 
been lost with the development of the ‘command and control’ approach to water 
governance in the past century. The problem of flooding, especially for Bangladesh, is not 
just one of a surfeit of water, but also a surfeit of sedimentation. Compounding the 
diversions of Ganges River flow to Bangladesh is the rapid rise in silt deposition rates since 
the Farakka Barrage was erected upstream in India in 1975. Such sedimentation 
substantially reduces the river bed’s storage capacity and further increases flood risk.1514  
These issues of hydropower generation, irrigation, flooding and sedimentation are brought 
together in the prevailing narrative of freshwater resource development in the region. The 
prevailing thinking is that there is almost infinite hydropower potential in the Himalayas 
(especially Nepal) and that it should be exploited for the benefit of all riparians. Planned 
upstream dams are framed as ‘multi-purpose’ and promise to bring multiple benefits; 
economic benefit for Nepal, energy security for northern India, water storage for dry 
season flow augmentation and irrigation, and flood control throughout the basin. This 
narrative is based on the dominant paradigm of water management; command and control 
of nature, and the pursuit of technological and engineering solutions to water related 
problems.  
The World Bank has attempted to challenge some of the assumptions in this narrative 
through the 2014 Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment. This study is the first to 
comprehensively model the hydrological, economic and social aspects of this basin, and to 
provide the foundations for evidence-led policy. The Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment 
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intended to challenge existing misconceptions about how to manage the region’s 
freshwater resources, and commence a new era of cooperative governance based on 
benefit sharing. The World Bank has taken a scientific approach to mapping out how to 
optimise the various benefits that can be derived from the Ganges basin. But the response 
from riparian states was less than accepting. India, Nepal and Bangladesh rejected the 
World Bank study. The Ganges Strategic Basin Assessment had touched a raw nerve, that 
of underlying and unresolved grievances between these riparians.  
Water interactions between India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh are not positive 
As A. Dinar et al. note, ‘the Ganges has tremendous joint development potential that has 
not yet been realised but its riparian states. Rather, the Ganges Basin is more popularly 
known for its rich history of disputes.’1515 Factors in this ‘rich history of disputes’ include 
the lack of strong regional identity, the securitisation of water issues, the presence of a 
hydro-hegemon that struggles to be a regional leader, the reliance on bilateral rather than 
multilateral approaches to transboundary water governance, and a number of unresolved 
disputes between India-Nepal and India-Bangladesh. Wirsing et al. also add faltering river 
diplomacy, and simmering separatist tensions and political turmoil to these conflict-
inducing factors.1516 
Uprety summarise the transboundary water interactions in South Asia by saying that while 
some riparians claim to be in favour of cooperative, multi-national approaches to water 
governance, ‘collective multilateral attention to the problems of transboundary waters has 
been rare. Historically, the region has lacked a collective strategy and bilateralism remains 
the focus.’1517 He continues that  
‘Due to their prevailing mutual distrust, their inability to delink 
hydropower from water resources, and their reservation against 
generalizing policy to avoid establishing precedent, the strategic 
approach of most of the countries is merely to theoretically engage in 
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water-related initiatives, but practically advance only those serving their 
own specific interests.’1518 
South Asia is one of the most poorly governed regions in the world, with inefficient and 
inequitable deployment of resources, crippling debt burden, social divisions along ethnic 
and sectarian lines, as well as rampant corruption and vulnerability of civil society 
organisations.1519 As Baqai argues, ‘[t]he South Asian state is both strong and weak. On one 
hand, a high degree of “state-ness” is witnessed, while on the other hand, the breakdown 
of state authority, as a result of social disorder makes political upheaval the norm.’1520  
The weak solidarity and regional identity in South Asia also means that the region lacks a 
security community.1521 As Asthana and Shukla show, there is also no sense of collective 
action for dealing with non-traditional security threats, such as water conflicts. Indeed, 
they argue that ‘[n]on-traditional threats are also securitised across borders due to a bitter 
past, mistrust and hatred that dominates the socio-political structure in these 
countries.’1522 The securitisation of water continues to be a driver of negative water 
interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. 
India’s hydro-hegemony is a further point of tension for Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh.1523 
India’s relative political, military and economic strength allows it to mitigate the fact of 
geography that it does not control the headwaters of all the rivers that pass through its 
territory. India is thus able to influence its upstream neighbours to gain access to their 
water resources, and its downstream neighbours to overlook transboundary water 
arrangements that may adversely affect them. This influence, as that of any hydro-
hegemon, can at times be constructive and at times coercive.1524  
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Hydro-hegemony is not inherently a destabilising factor; indeed, a hydro-hegemon could 
be a strong regional leader that promotes cooperation among riparians. But, as Bhasin 
argues, India has failed to provide political advice and economic guidance to neighbours 
without appearing domineering.1525 The perception of India as a sometimes bullying ‘big 
brother’ continues to foment resentment, distrust, and political tension within Nepal, 
Bhutan and Bangladesh vis-à-vis the hydro-hegemon. 
As Hill shows, ‘[t]he geopolitics of the region is arguably defined by the dominance of 
India and issues surrounding whether trans-boundary disputes should be handled 
bilaterally or internationalised continue to provoke tensions’ and furthermore these 
tensions ‘are likely to intensify as demand for water becomes more acute in the future.’1526 
Even though all the rivers flowing through India are international and pass more than one 
country, all the treaties on these rivers are bilateral.1527 India’s persistence in establishing 
strictly bilateral arrangements and not involving the international community in matters 
of transboundary water governance in South Asia has, argues Hill, shaped the 
transboundary water interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed.1528  
Negative water interactions between the hydro-hegemon and Nepal and Bangladesh are 
further exacerbated by several unresolved transboundary water issues. Condon et al. argue 
that Nepal’s limited diversion or storage capacity is at the root of water disputes with 
India.1529 While for Nepal the issue of water storage is largely one of untapped potential, 
for Bangladesh it is a question of mitigating the negative effects of India’s upstream 
projects. Bangladesh has a seeming abundance of water resources, but most of its annual 
flow comes in the form of monsoonal floods that quickly flush out to the Bay of Bengal; 
Bangladesh is a predominantly flat, deltaic country with limited water storage potential.1530 
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At the same time, Bangladesh has not benefitted from water storage and diversion in 
upstream India. 
In contrast, the water interaction between India and Bhutan is largely positive. The 
cooperative relationship between Bhutan and India over transboundary water resources 
can be attributed in large part to the kingdom’s far-sightedness and political savvy in 
fostering the non-zero-sum-thinking that allows the interests of both Bhutan and India to 
be addressed through hydropower development. Bhutan’s stance toward the hydro-
hegemon can be said to be an instance of ‘bandwaggoning’, whereby weaker states in a 
regional system seek accommodation with the local hegemon in order to receive economic 
and military benefits.1531 Bhutan has been able to negotiate favourable outcomes with India 
regarding shared waters because, unlike Nepal or Bangladesh, it is a small, politically 
stable, ethnically and religiously homogenous country that does not have to grapple with 
many significant domestic priorities (e.g., insurgency and frequent changes of 
government, as is the case in Nepal) that could dilute political will for transboundary 
water governance.1532 
The problem: there are many international actors working to improve 
transboundary water interaction 
The response of international organisations and donors to this situation – environmental 
vulnerability, numerous issues for transboundary water governance, and less than positive 
interaction between the hydro-hegemon and the other riparians – has been to frame it as a 
collective action problem. Colopy points out that ‘[i]ntelligent choices about river 
management for the future in this complex basin [Ganges] would seem impossible without 
regional cooperation.’1533  
Grey, Sadoff and Connors (all of whom have worked for the World Bank in South Asia) 
note that there is ‘very limited existing transboundary cooperation’ in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed, and that although ‘[f]uture risks are undoubtedly high’ they 
could nonetheless  
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‘potentially be mitigated through cooperation. Joint institutions for 
information sharing could help predict and monitor the basin’s 
changing hydrology and underpin early warning systems, thus 
enhancing both agricultural productivity and disaster preparedness. 
Cooperative infrastructure development and/or operation could help 
regulate river flows, to mitigate floods and droughts, generate power 
and irrigate fields. Cooperative environmental management could 
enhance water quality and ensure environmental flows for ecosystem 
health. And all of this cooperative engagement could improve regional 
relationships “beyond the river”.’1534  
The underlying assumption in these schemes for increasing transboundary water 
cooperation is that they require third party support or facilitation. After all, if riparian 
states had the capacity and political will to mitigate future water security risks on their 
own, they would have.  
Hill too agrees that ‘co-operation between all of South Asia’s states for the benefit of the 
region’s citizens…is essential if the multiple crises of water are to be overcome to any 
significant degree’ but worries that transboundary water cooperation in the foreseeable 
future ‘is less likely than continual division and enmity.’1535 In contrast to Grey et al., 
however, Hill places less emphasis on the role of international organisations in facilitating 
transboundary cooperation and more on multi-scalar civil society networks. But, he notes, 
‘at present, such networks are weak, underdeveloped and unable to exert significant 
influence on state policy and inter-state relations.’1536 This alleged weakness creates an 
opportunity for international actors to intervene through Track II or Track III dialogue 
(that is, dialogue between civil society actors). 
The framing of water security issues as a collective action problem (one that riparians, 
especially in the developing world, are presumably ill-equipped to tackle themselves) is 
not a phenomenon unique to the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed but rather it is part of 
a recent global trend. Since around the year 2000, the new ‘sanctioned discourse’ of water 
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management has, according to Mollinga and Gondhalekar, centred on the ideas of the 
market, good governance, and sustainability. This discourse has been supported by a set of 
global organisations (notably the Global Water Partnership and several UN organisations), 
and actively propagated through international development funding agencies.1537 Thus the 
framing of the situation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed as a collective action 
problem is part of the emerging ‘global politics of water’, or the globalisation of regional 
water security issues through international organisations and aid donors.1538 
That is not to say that there is no desire for cooperation and collective action from within 
the problemshed. On the contrary; scholars from India, Nepal and Bangladesh have been 
arguing that only collaborative approaches can resolve the water-related disputes in the 
region. Iyer, one of the most prominent and well-respected authorities on water issues in 
South Asia, points out that the idea of regional cooperation is gaining currency in South 
Asia – but the question remains, cooperation at what level, between whom, and for what 
purposes?1539 
Sharma argues that ‘a basin-scale approach would help manage the water resources better’ 
but that such an approach would ‘require close coordination with all the countries sharing 
the Ganga, such as Nepal and Bangladesh, so that the interests of both upstream and 
downstream users are taken into consideration.’1540 Sharma also lists various government 
and non-government agencies, the private sector, civil society groups, and the public at 
large as needing ‘to be actively engaged in these efforts’1541 for improving water governance 
in the Ganges basin. International actors are absent from this list of stakeholders.  
Asthana and Shukla also agree that ‘[c]urrent water resource development in South Asia is 
not sustainable. There needs to be a shift in emphasis on demand management practices 
and further incentives for conservation of water resources.’1542 They argue that ‘South Asia 
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needs to move forward with a cooperative and participatory approach on river basins and 
water sharing. There needs to be a regional awareness that rivers can be better harnessed 
through collective efforts and recognition that cooperation is essential to alleviate threats 
to water security.’1543 Their suggested approach for fostering cooperation is that of 
inclusion and dialogue: ‘Policy making needs to be more inclusive of other voices in the 
formation process, engaging civil society, and moving beyond the top-down exclusionary 
approach.’1544 For Asthana and Shukla, then, Track II dialogue may be an appropriate 
approach to improving transboundary water interaction, but it does necessarily have to be 
facilitated by international actors. 
Even Chellaney, a proponent of the idea that Asia may be on the brink of water-related 
war, agrees that only an approach based on ‘integrated resource management that involves 
all basin states’ can prevent water conflicts from worsening, and that ‘[o]nly collaborative 
paths that embrace all stakeholders and break free from the business-as-usual approach 
can help unlock solutions.’1545 Again, however, international actors are not explicitly made 
part of the solution to negative transboundary water interaction in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed.  
The impetus for foreign aid donors and international organisations in increasing 
transboundary water cooperation has come not from within the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed, but from these external actors. The new ‘sanctioned discourse’ of good 
governance and sustainable development, combined with the emergence of the global 
politics of water, is driving international organisations and donors to invest more and 
more in the water governance of regions of strategic importance to them. The global focus 
on climate change has also added a layer of urgency to ‘fixing’ transboundary water 
problems. As Mollinga and Gondhalekar point out, ‘The recent surge in attention to 
climate change, in debates on which water resources play a central role, has added to the 
perceived global nature of the “water question”, most recently popularly framed as a 
“water security” question.’1546 
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South Asia is increasingly portrayed as ‘the linchpin of humanity’s collective effort’1547 for 
collective action problems. Asthana and Shukla, for example, argue that ‘[b]eyond doubt, 
hydropolitics between India and its neighbouring riparian states is one of the most urgent, 
complex, and contentious issues facing the regional community in the twenty-first 
century.’1548 International actors are rising to this challenge. In the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed, Colopy shows that ‘[o]ne sign of this is an effort led by the World Bank 
called the South Asia Water Initiative, funded by Great Britain, Australia, and Norway. The 
bank has organised forums in different parts of the region and urged the various nations to 
share information’1549 For Australia, the commitment to SAWI and the goal of increasing 
transboundary water cooperation comes directly from the perception of a collective action 
problem in the Ganges-Brahmaputra basin:  
‘The combination of high poverty and high population density, in a 
largely agrarian society undergoing rapid urbanization, makes it 
extremely difficult for communities to cope with hydrological and 
climate variability. To ensure sustained food security, economic growth 
and political stability in the future, water must be managed better.’1550 
SAWI was established in 2009 following the World Bank-led Abu Dhabi Dialogue. In 2006, 
‘The Abu Dhabi Dialogue (ADD) was created to foster cooperation in the management of 
the rivers in the Greater Himalayas…The ADD is a non-formal, consultative process, 
designed to foster regional cooperation on various challenges relating to the Himalayan 
Rivers, including climate change and its future impacts on livelihoods from the headwaters 
to the floodplains.’1551 The ADD process is not limited only to the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed, but rather includes all seven countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
China, India, Nepal, and Pakistan) that share the rivers of the Himalayas. The members of 
the ADD are not only government officials, but also representatives from academia and 
civil society. In other words, the ADD is a formalised Track II dialogue process. It is also 
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modelled on the ‘common water-sharing framework in line with the Nile Basin 
Initiative.’1552 
According to the World Bank, ‘[t]he key rationale for engagement is to demonstrate and 
then to help achieve the mutual benefits of cooperation across shared river basins.’1553 The 
focus of the ADD and SAWI on fostering regional cooperation over transboundary water 
issues is an appropriate one considering the myriad unresolved transboundary water issues 
in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed. The need for increasing transboundary water 
cooperation has been noted by scholars from within the region, yet the riparian states 
themselves are on the whole unwilling or unable to actively pursue positive water 
interaction with one another.  
The riparians are also largely indifferent to the efforts of international actors to facilitate 
cooperative processes. Furthermore, it may be that Track II dialogue – the primary 
approach of the ADD and SAWI – may be insufficient to develop positive water interaction 
between India-Nepal and India-Bangladesh (the interaction between India and Bhutan is 
already on the whole positive). The gulf between the approach of international actors to 
fostering transboundary water cooperation, and the reasons for less than positive water 
interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is the central puzzle of this thesis. 
The question: can transboundary water interaction be improved through 
foreign-led intervention? 
Foreign aid donors and international organisations have taken on the challenge of 
increasing transboundary water cooperation in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, 
but they are unlikely to meet it singlehandedly. As Earle et al. argue, the attempts to 
improve transboundary water interaction ‘have not ventured beyond political statements 
and setting up lofty goals’ and that ‘the World Bank has failed in its hope to bring South 
Asian countries within a common water-sharing framework.’1554  
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There are many explanations for this, but three in particular reveal something about the 
nature of transboundary water cooperation. First, there is little political among riparians 
to address unresolved transboundary water issues. Earle et al. note that ‘there is certainly a 
lack of political will in the basin, particularly in India, to provide the space for multilateral 
river institutions to effectively emerge.’1555  
Desire for cooperation is important because, in the words of Israeli hydrologist, Uri 
Shamir, ‘[i]f there is a political will for peace, water will not be a hindrance. If you want 
reasons to fight, water will give you ample opportunities.’1556 India, Nepal and Bangladesh 
(but not Bhutan) do not place transboundary water governance at the top of their political 
priorities, and ongoing tensions over past failures at improving interaction continues to 
keep political will low.  
The issue of historical grievances is linked to the second point: there is little trust between 
riparians. Earle et al. point out that ‘the trust deficit is extremely high in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra basin.’1557 Uprety argues that the lack of a collective strategy between India, 
Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh over transboundary waters is ‘[d]ue to their prevailing 
mutual distrust’1558 while Asthana and Shukla show that water remains ‘securitised across 
borders due to a bitter past, mistrust and hatred that dominates the socio-political 
structure in these countries.’1559  
Lack of trust is easy to diagnose, but difficult to remedy. As Pohl et al. point out, in regards 
to transboundary water interaction, ‘[t]rust can only be built through longterm 
transparency in terms of data-sharing and intentions regarding future infrastructure, 
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which in turn requires long-term engagement.’1560 International actors, however, are 
unlikely to be involved in transboundary water governance in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
problemshed over the long-term because of their relatively short funding cycles, reliance 
on short-term consulting positions, and changing global agendas. 
The third reason that foreign-led interventions are unlikely to create positive water 
interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is that they are attempting to do so 
primarily through Track II dialogue. The bringing together of government and civil society 
stakeholders is only one factor in cooperation. Track II dialogue may be a useful process 
for building some trust between riparians but it is undermined if there is no political will 
for cooperation. Likewise, Track II dialogue may create a sense of urgency around 
transboundary water issues, but this could be weakened if riparians do not trust each 
other enough to cooperate together.  
What, then, are the necessary and sufficient conditions for transboundary water 
cooperation? Understanding these conditions, how can international actors intervene 
more effectively to improve transboundary water interaction? These are the central 
questions of this thesis. 
The response: external intervention alone is not enough, the context needs to 
be addressed 
Because of the complex nature of transboundary water governance, and the inherent 
unpredictability of complex adaptive systems, international actors alone are unable to 
directly bring about positive water interaction between riparians. They may, however, to 
some extent influence the conditions from which cooperation may emerge. For example, 
donors and international organisations could address underlying historical grievances 
between riparians and thus, in the long term, build trust. Third parties could also work 
with states to convey the sense of a transboundary water crisis and thus build political will 
for cooperation. Lastly, external actors could continue bringing together government and 
non-government actors into dialogue on issues of mutual importance.  
International actors could also play a role in building and strengthening transboundary 
water governance institutions. As Earle et al. argue,  
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‘There is now a strong need for setting up an institutional, systematic, 
and collaborative river water management mechanism in the basin. 
Basin-based institutions can help to reduce uncertainty surrounding 
Ganges-Brahmaputra riparian relations, which has been the bane of the 
region for a long time. If successful, these institutions can possibly shift 
the focus from disconnected and short-term interactions of the riparian 
countries into a continuous relationship that has scope for future 
routine gains.’1561  
But first the issue of India’s hydro-hegemony must be addressed. Earle et al. point out that 
‘India’s refusal to take up any river management issue in a multilateral forum reduces the 
scope for possibility of any basin-based organisational framework to emerge.’1562 
The main argument here is that international actors may be able to play a role – albeit a 
highly circumscribed one – in creating the conditions necessary for transboundary 
cooperation to emerge, if they are invited to do so. If there is trust between riparians, and 
political will to address transboundary water issues, then cooperative water interaction 
will likely develop without the assistance of third parties. Third parties can, however, play 
a role in facilitating Track II dialogues and these dialogues may in the long term 
contribute to the development of transboundary water cooperation. Without either trust 
or political will, however, the likelihood of this occurring diminishes. In other words, 
Track II dialogue alone is not sufficient to create positive water interaction between 
riparians. As Jones points out, ‘real peace is made as a result of a complex and interlocking 
web of factors, and…Track Two, however important in getting a dialogue going, is but one 
of these.’1563 
Furthermore, international organisations and foreign aid donors may be better placed to 
support riparian states in influencing the conditions in which transboundary water 
cooperation may emerge if they collaborate more closely with stakeholders within the 
basin and address their concerns. Specifically, stakeholders within the Ganges-
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Brahmaputra problemshed would like to see approaches to transboundary water 
interaction that: 
• address the political context and historical grievances  
• build trust and address power asymmetry between riparian states 
• create political will for cooperation 
• de-securitise water 
• take a problemshed view 
• strengthen water sharing institutions 
• move beyond narratives of water scarcity and supply-side solutions. 
Water interactions are complex, and change is slow and unpredictable 
Another contextual factor for international actors to consider is that transboundary water 
interaction is that it is complex. It cannot be readily quantified, and it is not predictable. 
Transboundary water cooperation, for example, cannot be measured by the number of 
international treaties or agreements. A treaty may, in fact, ‘sustain the conflict it was 
intended to transform’1564 while disputes over water are not always undesirable: ‘Tensions 
may lead to resolution of conflict and thus be considered in a positive light.’1565 At the 
same time, a negotiated agreement is neither the beginning nor the end of water 
interaction. As Tiwary points out, ‘[t]he politics (national or domestic) over water do not 
abruptly end with an international treaty; it just enters a new phase of inter- and intra-
nation level scrutiny and criticisms.’1566 Similarly, an agreement over sharing the costs and 
benefits of a transboundary river are not necessarily a reflection of cooperation between 
riparian states. Zeitoun and Mirumachi argue that benefit sharing arrangements enshrined 
in treaties and international agreements are an example of neutral rather than of positive 
water interaction.1567 
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With so much ambiguity in transboundary water interaction, cooperation is complex and 
unpredictable. Jones argues ‘real peace is made as a result of a complex and interlocking 
web of factors.’1568 Similarly, Pahl-Wostl shows that ‘[g]iven the complex nature of 
governance systems, change can be expected to be a combination of purposeful collective 
action and emergent phenomena resulting from selforganising processes and the 
interactions among a range of actors.’1569 
System-wide change takes a long time. Long-term engagement is, according to Pohl et al., 
the only appropriate approach to successfully building trust in a system of transboundary 
water interaction.1570 But even in the long-term cooperation cannot be guaranteed. There 
is no one path to cooperation, and no certainty for the external actors that they will 
resolve conflicts. Numerous factors play into the dynamics within dispute resolution 
processes and the contexts in which they occur; culture, domestic politics, trust (or lack 
thereof) between parties, power asymmetries, issue power, the presence or absence of 
third parties, et cetera. While all these, and other, factors define the outcome of 
interactions, dialogues, negotiations, they do not pre-determine them. As Hill shows, there 
have in the past been many initiatives in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed for water 
dispute resolution, but changing the way riparians states think about shared water 
resources is difficult: ‘[g]iven how politically contentious many parts of the region already 
are, this will be a long and unenviably difficult process and there are no guarantees of any 
success in this regard.’1571  
Transboundary water governance is also affected by non-water-related factors. In the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin, for example, S. Dinar shows that ‘domestic politics 
play a large role in the hydropolitics between the basin riparians.’1572 One illustration of 
this is that Nepal has been unable to negotiate effectively with India over shared water 
issues because of numerous domestic distractions (political upheaval, insurgency, et 
cetera). In contrast, Bhutan, with fewer domestic non-water-related considerations for the 
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polity, has been able to reach more satisfactory negotiation outcomes with India.1573 Hill 
also cites the example of India’s bureaucracy as another domestic, non-water related 
challenge to positive transboundary water interaction.1574 
Tiwary shows that considerations outside of the negotiation table affect the outcome of 
formal negotiations. He argues that states negotiate not only in reaction to other riparians, 
but also in reaction to domestic politics.1575 Understanding the cultural context and power 
dynamics between riparians is therefore important in understanding not only negotiation 
dynamics, but also the lengthy, complex and unpredictable process of building 
transboundary water cooperation.  
Trust and political will are necessary conditions of water cooperation 
Change and progress is slow in the complex and unpredictable system of transboundary 
water governance; but it is even slower without political will among riparian states for 
increasing cooperation over shared water issues. Tiwary argues that above all else, 
‘international water conflict resolution requires considerable political will on all the sides’ 
and sustained motivation to reach agreement.1576 As this thesis illustrates (especially in 
Chapters 3 and 5), the low political will in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed is a 
limitation for international actors to increase transboundary water cooperation. Earle et al. 
have also argued that ‘there is certainly a lack of political will in the [Ganges-Brahmaputra] 
basin, particularly in India, to provide the space for multilateral river institutions to 
effectively emerge.’1577  
Trust between riparian states is another necessary condition of transboundary water 
cooperation. Without trust, argues Uprety, ‘the strategic approach of most of the countries 
is merely to theoretically engage in water-related initiatives, but practically advance only 
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those serving their own specific interests.’1578 A further consequence of distrust between 
riparians is that a zero-sum attitude to water sharing prevails. A zero-sum view of 
transboundary water resources presumes that the water can only be used once, and only 
by one party. ‘Not surprisingly,’ argues Islam and Susskind, ‘it yields outcomes in which 
one side “wins” and others “lose.”’1579 In contrast, a positive-sum view enables win-win 
arrangements, but ‘it is predicted that riparian states will cooperate because they have a 
shared interest in doing so.’1580 But perceiving a shared interest, or being willing to pursue 
it, requires some trust between the riparians. 
The circumscribed role of third parties 
In light of the complexity and uncertainty in transboundary water interaction, is there any 
role at all for international actors to intervene in problemsheds with low levels of 
cooperation? The literature review in Chapter 2 described the important roles that a third 
party can play in formal negotiations, for example through mediation or arbitration. The 
same chapter also outlined the requirement of a neutral but informed facilitator in Track 
II dialogue processes. These are legitimate roles for third parties, but they will not 
necessarily result in improved transboundary water interaction. The problems of effect 
and attribution were discussed in Chapter 6, which also illustrated that the presence of a 
third party – even a neutral and well intentioned one – can create more resentment, 
tension, or apathy among riparians states. At the same time, changing the dynamic of the 
hydropolitics, for example, through imposing important (albeit irritating) conditions such 
as environmental impact assessments, a third party may be able to shift power dynamics 
between riparians. That, in turn, may affect the quality of transboundary water interaction. 
Still, just because an opportunity exists for intervention, it does not mean it should be 
taken. 
The presence of an international actors can complicate an already complex scenario. In 
this sense, the third party is another drop in the ocean of complex hydropolitics. But there 
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are several factors that may increase the likelihood of foreign-led interventions 
contributing to improved transboundary water interaction. These are discussed below.  
Interventions led by international organisations and aid donors are just one part of the 
slow, steady, and largely uncoordinated work that constitutes ‘chipping away’ at the 
problem of transboundary water governance.1581 As such, if they are to increase 
cooperation between riparian states, that can only happen over the long-term. Trust, 
which is a necessary condition of cooperation, can only be built, according to Pohl et al., 
through long-term engagement.1582 External actors should not expect radical improvement 
in transboundary water interaction to happen rapidly.1583  
That raises the point of expectations. In the current system of foreign aid, program and 
project descriptions and funding rationale documents tend to be filled with broad 
objectives, but narrow and short-term indicators for evaluating progress. In other words, 
there are a lot of unrealistic expectations about what international actors, or specific 
methods, can achieve. For example, Track II dialogue is touted as a direct and effective 
way of increasing transboundary water cooperation. Similarly, the idea of benefit sharing is 
sometimes conflated with transboundary water cooperation. But while benefit sharing 
may stem from positive transboundary water interaction, it is not the same thing as 
cooperation. It is a method of mediated negotiation.  
In a negotiation with a focus on benefit sharing, ‘the various values derived from water use 
– in multiple spheres, including economic, social, political and environmental’ are, 
according to Qaddumi, seen by riparians as a problem of ‘positive-sum outcomes 
associated with optimising benefits rather than the zero-sum outcomes associated with 
dividing water.’1584 But benefit sharing, as promising as it sounds, may not necessarily be 
the solution to every transboundary water conflict. As Petersen-Perlman and Wolf argue,  
‘It appears that objective or “paper” beneﬁts (as projected in the many 
studies on regional cooperation or integration, e.g., Feitelson and 
Haddad, 1998; Sadoff and Grey, 2002, 2005) are only the starting point. 
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In other words, beneﬁts are necessary, but they are not sufﬁcient to 
induce cooperative action.’1585 
Ultimately, benefit sharing is a reductionist approach that simplifies water conflicts into a 
puzzle of discrete parts that only need to be rearranged to resolve the problem. A 
reductionist approach attempts to understand a system by examining the sub-systems that 
make it up. According to Islam and Susskind, however, it is inadequate for examining 
complex systems because it does not take into account relationships between parts and 
the effect of extrinsic systems.1586 That is not to say that striving for positive-sum outcomes 
is undesirable, but rather that the complexity of transboundary water conflicts cannot be 
fully understood only through the lens of benefit sharing. 
Expectations of which method can realistically bring what results is one important 
consideration for international actors involved in improving transboundary water 
governance. Other considerations are equally applicable to reducing some limitations on 
the system of foreign aid generally. Riddell has several recommendations in this regard. 
One is ‘[e]nsuring short-term uses of aid are supportive of long-term development 
goals’1587 while at the same time ‘[l]inking all aid more closely to overall developing country 
goals and processes.’1588 Riddell also recommends ‘[d]eepening knowledge of local 
contexts’1589 and ‘[l]earning lessons – moving from rhetoric to reality.’1590 
Related to the point of moving from rhetoric to reality, Asthana and Shukla advise that 
good governance should be more than just rhetoric. ‘In most cases,’ they argue, 
‘participation of stakeholders begins only when the decision is already announced, after 
which stakeholders engage in activist roles and resort to collective action rather than 
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being part of the planning process. Policy making needs to be more inclusive of other 
voices in the formation process, engaging civil society, and moving beyond the top-down 
exclusionary approach.’1591 This is part of the theory behind Track II dialogue and other 
deliberative governance processes. But, as this thesis illustrates, the practice has not 
always been in line with the theory. 
Moreover, the mission must be clear: is the purpose to manage water disputes, or resolve 
them? Conflicts can be managed, or they can be resolved, and the latter way is considered 
the fairer approach by Zeitoun et al.1592 The idea that conflict management is not the same 
as and, indeed, inferior to, conflict resolution, echoes Islam and Susskind’s main argument 
that dialogue, though important for relationship building, is not the same as problem 
solving.1593 In other words, dialogue between stakeholders to a water conflict may be the 
starting point for either the management or the resolution of that dispute, but the latter is 
preferable because it necessarily involves addressing water (in-)justice. As Zeitoun et al. 
point out, ‘the conflict management approach is at odds with the more principled 
approach of conflict resolution or conflict transformation’ because in seeking the easiest 
arrangements over distribution and control of transboundary waters, alternatives are 
ignored or de-legitimised while arrangements created through asymmetries in power are 
reinforced.1594  
They add that a further condition to the principled approach to conflict resolution, and 
that is the equitability. Equitability refers to ‘outcomes that may be considered balanced 
and fair, though not necessarily equal’1595 To recap the definitions of distributive justice, 
there are three broad types; equity, needs and equality. Equity is achieved when a person’s 
rewards or outputs are perceived to be in proportion to that person’s inputs or 
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contributions. Needs are met when a person who has a greater need receives greater 
rewards or outputs, irrespective of their inputs or contributions. Equality occurs when 
everyone receives equal rewards or outputs regardless of their needs or contributions.1596 
For Zeitoun et al., equitability is ‘the spirit of justice; that is, the basis upon which we may 
use fact and thought to reason out what is “just.”’1597 Therefore, for the international actor 
taking a water justice approach to resolving transboundary water conflict, ensuring 
equitability is a pre-condition for ‘positive’ cooperation and a sustainable outcome.1598  
Lastly, there remains a role for foreign aid donors and international organisations in 
shaping the international community that in turn affects and influences riparians in basin 
with low transboundary water cooperation. Zeitoun and Jägerskog provide an example of 
why this is important. At the 2009 World Water Forum, steps to develop legal and fair 
water sharing principles were resisted by powerful hydro-hegemons who instead pushed 
for enshrining in international law the principle of ‘hydro sovereignty’ (which, according 
to Zeitoun and Jägerskog, ‘appears to be a reversion to the discredited Harmon Doctrine 
that had been abandoned over a century ago.’1599) The role of international actors in 
promoting transboundary water cooperation, then, is not limited to basins characterised 
by negative or neutral transboundary water interaction. Instead, Zeitoun and Jägerskog 
urge that ‘[w]e must keep our eyes open to recognise and confront the reality of power 
asymmetry, basin bullies and coercion in order to achieve effective cooperation’ at all 
levels and in all spheres.1600 This, they argue, ‘makes the role of third-parties all the more 
crucial.’1601  
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Glossary 
Barrage: An artificial obstruction positioned to increase water levels or divert flows, 
usually to control peak flow for later release. 
Basin: See: River basin 
Benefit sharing: Any action designed to change the allocation of costs and benefits 
associated with cooperation. 
Complex systems: The field of complex systems challenges the notion that by 
understanding a system at a component level we can understand the system as a whole. 
Unless we understand the nature of different components of a system and their evolving 
and continuously changing interdependent relationships and feedbacks, we cannot 
understand the behaviour of a complex system. Complexity theory attempts to explain the 
behaviour of networks and systems (especially natural systems) that cannot be understood 
solely in terms of their constituent parts or mechanistic accounts of how those parts 
interact. Systems amenable to description using complexity theory are characterised by 
non-linearity, uncertainty, interactions, and emergence. 
Co-riparians: Two or more countries that share a common, transboundary river. 
Dam: A structure designed to hold and retain water, thus forming a pond, lake or 
reservoir. 
Deliberative water governance: Constructive engagement in water governance arenas 
through promotion of inclusive, deliberative processes that emphasise different 
perspectives, critical analysis, learning and institution-building whilst respecting rights, 
accounting for risks, acknowledging responsibilities and fairly distributing rewards. 
Distributive water justice: The allocation of water resources that is perceived as fair by 
stakeholders. Principles of distributive water justice include: equitable sharing of benefits; 
avoiding unfair and involuntary risk-bearing; protection of livelihood security; and 
provision of compensation, insurance and, where necessary, welfare support for project-
affected people. See also: Water justice, Procedural water justice 
Doctrine of prior appropriation: The principle that earliest water users have priority 
over later appropriators during times of water shortage. 
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Emergent property: The emergent property of a water network is derived from the 
interactions and feedback of nodes and links (representing natural, societal, and political 
variables and processes), and is not observable or inherent in any node or link of the 
network considered separately. 
Energy security: The ability of a nation to secure sustainable energy supplies to meet its 
energy needs at a reasonable price. 
Equitable distribution of water resources: The term ‘equality’ is used when discussing 
the assumed parity of capacity and rights of actors, and ‘equitability’ when discussing 
outcomes that may be considered balanced and fair, though not necessarily equal (so, in 
the same sense that others use the term ‘equity’). ‘Equitability’ can be considered the spirit 
of justice. See also: Water justice 
Good governance: Good governance is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, 
transparent, responsive, equitable and inclusive, effective and efficient and follows the rule 
of law. 
Gross National Happiness: Bhutan's a philosophical approach to policy for equitable 
socio-economic development; conservation of environment; preservation of culture; and 
promotion of good governance. 
Groundwater: Water that flows or seeps downward and saturates soil or rock to supply 
springs and wells, creating the saturate zone. The upper surface of the saturate zone is the 
water table where water is stored underground in rock crevices and in the pores of 
geologic materials that make up the Earth’s land surface. Below the surface of the saturate 
zone lies the aquifer. See also: Surface water 
Harmon Doctrine: See: Doctrine of prior appropriation 
Hydro sovereignty: The principle that riparian states have exclusive rights over water 
flowing in their territory. 
Hydro-diplomacy: Diplomacy, sometimes facilitated by third parties, to anticipate, 
mitigate and resolve conflicting claims on shared water resources. See also: Water 
Diplomacy 
Hydro-hegemon: A riparian state that can establish the form of interaction over 
transboundary waters that it prefers. Whether the hydro-hegemon chooses leadership or 
domination in the water sector is ultimately governed by the broader political context.  
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Hydropolitics: The political dynamics that determine who decides who gets water, when, 
how, and why. 
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM): A process which promotes the 
coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources, in order 
to maximise the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without 
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems. 
Internally renewable water resources: Amount of runoff generated within a country, 
plus any flows into the country, less any flows to a neighbouring country. See also: Water 
dependency 
International watercourse: A system of surface waters and ground waters constituting 
by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a 
common terminus, parts of which are situated in different states. 
Irrigation: Controlled application of water for agriculture through artificial systems to 
supply water requirements not satisfied by rainfall. 
Meltwater: Liquid water running from snow or ice, often in reference to melting of 
glaciers. 
Necessary condition: A condition that must be satisfied for a statement to be true, but 
that does not in and of itself make it true. See also: Sufficient condition 
Negative interaction: Arrangements that do not satisfy the interests of at least one of the 
parties involved, thus directly or indirectly degrading relations at the broader political 
level. See also: Positive transboundary water interaction 
Negotiation: Formal, bounded conflict usually over a single issue. Negotiation is a joint 
decision-making process through which negotiating parties accommodate their conflicting 
interests into a mutually acceptable settlement. A negotiation can be in aid of dispute 
resolution or for the purpose of reaching a binding agreement or treaty. A negotiation can 
involve a third party in the role of mediator, conciliator, arbitrator or adjudicator. 
Negotiation is the means of dispute resolution most often employed by states when trying 
to resolve any international conflict, including those over transboundary water resources. 
See also: Pre-negotiation 
Non-zero-sum thinking: A joint problem-solving framework that assumes outcomes 
favourable to one party are not necessarily detrimental to another.  
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Panchayat: System of self-governance historically prevalent in South Asia. 
Positive transboundary water interaction: Contexts where the interaction satisfies the 
interests of all players and culminates in an improvement (or at least a sustenance) of 
relations at the broader political level. See also: Negative transboundary water interaction 
Positive-sum thinking: See: Non-zero-sum thinking 
Pre-negotiation: Steps that take place prior to negotiations in an effort to ensure the best 
'groundwork' is in place for effective negotiation. Includes identifying the right 
stakeholders, developing an agenda and timetable for the negotiation, and establishing 
joint problem-solving procedures. usually refers to the work that individual parties do on 
their own to prepare for negotiations as well as the work done on behalf of all the 
participants by a convener or a professional neutral. See also: Negotiation 
Problemshed: A geographic area that is large enough to encompass water management 
issues, but small enough to make implementation feasible. 
Procedural water justice: The process of allocating water resources that is perceived as 
fair by the stakeholders. Principles of procedural water justice include: inclusion of 
stakeholders in decision-making; access to information, legal and other support; 
demonstrable public acceptance; and free, prior and informed consent of affected 
indigenous and tribal peoples. See also: Water justice, Distributive water justice 
Riparian: An area near or on the banks of a river or other major body of water. Also 
referred to in the context of 'upper' and 'lower' riparians, which designate the country in 
which a certain transboundary river originates. 
Riparian state: The country or other political entity on or near the banks of a river or 
other major body of water. 
River basin: The area drained by a river and its tributaries. 
Securitisation: Elevating a non-security issues to a security issue. Securitising an 
environmental issue implies subjecting it to a military security logic (e.g., top-down 
decision-making, classifying information, bypassing normal standards of participation and 
economic valuation.) 
Sedimentation: Accumulation of materials suspended in water or recently deposited. 
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Sufficient condition: A condition that must be satisfied for a statement to be true and 
without which the statement cannot be true. See also: Necessary condition 
Surface water: Water on the Earth’s surface, such as in a stream, river, lake or reservoir. 
See also: Groundwater 
Sustainable development: Development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. 
Third party: A person or group besides the two primarily involved in a situation, 
especially a dispute. A third party is often a feature of Track II dialogue. Track II dialogue 
features two parties who are in conflict plus a third party who is present to arrange and 
facilitate the interaction. Not all Track II processes require an outside third party, but the 
great majority of conflict resolution-oriented Track II processes feature a third party. In 
the context of transboundary water interaction in the Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed, 
it is any individual, government, organisation, or other group that does not come from 
India, Nepal, Bhutan or Bangladesh but that nonetheless is engaged in water governance. 
See also: Track II dialogue 
Track II dialogue: Unofficial dialogues, generally between two antagonistic parties, and 
often facilitated by an impartial third party and involving individuals with some close 
connections to their respective official communities, focused on cooperative efforts to 
explore new ways to resolve differences over, or discuss new approaches to, policy-relevant 
issues.  
Transboundary water cooperation: Emergent property of positive transboundary water 
interaction. See also: Transboundary water interaction, Positive transboundary water 
interaction, Emergent property 
Transboundary water interaction: Relations of co-existing cooperation and conflicts 
among communities, groups or states over international or sub-national water, with a 
focus here on inter-state interaction. See also: Positive transboundary water interaction, 
Negative transboundary water interaction 
Transboundary waters: Any surface or groundwaters which mark, cross or are located on 
boundaries between two or more States; wherever transboundary waters flow directly into 
the sea, these transboundary waters end at a straight line across their respective mouths 
between points on the low-water line of their banks. 
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Tributary: A stream that flows into another stream or body of water. 
Water dependency: The percentage of water that originates outside a country’s political 
borders. See also: Internally renewable water resources 
Water Diplomacy: Theory and practice of adaptive water management being developed 
at Tufts, MIT, and Harvard universities. Water Diplomacy is rooted in the ideas if 
complexity theory and negotiation. Conflicts over water occur when natural, society, and 
political forces interact, creating complex water-networks. Management of them becomes 
critically important as population growth, economic development, and climate change 
create pressure on finite water resources. Science or policymaking alone is not sufficient. 
sustainable solutions can only come from diplomacy that takes science, policy, and politics 
into account. The Water Diplomacy Framework posits that complex water problems might 
be more effectively managed by thinking about water as a flexible resource and invoking 
three key assumptions about water networks: 1) water networks are open and continuously 
changing as a function of the interaction among natural, societal, and political factors; 2) 
water network characterization and management must account for uncertainty, 
nonlinearity, and feedback; and 3) management and evolution of water networks ought to 
be adaptive and negotiated using a non-zero-sum approach. See also: Hydro-diplomacy 
Water governance: The range of political, social, economic and administrative systems 
that are in place to regulate development and management of water resources and 
provisions of water services at different levels of society. See also: Deliberative water 
governance 
Water justice: Water governance that aims for achieving equitable distribution of water 
resources. Distributive and procedural justice are the most popular means of 
understanding justice because they provide good insights into the quantities and processes 
of allocation and distribution of natural resources. In complex multi-level systems just and 
unjust outcomes can result from the same water allocation decision. In some cases, a just 
outcome at one level may cause an injustice at another level for the same or a different set 
of stakeholders. What appears to be just at one level may not be just at other levels within 
the system under investigation. A sense of unfairness and injustice is often at the root of 
conflict, over water or otherwise. See also: Procedural water justice, Distributive water 
justice 
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Water scarcity: The point at which the aggregate impact of all users impinges on the 
supply or quality of water under prevailing institutional arrangements to the extent that 
the demand by all sectors, including the environment, cannot be fully satisfied. 
Water security: The capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate 
quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-being, and 
socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water-borne pollution and 
water-related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and political 
stability. 
Water stress: The volume of freshwater resources in a country divided by the population. 
Countries with less than 1,666 cubic metres of water availability per capita are considered 
water stressed, while those with less than 1,000 cubic metres per capita as chronically 
water stressed. 
Watershed: See: River basin 
Zero-sum thinking: A win/lose perspective on negotiations that assumes gains to one 
party result in matching losses to other parties. In water negotiations, this thinking 
manifests itself in the notion that water can only be used once, and by only one party. See 
also: Non-zero-sum thinking 
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Appendix 1: Fieldwork interviewees 
All interviews were conducted in person except that with Ashok Swain, which was 
conducted over email. 
Name Institution City Meeting date 
Ajaya Dixit Nepal Water Conservation 
Foundation 
Kathmandu 04 August 2014 
Amita Bhaduri India Water Portal Delhi 25 July 2014 
Anjal Prakash International Centre for 
Integrated Mountain 
Development 
Kathmandu 18 August 2014 
Anonymous 1 Embassy Delhi 19 May 2014 
Anonymous 2 International organisation Dhaka 01 October 2014 
Anonymous 3 Think tank Dhaka 16 October 2014 
Anonymous 4 Think tank Mumbai 18 July 2014 
Anonymous 5 Media organisation Kathmandu 19 August 2014 
Anonymous 6 Think tank Delhi 26 June 2014 
Anonymous 7 Think tank Kathmandu 07 August 2014 
Anonymous 8 Embassy Delhi 16 January 2015 
Anonymous 9 International organisation Dhaka 14 October 2014 
Anonymous 10 Embassy Delhi 02 November 2014 
Anonymous 11 International organisation Delhi 23 May 2014 
Ashok Swain 
(email exchange) 
Research School for 
International Water 
Cooperation, Uppsala 
University 
Uppsala 05 May 2016 
Bill Young South Asia Water Initiative Delhi 20 May 2014 
David Molden International Centre for 
Integrated Mountain 
Development 
Kathmandu 06 August 2014 
Dhaval Desai Observer Research Foundation Mumbai 17 July 2014 
Dunu Roy Hazard Centre Delhi 24 June 2014 
Gareth Price Chatham House London 14 May 2014 
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Hamsa Iyer Observer Research Foundation Mumbai 17 July 2014 
Himanshu 
Thakkar  
South Asia Network on Dams, 
Rivers and People 
Delhi 24 June 2014 
Joydeep Gupta The Third Pole Delhi 01 July 2014 
Mandakini 
Devasher Surie 
Asia Foundation Delhi 07 July 2014 
Mihir Bhonsale Observer Research Foundation Kolkata 20 October 2014 
Pranab Kumar 
Ray 
Observer Research Foundation Kolkata 21 October 2014 
Ramaswamy R. 
Iyer 
Centre for Policy Research  Delhi 31 May 2014 
Rishi Aggarwal Observer Research Foundation Mumbai 17 July 2014 
Rohan D'Souza Jawaharlal Nehru University Delhi 23 June 2014 
S. Vishvanath India Water Portal Bangalore 14 July 2014 
Sabita Kaushal India Water Portal Delhi 25 July 2014 
Sagar Prasai Asia Foundation Delhi 07 July 2014 
Shawahiq 
Siddiqui 
Indian Environment Law 
Offices 
Delhi 20 June 2014 
Shawn Novel Shawn Novel & Associates Dhaka 13 October 2014 
Sonali Mittra Council on Energy, 
Environment and Water, ORF 
Delhi 03 June 2014 
Srinivas 
Chokkakula 
Centre for Policy Research  Delhi 31 October 2014 
Sujeev Shakya beed management Kathmandu 06 August 2014 
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Appendix 2: Organisations engaged in water governance in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra problemshed  
The purpose of this list is to convey a general impression of the large number of 
organisations that are in some way concerned about water governance in the Ganges-
Brahmaputra problemshed. This list is not exhaustive, and the categorisation of 
organisations by type is not definitive. Nonetheless, this list does underscore the plethora 
of initiatives that receive international funding for their work on water governance. 
Note these organisations do not include corporations, construction companies, geological 
survey firms, et cetera, because they are not directly involved in water governance. Some 
organisations, notably the World Bank, are listed under the main initiative that works on 
water governance issues, that is, the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, and the South Asia Water 
Initiative. 
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2030 Water 
Resources Group  
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Abu Dhabi 
Dialogue (ADD) 
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Asia 
Development 
Bank (ADB) 
 
✓ 
    
✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Centre for 
Advanced 
Studies (BCAS) 
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Centre for Policy 
Research   
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Commonwealth 
Scientific and 
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Research 
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(CSIRO) 
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eWater ✓ 
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Institute for 
Social and 
Environmental 
Transition – 
Nepal (ISET-
Nepal) 
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✓ ✓ ✓ 
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International 
Centre for 
Integrated 
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Development 
(ICIMOD) 
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✓ ✓ 
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International 
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Nature (IUCN) 
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International 
Water 
Management 
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Monash 
Sustainability 
Institute 
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Murray-Darling 
Basin Authority 
(MDBA) 
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Solidarity on 
Rivers and 
Peoples (SARP) 
  
✓ 
    
✓ 
 
✓ ✓ 
  
Strategic 
Foresight Group   
✓ 
  
✓ ✓ 
  
✓ 
  
✓ 
Third Pole 
    
✓ ✓ 
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✓ 
  
Tribhuvan 
University of 
Nepal 
   
✓ 
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United Nations 
Environment 
Program (UNEP) 
✓ 
     
✓ ✓ ✓ 
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World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF)  
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